Defining Ijmāʿ (Consensus)
Ironically, there is no consensus over the very definition of ijmāʿ “consensus,” which most schools of law take as an authoritative source of legislation. Dozens of different definitions and conditions for its occurrence are set forth even within each school of law. As regards the linguistic meaning of ijmāʿ, it is used in the Arabic language as a synonym for ʿazm or resolution and determination to execute something, and ittifāq, or agreement. When a group of people agree on something, it is said, “ajmʿaū,” i.e., they have consensus. The root meaning of ijmāʿ is to collect, bring together, gather up, assemble, congregate, muster, or draw together. It also stands for determining, resolving, or deciding upon an affair so as to make it firmly settled.[1]
Early Technical Definitions of Ijmāʿ
Technically, ijmāʿ is defined in numerous ways. For instance, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) defines it as agreement of a group on a certain matter, either by action or abandonment.[2] For Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, ijmāʿ is used exclusively to mean the unanimity of the Ummah of Muḥammad, particularly on certain religious issues.[3] Commenting on the definition cited by Ibrāhīm an-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), al-Ghazālī clarifies that ijmāʿ for an-Naẓẓām is an expression for every statement whose proof is evident, even if it is a statement of an individual. He commented that this definition is contrary to both the linguistic and technical usages. An-Naẓẓām purposefully tailored it to his own view, for he did not consider ijmāʿ as an authoritative proof. Given the emphasis on ijmāʿ rendered by way of tawātur (indefinite number of people who cannot possibly agree upon a falsehood because of their huge number and geographical situation), he defined it as every position whose proof has been established.
In another definition of ijmāʿ, the consensus of the whole community is reduced to that of the influential people only (ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqd). Al-Āmidī defines ijmāʿ as the agreement of all the people of binding and loosing who belong to the community of Muhammad, in a certain period of time, on a rule about a certain incident.[4] Again, some definitions restrict the consensus to a certain group only. Ijmāʿ, according to the Zahirīs is the consensus of the Companions alone.[5] Mālikīs are said to limit it to the consensus of the people of Madinah. On the other hand, Shiite sources consider the Prophet’s next of kin to form a legitimate consensus.[6] Another definition states ijmāʿ to be a consensus of opinion of the persons competent for ijmāʿ (ahl al-ijmāʿ), when a religious issue arises, whether rational or legal.[7]
The Authority, Feasibility, and Contemporary Development of Ijmāʿ
Many scholars, however, define it as the unanimous agreement of all mujtahids of the Muslim Ummah in any particular age on a particular Shariʿah ruling, after the death of the Prophet.[8] A group of scholars is of the opinion that the condition of strict unanimity of all competent jurists turns ijmāʿ into a mere theory which can hardly be put into practice. Scholars of uṣūl have remarkably differed on the authority of ijmāʿ, its textual basis, feasibility, and legal effect in terms of certainty and probability. Some proponents of this legal precept held its authority as a derivative of the certainty of revelation and not one which is self-constituted. They have also differed concerning the possibility of constituting ijmāʿ on the basis of majority opinion. Moreover, some contemporary scholars consider this classical ijmāʿ as a form of collective legislation, rather than a consensus of competent jurists.[9]
This article is an excerpt from: Hossam Sabry Othman, Collective Ijtihad: Regulating Fatwa in Postnormal Times (London/Washington: IIIT, 2024), pp. 5-6.
https://iiit.org/en/book/collective-ijtihad-regulating-fatwa-in-postnormal-times/
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).
Notes
[1] Muḥammad ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 57.
[2] Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. Khalil al-Mees (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1st ed., 1403 AH), vol. 2, p. 3.
[3] Ahmad Ḥammad, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s Juristic Doctrine in al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, with Translation of Volume One (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1987), p. 662.
[4] Al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām, vol. 1, p. 262, cited in Ahmed Ḥasan, “The Classical Definition of Ijmāʿ: The Nature of Consensus,” Journal of Islamic Studies 14, no. 4 (Winter 1975): 261–270, at 262.
[5] Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām, ed. Ahmed Shaker (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, n.d.), vol. 4, pp. 147–51.
[6] Muḥammad al-Kulaynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, ed. ʿAlī Akbar al-Ghiffārī (Tehran: Dār al-Manshūrāt al-Islāmiyyah, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 178–79; ʿIrshād ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, “Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements,” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 27 (Spring/Summer 2002): 83.
[7] Ahmed Hasan, “Ijmāʿ in the Early Schools” in Islamic Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (1967), pp. 121–139 at 121.
[8] Al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-Fuṣūl ilā Taḥqīq al-Ḥaqq min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 348.
[9] See ʿAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh (UAE: Muslim Council of Elders, 1st ed., 2019), p. 149.
