


SOURCE METHODOLOGY IN

Islamic Jurisprudence

Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami



Taha Jabir al-Alwani

The International Institute of Islamic Thought

SOURCE METHODOLOGY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE

Uṣūl al-Fiqh al-Islāmī



TAHA JABIR AL-ALWANI

A New Revised English Edition by
YUSUF TALAL DELORENZO & ANAS S. AL SHAIKH-ALI



THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT
LONDON • WASHINGTON

© The International Institute of Islamic Thought

THIRD EDITION 2003

SECOND EDITION 1993

FIRST EDITION 1990

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

P.O. BOX 669, HERNDON, VA 22070, USA

LONDON OFFICE

P.O. BOX 126, RICHMOND, SURREY TW9 2UD, UK

*This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of the publishers.*

ISBN 1-56564-404-2 paperback

Cover Design by Saddiq Ali

Typeset by Shiraz Khan

Printed in the United Kingdom

by Biddles Limited, Guildford and King's Lynn

DEDICATION

We present this study to those among the Muslim youth who are searching for a ray of light in the deepest darkness that surrounds us, and who are seeking a solution and a way out of the crisis that currently overwhelms us; in the hope that it may be of benefit to them, inshā'Allah.



CONTENTS

	<i>page</i>
<i>Foreword</i>	vii
<i>A Word from the Editors</i>	ix
<i>Author's Introduction</i>	xi
1. UŞÜL AL-FIQH: METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE	1
Definition	1
Subject Matter	1
Benefit	1
The Sciences from Which <i>Uşūl al-Fiqh</i> Derived its Academic Basis	2
Origins and Development of <i>Uşūl al-Fiqh</i>	4
Methods for Deriving Rulings from the Sources	6
The Qur'an	6
The Sunnah	7
Ijtihad	8
2. THE ŞAHĀBAH WHO GAVE FATĀWĀ DURING THE PROPHET'S LIFETIME	11
The Era of the Great <i>Şahābah</i>	12
The Time of Abū Bakr al-Şiddīq	12
Special Features of Fiqh in the Period	14
The Time of 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb	15
The Time of 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān	17
The Time of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib	18
The <i>Fuqahā'</i> Among the <i>Şahābah</i> and the <i>Tābi'ūn</i>	20

3. LEGISLATION AFTER THE TIME OF THE ŠAHĀBAH	22
After the <i>Tābi‘ūn</i> : The Time of <i>al-A’immaḥ</i>	
<i>al-Mujtahidūn</i>	24
Rationalists and Traditionalists: <i>Ahl al-Hadīth</i> and	
<i>Ahl al-Ra’ī</i>	28
4. IMAM AL-SHĀFI‘Ī	31
The Method of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī in His Book, <i>al-Risālah</i>	35
5. UŞŪL AL-FIQH AFTER IMAM AL-SHĀFI‘Ī	43
Developments in <i>Uşūl al-Fiqh</i> after Imam al-Shāfi‘ī	46
The Role of the Followers of Abū Ḥanīfah in the Writing of <i>Uşūl</i>	50
The Methods of the Followers of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī or, the <i>Mutakallimūn</i> , and those of the Ḥanafīyyah	52
The Method of the Ḥanafī Scholars of <i>Uşūl</i>	53
The Science of <i>Uşūl al-Fiqh</i> During the Sixth Century AH and the Following Period	54
6. ISSUES RELATED TO IJTIHAD	58
<i>Notes</i>	69
<i>Biographical Index</i>	76
<i>General Index</i>	81

Foreword

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT (IIIT) has great pleasure in presenting a newly revised and edited edition of Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani's *Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence: Uṣūl al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*. Since publication of the first edition in 1990, the work has proved to be extremely popular, receiving attention from a large circle of readership worldwide, successful enough, felt the publishers, to warrant the production of a third edition.

Uṣūl al-fiqh is a science in which reason and revelation come together, where considered opinion is accompanied by received law. Yet, *al-Uṣūl* does not rely purely on reason in a way that would be unacceptable to revealed law, nor is it based simply on the kind of blind acceptance that would not be supported by reason. Hence, the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* has been called the “Philosophy of Islam”.

Uṣūl al-fiqh is a very complex and important subject, difficult to grasp even for those with an understanding of the Arabic language the medium in which most written material has hitherto been available. This translation has tried to bridge the gap by presenting to an English-speaking audience an introduction and insight into some of the basic and core aspects of this vital subject.

It is also an attempt to simplify *uṣūl al-fiqh* and introduce it to specialists in the social sciences and humanities who do not have the opportunity to study the details of the science considered to be the most important method of research produced by Muslim thought during its most creative period.

In conformity with the IIIT In-House Style Sheet, *A Guide for Authors, Translators and Copy-Editors*, words and proper names of Arabic origin or written in a script derived from Arabic have been transliterated throughout the work except when mentioned in

quoted text. In such cases they have been cited as they appear without application of our transliteration system. However, words and common nouns of Arabic origin that have entered into general usage are not italicized, nor written with initial capital.

We would like to express our thanks to Dr. Taha J. al-Alwani, who, throughout the various stages of the production of this edition, cooperated with the editorial group at the IIIT London Office.

We would also like to thank the editorial and production team at the London Office and those who were involved in the completion of this book: Shiraz Khan, Dr. Maryam Mahmood, and Melissa Dyson, all of whom worked tirelessly in preparing this new edition for publication. May God reward them and the author for all their efforts.

Sha'ban 1424
October 2003

DR. ANAS AL SHAIKH-ALI
ACADEMIC ADVISOR
IIIT LONDON OFFICE

A Word from the Editors

THE BRIEF EDITORS' INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION BEGAN AS FOLLOWS:

Legal studies in any language pose problems to authors and readers alike. In translation, those same problems are compounded, even many times over at some places in the text, so that quite often the result is, to say the least, disappointing. Unfortunately, with regard to English translations of classical works of the Islamic intellectual heritage, this sort of disappointment has been the rule rather than the exception.

Certainly, to the student of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* this disappointment has been all the more acute. While translations of classical works in the field are nonexistent, with the shining exception of Professor Khadduri's excellent rendition of Imam al-Shāfi'i's *Al-Risālah*, there is as yet no general and systematic study of the discipline in English. In Western languages, even survey literature on the subject is scarce.

In the years that have passed since the publication of the first edition of this work, however, a number of significant studies on the subject have appeared. The Institute had itself published two works in Arabic on the *maqāṣid*. While mention of several of these works is made at various places in the notes of this edition, it will not be out of place to acknowledge here the valuable contributions to the field of English made by the following scholars: Bernard Weiss, Wael Hallaq, Ahmad Zaki, Frank Vogel, Nuh HaMim Keller, Marcia Hermansen, M. Hashim Kamali, Ahmad Hasan, Khalid Masud and Imran Nyazee. The Institute can only hope that the interest shown by these scholars and others will contribute to a serious effort among Muslims, and particularly among Muslim social

scientists, to approach the classical discipline of *uṣūl* as the forerunner, if not the foundation, of a new methodology for dealing with the sciences of revelation in the overall quest for answers to the problems of Muslim society today.

The present volume should be understood as an overview of the field, and as an introduction to the classical discipline. It remains the conviction of the Institute that the source methodology developed by the scholars of *uṣūl* for dealing with and interpreting the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah is the sort of tool that needs to be placed in the hands of Muslim social scientists. By acquainting them with the field and with those who have enriched it in the past, the Institute hopes to increase the appreciation of modern scholars for this discipline and the academic excellence which it represents.

Certainly, for our part, we can only hope that we have succeeded in making the text clear. Moreover, we have taken pains to include a full subject index that should prove useful to specialist and generalist alike. Also, while the Arabic edition of this book was published with topic headings, it was not divided into chapters. In the interest of clarity, we have divided the work into chapters by converting, where necessary, topic headings into chapter headings; and by adding brief explanatory notes.

May our modest effort, joined in a worthier labor of the author, be accepted by the Almighty, and may it be of some service to those who seek the truth and work for the betterment of our universal nation.

YUSUF TALAL DELORENZO

ANAS AL-SHAIKH-ALI

Author's Introduction

The research for this work originally formed part of the studies I undertook for Islamic jurisprudence for the doctoral program at Al-Azhar University in 1973. On the occasion of the Second International Conference on Islamic Thought, held in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1982 on the subject of the “Islamization of Knowledge,” material from this thesis was presented in a revised form.

When the League of Muslim Youth expressed their desire to hold a course on *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence), the material for this study formed one of the six subjects covered in the course. Then, as many of those who attended the course expressed a wish to obtain the lectures in printed form, and as the study was already being printed as one of the papers for the Islamabad Conference on the Islamization of Knowledge, which the Institute will soon publish*, *inshā'Allah*, we decided to take this opportunity to present this part of the Conference material to both those who attended the course and to others who may wish to gain knowledge of this essential science of Shari‘ah.

The science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is rightly considered to be the most important method of research ever devised by Islamic thought. Indeed, as the solid foundation upon which all the Islamic disciplines are based, *uṣūl al-fiqh* not only benefited Islamic civilization but contributed to the intellectual enrichment of world civilization as a whole. It will not be out of place to note here that the methods of analogical reasoning developed within the framework of Islamic Jurisprudence constituted the methodological starting-point for the establishment and construction of empiricism, which in turn is considered to be the basis for contemporary civilization. We

* The edited proceedings of the Islamabad Conference were published by the Institute as volume number 5 in the Islamization of Knowledge Series, and is entitled *Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge* (Herndon, Virginia: IIIT, 1988).

present this brief work to all those who are interested in gaining some knowledge of this science; and we ask Allah to help us benefit from what we learn, and to learn that which will benefit us, and to protect us from knowledge which is not beneficial, and from deeds that are not acceptable to Him. All praise and thanksgiving belong to Him, the Lord and Sustainer of all the worlds!

TAHA JABIR AL-ALWANI

CHAPTER ONE

Uṣūl al-Fiqh: Methodology for Research and Knowledge in Islamic Jurisprudence

DEFINITION

The science of source methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) has been defined as the aggregate, considered per se, of legal proofs and evidence that, when studied properly, will lead either to a certain knowledge of a Shari‘ah¹ ruling or to at least a reasonable assumption concerning the same; the manner by which such proofs are adduced, and the status of the adducer.²

SUBJECT MATTER

As its subject matter, this science deals with the proofs in the Shari‘ah source texts, viewing them from the perspective of how, by means of ijtihad,³ legal judgements are derived from their particulars; though after, in cases where texts may appear mutually contradictory, preference has been established.⁴

BENEFIT

The science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* engenders the ability to have knowledge of Shari‘ah rulings through study, on the part of those qualified to perform ijtihad and who meet all its requirements, of the legal proofs revealed in the sources by the Lawgiver.

The benefit to be had from this science to those not qualified to perform ijtihad is that, through their study of the classical schools of legal thought (*madhāhib*; sing. *madhhab*) of the *mujtahidūn* (those who practice ijtihad) and the reasoning behind their rulings, the student of source methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence is enabled to understand the various schools of thought, to analyze them, to choose from among their interpretations and assign preference, and to adduce legal arguments on the basis of the principles formulated by the classical *mujtahidūn*.

THE SCIENCES FROM WHICH *UŞÜL AL-FIQH* DERIVED ITS ACADEMIC BASIS

The science of *uşūl al-fiqh* is in fact an independent and autonomous field. It is, however, based upon certain fundamental predications (*muqaddamāt*), knowledge of which the Islamic legal scholar cannot do without. These predications have been derived from several other disciplines:

- (a) Some are derived from the science of Aristotelian logic which the philosopher-theologian writers (*muttakallimūn*) had become accustomed to discussing in the introductions to their works. These academic discussions dealt, for example, with the ways in which words convey meanings, the division of subjects into present and predictable, the need for, and varieties of, discourse depending on conceptual principles taken from interpretations and definitions, the validity of conclusions based on inductive reasoning, and discussions about the evidence and how it may be used to prove the claims of the one who is adducing it, or to refute contradictions, and so on.
- (b) Some are derived from *‘ilm al-kalām* (scholastic theology), and include discussions of such questions as the nature of jurisdiction, in the sense of whether it is the Shari‘ah itself or reason which decides what is right or wrong; or whether one can have knowledge of right and wrong before the Revelation; or whether rendering thanks to the Creator is a duty derived from the

Shari‘ah or from human reasoning.

- (c) Some are general linguistic rules which the scholars of *uṣūl* developed through linguistic research and presented in a crystallized form, such as research dealing with languages and their origins, the classification of words into metaphorical and literal, discussions of etymology, synonymity, emphasis, generalization, specification, the meanings of grammatical particles and so on.
- (d) Some are derived from the classical sciences of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, such as discussions concerning the transmission of Hadith⁵ by a single narrator (*āhād*), or by an impeccable plurality of narrators (*tawātur*), the non-standard recitations of the Qur’ān and the rules about them, the criteria for the acceptance (*ta‘dīl*) or rejection (*jarḥ*) of narrators of Hadith, abrogation of legislation (*nāsikh wa mansūkh*)⁶, the condition of the text of a hadith and its chain of narrators, and so on.
- (e) Finally, the examples cited by the scholars of *uṣūl* in illustration of their arguments are derived from the specifics of fiqh⁷, and from detailed evidence for the same as taken from the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.

The issues with which the scholars of *uṣūl* are primarily concerned include the following:

- Logic and its predication
- Linguistics
- Commands and prohibitions
- Comprehensive (*‘āmm*) and particular (*khāṣṣ*) terms
- Inconclusive (*mujmal*) and determined (*mubayyan*) concepts
- Abrogation (*naskh*)
- Deeds (in particular, those of the Prophet (ﷺ)⁸, and their significance)
- Consensus (*ijma‘*)
- Narrations relating to the Sunnah
- Analogical reasoning (*qiyās*)
- Indicating preference in cases of apparent contradiction

Exercising legal acumen and scholarship (ijtihad)
 Following a specific school of legal thought (*taqlīd*)
 Disputed sources (those other than the four “agreed” sources)

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF *UŞÜL AL-FIQH*

It is difficult to attempt a study of *uşūl al-fiqh* and its development without considering the history of fiqh, the practical precepts of the Shari‘ah that have been gleaned from detailed source evidence.

The lexical meaning of *asl* (pl. *uşūl*) is foundation, or basis – that upon which something else is built. In the legal system of Islam, fiqh is built upon and stems from the bases *uşūl* which constitute its source evidence. Hence, in order to understand the origins of *uşūl al-fiqh*, we need to have a general idea of the history of Islamic legislation (*tashrīf*).

Establishing Shari‘ah legislation, prescribing by law, laying down rules and regulations, and defining systems is a function which is specific to Allah (SWT)⁹ alone. Anyone who presumes to ascribe these functions to any other than Allah commits the sin of *shirk*,¹⁰ as, in doing so, he/she has effectively contradicted the belief in the “Unification” of Allah (*tawhīd*)¹¹.

Allah has provided articulate proofs and clear source evidence in order that the believers should have no trouble in finding their way to the particulars of His legislation. With reference to some of this source evidence, the Ummah has agreed on its validity and its relevance to the *al-kām* (legal rulings), and has accepted it as such. However, there are differences with regard to other kinds of source evidence.

The source evidence upon which the whole Ummah fully agrees, and on the validity of which there is a general consensus, comprises the two sources that formed the basis of legislation at the time of the Prophet. These two sources of legislation are:

1. **The Qur’ān:** This may be defined as the words revealed to the Prophet, the recitation of which itself constitutes an act of worship, the shortest surah¹² of which is a challenge to mankind to

produce anything the like thereof, every letter of which has been transmitted to us via an indisputably authentic chain of authority (*tawātur*), which is written between the two covers of the Qur'an beginning with *Sūrat al-Fātihah* (the Opening Chapter) and ending with *Sūrat al-Nās*. (no. 114).

2. **The Sunnah:** This includes everything, other than the Qur'an, which has been transmitted from the Prophet: what he said, did and agreed to. Thus, every utterance of the Prophet apart from the Qur'an, and every deed, from the beginning of his mission to the last moment of his life, constitute his Sunnah, in the general sense of the word, whether these establish a ruling which is generally applicable to all members of the Ummah, or a ruling which applies only to the Prophet himself or some of his *Ṣaḥābah* (Companions of the Prophet). Regardless to whether what the Prophet did was instinctive or otherwise, his every word, deed, and approval and disapproval of the deeds or words of others may be taken as the basis for evidence in a legal ruling. This is so regardless of whether his utterances or actions related to matters of faith or practice, or whether they were concerned with commanding or recommending, prohibiting, disapproving, or allowing; and regardless of whether his word or action was based on a ruling previously revealed in the Qur'an, or whether it served independently to establish legislation.

During the lifetime of the Prophet, all the legal rulings (*ahkām*) of the Shari'ah, inclusive of all of its classifications, such as principal and derived rulings, teachings on the fundaments of the faith, and regulations regarding personal practice and legalities, were derived from these two sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

Ijtihad was practiced by the Prophet and by those of his Companions with legal proclivities (*ahl al-Naẓar*). The Prophet's ijтиhad was sometimes confirmed by the Qur'an and sometimes not; in which case it was explained that the better solution was other than that which he had adopted. The ijтиhad made by the Companions was always in response to situations which actually occurred to them. Later, when they met the Prophet, they would explain what

happened and tell him what they had decided. Sometimes he approved of their ijтиhad, and such decisions of theirs (having gained the approval of the Prophet) became a part of the Sunnah. If he disapproved of their ijтиhad, his explanation of the correct procedure would become the Sunnah.

Thus, we can say that at that stage legislation depended on two forms of Divine Revelation (*wahī*):

1. Recited Revelation (*wahī matlū*); or the Qur'an with its absolute inimitability (*i'jāz*).
2. Non-recited revelation (*wahī ghayr matlū*); or the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.

Indeed, the ijтиhad made by the Prophet set a precedent for his *Sahābah* and later Muslims, that clearly established the legitimacy of ijтиhad, so that when they could not find an express legal ruling in the Qur'an or the Sunnah, they were to make use of ijтиhad in order to arrive at judgements on their own.

Moreover, probably to reinforce and establish this concept, the Prophet used to order certain of his Companions to make ijтиhad concerning certain matters in his presence. Then he would tell them who was correct and who was mistaken.

METHODS FOR DERIVING RULINGS FROM THE SOURCES

The Qur'an

The Qur'an was learned and understood by the *Sahābah* without their ever having recourse to formal rules of grammar. Likewise, endowed as they were with clear vision, sharp wits, and common sense, they readily understood the aims of the Lawgiver and the wisdom behind His legislation.

Indeed, the *Sahābah* rarely used to question the Prophet about any matter unless he himself mentioned it first.

It is reported that Ibn 'Abbās said:

I have never seen a people better than the *Sahābah* of the Prophet,

may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Throughout his mission, until he passed away, they only asked about thirteen matters, all of which are mentioned in the Qur'an. For example, [the meaning of]: "They ask you about fighting in the sacred month..." (2:217); and "They ask you about the menstruating woman..." (2:222). [The *Sahābah*] only asked [the Prophet] about matters which were of actual concern to them.¹³

Ibn ‘Umar said in this respect:

Do not ask about something that has never happened, for I heard [my father] ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb curse the one who asked about something which had not occurred.¹⁴

Al-Qāsim said to the third generation of Muslims:

You ask about things we never asked about, and you quarrel about things we never quarrelled about. You even ask about things with which I am not familiar. If we did know, however, it would not be lawful for us to remain silent [if questioned] concerning them.¹⁵

Ibn Ishāq said:

I met more of the Prophet's *Sahābah* than anyone else did; and I have never seen a people who lived more simply, or who were less demanding on themselves.¹⁶

‘Ubādah ibn Nusayr al-Kindī said:

I have known a people whose austerity was not as rigid as yours, and whose questions were quite other than the ones you ask.¹⁷

Abū ‘Ubaydah said in his book *Majāz al-Qur'an*:

It has never been reported that any of the *Sahābah* went to the Prophet for knowledge of anything which could be found in the Qur'an.¹⁸

The Sunnah

The part of the Sunnah which consisted of the Prophet's words was in the Companion's own language, so they knew its meaning and understood its phrases and context.

As far as the Prophet's deeds were concerned, they used to witness them, then tell others exactly what they had seen. For example, hundreds of people saw the Prophet making *wudū'*,¹⁹ and then adopted his practice without asking him about details, such as which of the various acts in *wudū'* were obligatory and which were recommended, which were merely allowed and which were not. Likewise, they witnessed him performing hajj²⁰ and salah,²¹ and other acts of worship.

People were heard asking the Prophet to give *fatāwā*²² concerning various matters, and he did so. Cases were referred to him, and he would pronounce his judgement. Problems would arise amongst the *Sahābah*, and he would give a definite answer, whether the problems concerned mutual relations, personal conduct, or various political matters. They witnessed all these situations and they understood the context in which they took place, so that the wisdom and purposes of the Prophet's judgements were not hidden from them.

People also saw how the Prophet used to notice the conduct of his *Sahābah* and others. Thus, if he praised anybody, they knew that the person's act had been a good one; and if he criticized anybody, they knew that there had been something wrong with what the person had done. Moreover, all the reports concerning the Prophet's *fatāwā*, rulings, decisions and approval or disapproval of various matters indicate that they took place in the presence of many people. So, just as the colleagues of a doctor know, owing to their long association and experience,²³ the reasons for his prescribing certain medicines, so also the *Sahābah* of the Prophet knew exactly the reasoning behind his decisions.

Ijtihad

The indications that ijtihaad is valid and relevant in the contemporary context are many. For example, Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal states that when the Prophet sent him to Yemen, he asked:

“What will you do if a matter is referred to you for judgement?”
Mu‘ādh said: “I will judge according to the Book of Allah.” The

Prophet asked: “What if you find no solution in the Book of Allah?” Mu‘ādh said: “Then I will judge by the Sunnah of the Prophet.” The Prophet asked: “And what if you do not find it in the Sunnah of the Prophet?” Mu‘ādh said: “Then I will make ijtihad to formulate my own judgement.” The Prophet patted Mu‘ādh’s chest and said: “Praise be to Allah who has guided the messenger of His Prophet to that which pleases Him and His Messenger.”²⁴

This ijtihad and forming of one’s own judgement, as mentioned by Mu‘ādh, is further explained in the advice ‘Umar gave to Abū Mūsā when he appointed him a judge: “Judgement is to be passed on the basis of express Qur’anic imperatives or established Sunnah practices...” Then he added:

Make sure that you understand clearly every case that is brought to you for which there is no applicable text of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Yours, then, is a role of comparison and analogy, so as to distinguish similarities in order to reach a judgement that seems nearest to justice and best in the sight of God.²⁵

Consequently, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī explained “opinion” as meaning ijtihad, and ijtihad as meaning *qiyās*.²⁶ He said: “They are two names for the same thing.”²⁷

Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (RAA)²⁸ said: “As far as the Prophet is concerned, his opinion was always correct because Allah guided him. In our case, however, we opine and we conjecture.”²⁹

Thus, we may state that the concern of ijtihad or “opinion,” at that stage, went no further than one of the following:

- (a) Applying one or another of the possible meanings in cases where a sentence may lend itself to two or more interpretations, e.g. when the Prophet ordered the Muslims to pray among Banū Qurayẓah.³⁰
- (b) Comparative *qiyās*; which deals with a matter by comparing it with another, similar matter which is dealt with in the Qur’an or the Sunnah. For example, the *qiyās* of ‘Ammār who compared the case of *tayammum*³¹ when in a state of *janābah* to *ghusl*,

and therefore rubbed his whole body with dust.³²

- (c) Ijtihad by taking into account something which is potentially beneficial; or prohibiting something which could lead to wrong doing; or deriving a particular ruling from general statements; or adopting a specific interpretation.

The extent of the Prophet's concern with encouraging the *Sahābah* to make ijtihad and training them in its use can be seen in his saying: "When a judge makes ijtihad and reaches a correct conclusion, he receives a double reward; and if his conclusion is incorrect, he still receives a single reward."³³

The ijtihad of many of the *Sahābah* was so accurate that in many cases the revelations of the Qur'an confirmed it, and the Prophet supported it. Obviously, their close association with the Prophet had afforded them a keen sense of the aims of the Lawgiver, of the basic purposes behind the Qur'anic legislation, and of the meanings of the texts; opportunities which those who came after them did not directly enjoy.

CHAPTER TWO

The Ṣahābah Who Gave Fatāwā During the Prophet's Lifetime

The *Ṣahābah* who gave *fatāwā* in the Prophet's lifetime were: Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī, ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf, ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas‘ūd, Ubay ibn Ka‘b, Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal, ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir, Hudhayfah ibn al-Yamān, Zayd ibn Thābit, Abū al-Dardā’, Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī, and Salmān al-Fārisī.

Some *Ṣahābah* gave more *fatāwā* than others. Those who gave the most *fatāwā* were: ‘Ā’isha, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and his son ‘Abd Allah, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbās and Zayd ibn Thābit. The *fatāwā* given by any of these six would fill a great volume. For example, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Mūsā ibn Ya‘qūb ibn al-Khalīfah al-Ma’mun collected the *fatāwā* of Ibn ‘Abbās in twenty volumes.

Those from who a lesser number of *fatāwā* were narrated are: Umm Salmah, Anas ibn Mālik, Abū Sa‘id al-Khudrī, Abū Hurayrah, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī, Sha‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, Salmān al-Fārisī, Jābir ibn ‘Abd Allah, Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal and Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq. The *fatāwā* of each of these thirteen would fill only a small part of a book.

To this list can be added Ṭalhah, Zubayr, ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf, ‘Imrān ibn Ḥusayn, Abū Bakrah, ‘Ubādah ibn al-Ṣāmit and Mu‘āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān. The rest gave only a few *fatāwā*, and only one or two, in some instances more, have been transmitted from any of them. Their *fatāwā* could be collected into a small

volume, but only after much research and sifting through the texts.³⁴

In preparing their *fatāwā* the *Sahābah* used to compare the particulars of events that had happened to them with similar matters for which judgements had been given in the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In thus referring the matter to the sources, they employed the method of looking for the meaning and the legal significance through examination of the text's literal wording, its implications, and any other relevant details.

Having arrived at a decision, they would then explain to others how they had adduced the arguments that led them to their judgements, whether these had been derived from the letter of the text or from its spirit, and the people would follow them. Indeed, these early Muslim jurists never stopped researching a question until they reached a decision they felt certain of, and until they were completely satisfied that they had done their best and could do no more.

THE ERA OF THE GREAT *SAHĀBAH*

After the time of the Prophet came the era of the great *Sahābah* and the Rightly Guided *Khulafā'*.³⁵ This period lasted from 11 to 40 AH. The reciters (*qurrā'*) was the term used at the time to denote those *Sahābah* who had a good understanding of fiqh and gave *fatāwā*.

THE TIME OF ABŪ BAKR AL-SIDDĪQ

Maymūn ibn Mahrān summed up Abū Bakr's method of arriving at legal judgements as follows:

Whenever a dispute was referred to him, Abū Bakr used to look in to the Qur'an; if he found something according to which he could pass a judgement, he did so. If he could not find a solution in the Qur'an, but remembered some relevant aspect of the Prophet's Sunnah, he would judge according to that. If he could find nothing in the Sunnah, he would go and say to the Muslims: "Such and such

a dispute has been referred to me. Do any of you know anything in the Sunnah according to which judgement may be passed?" If someone was able to answer his question and provide relevant information, Abū Bakr would say: "Praise be to Allah who has enabled some of us to remember what they have learnt from our Prophet." If he could not find any solution in the Sunnah, then he would gather the leaders and elite of the people and consult with them. If they agreed on a matter then he passed a judgement on that basis.³⁶

If all the methods mentioned above failed to produce any result, then he would make ijtihad and form his own opinion, either by interpreting a text in such a way that its legal implications became apparent, or by exercising his own legal acumen.

An example of ijtihad of the first kind was when he was asked about the *kalālah*. In response, Abū Bakr said: "My opinion, if it is correct, then it is from Allah, and if it is wrong, then it is from myself and from *Shaytān* (Satan). The *kalālah* is one who has neither ascendants nor descendants."³⁷

Another example of the same was when ‘Umar mentioned to him the following hadith of the Prophet: "I have been commanded to wage war against people until they say that there is no god but Allah..."³⁸ and Abū Bakr said, "zakah³⁹ is a part of it."⁴⁰

When Abū Bakr wanted to wage war against those who were withholding zakah, ‘Umar cited this hadith to show that fighting them was not permitted, because the Prophet had said: "...until they say that there is no god but Allah. Then, if they say this, their blood and their wealth will be spared by me, except where due by right [i.e. unless they commit crimes that are punishable in accordance with the Shari‘ah]."

According to ‘Umar, these acts were: adultery, murder, and apostasy; since withholding zakah was not expressly mentioned by the Prophet. But Abū Bakr said to him: "Zakah is a part of it. By Allah, I would fight anyone who performed salah but did not pay zakah! If anyone were to withhold from me even the smallest amount they used to pay to the Prophet, I would go to war with them over it."

An example of the second type of ijтиhad was when he decided that the mother's mother may inherit, but the father's mother may not. Some of the Ansār said to him: "You allow a woman to inherit from the deceased, while he would not inherit from her if she were the deceased. And you have left with nothing the woman from whom he would inherit were the situation reversed."

Abū Bakr then decided that both maternal and paternal grandmothers would share one sixth of the inheritance.

Another example is his judgement that everyone should receive an equal share from the public treasury. 'Umar asked him: "How can you consider one who entered Islam with misgivings to be equal to the one who left his home and wealth behind, and migrated to be with the Prophet?" Abū Bakr, however, insisted that: "They all entered Islam for the sake of Allah, and their reward is with Him; this world is nothing."

When, however, 'Umar became *khalīfah*,⁴¹ he differentiated between people and he paid the "stipend" according to how each person had entered Islam, whether they had migrated, and how much they had suffered for the sake of Islam.

Another example of Abū Bakr's exercise of ijтиhad was when he compared the appointment by the *khalīfah* of his own successor, to the appointment by means of *bay'ah*.⁴² Thus he appointed 'Umar to be the *khalīfah* after him, and the *Sahābah* agreed with him.

Khālid ibn al-Walīd wrote to Abū Bakr, telling him that in some areas of the Arabian Peninsula he had found men engaging in homosexual practices. Abū Bakr decided to consult the *Sahābah* for their opinions as to what he should do about it.

One of the *Sahābah* was 'Alī, and his was the strictest judgement. He said: "This sin was known only in one nation, and you know what Allah did to them. I suggest that these people be burnt to death." Abū Bakr write back to Khālid to tell him that they should be burnt to death, and this was done.⁴³

SPECIAL FEATURES OF FIQH IN THE PERIOD

1. The use of *qiyās* was widespread in cases where there was no

relevant text in the Qur'an or the Sunnah; and none of the *Sahābah* objected to this.

2. Ijma^c was also widely used as a basis for judgement. This was facilitated by the fact that the *Sahābah* were few, and it was easy for them to agree amongst themselves. They used ijma^c in many cases: For example, their decisions that the *khalifah* or imam should be appointed, that apostates should be fought and killed, that an apostate could not be taken as a prisoner of war, and that the Qur'an should be collected and written down in one volume.

THE TIME OF ‘UMAR IBN AL-KHATTĀB

‘Umar’s recommendations to the judge, Shurayh, as mentioned above, explain his way of deriving judgements from the available evidence. The most noticeable feature of ‘Umar’s methodology, however, is the fact that he often consulted the *Sahābah* and discussed matters with them so as to reach the best understanding and find the most appropriate way to carry out judgements. In his approach to questions of legalities, ‘Umar was like a shrewd and cautious chemist whose intent is to produce medicine that will cure the disease without causing adverse side effects.

As a result, ‘Umar left us a great wealth of jurisprudence. Ibrahim al-Nakha‘ī (d.97 AH) said that when ‘Umar was martyred, “nine-tenths of all [available] knowledge disappeared with him.”⁴⁴ Ibn Mas‘ūd said of him: “Whatever path ‘Umar chose, we found it easy to follow.”⁴⁵

‘Umar’s understanding was comprehensive and he possessed good common sense. Thus, he was quick to relate the particular to the general, and could pursue the ramifications of an issue back to basic principles in order to see its wider implications. This is how he was during the times of the Prophet and Abū Bakr, and he did not change himself when he became the *khalifah*.

‘Umar learnt a great deal from the Prophet. He often noticed that the Prophet would refrain from issuing an order to the people

to do something good, although he wanted to do so, because he did not want to subject them to hardship. The Prophet often used to say: “If it were not that I am afraid to impose hardship on my Ummah, I would have commanded them to do...such and such.”⁴⁶

Sometimes the Prophet would forbid them from doing certain things, and then, when he saw that the reason for forbidding was no longer valid, he would lift the ban. On other occasions, he would be about to forbid something, and the people would tell him of the hardship and distress that such a prohibition would cause them, so he would abandon his resolve in order to spare them the hardship.

‘Umar saw how the Prophet, whenever he was faced with a choice between two things, would always choose the easier of the two; and this had a great effect on him. Indeed, ‘Umar well understood that the Shari‘ah has purposes and aims which must be discerned and considered; and that there are grounds for, and reasons behind, these judgements, some of which are made clear in the primary texts while others are only alluded to. He felt it the duty of scholars to discover those reasons which are not specified in the texts, so that legal judgements may be applied to new issues and developments, and everything brought under the judgement of Allah so that people will not become accustomed to seeking remedies for, and legal rulings on, their problems outside the Shari‘ah.

Hence, when we look at ‘Umar’s practice of ijtihaad, we find clear methods of arriving at judgements. Anyone who studies his *fataawā* will readily see that the reasoning behind them is based on the public interest, on taking precautions to prevent wrongdoing or to combat corruption, and on adopting the easiest and most expedient course under the law.

‘Umar, for example, declared some judgements invalid because the reasons for enforcing them no longer applied, or because some of the conditions for following them no longer prevailed. Among those judgements were his request to the Prophet that the prisoners of the battle of Badr be killed; his suggestions about *hijāb*⁴⁷; that the Prophet should not tell the people that whoever testified that “there is no god but Allah” would enter Paradise, in case they relied only on that and made no further effort; his suggestion to

Abū Bakr that he should no longer give an extra share from the public treasury to those who had recently embraced Islam; and his decision not to distribute conquered lands among the army.

THE TIME OF ‘UTHMĀN IBN ‘AFFĀN

When allegiance was given to ‘Uthmān, it was done on the condition that he worked in accordance with the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and the precedent set by the first two *khulafā’*. This he promised to do. ‘Alī, however, indicated that when he became *khalifah* he would be prepared to work according to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and then to do the best that his own knowledge and energy would allow. Because ‘Uthmān showed that he was willing to undertake to work in accordance with the precedents set by the first two *khulafā’*, he was supported by ‘Abd al-Rahmān, who cast the deciding vote. Thus, a third source of legislation, the precedent set by the first two *khulafā’* was added at the time of the third *khalifah*, and was approved by him.

Since ‘Alī had reservations about this, when he himself became *khalifah* he acted according to his own *ijtihad* in matters for which the earlier *khulafā’* had already produced *ijtihad*. For example, ‘Alī reconsidered the issue of whether slave women who had borne children to their masters could be sold.

‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān was one of the *Sahābah* who did not produce a great number of *fatāwā*, probably because most of the matters he came across had already been dealt with by Abū Bakr and ‘Umar, and he preferred to adopt their opinions. But in some cases, he had to make *ijtihad*, just as his predecessors had done. Once, before ‘Uthmān had become *khalifah*, ‘Umar asked him about a legal matter. In reply, ‘Uthmān said: “If you follow your own opinion that will be right. But, if you follow the opinion of the *khalifah* before you [Abū Bakr], that is better, because he was so good at passing judgement!” He also performed his own *ijtihad* when, during the hajj, he did not shorten salah in Minā; though certainly it is permitted to do so. There are two possible explanations for this: first, he had been married at Makkah, and thought

that the people of Makkah were not permitted to shorten their salah in Minā; second, he was afraid that some bedouins might be confused when they watched him do so, and so he did not.

‘Uthmān also formulated the ijtihad that everyone should read the Qur’ān according to Zayd’s way of recitation, because he thought that this was the most sound, and also the most likely to forestall disagreements.

THE TIME OF ‘ALĪ IBN ABĪ ṬĀLIB

‘Alī was like ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, in the way that he understood and applied the texts of the Qur’ān, and in his deep concern with linking particular issues to general principles. Prior to his assuming the office of *khalifah*, he was considered the best judge in Madinah. When the Prophet appointed ‘Alī judge in Yemen, he prayed for him, saying: “O Lord! Guide his heart and make him speak the truth.” Indeed, ‘Alī proved to be an excellent judge, and resolved many difficult cases.

‘Alī described his own knowledge by saying: “By Allah, no verse of the Qur’ān was ever revealed except that I knew about what it was revealed, and where and why it was revealed. My Lord had bestowed upon me a heart that is understanding and a tongue that is articulate.” Whenever a matter was referred to ‘Alī for judgement, he would accept it without hesitation. And if he were asked to give a fatwa, he would do so by citing from the Qur’ān and then the Sunnah. Indeed, the extent of his knowledge of both was very well known. ‘A’ishah said: “In regard to the Sunnah of the Prophet, he was the most knowledgeable of all people.”

‘Alī used *qiyās*, *istiḥāb*,⁴⁸ *istihsān*,⁴⁹ and *istiṣlāh*,⁵⁰ always basing his opinion on the broader aims of the Shari‘ah. When consulted about a possible increase in the *hadd* punishment for one found guilty of drinking alcohol, he compared drunkenness to the false accusation of adultery, on the basis that drunkenness could lead a person to make such an accusation.

During the tenure of his *khilāfah*, ‘Umar consulted ‘Alī about the punishment of a group of people who jointly conspired to commit

premeditated murder. ‘Alī said: “O Commander of the Faithful! If a group of people joined together in stealing, would you not cut off one hand of each of them?” When ‘Umar replied in the affirmative, ‘Alī said, “Then the same applies in this case.” Consequently, ‘Umar uttered his famous saying: “If all the citizens of San‘ā were to join together in murdering one man, I would execute the lot of them.” The analogy between murder and robbery was made because in each case there is a criminal motive shared between all those who commit these acts, and it is this which requires rebuke and deterrent punishment.

Moreover, ‘Alī, preferred to burn alive those overzealous apostates and heretics who defied him, although he was well aware that the Sunnah ruling was merely to put such disbelievers and apostates to death. In this ruling, ‘Alī showed himself keen to establish the strictest possible deterrent from the worst kinds of apostasy, because if considered this to be a very serious matter. Thus, he established the harshest punishment for such an act, so as to deter people from committing it. Moreover, to emphasize this, he recited the following verses of poetry:

*When I realized how grave the matter was,
I lit my bonfire and called for Qanbar.*

Once ‘Umar heard of a woman whose husband was away on a military expedition and who was receiving strangers in her home. ‘Umar therefore decided to send a messenger to her that she should not receive strangers whilst her husband was absent. When the woman heard that the *khalifah* wanted to speak to her, she became fearful and, as she was pregnant, she miscarried the child on her way to see ‘Umar. Greatly disturbed by what had occurred, he consulted the *Ṣaḥābah* about the matter. Some of them, including ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf, assured him: “You were merely trying to educate her; you have done nothing wrong.” When ‘Umar turned to ‘Alī, asking his opinion, ‘Alī said:

These men have spoken, and if this is the best opinion they can

come up with, then fair enough. But, if they have only spoken to please you, then they have cheated you. I hope that Allah will forgive you for this sin, for He knows that your intention was good. But, by Allah, you should pay compensation for the child.

‘Umar said: “By Allah, you have spoken sincerely to me. I swear that you should not sit down until you have distributed this money among your people.”

THE FUQAHĀ’ AMONG THE SAHĀBAH AND THE TĀBIŪN

This period is considered to have begun in 40AH when the period of the *al-Khulafā’ al-Rāshidūn* ended. Thus began a new era, that of the *fuqahā’* from among the *Sahābah* and the elder *Tābi’ūn*.⁵¹ Legislation during this stage was still very much as it had been in the previous stage, as its sources, i.e. the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, *ijmā’* and *qiyās*, remained the same. Nonetheless, it differed in many aspects from what had gone before as follows:

1. Scholars had become more interested in delving into what lay beyond the explicit meanings of the texts.
2. Their ways of dealing with the Sunnah underwent a great deal of change. Essentially, the difference was the outcome of political differences that accompanied the emergence of various sectarian and philosophical factions, such as the Shi‘ah and also the *Khawārij*, whose attitude to the Sunnah was different. The Shi‘ah refused to accept *ahādīth* not narrated by their own *a’immah*; and the *Khawārij* refused to accept *ahādīth* if, anywhere in the chain of narrators, there was no more than a single narrator.⁵² The *Khawārij* also rejected any *ahādīth* not supported by a text from the Qur’ān.
3. Owing to the divisions which had arisen, *ijmā’* was no longer a possibility in this period. Basically, this was because every group mistrusted the scholars of every other group, and would no longer accept any of their opinions, whether they agreed or disagreed with them. In addition, the *fuqahā’* from among the

Sahābah had become scattered all over the Islamic world, so that it was no longer possible for them to meet to discuss matters.

4. Also in this period, the narration of Hadith and Sunnah became popular, whereas this had not previously been the case.
5. The fabrication of Hadith, for many well-known reasons which we do not need to discuss here, became widespread. In this respect, Muslim reported that Ibn ‘Abbās said: “We used to narrate many *ahādīth* from the Prophet without ever having to worry about fabrication, but when people started to become careless in narrating things attributed to the Prophet, we stopped narrating *ahādīth*.”

CHAPTER THREE

*Legislation After the Time of the *Sahābah**

The time of the *Sahābah* came to an end between the 90 and 100 AH, and was followed by the time of the *Tābi‘ūn* whose scholars became responsible for fiqh and giving *fatāwā*.

The last of the *Sahābah* in Kufah died in 86 or 87 AH. The last one in Madinah, Sahl ibn Sa‘d al-Sā‘idī, died in 91 AH. The last one in Basrah, Anas ibn Mālik, died in 91 AH (some say 93 AH). The last one in Damascus, ‘Abd Allah ibn Yusr, died in 88 AH. The last of the *Sahābah*, ‘Āmir ibn Wāthilah ibn ‘Abd Allah (Abū al-Tufayl), died in 100 AH.

Thereafter, those who became responsible for issuing *fatāwā* were the freedmen (*mawālī*), most of whom had lived among the *fuqahā’* among the *Sahābah*, such as: Nāfi‘, the freedman of Ibn ‘Umar; ‘Ikrimah, the freedman of Ibn ‘Abbās; ‘Atā’ ibn Abī Rabah, the *faqīh* of Makkah; Tāwūs, the *faqīh* of the people of Yemen; Yahyā ibn Kathīr, the *faqīh* of Yamamah; Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, the *faqīh* of Kufah; al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the *faqīh* of Basrah; Ibn Sirīn, also of Basrah; ‘Atā’ al-Khurāsānī in Khurāsān, and others.

Indeed, Madinah was unique in having a *faqīh* who was an Arab from Quraysh, Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab.

These *Tābi‘ūn* vary rarely altered the *fatāwā* of the *Sahābah* from whom they had gained their knowledge; hence it is difficult to find differences between the methods they used to derive judgements and those of their predecessors.

Even so, the methods of deriving judgements were, at this stage, starting to evolve and, in the process, to become clearer than ever before.

It is narrated that al-Hasan ibn ‘Ubayd Allah al-Nakha‘ī said: “I asked Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī: ‘Did you hear from others all the *fatāwā* that I hear you giving?’” He said “No.” So I asked him: “Then you give *fatāwā* that you did not hear?” He said: “I heard what I heard; but when I was confronted with matters concerning which I had not heard anything, I compared them, by analogy, with matters which I had heard about.”⁵³

Among the significant features of this period was the emergence of differences of opinion between legal scholars on a variety of matters. This was underscored by two decisions taken by the *khalīfah* of the times, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.

1. He ordered that practices attributed to the Prophet should be collected and written down. Accordingly, the people of every locality wrote down in books whatever they knew to be a part of the Sunnah.⁵⁴
2. He restricted the authority to issue *fatāwā*, in most districts, to a few named individuals, as he did in Egypt, when he named only three people for this purpose. Interestingly, two of them were freedmen, Yazīd ibn Abī Ḥabīb and ‘Abd Allah ibn Abī Ja‘far, and the third was an Arab, Ja‘far ibn Rabi‘ah. When the *khalīfah* was questioned about appointing two freedmen and only one Arab, he answered: “What fault is it of mine if the freedmen are improving themselves and you are not.”⁵⁵

In his letter to Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn ‘Amr ibn Ḥazm al-Anṣārī, the *khalīfah* explained his reasons for ordering that the practices attributed to the Prophet should be written down.

He wrote: “Look for whatever hadith of the Prophet, or Sunnah, or practice you can find. Then write these down for me; for I fear that this knowledge will pass away with the passing of the scholars.”⁵⁶

AFTER THE *TĀBI'ŪN*: THE TIME OF *AL-A'IMMAH AL-MUJTAHIDŪN*

This period was described by Wālī Allāh al-Dahlawī as follows:

The *fuqahā'* of the period took the hadith of the Prophet, the decisions of the early judges, and the legal scholarship of the *Sahābah*, the *Tābi'ūn* and the third generation, and then produced their own *ijtihad*.

This was the way the legal scholars of those times worked. Basically, all the them accepted both the *musnads*⁵⁷ as well as the *mursals*⁵⁸ hadith. Moreover, it became their practice to cite the opinions of the *Sahābah* and the *Tābi'ūn* as evidence. Essentially, there were two reasons for this:

1. Such opinions were actually *ahādīth* of the Prophet which had been narrated by one of the *Sahābah* or the *Tābi'ūn* who, for fear of misquoting, had not dared to attribute them to the Prophet.
2. The other likelihood is that such opinions were derived by the *Sahābah* from the texts of *ahādīth*, and represented their own understanding of the Sunnah.

In this respect, of course, the *Sahābah* were better than those who came later, because they had known the Prophet, and were thus more capable of interpreting what he had said. Therefore, their judgements and opinions were accepted as authoritative, except in cases where they themselves differed, or where their pronouncements were in clear contradiction to sound *ahādīth* of the Prophet.

On the other hand, in the cases where two or more *ahādīth* conflicted, the scholars would refer to the opinions of the *Sahābah* in order to determine which of the two was the correct one. Thus, if the *Sahābah* had said that a hadith had been abrogated, or was not to be understood literally; or if they did not expressly say anything about a hadith, but had ignored it, and had not acted in conformity with it, thus indicating that the hadith in question was in some way defective, or that it had been abrogated, or that its interpretation

was other than the literal, then *al-A'immah al-Mujtahidūn* would accept their opinions.

When the pronouncements of the *Sahābah* and *Tābi'ūn* differed on any matter, then each *faqīh* would follow the rulings of those from the same region as himself, and his own teachers, because he would be more able to discern the authenticity, owing to his familiarity with the narrators, of the opinions and sayings that reached him on their authority. Likewise, the *faqīh* would be better acquainted with their legal methodology.

The legal school of thought based on the opinions of 'Umar, 'Uthmān, Ibn 'Umar, 'Ā'ishah, Ibn 'Abbās, Zayd ibn Thābit, and their companions among the *Tābi'ūn*, like Sa'īd ibn al-Musayyab (d. circa 93 AH), 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr (d. 94 AH), Sālim (d. 106 AH), 'Aṭā' ibn Yāsār (d. 103 AH), al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad (d. 108 AH), 'Ubayd Allah ibn 'Abd Allah (d. 99 AH), al-Zuhri (d. 124 AH), Yahyā ibn Sa'īd (d. 143 AH), Zayd ibn Aslam (d. 136 AH) and Rābi'at al-Ra'i (d. 136 AH), was the school most acceptable to the people from Madinah. It was for this reason that Imam Mālik based his legal arguments on their teachings.

In the same way, the legal opinions of 'Abd Allah ibn Mas'ūd and his companions, the judgements of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Shurayh (d. 77 AH), and al-Sha'bī (d. 104 AH), and the *fatāwā* of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha'i (d. 96 AH) were the most acceptable to the people of Kufah. Commenting on this phenomenon, al-Dahlawī wrote:

When Masrūq (d. 63 AH) followed Zayd ibn Thābit's opinion concerning sharing out the inheritance between the grandfather and the brothers [of the deceased], 'Alqamah (d. 62 AH) asked him, "Are any of you more knowledgeable than 'Abd Allah [ibn Mas'ūd]?" Masrūq answered, "No, but Zayd ibn Thābit and the people of Madinah share the inheritance between the grandfather and the brothers..."

Thus, if the people of Madinah agreed on a matter, the scholars of the generation following the *Tābi'ūn* adopted it resolutely. This is what [Imam] Mālik meant when he said: "The Sunnah concerning which we, the people of Madinah, have not differed is such-and-such."

If the early scholars of Madinah had differed concerning any matter, the later scholars would follow those opinions which were stronger and more dependable by virtue either by their having been adopted by a majority of the early scholars, or of their having been the result of sound legal analogy, *qiyās*, or which were derived from some text in the Qur'an or the Sunnah. It is to this process that [Imam] Mālik refers when he says: "This is the best that I have heard." Then, if the later scholars could find no solution to a problem in the work of their predecessors, they would themselves turn to the relevant texts in order to formulate their own legal opinions.

...At this stage, the scholars were inspired to start recording things in writing. So [Imam] Mālik (d. 179 AH) in Madinah, Ibn Abī Dhi'b (d. 158 AH), Ibn Jurayj (d. 150 AH) and Ibn Uyaynah (d. 196 AH) in Makkah, al-Thawrī (d. 161 AH) in Kufah, and Rabī' ibn al-Subayḥ (d. 160 AH) in Basrah, began to write things down, and they all followed the same method.

When the *khalifah* al-Manṣūr performed hajj and met [Imam] Mālik, he said: "I have decided that copies be made of these books which you have written. I will send a copy to every region of the Muslim world and order the scholars to act in accordance with them and not to refer to any other works."

Mālik said: "O 'Amīr al-Mu'minīn, do not do that! Already the people have heard different legal opinions, and listened to *aḥādīth* and narrations; and they have accepted whatever has reached them first, so that this had contributed to differences in the prevailing practices among people. Leave the people of each town with the choice they have already made."

The same story is told in reference to the *khalifah*, Harūn al-Rashīd, that he wanted to compel people to follow the *Muwatṭa'*. But Mālik said to him: "Do not do that, for the *Sahābah* of the Prophet used to differ on the Sunnah. Then they scattered and settled throughout the Muslim world, and now their different ways are firmly established."

...Mālik was the most knowledgeable about the *aḥādīth* related by the people of Madinah from the Prophet, and Mālik's chain of narrators was the most reliable. He was also the most knowledgeable

about the judgements of ‘Umar and the legal pronouncements of ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar and ‘Ā’ishah and their companions from among the seven *fuqaha*'. The sciences of Hadith narration and fatwa were based on the knowledge of [Imam] Mālik and those like him.

[Imam] Abū Ḥanīfah was devoted to the legal interpretations of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī and his colleagues, and would rarely transgress their arguments. He was excellent at producing decisions based on Ibrāhīm's method, exact in employing that methodology in order to deal with details of case law.

If you wish to know the truth about what we have stated, then summarize the teachings of Ibrāhīm and his cohorts as recorded in the following works: *Al-Āthār* [Traditions] by Muḥammad al-Shaybāni, the *Jāmi‘* [The Compendium] of ‘Abd al-Rāziq and the *Muṣannaf* [Compilation] of Ibn Abī Shaybah, and compare them with [Imam] Abū Ḥanīfah's formal opinions. Indeed, you will find that Abū Ḥanīfah departs only rarely from their way, and even then his opinion will not differ from the opinions of the jurists of Kufah.⁵⁹

In fact, al-Dahlawī's comments need to be considered. He was very eager to stress that Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfah were more or less conforming to the opinions of the *Tābi‘ūn* and the *Sahābah* before them (as opposed to generating their own *ijtihad*), and had not transcended the jurisprudence of their predecessors. This, however, is a conclusion with which it is difficult to agree.

It is well known that there are various approaches to fiqh; and each Imam adopted a different approach to the subject. It is not a simple matter to claim that these were drawn from the *Sahābah* and the *Tābi‘ūn*. Consider, for example, Mālik's taking the customs and practices of the people of Madinah as a secondary source for legislation; or Abū Ḥanīfah's use of *istihsān* and *‘urf* (local custom that is “recognizably” good).⁶⁰

Moreover, neither of them based their arguments on the *fatawā* of the *Tābi‘ūn*, but rather competed with them, saying: “They were men [of knowledge] and so are we.”

In addition, unlike anyone before them, each had laid down his own set of conditions for accepting *ahādīth* as authentic.

Moreover, the incidence of the increased circulation of *ahādīth* in those times, in addition to the appearance of *ahādīth* that had never been circulated at all, led, in some cases, to legal rulings and positions quite different from those held by the *Sahābah*.

RATIONALISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS:

AHL AL-HADĪTH AND *AHL AL-RA’Ī*

Perhaps this truth may become all the more intelligible when we mention the emergence of two informal schools of legal thought, the rationalists or *ahl al-Ra’ī* (lit. opinion), and the traditionalists or *ahl al-Hadīth*, and the appearance of differences between them concerning source methodology and issues of case law. While it is true that both of these schools had their roots in the approaches of the preceding two generations, it was at this time that their differences in matters of fiqh became clear; and it was at this time that people began grouping themselves on the basis of their differences in deriving legal points from the sources.

Writers on the Islamic legal history emphasize that the rationalist school of *ahl al-Ra’ī* was an extension of the school of ‘Umar and ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas‘ūd, who, among the *Sahābah*, were the most wide-ranging in their use of *ra’ī*. In turn, Alqamah al-Nakha‘ī (d. circa 60 AH), the uncle and teacher of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, was influenced by them. Ibrāhīm then taught Ḥammād ibn Abī Sulaymān (d. 120 AH), who in turn was the teacher of Abū Hanifah.

The same historians stress that the traditionalist school of *ahl al-Hadīth* was a continuation of the school of those *Sahābah* whose fear of contradicting the letter of source texts (*nuṣūṣ*) made them circumspect to the point where they never went any further than the texts themselves. This was the case, by and large, with ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭāb, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Ās, al-Zubayr, and ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbās.

The school of *ahl al-Hadīth* became widespread in the Hijaz for many reasons, of which perhaps the most important were the great

number of *ahādīth* and other narrations known to the people of that area, and the fact that the region was more stable after the seat of the *khilāfah* had been removed, and most of the political activity had been transferred, first to Damascus, then to Baghdad. The Imam of Madinah, Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab, once noted that the people of Makkah and Madinah had not lost much of their fiqh and knowledge of Hadith, because they were familiar with the *fatawā* and reports of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī (before he became *khalīfah*), as well as ‘Āishah, Ibn ‘Abbās, Ibn ‘Umar, Zayd ibn Thābit and Abū Hurayrah, and thus did not need to use *ra’ī* in order to derive law.

The school of *ahl al-Ra’ī*, on the other hand, gained currency in Iraq. The scholars of this group thought that the legal interpretations of the Shari‘ah should have a basis in reason, should take into account the best interests of the people, and should be backed by discernable wisdom. Indeed, these scholars felt it their duty to uncover the higher meanings and the wisdom behind the laws, and to make the connection between them; so that if the reasons for any law were to lose relevance with the passing of time and the changing of circumstances, the law would no longer be valid. If they found the reasons behind the law, they would sometimes prefer to cite arguments based on analytical treatment of those reasons. Thus, in many cases, reason would be accorded legalistic preference when such reasoning conflicted with the evidence of certain categories of *ahādīth*.

The spread of this method in Iraq was helped by the numbers of *Sahābah* influenced by the methods of ‘Umar. Among them were Ibn Mas‘ūd, Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī, ‘Imrān ibn al-Husayn, Anas ibn Mālik, Ibn ‘Abbās and others. The spread was also assisted by the transfer of the *khilāfah* to Iraq, and the settling there of ‘Alī and his supporters.

When sects, like the Shi‘ah and the *Khawārij*, appeared in Iraq, conflict arose and the fabrication of hadith became widespread.⁶¹ Consequently, the legal scholars of Iraq were forced to lay down conditions for the acceptance of hadith, according to which only a few of the reports given by the *Sahābah* living in Iraq were acceptable.

Moreover, the great number of legal problems and the constant increase in unprecedented legal issues in that area were more than could be dealt with on the basis of reliable *ahādīth*.

So, it was in this way that the people, those who had not joined either the Shi‘ah or the *Khawārij*, were divided into two groups, *ahl al-Hadīth* and *ahl al-Ra‘ī*; and the conflict between them intensified.

Thus, *ahl al-Ra‘ī* often used to criticize *ahl al-Hadīth* for having little intelligence and less fiqh-understanding; while *ahl al-Hadīth* claimed that the opinions of *ahl al-Ra‘ī* were based on no more than conjecture, and that they had distanced themselves from the necessary circumspection in those matters of religious significance which could be ascertained only through recourse to the source texts.

In fact, *ahl al-Ra‘ī* agreed with all Muslims that once a person has clearly understood the Sunnah, he may not reject it in favor of what is no more than someone’s opinion. Their excuse in all those cases in which they were criticized for contradicting the Sunnah is simply that they did not know any hadith concerning the matter in dispute, or that they did know a hadith but did not consider it sound enough owing to some weakness in the narrators or some other fault they found in it (a fault which perhaps others did not consider to be damaging), or that they knew of another hadith which they considered sound and which contradicted the legal purpose of the hadith accepted by others.

Moreover, *ahl al-Hadīth* agreed with *ahl al-Ra‘ī* on the necessity of having recourse to reason whenever a matter occurs for which there is no specific ruling in the source texts. Still, in spite of these areas of agreement, the conflict and the tension between the two groups remained acute.

CHAPTER FOUR

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī was born in 150 AH, the year in which Imam Abū Ḥanīfah died. He studied fiqh, first in Makkah with some scholars of *ahl al-Hadīth*, such as Muslim ibn Khālid al-Zinjī (d. 179 AH) and Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah (d. 198 AH). Then he went to the Imam of Madinah and the leader of *ahl al-Hadīth*, Mālik ibn Anas, and studied with him, and committed to memory (so as later to relate it) Mālik’s collection of hadith and legal opinions, the *Muwatṭa’*. Indeed, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī always felt himself indebted to Imam Mālik.

It is reported that Yūnus ibn ‘Abd al-‘A‘lā heard al-Shāfi‘ī say: “Whenever the ‘ulama are mentioned (and their work and knowledge compared), Mālik outshines them all. No one has ever done me a greater favor than Mālik ibn Anas.”⁶² This is what Imam al-Shāfi‘ī said after he had studied with masters of language, poetry, literature, the natural sciences, mathematics and history.

Al-Shāfi‘ī was not impressed with all that he had learned of the work of *ahl al-Hadīth*. For example, he criticized them for accepting a hadith that is *munqaṭi‘*,⁶³ saying: “The *munqaṭi‘* is nothing.”

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī also criticized them for accepting the *mursal*⁶⁴ variety of hadith (though he himself made an exception in the case of *mursal* hadith related by Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab), and for imposing overly strict conditions on the acceptance of narrators as reliable (and the hadith they related as authentic).

When Imam al-Shāfi‘ī went to Iraq, to the strong hold of *ahl al-*

Ra’ī, he noticed that they were always eager to find fault with the legal methods and opinions of the people of Madinah, and especially his teacher, Imam Mālik. Thus Imam al-Shāfi‘ī stood up in defense of his teacher, his school of thought, and his methods. It is narrated that he once said:

Muhammad ibn al-Hasan said to me: “Our teacher (i.e. Abū Hanīfah) was more knowledgeable than yours. Your teacher should not have spoken, but our teacher would have been wrong to remain silent.” I became angry and said to him: “I ask you by Allah, who had more knowledge of the Sunnah of the Prophet, Mālik or Abū Hanīfah?” He said, “Mālik. But our teacher was more adapt at *qiyās*.” I replied: “Yes, and Imam Mālik was more knowledgeable than Abū Hanīfah about the Qur'an, about abrogation, and about the Sunnah of the Prophet. Whoever has more knowledge of the Qur'an and the Sunnah has more right to speak!”⁶⁵

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī studied the books of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and other Iraqi scholars.⁶⁶ Indeed, he became Muhammad ibn al-Hasan's pupil, and discussed his opinions, all the while supporting the Sunnah and *ahl al-Hadīth*.

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī left Baghdad for a period of time, and when he returned, in 195 AH, there were forty or fifty study circles that met regularly at the great mosque. Imam al-Shāfi‘ī began moving from one circle to another, explaining what “Allah and His Prophet said,” while other teachers spoke only of what their teachers said. Eventually, there were no study circles left in the mosque other than that of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī.

Some of the great scholars of *ahl al-Ra’ī*, like Abū Thawr, al-Zāfarānī, al-Karabīsī and others, attended the study circles of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī. Many abandoned the way of *ahl al-Ra’ī* and began to follow Imam al-Shāfi‘ī. Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal also attended this circle, and it is narrated that he said:

Any narrator of Hadith who carried an ink pot benefited in some way from Imam al-Shāfi‘ī.” When Imam Aḥmad was asked to explain, he said: “*Ahl al-Ra’ī* used to laugh at *ahl al-Hadīth* until Imam al-Shāfi‘ī taught them otherwise, and vindicated the traditionalist position through sound arguments.⁶⁷

Moreover, it was in response to a request from *ahl al-Hadīth* that Imam al-Shāfi‘ī wrote his book, *Al-Hujjah* (The Argument), in Baghdad, in order to refute the arguments that *ahl al-Ra‘ī* had brought against him.⁶⁸ Thereafter, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī travelled to Egypt where he found that most of the people adhered strictly and unquestioningly to the opinions of Mālik. Consequently, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī began a critical analysis of Mālik’s legal opinions, and found that in some cases:

...he [Mālik] formulates opinions on the basis of a general principle, while ignoring the specific issue; whereas, at other times he gives a ruling on a specific issue and ignores the general principle.

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī also found that Mālik sometimes rejected a sound hadith in favor of a statement made by one of the *Sahābah* or the *Tābi‘ūn*, or in the preference of his own reasoning. Imam al-Shāfi‘ī also discovered that Mālik rejected the statement of one of the *Sahābah* in favor of the opinion of a *Tābi‘ī*, or his own personal opinion; and that he would do this in individual cases, and in extrapolating legal details, without taking general principles into account. Moreover, Mālik claimed in many cases that there was *ijmā‘* concerning this matter, when there was, in fact, disagreement about it.

Al-Shāfi‘ī also found that Mālik’s opinion that the *ijmā‘* of the people of Madinah could be treated as source evidence was, in fact, not very strong. He wrote a book entitled *Al-Ikhtilāf ma‘a Mālik* (Disagreement with Mālik) in which he dealt with all the matters mentioned above.⁶⁹

According to Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, Imam Mālik exceeded the proper bounds in applying his principle of *al-maṣālih al-mursalah* (the interest of the greater good) without having recourse to the abundance of evidence available. His opinion in regard to Abū Ḥanīfah was that, in many cases, he concentrated on the particular, and on minor issues and details, without regard to basic rules and principles.⁷⁰

With these matters in mind, then, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī came to the conclusion that the undertaking most deserving of attention was

the collection of the principles of jurisprudence, the organization of the basic rules for their application, and the development of a source methodology by means of which questions of fiqh may be decided through proper recourse to valid and relevant forms of evidence. Thus, fiqh might become the practical application of this methodology, so that a new fiqh might emerge as an alternative to the two established legal schools of thought.

It was for this reason that Imam al-Shāfi‘ī wrote the *Risālah*, and built his fiqh and legal teachings on the foundations of the principles of the methodology expounded in that book.

Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal said: “until Imam al-Shāfi‘ī came along, we never thought of things like the general and the specific (*al-‘āmm wa al-khāṣṣ*).”⁷¹

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī used to say to Imam Aḥmad:

“You have more knowledge about Hadith and narrators than I do. So if a hadith is authentic then tell me. If it is authentic, I will accept it, even if it is [reported by narrators] from Kufah, Basrah or Damascus.”⁷²

This statement clearly indicates that Imam al-Shāfi‘ī was more concerned with establishing principles than with dealing with minor issues and details.

The scholars writing on the history of *uṣūl al-fiqh* unanimously agree that the first writer on the subject was Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, and that the first book ever written on the subject was *al-Risālah*.⁷³

In his book, *al-Bahr al-Muhiṭ*, al-Zarkashī (d. 794 AH) devoted a chapter to this, in which he said:

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī was the first to write about *uṣūl al-fiqh*. He wrote *al-Risālah*, *Aḥkām al-Qur’ān* [Legal Interpretations of the Qur’ān], *Ikhtilāf al-Hadīth* [Conflicting Hadith], *Ibtāl al-Istīḥsān* [The Invalidity of Juristic Preference], *Jimā‘ al-‘Ilm* [The Congruence of knowledge], and *al-Qiyās* [Analogical Reasoning]—the book in which he discussed the error of the Mu‘tazilah group, and changed his mind about accepting their testimony. Then, other scholars followed him in writing books on *uṣūl*.

In his commentary on *al-Risālah*, al-Juwainī wrote:

No one before Imam al-Shāfi‘ī wrote books on the subject of *uṣūl*, or had as much knowledge of it as he did. It is related that Ibn‘Abbās mentioned something about the particularization of the general, and that some of the others among the early scholars made pronouncements which suggested they understood these principles. Still, those who came after them said nothing about *uṣūl*, and they contributed nothing to it. We have seen the books of the Tābi‘ūn and the third generation, and have found that none of them write books about *uṣūl*.⁷⁴

THE METHOD OF IMAM AL-SHĀFI‘Ī IN HIS BOOK,
AL-RISĀLAH

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī began his book by describing the state of mankind just before the mission of the Prophet, in doing so, he divided them into two groups:

1. *Ahl al-Kitāb* (People of the Book); otherwise, the followers of earlier revelation who had altered their scripture and tampered with some of its legal injunctions. Essentially, these people had lapsed into disbelief and then attempted to fuse their falsehood with the Truth which Allah had revealed.
2. *Mushrikūn* and *kāfirūn* who worshiped idols instead of Allah.

Then Imam al-Shāfi‘ī went on to say that Allah rescued all mankind by sending them the last of the Prophets, and revealing to him His Book, so that people might be delivered by means of it from the blindness of disbelief into the light of guidance:

Behold, it is a Divine Scripture, sublime. No falsehood can attain to it openly and neither in a stealthy manner, [since it is] bestowed from on high by One who is Truly Wise, Ever to be Praised. (Qur'an 41:41-42)

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī went on to discuss in detail the status of the Qur'an and its comprehensive statements about what Allah had permitted and prohibited, how people are to worship Allah, the rewards of those who obey Him, and how He admonished them

through the stories of those who had gone before.

Then Imam al-Shāfi‘ī explained that students seeking knowledge of Islam should learn as much of the Qur'an and its sciences as possible; and that when their intentions are pure they may both quote its verses and infer meanings from them.

At the end of his introduction to *al-Risālah*, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī wrote:

No misfortune will ever beset any of the followers of Allah's religion for which there is no guidance in the Book of Allah to indicate the right way. For, Allah, the Blessed and Most High said:

"A Book We send to you, that you may bring forth mankind from darkness to light, by the permission of their Lord to the path of the Almighty, the Praiseworthy." (14:1)

He also said:

"And We sent down to you the Reminder, that you may make clear to mankind what was sent down to them; and so haply they may reflect." (16:44)

And:

"And We have sent down to you the Book as an explanation of everything; and as a guidance, and a mercy, and good tidings to the Muslims." (16:89)

Also:

"Likewise, We have revealed to you a spirit of Our bidding. You did not know what the Book was, nor the faith; but We made it a light by which We guide whomsoever We will from Our servants. And, verily, you shall be a guide unto the right path, the path of Allah." (42:52)

There follows a chapter on *bayān*⁷⁵ in which the word is defined as a legal term, and then divided into categories in explanation of the ways that the Qur'anic declaration indicates matters of legal significance.

There are five such categories:

1. That which Allah declared [in the Qur'an] as a specific legal provision which admits of no interpretation other than its literal meaning. This category of *bayān* needs no other explanation than the Qur'an itself.
2. That which the Qur'an mentions in texts that may be interpreted in several ways, and for which the Sunnah provided an explanation of exactly which one was intended.
3. That which was clearly stated to be obligatory; and which the Prophet explained in terms of how, why, upon whom, and when applicable and when not.
4. That which was explained by the Prophet but not mentioned in the Qur'an. Allah commanded in the Qur'an that the Prophet be obeyed and his rulings accepted. Therefore, what is said on the authority of the Prophet, is said on the authority of Allah.
5. That which Allah requires His creation to seek through ijtihad. This is *qiyās*. According to Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, *qiyās* is a method for reaching a legal decision on the basis of evidence (a precedent) in which a common reason, or an effective cause, is applicable.

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī then went on to explain these five categories in five separate chapters, giving examples and evidence for each. Thereafter, *al-Risālah* included the following chapters:

- The general declaration revealed in the Qur'an intended to be general (*‘āmm*), but which includes the particular (*khāṣṣ*).
- The explicit general declaration of the Qur'an in which the general and the particular are included.
- The explicit general declaration of the Qur'an which appears to be general but is intended to be entirely particular.
- The category of *bayān* in the Qur'an, the meaning of which is clarified by context.
- The category of *bayān* in the Qur'an the wording of which indicates the implicit (*al-bātin*) rather than the explicit (*al-zāhir*).
- That, of the Qur'an, which was revealed as general but which the Sunnah specifically indicates is meant to be particular.

In the above-mentioned chapter, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī explained the validity of the Sunnah as evidence and its status in the religion. For this reason, he then included the following chapters:

- A declaration concerning the duty imposed by Allah in the Qur'an to follow the Sunnah of His Prophet.
- Allah's command ordering obedience to the Prophet as being both associated with obedience to Him and ordered independently.
- Allah's command ordering obedience to the Prophet.
- The obligation made clear by Allah that the Prophet was obliged to observe what was revealed to him and to obey whatever commands Allah gave him; and that Allah will guide any who follow him (the Prophet).

In this chapter, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī affirmed that parts of the Sunnah of the Prophet dealt with and were related to the Qur'an, whilst other parts explained matters concerning which there was no relevant text in the Book. Imam al-Shāfi‘ī also showed that part of the Sunnah existed independently of the Qur'an, and quoted evidence in refutation of those who disagreed with him on this matter. Then he said:

I shall explain what I have already said about the sunna, [whether] it specifies the Book of God or provides [additional legislation] for matters on which there is no text in the Book, such examples as may clarify the meaning of the subject that was discussed. The first one I take up will be [a discussion] on the sunna based on the Book of God. I shall discuss by means of *istidlāl* (deductive reasoning) the sunna relating to the subject the *nāsikh* (abrogating) and the *mansūkh* (abrogated) passages in the Book of God. Next, [I shall] state the duties provided in the text [of the Book] and the sunna which the Apostle has laid down on the basis of the Book; the general duties which the Apostle specified for its modes and its times of fulfillment; next the general [commands] which were intended to be general and the general [commands] which were intended to be particular; and [finally] the sunna [of the Prophet] for which there is no text in the Book.⁷⁶

There follows a chapter entitled, “The Origin of the Abrogating and the Abrogated,” which explains that Allah used abrogation to make the Shari‘ah easier and more flexible. This chapter also makes the point that a verse (*āyah*) of the Qur’ān can only be abrogated by another verse of the Qur’ān; and that the Sunnah can only be abrogated by the Sunnah. Then he dealt with the abrogating and the abrogated which are indicated in part by the Qur’ān and in part by the Sunnah. Thereafter, he mentioned the *fard*-duty of salah and the explanation in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah concerning those who may be excused from performing it, and those whose salah is not accepted because of some act of disobedience they may have committed. Then Imam al-Shāfi‘ī continued to discuss the abrogating and the abrogated that are indicated by the Sunnah and *ijma‘*.

He devoted a separate chapter to *fard*-duties: *fard*-duties laid down in the text of the Qur’ān; *fard*-duties laid down in the Qur’ān which the Prophet also dealt with in the Sunnah; *fard*-duties laid down in the text of the Qur’ān which the Sunnah indicated were meant to be particular in application; general *fard*-duties which are clearly meant to be compulsory and for which the Prophet gave the explanation as to how they were to be performed – like salah, zakah, hajj, ‘iddah,⁷⁷ the number of wives, women whom one is not permitted to marry, and dietary prohibitions.

In the next chapter he discussed and explained defects in Hadith, and explained that the contradictions between *ahādīth* could be attributed to many reasons: a contradiction might appear because one hadith was abrogated by another, or because mistakes occurred in the narration of the hadith; mistakes which might cause contradictions in the hadith, and many other reasons for such contradictions. Then he dealt with the various types of prohibitions, and explained that some *ahādīth* clarify others.

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī also included a chapter on knowledge, and explained that there are two types of knowledge. The first is that sort of common knowledge which no sane, mature adult could possibly not have. All of this knowledge can be found in the text of the Qur’ān, and its details are known to Muslims because it has been transmitted down from the Prophet to each succeeding generation

in turn. There is no dispute concerning the authenticity of this knowledge, and all are agreed that it is binding. Indeed, the nature of this knowledge is such that there can be no mistakes in its transmission or interpretation.

The second type of knowledge is of details which stem from the obligations, and the specific laws relating to them. These are not mentioned in the text of the Qur'an, and most of them are not mentioned in the text of the Sunnah, apart from individual narration (*akhbār al-āhād*). Thus, Imam al-Shāfi'i introduced a new subject, the individual narration, (*khabar al-wāhid*).

Imam al-Shāfi'i then explained what is meant by this term, and the conditions which determine whether or not a narration is of the individual variety. The difference between testimony and reporting, *shahādah* and *riwāyah*, was explained; as were those matters which may be accepted through an individual narration, and those for which *khabar al-wāhid* alone is not sufficient. Then Imam al-Shāfi'i discussed the authority of *khabar al-wāhid*, and whether such reports could be deduced as evidence. His conclusion, which was supported by very sound agreements, was that indeed they could be used. Thus, Imam al-Shāfi'i succeeded in refuting all the misgivings brought up by his opponents on this issue.

The following chapters then discuss:

- *Ijma'*: its definition, and legal authority.
- *Qiyās*: its meaning and nature, the need for it, the varieties of *qiyās*, and who is, and is not, competent to employ it.
- *Ijtihad*: how it is based first on the Qur'an, and then on the Sunnah; what constitutes correct and incorrect *ijtihad*.
- *Istihsān* (juristic preference): al-Shāfi'i was careful to explain that no Muslim is permitted to use *istihsān* in order to contravene the Hadith, nor may he pronounce any legal judgement which is not based on the Qur'an, Sunnah, *ijma'* or *qiyās*. He also explained the difference between *qiyās* and *istihsān*.

- Disagreement among scholars: Imam al-Shāfi‘ī explained that these disagreements are of two types: those which are prohibited and those which are not. The types of disagreements which are not allowed are those concerning matters for which Allah has provided clear evidence in the texts of the Qur'an or in the Sunnah. The sort of disagreement which are permitted pertain to matters which could be interpreted in several ways and to which each scholar applies his own reasoning. Imam al-Shāfi‘ī then gave examples of both kinds of disagreements, and mentioned the reasons for each. He also gave examples of issues on which the *Sahābah* had disagreed, such as ‘iddah, oaths and inheritance. In this chapter, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī mentioned something of his methodology for assigning preference to the opinions of the *Sahābah* when they differed.

Al-Risālah concludes with an explanation of al-Shāfi‘ī’s opinion on the “categories of evidence” mentioned above:

We make decisions on the basis of [text of the] Book and the generally accepted sunna, concerning which there is no disagreement, and we maintain that therefore such decisions are right according to both the explicit and the implicit [meaning of these sources]. We also make decisions on the basis of a single-individual tradition on which there is no general agreement, and we hold that we have made the decision correctly according to its explicit meaning, since it is possible that he who related the tradition may have made an error in it. We also make decisions on the basis of consensus and analogy, although the latter is the weaker of the two instruments. Analogy is used only in case of necessity, since it is not lawful if a tradition exists....⁷⁸

From the writings of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, we know which sources of Islamic jurisprudence were agreed upon, and which were the cause of disagreement at that time. The sources which were agreed upon were the Qur'an and the Sunnah in general. The sources concerning which there was disagreement included the Sunnah in its entirety, to some, and *khabar al-wāḥid* narrations (which Imam al-Shāfi‘ī referred to as *khāṣṣ*) in particular. But Imam al-Shāfi‘ī’s

contribution was that he examined these two issues both in their entirety in *al-Risālah* and *Jimā‘ al-‘Ilm*.

Other matters on which there were disagreements included:

1. *Ijma‘*: Disagreements concerning its validity as evidence; the different types of *ijma‘*; whose *ijma‘* may be accepted as evidence; matters in which *ijma‘* may be considered as evidence; and how the public may be made aware that there is *ijma‘* on any particular matter.
2. *Qiyās* and *istihsān*: There were disputes concerning the meaning of these terms, their nature, validity as evidence, the possibility and method of using them, and whether the actions of the *Sahābah* could be considered *qiyās* or *istihsān*.
3. There was also open disagreement concerning the significance of the Qur’anic command and prohibition, their meanings and their impact on the rest of the legal, fiqh judgements. We may notice that in this period, the four Sunni *a’immah* did not use strictly defined terminology such as *tahrīm* (prohibition), *ījāb* (obligation), etc, for these words were not commonly used in their vocabulary. Rather, this kind of legal terminology appeared later on, as Ibn al-Qayyim has pointed out.⁷⁹
4. Other sources of Islamic jurisprudence concerning which there are differences were not commonly discussed at the time of the early jurists. For example, such terms as *‘urf*, *‘ādah*,⁸⁰ and *istiṣḥāb* were not part of their vocabulary.

CHAPTER FIVE

Uṣūl al-Fiqh After Imam al-Shāfi‘ī

Imam al-Shāfi‘ī’s *al-Risālah* dominated studies in Islamic jurisprudence from the moment it appeared. Indeed, as a result of it, there was a division of scholars into two groups. One group, the majority of *ahl al-Hadīth*, accepted it, and used it in support of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī’s school of legal thought. The other group, however, rejected most of what it contained, and attempted to refute whatever of al-Shāfi‘ī’s work contradicted their own methods and practice before it had a chance to influence people. The members of this group were taken almost exclusively from *ahl al-Ra’ī*, all of whom were in disagreement with nearly all that al-Shāfi‘ī had written.

Ibn al-Nadīm mentioned books which were written in the field of *uṣūl al-fiqh* after *al-Risālah*, including *al-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh* and *al-Sunnah* by Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 233 AH). *Al-Sunnah*, however, is more a book on *tawḥīd* and Islamic beliefs (*‘aqā’id*) than of jurisprudence. There are two versions of this work in print; the longer version is the one printed in Makkah in 1349 AH, of which there are manuscript copies in Dār al-Kutub and Zāhiriyah libraries in Egypt and Damascus respectively. A smaller version, printed in Cairo without a date, deals with all the fundamental beliefs of the Sunni Orthodoxy, or *ahl al-Sunnah*.

Imam Aḥmad also wrote *Tā’at al-Rasūl* (Obedience to the Messenger). Ibn al-Qayyim quotes from it often in his book, *Iḥlām al-Muwaqqi‘in*, and it seems that he possessed a copy of the work.

Nonetheless, I have looked for this book in many places, but have never been able to find it. From the quoted passages in Ibn al-Qayyim's book, it is apparent that the book was indeed an important one on the subject of jurisprudence, and the methodology of dealing with the Sunnah. It may have been lost after Ibn Qayyim's time, or bound into another book, or the title page lost so that it may be found only after much searching.

The sources also mention that Dāwūd al-Zāhirī (d.270 AH) wrote *Ijma'* (Consensus), *Ibtāl al-Taqlīd* (On the Abolition of Imitation), *Khabar al-Wāhid* (On the Individual Narration), *al-Khabar al-Mūjib* (On the Obligating Narration), *al-Khuṣūṣ wa al-‘Umūm* (On the Particular and the General), *al-Mufassar wa al-Mujmal* (The Succinct and the Detailed), *al-Kāfi fī Muqābalāt al-Muṭṭalibī*⁸¹ (On the Encounter with al-Shāfi‘ī) and *Mas’alatayn Khālafa Fīhimā al-Shāfi‘ī* (Two Issues on Which he Differed with al-Shāfi‘ī).

During this period, the ‘ulama who accepted the school of Imam Abū Ḥanīfah devoted their attention to the study of al-Shāfi‘ī's *al-Risālah*, both in order to refute what they disagreed with, and to derive their own source methodology and principles of jurisprudence from the *fatāwā* made by Imam Abū Ḥanīfah.

In this vein, the Ḥanafī scholars produced several works: ‘Isā ibn Abbān (d. 220 AH) wrote *Khabar al-Wāhid*, *Ithbāt al-Qiyās*, (Validating Analytical Deduction), and *Ijtihād al-Ra’ī* (The Exercise of Legal Reasoning). Al-Barza‘ī (d. 317 AH) wrote *Masa’il al-Khilāf* (Issues of Disagreement), of which there is a 236-page copy in al-Zaytunah Library in Tunis, number 1619. Abū Ja‘far al-Tahāwī (d. 321 AH) wrote *Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’* (Disagreement of the Jurists), which was summarized by Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d.370 AH). There is a copy of this book in Cairo. For more details, refer to the index of *Ma‘had al-Makhtūṭāt* (1/329).⁸² Al-Karābīsī al-Najafī (d. 322 AH) wrote *al-Furūq* (Differences), of which they are manuscripts in Ahmad III and Fayd Allah libraries in Istanbul. Several untitled works on jurisprudence were also attributed to Ibn Samā‘ah (d. 233 AH).⁸³ Al-Kannānī (d. 289 AH) wrote *al-Hujjah fī al-Radd ‘alā al-Shāfi‘ī* (The Evidence in Refutation of al-Shāfi‘ī).

^cAlī ibn Mūsā al-Qummī al-Hanafī (d. 305 AH) wrote *Mā Khālafa Fīhi al-Shāfi‘ī al-‘Irāqiyyīn fī Aḥkām al-Qur’ān* (Instances in which al-Shāfi‘ī Disagreed with the Iraqis in the legal interpretation of the Qur’ān), *Ithbāt al-Qiyās*, *al-Ijtihād* and *Khabar al-Wāhid*. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 340 AH) wrote his well known book *al-Uṣūl* (The Sources) which was printed with a collection of other books in Cairo (no date). Abū Sahl al-Nawbakhtī (d. circa 93 AH), who belonged to the *Imāmiyyah*, wrote *Naqd Risālat al-Shāfi‘ī* (A critique of al-Shāfi‘ī’s *al-Risālah*), *Ibtāl al-Qiyās* (Invalidating *Qiyās*), and *al-Radd ‘alā Ibn al-Rawāndī fī Ba‘d Ārā’ihī al-Uṣūliyyah* (Refutation of Certain of Ibn al-Rawāndī’s Legal Opinions). Ibn al-Junayd (d. 347 AH), who belonged to the *Zaydiyyah* school, wrote *al-Faskh ‘alā man Ajāza al-Naskh limā Tamma Shar‘uhu wa Jalla Naf‘uhu* (The Nullification of those who Permitted Abrogation on Laws already Promulgated and Proved Beneficial), and *al-Iḥfām lī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām* (Understanding Juristic Principles).

The adherents of al-Shāfi‘ī’s school of legal thought (*al-Shāfi‘īyyah*) produced the following works: Abū Thawr (d. 240 AH) wrote *Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’* (Disagreement of the Jursits). Abū ‘Abd Allah Muḥammad ibn Naṣr al-Marwazī (d. 294 AH) also wrote a book on the same subject. Abū al-‘Abbās ibn Surayj (d. 305 AH) wrote a book refuting both ‘Isā ibn Abbān and Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd al-Zāhirī on matters in which they differed with al-Shāfi‘ī. Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad al-Marwazī (d. 340 AH) wrote *al-‘Umūm wa al-Khuṣūṣ* (The General and the Particular) and *al-Fuṣūl fī Ma‘rifat al-Uṣūl*⁸⁴ (Chapters and Knowledge of Legal Source Methodology).

Some of these scholars devoted their attention to producing commentaries on al-Shāfi‘ī’s *al-Risālah*, like Abū Bakr al-Ṣayrafi (d. 330 AH), Abū al-Walīd al-Nīsābūrī (d. 365 or 363 AH), Abū Bakr al-Jawzaqī (d. 388 AH) and Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī, the father of the famed Imam al-Haramayn.

Commentaries of *al-Risālah* are also attributed to five other scholars, namely: Abū Zayd al-Jazūlī, Yūsuf ibn ‘Umar, Jamāl al-Dīn Afqahsī, Ibn al-Fākihānī, and Abū al-Qāsim ‘Isā ibn Nājī.

None of these commentaries, from when the scholars used to

quote until after the seventh century, has come to light in modern times.

Shaykh Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Rāziq⁸⁵ mentioned that the public library in Paris held a copy of al-Juwaynī’s commentary on *al-Risālah*, and quoted some parts of it. I myself have tried – but failed – to locate this manuscript in Paris, perhaps it has been placed with other books under a different heading or title.⁸⁶

DEVELOPMENTS IN *UŞÜL AL-FIQH* AFTER IMAM AL-SHĀFI‘Ī

What we have mentioned so far can hardly be regarded as development, as it mainly resolves around criticizing, supporting or commenting on *al-Risālah*, and really goes no further than that. Once the discipline has been established, the state of affairs continued to about the beginning of the fifth century AH, when what could be considered a significant development in the field began to take place.

During this period, al-Bāqillānī (d. 403 AH) and ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī (d. 415 AH) undertook to rewrite the whole subject of the practice and principles of Shari‘ah source methodology, or *uṣūl*.

In his book *al-Bahr*, al-Zarkashī wrote:

... the judge of *ahl al-Sunnah*, Abū Bakr al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, and the judge of the Mu‘tazilah, ‘Abd al-Jabbār, came and expanded upon what had been written, clarified what had previously been little more than indications, provided detail to what had been mentioned in a general way, and removed ambiguities.

Al-Bāqillānī earned that title of *Shaykh al-Uṣulīyyin*⁸⁷ (Master of the Scholars of *Uṣūl*), after he wrote *al-Taqrīb wa al-Irshād* (Clarification and Guidance). This book has been lost for centuries, though it may yet turn up in one collection of manuscripts or another. In any case, the scholars of *uṣūl* continued quoting from it until the ninth century AH.

For his part, ‘Abd al-Jabbār wrote a book entitled either *al-‘Ahd*

(The Covenant) or *al-‘Amad* (The Pillars) and also wrote his own commentary on it. Imam al-Ḥaramayn (d. 478 AH) summarized al-Bāqillānī’s *al-Taqrīb wa al-Irshād* in a book entitled *Talkhīṣ* (The Summarizing) or *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* (The Summary), of which some pages are preserved in some manuscript collections. Later scholars of jurisprudence transmitted many of al-Bāqillānī’s ideas from his work.

Imam al-Ḥaramayn patterned his own book on *uṣūl*, *al-Burhān* (The Proof), on al-Bāqillānī’s *Taqrīb*, in that it included all fields of jurisprudence, it was free in its method, and followed whatever evidence was available.⁸⁸ He disagreed with his teachers, Imam al-Ash‘arī and Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, on so many issues that many of his fellow scholars from the Shāfi‘ī school of legal thought rejected his commentary and did not give it the attention it deserved, even though they transmitted a great deal from it in their own books. Two Mālikī scholars, Abū ‘Abd Allah al-Māzarī (d. 536 AH) and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Abyārī (d. 616 AH), wrote commentaries on *al-Burhān*. A third Mālikī scholar, Abū Yahyā, combined the two commentaries. Still, all three scholars dealt harshly, if not somewhat unfairly, with Imam al-Ḥaramayn because of what they considered to be his audacity in refuting Imam al-Ash‘arī on matters where he disagreed with him, and with refuting Imam Mālik on the question of *al-maṣāliḥ al-mursalah*. Imam al-Ḥaramayn added introductions to Imam al-Shāfi‘ī’s book which dealt with matters not found in *al-Risālah*. He began by discussing the knowledge of those sources and concepts which anyone who wishes to study any science in depth must have. He explained that the sources of *uṣūl al-fiqh* were *‘ilm al-kalām* (scholastic theology), Arabic language and *fiqh*. Then he dealt with legal judgements, duties, and competence, discussing in detail issues pertaining to various sciences, and explaining those which could be understood by reason, and those by religion. All the above matters formed an introduction to a discussion of the term *bayān* (perspicuous declaration), the subject with which Imam al-Shāfi‘ī began *al-Risālah*.

It is quite apparent, however, when we see how Imam al-Ḥaramayn dealt with the subject of *bayān*, and with other of the

subjects mentioned in *al-Risālah*, that Imam al-Haramayn defined the terms, including *bayān*, more precisely than Imam al-Shāfi‘ī had done. He defined it, explained its essence, mentioned disagreements over it, and set forth its different categories. He also dealt with another matter which Imam al-Shāfi‘ī had not covered, i.e. *ta’khīr al-bayān ‘ilā waqt al-hājah* (deferment of *bayān* until the time when it was needed), and disagreements over it. Then, in discussing the different categories of *bayān*, he reiterated the five categories which Imam al-Shāfi‘ī had mentioned, advocated Abū Bakr ibn Dāwūd al-Zāhirī’s comments on the subject, and then mentioned the other categories of *bayān*, which some jurists had suggested.

Imam al-Haramayn held the opinion that what was meant by *bayān* was “evidence,” of which there are two types: *aqlī* (rational) and *sam‘ī* (received). The basis for “received” evidence is the inimitable Qur’an; so that the closer the evidence is to the Qur’an, the more precedence it has. Hence the order of priority in “received” evidence is: the Qur’an, the Sunnah, *ijma‘*, *khabar al-wāhid*, and *qiyyās*.

Then he turned to languages, and explained that the scholars of jurisprudence had dealt with linguistic matters which the scholars of Arabic had omitted, such as for instance, *awāmir* (commands), *nawāhi* (prohibitions), and *al-‘umūm wa al-khuṣūṣ* (the general and the particular), which al-Shāfi‘ī had covered.

In the course of this linguistic discussion, Imam al-Haramayn mentioned some of al-Bāqillānī’s ideas, which clearly indicates that al-Bāqillānī had already made these additions to the methods of al-Shāfi‘ī.

When Imam al-Ghazālī was the student of Imam al-Haramayn it was only natural that he be influenced by him. In fact, Imam al-Ghazālī wrote four books on the subject of *uṣūl*. The first was *al-Mankhūl* (The Sifted), a medium-sized volume written as though for beginners or intermediate-level students of *uṣūl*. Of the second book nothing is known except that it was referred to in *al-Muṣṭafā*,⁸⁹ and that its title was *Tadhib al-Uṣūl* (On the Refinement of *Uṣūl*). The third book was entitled *Shifā’ al-Ghalil fī Bayān al-Shibh wa al-*

Mukhayyal wa Masālik al-Ta‘līl, and was edited and published in Baghdad in 1390/1971. Imam al-Ghazālī’s encyclopedia of Shari‘ah source methodology, his fourth book on the subject, and his last word, was *al-Mustasfā*, which has been printed several times in Egypt and elsewhere. This is the work he wrote after coming out of his period of meditation and seclusion. Al-Ghazālī began his book with an introduction in which he covered nearly all of Aristotelian logic, a subject in which he had always been deeply interested. Then he wrote on the *hadd* (prescribed punishment – plural *hudūd*), about the conditions that must be satisfied before it can be applied, and about the different types of *hudūd*. He then discussed the *dalīl* (evidence) and its various types.

At this point in the book, al-Ghazālī proceeded to discuss the four poles of his work, headings under which everything in the field of *uṣūl* is covered, and with which his teacher, Imam al-Haramayn, and predecessors, such as al-Bāqillānī, were most concerned. As his teacher has held opinions that differed from those of al-Shāfi‘ī and al-Ash‘arī, so also did Imam al-Ghazālī hold opinions which differed from those of his predecessors. Likewise, among Imam al-Ghazālī’s contemporaries there were those who accepted his views and those who did not.

These were the most important developments made by the followers of Imam al-Shāfi‘ī in the field of *uṣūl*.

The second group to contribute to the development of the discipline were the Mu‘tazilah. After the judge ‘Abd al-Jabbār had written his book, *al-‘Amad* or *al-‘Ahd*, in addition to a full commentary on it, he recorded some of his opinions on *uṣūl* in his encyclopedia, some parts of which have been found and printed under the title *al-Mughnī*. The seventeenth volume of this encyclopedia was devoted to studies of *uṣūl*.

As Imam al-Haramayn concerned himself with the books of al-Bāqillānī, so Abū al-Husayn al-Baṣrī al-Mu‘tazilī (d. 435 AH) concerned himself with the books of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, and wrote a commentary on *al-‘Amad* or *al-‘Ahd*. When he felt that this commentary was too long, he summarized it in his well-known book *al-Mu‘tamad* (The Reliable), which is in print and widely available.

During this period, Shaykh Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476 AH) wrote his two books, *al-Lam*^c (The Bright Light) and *al-Tabṣirah* (Enlightenment), both of which are in print. Abū Yālā al-Farrā' al-Ḥanbali wrote a book entitled *al-‘Uddah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (The Tools of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*), which was edited and published in Saudi Arabia in 1400/1980. Ibn ‘Aqīl al-Baghdādī, another Ḥanbali scholar, wrote *Al-Wadīh fī al-Uṣūl* (What is Clear in *Uṣūl*), Abū al-Khaṭṭāb wrote his well known book, *al-Tamhid* (The Preface), which was recently edited and published in Makkah.

Among the books written by scholars of the Mālikī school of legal thought at that time was *‘Uyūn al-Adillah fī Masā'il al-Khilāf bayna Fuqahā’ al-Amṣār* (Profusion of Evidence on Controversial Issues among the Jurists of the New Muslim Settlements) by Ibn Qaṣṣār al-Baghdādī (d. 398 AH), of which there is a copy at Qarawiyīn University in Fez.⁹⁰ Al-Shīrāzī considered this the best book by any Mālikī scholar on the subject of juristic differences. Ibn Qaṣṣār also wrote *Muqaddimah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Introduction to *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*) of which there is a copy at al-Azhar University library.

The books of the *Shāfi‘iyyah*, *Hanābilah*, *Mālikiyyah* and *Mu‘tazilah* all followed a similar pattern in terms of the order of their chapters and the treatment of their subject matter. Eventually, this pattern became known as “the method of the *Mutakallimūn*.”

THE ROLE OF THE FOLLOWERS OF ABŪ ḤANĪFAH IN THE WRITING OF *UṢŪL*

Some historians of *uṣūl al-fiqh* have suggested that al-Qādī Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan wrote about jurisprudence,⁹¹ but this claim has not been proven. The author of *Kashf al-Zunūn*⁹² quoted ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī’s saying from *Mizān al-Uṣūl* (*Uṣūl* in the Balance):

Know that *uṣūl al-fiqh* is a branch of *uṣūl al-dīn*; and that the composition of any book must of necessity be influenced by the authors beliefs. Therefore, as most of the writers on *uṣūl al-fiqh*

belong to the Mu‘tazilah who differ from us in basic principles, or to the *ahl al-Hadīth* who differ from us in questions of detail, we cannot rely on their books.

Our [Hanafi] scholar’s books, however, are of two types. The first includes books that were written in a very precise fashion, because their authors knew both the principles and their application. Examples are: *Ma’khadh al-Shar‘* (The Approach of the Shari‘ah) and *al-Jadal* (the Argument) by Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333 AH).

The second type dealt very carefully with the meanings of words and was well arranged, owing to the concern of the authors with deriving detailed solutions from the explicit meanings of narrations. They were not, however, skilful in dealing with the finer points of *uṣūl* or questions or pure reason. The result was that the writers of the second type produced opinions in some cases agreeing with those whom we differed. Yet, books of the first type lost currency either because they were difficult to understand or because scholars lacked the resolution to undertake such works.

There is much more that could be said about how accurately this statement depicts the development of the Hanafi studies of *uṣūl*, even if it were made by a Hanafi. The statement does, nonetheless, come to close to reality in explaining the role of the *Hanafiyah* in the development of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. In the first period, these scholars concentrated, even before Imam al-Māturīdī, on discussing the issues brought up by Imam al-Shāfi‘ī in *al-Risālah*, as Ḥasan ibn Abbān and others.

During the following period, one of the most prominent writers of *uṣūl* was ‘Ubaydullah al-Karkhī (d. 340 AH). His book on *uṣūl* consists of a limited number of pages that were printed with Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī’s book *Ta’sīs al-Naẓar* (Establishing Opinion) which has been published in several editions in Cairo.

Then, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370 AH) wrote *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl* as an introduction to his *Aḥkām al-Qur‘ān* (Legal Interpretations of the Qur‘ān). *Al-Fuṣūl* has been researched and edited for a doctoral thesis, and was published recently in Kuwait.⁹³

True development of the *Hanafiyah* writing on the subject of *uṣūl* may be considered to have begun with Imam Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī (d. 340 AH), who wrote two important books on the subject: *Taqwīm al-Adillah* (Appraising Evidence), all or some of which has been researched and edited, but which has not yet been printed, and *Ta'sīs al-Naẓar*.⁹⁴ Abū Zayd made use of the work on *uṣūl* done by his predecessors, especially that of al-Karkhī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, but with the difference that he expanded the field and explained it in greater detail; he also made brief reference to the points on which the *Hanafiyah* agreed and disagreed with others on matters of *uṣūl*. Abū Zayd was followed by Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī (d. 482 AH), who wrote the well known *Kanz al-Wuṣūl ‘ilā Ma‘rifat al-Uṣūl* (A Treasury on Attaining Knowledge of the *Uṣūl*) in which he dealt with *uṣūl* in general. Later the Ḥanafī scholars took great interest in the book and wrote many commentaries on it, the best and most important of which was *Kashf al-Asrār* (Secrets uncov-ered) by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Bukhārī (d. 830 AH). This commentary has been published in several editions in both Istanbul and Egypt. Likewise, Shams al-A’immah al-Sarkhasī (d. 423 AH) wrote *Uṣūl al-Sarkhasī* which has been printed in two volumes in Egypt. This book is considered to be in many ways an alternative reading of al-Dabbūsī’s *Taqwīm al-Adillah*. The Ḥanafī scholars of *uṣūl* took great interest in the books of al-Bazdawī and al-Sarkhasī, and have concerned themselves with teaching and commenting upon them for centuries.

From the above it should be clear that the development of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, as a specialized discipline, had been completed, and that its issues and academic parameters had been defined by the fifth century AH. Indeed, by that century, the scholars of every school of legal thought had recorded their own interpretations and understandings of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

THE METHODS OF THE FOLLOWERS OF IMAM AL-SHĀFI‘Ī OR, THE MUTAKALLIMŪN, AND THOSE OF THE ḤANAFIYYAH

Writings on this subject of *uṣūl* generally followed one out of two

methods. The first was al-Shāfi‘ī’s method, or that of the *Mutakallimūn*. This was the one followed by the *Shāfi‘iyyah*, the *Mālikiyah*, and the *Hanābilah* and the *Mutazilah*,⁹⁵ and it was known as the “method of the *Mutakallimūn*” because the authors of books written in this way used to introduce them with discussions of theological and philosophical issues, such as *hasan* and *qabīh* (the good and the reprehensible), *hukm al-ashyā’ qabl al-shar‘* (The Legal Status of Matters prior to the [revelation of] Shari‘ah), *shukr al-mun‘im* ([the necessity of] gratitude to the Bestower), and *al-hākim* (the question whether it is the Shari‘ah or reason which decides what is right or wrong).

A further reason for its being labelled “the method of the *Mutakallimūn*” was the use of the deductive method in defining principles of source methodology, in ascertaining the validity of those principles, and in refuting those whose opinions differed, without paying much attention to the issues and details which stem from the application of these principles.

THE METHOD OF THE HANAFI SCHOLARS OF UŞÜL

The Hanafi method of writing on *uṣūl* entailed defining the principles of *uṣūl* from the details of legal issues with which their earlier predecessors had already dealt. Thus, the basis of their studies was derived from the details of previously settled legal issues, and not the reverse.

Therefore, one who studies *uṣūl al-fiqh* by this method will gather the details of issues concerning which the Hanafi *a’immah* have already given *fatāwā*, and then analyze them. Through his analysis he will decide the basis on which these *fatāwā* were given.

Al-Dahlawī commented:

...I found that some of them claimed the differences between Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfi‘ī were founded on the *uṣūl* mentioned in al-Bazdawī’s book and elsewhere. But the truth is that most of these *uṣūl* were themselves derived from the differing legal pronouncements of the *a’immah*. My opinion is that such principles of *uṣūl* as the rules which say that the particular (*khāṣṣ*) is obvious

(*mubayyan*), and does not need to be followed by a declaration (*bayān*); that the addition of details to a text constitutes abrogation (*naskh*); that the comprehensive (*āmm*) is definitive (*qatī*) like the particular (*khāṣṣ*); that mere numbers of narrations may not be taken as a factor in according preference (*tarjīh*) to one opinion or another; that the hadith of one who is not a *faqīh* need not necessarily be adopted in cases where there can be no resort to reason; that there is no legitimacy to the notion of progressing from a precondition (*shart*) or description (*waṣf*) to a legal deduction; that the imperative ('*amr*) in a text always indicates legal obligation (*wujūb*); and so on; all of these are examples of principles inferred from the judgements of the *a'immah*. Indeed, there are no sound narrations to suggest that Abū Ḥanīfah or his two companions, Muḥammad and Abū Yūsuf, adhered to any of these principles of source methodology. As such, then, these principles deserve no more to be preserved and defended, as al-Bazdawī and the others did, than the opposing principles do.⁹⁶

THE SCIENCE OF *UŞÜL AL-FIQH* DURING THE SIXTH CENTURY AH AND THE FOLLOWING PERIOD

Following consolidation of the subject matter of this discipline, according to the method of the *Mutakallimūn*, in four major works: *al-Āhd*, *al-Mu'tamad*, *al-Burhān* and *al-Mustasfā*, two great scholars from among the *Mutakallimūn* summarized these four books in works of their own. The first was Imam Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH), who summarized them in his book *al-maḥṣūl* (The Sum and Substance), which I had the honor of researching and editing. This work had been printed in six volumes by Imam Muḥammad ibn Sa'ūd University, and has now been reprinted. The second was Imam Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631 AH), who summarized these four books in *al-Iḥkām fī Uşūl al-Aḥkām* (Precision in the Source Methodology of Law), which has been published in Riyadh, Cairo and elsewhere.⁹⁷

These two books are lengthier and certainly easier to read and understand than others. Of the two, *al-Maḥṣūl* is written in clearer language, and is more detailed in its explanations. Many glosses and

commentaries have been written on these two books. Tāj al-Dīn al-Armawī (d. 656 AH) summarized *al-Maḥṣūl* in his book *al-Hāṣil* (The Outcome) which was researched and edited for a doctoral thesis at al-Azhar University, but has not yet been published.

Muhammad al-Armawī (d. 672 AH) summarized it in *al-Tashīl* which was edited but never published. Imam al-Rāzī himself also summarized *al-Maḥṣūl* in a book entitled *al-Muntakhab* (Selections) which has also been researched and edited.

Qādī al-Baydāwī (d. 685 AH) summarized *al-Hāṣil* in his book *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ’ilā ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl* (The Way of Mastering the Science of *Uṣūl*); but his summary was so abbreviated that the result is like a riddle, very difficult to understand. Thus, many scholars undertook to produce commentaries on this book. Among such commentaries, the best is that of *al-Isnawī* (d. 772 AH), which is entitled *Nihāyat al-Su’l* (An End to Questioning). This book occupied the attention of scholars in the field for a long time, and the *Shāfi‘iyyah* scholars at al-Azhar are still devoted to it.

Al-Āmidi’s book, *al-Iḥkām* (Precision) was summarized by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646 AH) of the Mālikī legal school in his book *Muntaha al-Su’l wa al-’Amal fi ’Ilmay al-Uṣūl wa al-Jadal* (The Ultimate in the Sciences of Jurisprudence and Argumentation) which is well known among the followers of Imam Mālik. The best available commentary on this work is that of Ḥādd al-Dīn (d. 756 AH), for which several glosses and commentaries have been written. All of these books were written following the method of the *Mutakallimūn*, defining the principles, basing evidence upon them, and refuting by means of them those who held opposing views.

The *Hanafīyyah* scholars of *uṣūl* concentrated on studying the books of al-Bazdawī and al-Sarkhasī. This situation remained the same until the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the seventh century AH, when the scholars of *uṣūl* began using a new method. This method entailed combining the methods of the *Mutakallimūn* and the *Hanafī* scholars to produce books that combined the *uṣūl* of the two groups.

Following this method, Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Sā’atī (d. 694 AH) wrote *Bādī’ al-Niẓām al-Jāmi’ bayna Kitābay al-Bazdawī wa al-*

Iḥkām. This book is one that is readily available in print.

Şadr al-Shari‘ah (d. 747 AH) of the Ḥanafī school wrote *Tanqīh al-Ūṣūl* (Refining *Uṣūl*), in which he summarized *al-Maḥṣūl*, *Ūṣūl al-Bazdawī* and *Mukhtaṣar ibn al-Hājib*. He then wrote a commentary on his own book entitled *Tawdīh al-Tanqīh* (Clarification of Refining) to which al-Taftāzānī (d. 792 AH) added a marginal commentary entitled *al-Talwīh*. All three books, *al-Tanqīh*, *al-Tawdīh* and *al-Talwīh* are available in print.

Among the *Shāfi‘iyyah* scholars, Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī wrote his famous book, *Jam‘ al-Jawāmi‘* (The Compilation of the Comprehensive). In the introduction, he mentioned that he had compiled his work from a hundred different books on *uṣūl*. Many scholars wrote commentaries and added footnotes to al-Subkī’s book. Of these, perhaps the most important and most widely available commentary is *Sharḥ al-Jalāl al-Muhallī*, which remains even today the basis for studies in *uṣūl*, especially for the *Shāfi‘iyyah* scholars.

Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794 AH) also wrote a commentary, entitled *Tashnīf al-Masāmi‘* (Pleasing the Ears), part of which was printed in Cairo with footnotes by Shaykh al-Muṭī‘ī (d. 1354 AH). A part of this book was researched and edited for a doctoral thesis at Imam Muhammad ibn Sa‘ūd University.

Al-Zarkashī also wrote *al-Bahr al-Muhiṭ* (The Vast Ocean), in which he collected the submissions of scholars of *uṣūl* from over one hundred books. A student began researching and editing this book under my supervision and has already completed one volume and made it ready for publication. It has since been published in its entirety by the Ministry of Awqaf in Kuwait.

Among the Ḥanābilah, Ibn Qudāmah (d. 620 AH) wrote *Rawdat al-Naẓīr wa Jannāt al-Manāẓir*, in which he summarized al-Ghazālī’s *al-Muṣṭaṣfā*, and added to it other useful material on matters on which the Ḥanābilah disagreed with others. This book has been printed several times, and the Ḥanābilah took great interest in it, to the extent that they ignored nearly all other books. Sulaymān al-Ṭūfī (d. 716 AH) summarized this work, and then commented on his summary in two volumes.

Among the *Mālikiyyah*, al-Qarāfī (d. 684 AH) wrote *Tanqīh al-*

Fuṣūl fī Ikhtiyār al-Maḥṣūl (Refining chapters in the Summary of *al-Maḥṣūl*). Al-Qarāfī also wrote a commentary on *al-Maḥṣūl* in a large volume entitled *Nafā’is al-Uṣūl* (Treasures of *Uṣūl*), part of which has been researched and edited under our supervision in Riyadh.

CHAPTER SIX

Issues Related To Ijtihad

The subject of ijтиhad traditionally took up an entire chapter in a book of *uṣūl*. In that chapter, the author would first deal with ijтиhad by defining it, explaining the conditions for its validity, and differentiating between the various kinds of ijтиhad. Then, he would discuss whether or not the Prophet considered ijтиhad to be a form of worship (*'ibādah*), whether or not it constituted a form of *'ibādah* for the *Sahābah* during the Prophet's lifetime, whether only one answer resulting from ijтиhad on any issue could be correct, or whether there could be several correct answers, and when ijтиhad was and was not permitted. Then the scholars dealt with the subject of *taqlīd* in the same fashion.

In the eighth century AH, Ibrāhīm Abū Mūsā al-Shāṭibī (d. 790 AH) wrote *al-Mūwāfaqāt* (The Congruences), in which he spoke of ijтиhad as an intellectual exercise based on two pillars. The first pillar was complete knowledge of the grammar and syntax of the Arabic language. He left the details of this subject to the scholars of the Arabic language and other writers on *uṣūl*. The second pillar of ijтиhad, in al-Shāṭibī's opinion, was knowledge of the purposes behind the legislation of the Lawgiver. Al-Shāṭibī's predecessors in the field of *uṣūl* had never paid a great deal of attention to these higher purposes. Rather, the most they had down in this direction had been to search for a principle cause, *'illah*. Al-Shāṭibī, on the other hand, wrote his book in order to deal with this important matter. Indeed, knowledge of the purposes or *maqāsid* of the

Shari‘ah is essential to understanding the legislation of the Law-giver. Yet, the scholars of *uṣūl* have never given this book the attention it deserves. This may perhaps be explained by the notion fixed in the minds of many scholars that it is not permitted to seek reasons for legislation by the Almighty, because such speculation cannot be regulated or rendered precise.⁹⁸ When this is the case, or so goes the reasoning of a great many scholars, the study of such matters is little more than a needless intellectual luxury.

Anyway, al-Shāṭibī’s book is in print and widely available; and we can only hope that the teachers of *uṣūl* and those responsible for drawing up curricula will direct their student’s attention to this important work, especially those who are studying *qiyās*, *ta‘līl*⁹⁹ and *ijtihad*.¹⁰⁰ In our own times, the two great scholars, Ibn ‘Āshur and ‘Allāl al-Fāsī have written on the subject of the purposes of Shari‘ah.¹⁰¹

Ibn al-Humām (d. 861 AH) wrote *al-Tahrīr* (The Writing), and his student, Ibn ‘Amīr al-Hājj (d. 879 AH) wrote a commentary on it, entitled *al-Taqrīr wa al-Tahbīr*. Both are in print. *Al-Tahrīr* is one of the books written in the combined *Hanafīyyah–Mutakallimūn* method. There is another commentary, by Amīr Bādshāh, entitled *Taysīr al-Tahrīr* (Facilitating the Writing).

‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Mardāwī (d. 885 AH) wrote a summary of *Uṣūl Ibn Muflīh* (d. 763 AH), entitled *Tahrīr al-Manqūl wa Tahdhīb ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl*. This work has been researched and edited, and is due to be published soon. The same researcher has dealt with *Uṣūl Ibn Muflīh*. Later, Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūhī of the Ḥanbalī school of legal thought wrote a summary of *Tahrīr al-Mardāwī*, and also an excellent commentary on it. This commentary is considered to be one of the best and most comprehensive of the later books about *uṣūl*. An incomplete version of the book was printed in Egypt before it was researched and edited by two prominent professors, Dr. Nazīḥ Hammād and Dr. Muḥammad al-Zuhaylī. Their work was published by the Center for Academic Research in the College of Shari‘ah at Makkah.

In the twelfth century AH, Mūhibb Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Shakūr al-Bihārī (d. 1119 AH), of the Ḥanafī school, wrote his famous book

Musallam al-Thubūt. This is one of the most precise and comprehensive books on *uṣūl* written by the later generation of Ḥanafī scholars. This book has been printed on its own, and with a commentary, in India; and it has also been printed, with its famous commentary *Fawātiḥ al-Rahamūt*, in the margin of al-Ghazālī's *al-Mustasfā* several times.

All of these books were written following the methods mentioned above, and all of them concentrated on supporting their author's school of legal thought, and refuting those of his opponents.

From the sixth century until the present, there is no book to be found which is concerned with presenting *uṣūl al-fiqh* as a research tool that will protect the Muslim jurist from making errors in ijtihad, apart from one remark made in passing by Shaykh ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq in his book *Tamhīd lī Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-Islāmiyyah* (Preface to the History of Islamic Philosophy). His student, Dr. al-Nashshār, tried to explain this remark in his book *Manāhij al-Bahth* (Methods of Research).

In the thirteenth century AH, al-Shawkanī (d. 1255 AH) wrote his well known book entitled *Irshād al-Fuhūl* (Guidance of the Masters). This book, despite its diminutive proportions, presents different opinions in the field of *uṣūl*, and the evidence given by the proponents of each, in a brief but excellent fashion. The author also states which of the opinions he prefers. This book, which has been printed several times, is a useful one for the student of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and comparative studies in jurisprudence. However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been included in the curriculum of any institute, despite its suitability.

Muhammad Ṣiddīq Khan (d. 1307 AH) summarized this work in a book entitled *Huṣūl al-Ma’mūl min ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl* (The Attainment of the Hoped for Science of *Uṣūl*), which is in print. Indeed, *Irshād al-Fuhūl* is considered to be an accurate summary of al-Zarkashī's *al-Bahr al-Muhiṭ*; and al-Mahallāwī's *Tashīl al-Uṣūl* is considered to be a summary of *Irshād al-Fuhūl*.

After this period, we find that the study of *uṣūl* has followed either one of two major trends:

1. Writing study guides, summaries and notes. This has been done by lecturers and professors at various colleges of Shari‘ah and Law in order to make the study of *uṣūl al-fiqh* easier for their students, after they realized that their students were unable, or unwilling, to study this subject. Certainly, these notes did not contribute much to this field; and in most cases they are little more than attempts at recasting the issues of *uṣūl al-fiqh* in a simplified modern idiom. The following scholars, al-Marṣafī, al-Maḥallāwī, al-Khudrī, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, al-Shinqītī, al-Sāyis, Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Khāliq, ‘Abd al-Ghanī ‘Abd al-Khāliq, Abū Zahrah, Abū al-Nūr Zuhayr, Ma‘rūf al-Dawālibī, ‘Abd al-Karīm Zaydān, Zakī al-Dīn Sha‘bān, Muhammad Sallām Madhkūr, and others, all wrote books which were originally of Law and Shari‘ah where they taught.
2. The second trend has been the writing of university theses/dissertations on different aspects of this science, and the researching and editing of unpublished manuscripts. Undoubtedly both aspects of this trend are of great benefit, and I certainly do not intend to demean the efforts of anyone. Nonetheless, they fall short of achieving any sort of development in the field, and the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* remains in the same place our predecessors left it in the sixth century AH.

From the above, we may draw the following conclusions:

1. Nothing of the discipline now known as *uṣūl al-fiqh* had emerged, with its particular terminology, during the time of the Prophet or his *Sahābah*.

Nonetheless, almost all the various ijtihad processes employed during these two periods could be classified under the principles articulated by this science. The reason for this is that they used to derive detailed legal rulings on particular issues from the sources of law as a matter of instinct, just as they used to speak Arabic instinctively, or without being aware of the rules of grammar (which had yet to be articulated at the time).

2. The first scholar to compile a book about the principles of the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* was al-Shāfi‘ī (150–204 AH).

The first comprehensive book on the subject was *al-Risālah*, which he wrote in response to a request from Imam ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mahdī (135–198 AH). This was after the two famous schools of fiqh, the school of *ahl al-Hadīth*, led by Imam Mālik ibn Anas (93–179 AH), and the school of *ahl al-Ra’ī*, led by Imam Abū Ḥanīfah (70–150 AH), had become established and widespread.

Following the circulation of these two legal schools of thought, there arose between their followers, in addition to the political, theological and philosophical conflicts of the period, what can be described as “the fiqh controversy”.¹⁰²

3. *Uṣūl al-fiqh* is a method of research for the jurist,¹⁰³ and its place in fiqh is analogous to that of logic in philosophy.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, it was defined as “the aggregate, considered per se, of legal proofs and evidence that, when studied properly, will lead either to a certain knowledge of a Shari‘ah ruling or to at least a reasonable assumption concerning the same; the manner by which such proofs are adduced, and the status of the adducer.”¹⁰⁵

So *uṣūl al-fiqh* offers comprehensive guidelines which protect the *mujtahid* from making mistakes in the various ways he uses source material for the purpose of deriving legal judgements.¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, it was not used in this way until Imam al-Shāfi‘ī put it to use in his “new” fiqh.¹⁰⁷

4. An important fact that should be borne in mind is that scholars studied fiqh, and made pronouncements on it, for a long time before anyone began speaking about its *uṣūl* (apart from Imam al-Shāfi‘ī in his “new” fiqh).

Thus, the role given by others to *uṣūl al-fiqh* was little more than that of justification for legal pronouncements (*fatawā*) that they made on specific issues, and of the substance of argument and debate among them. Moreover, they did not view *uṣūl al-fiqh* as

a comprehensive legal guideline, or as a methodology capable of regulating the entire legal system, The *fuqahā'*, when faced with questions and situations, used to refer these back directly to the relevant evidence, without feeling the need to have recourse to the general principles articulated in *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

So, Imam Abū Ḥanīfah gave *fatāwā* on nearly half a million issues,¹⁰⁸ which his students learnt and passed on. But, the legal principles upon which Imam Abū Ḥanīfah based these *fatāwā* were never transmitted with anything like an uninterrupted line of authority from him,¹⁰⁹ apart from a few reports in which he refers to some of the sources of his *ijtihad*. He said, in one of those reports:

I follow the Book of Allah, and if I find no solution there, I follow the Sunnah of the Prophet, peace be upon him. If I find no solution in either the Qur'an or the Sunnah, I follow whichever of the pronouncements of the *Šahābah* I prefer, and leave whichever I wish. If there is a pronouncement on a particular matter by any of the *Šahābah*, I would not adopt any other opinion made by any other scholar. But, if I found a solution only in the opinions of Ibrāhim and al-Sha'bī, Ibn Sirīn, al-Hasan al-Baṣrī, ‘Atā’ and Sa‘īd ibn al-Musayyab, I would make *ijtihad* just as they did.¹¹⁰

When some people tried to turn the *khalīfah*, al-Manṣūr, against him, Abū Ḥanīfah wrote to the *khalīfah*:

The situation is not as you have heard, O *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*. I work according to the Book of Allah, then according to the Sunnah of the Prophet, then according to the judgements of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī, then according to the judgements of the rest of the *Šahābah*. Then, if there are any differences between any of their pronouncements, I resort to *qiyās*. No one of Allah's creatures is inherently closer to Him than any other.¹¹¹

When he was accused of preferring *qiyās* to an explicit text (*nass*) in the Qur'an, he replied: “By Allah, those who say that we prefer *qiyās* to a *nass* have lied and slandered us. Is there any need for *qiyās* after [finding an explicit] *nass*? ”¹¹²

5. It is quite obvious that from the beginning of the Umayyad period until the fall of the Islamic *khilāfah*, authority and leadership in the Ummah were in the hands of those who were not qualified to perform ijtiḥad, whilst the responsibility for ijtiḥad rested with the ‘ulama, who had no authority. It is difficult to find exceptions to this state of affairs, apart from the *khilāfah* of ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, from whom many judgements on questions of jurisprudence have been narrated. This situation had the far reaching effect of separating fiqh and its *uṣūl* from the practical aspects of Muslim life, so that in many cases these subjects became theoretical and idealistic.¹¹³ Essentially, both subjects became descriptions of how Muslim life ought to be; not how it really was, or what it might become.
6. The writers and historians of this science classified it among the sciences of the Shari‘ah that are based on transmitted evidence,¹¹⁴ even though some writers said that its principles are taken from the Arabic language, the rational sciences, and certain other Islamic disciplines.¹¹⁵ One of the most prominent writers in this field, Imam al-Ghazālī, wrote:

The noblest sciences are those in which reason (*aql*) and received evidence (*sam‘*) are married, and in which conclusions based on reason accompany those based on revelation. The science of *fiqh* and its *uṣūl* is one of these sciences. It draws equally from the purity of revelation and the best of reason. Yet it does not rely purely on reason in a way that would be unacceptable to revealed law, nor is it based simply on the kind of blind acceptance that would not be supported by reason.¹¹⁶

The statements of Imam al-Ghazālī and other writers of *uṣūl* enable us to suggest that there are three sources of fiqh:

- (a) *Wahī*, or Divine Inspiration: this includes both the recited, or the inimitable Qur'an, and the unrecited, or the Sunnah.
- (b) *Aql* or reason: to explain the texts, to seek ways in which they may be applied and ways in which various parts may be

connected to the whole, to search for the reasons behind legislation that seems to have no reason, to derive laws in matters for which the Lawgiver did not lay down an explicit judgement in the texts, and other similar matters which can be defined and explained.

(c) Experience, customs and the public interest.

All the *uṣūl*, both those which scholars have agreed upon and those concerning which there are disagreements, may be classified under the above three headings, as follows: The Qur'an, the Sunnah, *ijma'*, *qiyās*, the idea that what is basically beneficial is permitted and what is basically harmful is prohibited, *istiḥāb* and *istiḥsān*. In addition, the pronouncements of the *Ṣahābah* which were well known among them and which none of them opposed; the principle of adopting the least rigorous alternative; studying a few of the available relevant cases for purposes of comparison, common interest and customs which were neither commanded nor prohibited in any Islamic source; the conclusion that there is no law when there is nothing to indicate any law; the laws of nations before Islam, and closing the door on justifications.

7. There were certain factors in our history, some of which were mentioned above, that both intimidated and imposed instructions upon us. Consequently, the focus of our Islamic mentality and intellectual attention was diverted to minor issues, so that we were distracted from thinking in comprehensive terms, a characteristic that had once been considered to be the distinguishing feature of Islamic thought. This had a far-reaching effect on the way we dealt with fiqh and on the solutions we produced, in that these also bore the same characteristics and features.
8. It is well known that in every science and sphere of life, there are some matters that are naturally prone to development, that sometimes even require it in order to realize their full potential. Yet, there are some matters that are fixed and immutable.

According to the logic of Islam, the two must be integrated. Hence *uṣūl al-fiqh* has fixed rules which cannot be changed, and others that rely on continual development and renewal. This should be clear from the foregoing discussion of ijtihad.

Hence, while we urge all Muslim scholars not to begin from a vacuum, but to benefit from the reasoning and ijtihad of the scholars that went before them, we affirm that no one can claim that it is obligatory to follow any *mujtahid* in matters where his pronouncements were based solely on his individual reasoning. The best we can say in this matter is that his pronouncements are “an opinion, and an opinion can be shared.”¹¹⁷

9. From studying the methods of the early Muslims it is clear to us that their aim was not simply to ascertain the law and then to produce *fatāwā*. On the contrary, their objective was always the establishment of the rule of Allah through the application of His law. What this means, essentially, is that the circumstances surrounding the application of law cannot be separated from the conditions attached to it.

If, having understood the above, we wish to restore this science to its rightful place among the Islamic sciences, and transform it into a method of research into the source evidence of the Shari‘ah from which we may derive rulings on, and solutions to, our contemporary problems (thus maintaining the sovereignty of the Shari‘ah) we must do the following:

- (a) Review the topics covered by this science, and eliminate those without relevance to the modern scholar or jurist. These might all include *hukm al-ashyā’ qabl al-shar‘* (rulings before the Shari‘ah); *shukr al-mun‘im* (how one is required to thank the Bestower); *mabāḥith hākimiyāt al-shar‘* (studies about the sovereignty of the Shari‘ah); and excessive concern with definitions. We should also dispense with disputes concerning the uncommon recitations, *al-qirā’āt shadhdhah*, of the Qur‘an, and the Arabic nature of the entire Qur‘an. Likewise, we should now end the long disagreement about the single narrator hadith

by saying that if such a narration is proved to have met the conditions of being authentic (*sahīh*), it will be acceptable, and laws may be derived from it.

Moreover, we should re-examine all the conditions laid down by certain early jurists that seem to have been dictated by circumstances. For example, the condition is that a hadith should not contradict the general principles they established, that it should not be narrated by other than a *faqīh*, that it should not contradict *qiyyās*, or the traditions of the people of Madinah, or the explicit meaning (*zāhir*) of the Qur'an. Or the condition that a hadith, if it deals with a common issue or hardship or affliction, must be widely known. All of these conditions should be rejected, and the same must be done with other conditions which were and are still controversial and a source of disagreement among Muslims, and which still occupy the time of scholars.

- (b) Undertake linguistic studies relating to fiqh which will examine the styles of expression used by the Arabs at the time of the Prophet, and note the stages of development, which these styles later passed through, and the various meanings assigned to words in current usage at the time. This will enable us to understand the texts as they should be understood.
- (c) Pay special attention to the methods and the principles required in performing ijtihad, such as *qiyyās*, *istihsān*, *maṣlahah*,¹¹⁸ and others, and study them from a historical perspective, taking into account the circumstances which dictated the pronouncements of the *mujtahidūn*. We should also instill a juristic frame of mind into those who are researching in the fields of fiqh and *uṣūl*.
- (d) Realize that it is impossible at this time for one person to be a *mujtahid mutlaq*, or a legal authority in his own right (on the interpretation of the sources), capable of passing judgement on all manner of issues. As long as this is so, academic councils are the best alternative.

In order to enable these councils to meet the needs of the Ummah in matters of legislation, they should be composed of experts whose specializations cover all aspects of life, and who would be able to perceive clearly any problem presented to them. In addition to this, they would have to have complete knowledge of the general rules and principles of the Shari'ah of Islam. Such councils would also include jurists of the highest level possible, knowledgeable in both the sciences of the Shari'ah and the detailed source evidence. Perhaps one of our great jurists was referring to this idea when he was approached by someone who wanted to break his fast in the month of Ramadan, and the jurist told the man to seek the opinion of a trustworthy Muslim doctor, adding that if the doctor considered the fast injurious to his health, then it would be permissible for him to cease his fast.

- (e) We must make it easier for specialists in other fields to study what they need of the sciences of the Shari'ah.
- (f) We must become familiar with the fiqh of the *Sahābah* and the *Tābi'ūn*; and especially with the principles on which they derived their judgements. In particular, the fiqh of *al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn* and their contemporaries deserves close study. Then, this knowledge may be presented to those whose task it is to formulate legislation and make judgements in response to the demands of contemporary Muslim society.
- (g) We need to take an interest in knowing the aims and purposes of Shari'ah, and in developing the study of this matter by setting down rules and guidelines.

NOTES

¹ Shari‘ah: The collective name for all the laws of Islam including Islam’s whole religious and liturgical, ethical and jurisprudential systems.

² See Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fi ‘Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, edited by Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani (Riyadh: Imam ibn Sa‘ūd Islamic University, 1399/1979); 1st edition, part 1, 94.

³ Ijtihad: Considering that the accepted juridical source of Islam are valid for all times and places, ijtihad may be described as a creative but disciplined intellectual effort to derive legal rulings from those sources while taking into consideration the variables imposed by the fluctuating circumstances of Muslim society. See Taha Jabir al-Alwani, *Ijtihad* (Herndon, Virginia and London, IIIT, 1993); “*Taqlīd* and Ijtihad,” *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* (AJISS), VIII, 1, 129–142; “The Crisis in Fiqh and the Methodology of Ijtihad,” VIII, 2, 317–337; “*Taqlīd* and the Stagnation of the Muslim Mind,” VIII, 3, 513–524; “*Taqlīd* and Ijtihad,” IX, 2, 233–242; “The Scope of *Taqlīd*,” IX, 3, 383–386.

⁴ See the notes on *uṣūl al-fiqh* prepared by the professors of the Shari‘ah Faculty, al-Azhar University, for the academic year 1382/1963, 22.

⁵ Hadith (pl. *ahādīth*): The verbalized form of a tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad (ﷺAS) constitutive of his Sunnah. Also a collective term for all the *ahādīth*. With capital H it applies to the sciences dealing with the Prophet’s tradition in all aspects. The scholars of Hadith are called *muḥaddithūn*.

⁶ *Nāsikh wa munsūkh*: This is the study of those verses of the Qur’ān whose contents have abrogated a legal meaning in another verse, or in a hadith, which is therefore called *munsūkh*. This branch of *uṣūl* also studies whether or not the contents of the hadith may abrogate legal meanings in the Qur’ān, and in other hadith.

⁷ Fiqh: Knowledge of Islam through its laws; science of the law of Islam. *Faqīh* (pl. *fiqahāt*): A specialist in fiqh. Also can be a synonym for ‘alim (pl. ‘ulama) meaning Islamic scholar.

⁸ ﷺ: *Ṣalla Allahu ‘alayhi wa Sallam*: May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him. This prayer is said by Muslims whenever the name of the Prophet Muhammad is mentioned, or whenever he is referred to as the Prophet of Allah.

⁹ SWT: *Subhānahu wa Ta‘ālā*: May He be praised and may His transcendence be affirmed. Said in all occasions.

¹⁰ *Shirk*: Association of other beings with Allah; opposite of *tawḥīd*. *Mushrik* (pl. *Mushrikūn*) A person who practices or believes in *shirk*.

¹¹ *Tawḥīd*: The act of affirming that Allah is the One, the Absolute Transcendent Creator, the Lord and Master of all that is. *Tawḥīd* is the essence of Islam. For a thorough study see Ismā‘il R. Al-Farūqī, *al-Tawḥīd*, (Herndon, Virginia: IIIT, 1992); Ismā‘il R. Al-

Farūqī and Lois Lamya al-Farūqī, *The Cultural Atlas of Islam* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 73–91.

¹² Surah (pl. *suwar/surahs*) Chapter of the Qur'an. Each chapter is divided into a number of verses *āyāt* and the chapters are characterized, according to the place of their revelation as being either Makkian or Madinan.

¹³ See 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Dārimī, *Sunan*, I, 51.

¹⁴ Ibid., I, 50.

¹⁵ Ibid., I, 49.

¹⁶ Ibid., I, 51.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Quoted by Shaykh Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Rāziq in *Tamhīd li Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-Islamiyyah* (Cairo), 152.

¹⁹ *Wudū'*: Ritual washing of parts of the body before salah (prayer).

²⁰ Hajj: the fifth pillar of Islam consisting of acts performed in and around Makkah on the ninth and tenth days of *Dhu al-Hijjah*, the last month of the Islamic lunar year.

²¹ Salah: The act of worship resembling prayer in Islam. There are five appointed ritual *ṣalāwāt* daily: *fajr* (dawn), *zūhr* (noon), *'asr* (mid-afternoon), *maghrib* (dusk), *'ishā'* (night); but a person can, and does, perform voluntary ones.

²² *Fatāwā* (sing. *fatwa*): A juristic opinion given by a *faqīh*, an *'alim*, a *mufit*, or a *mujtahid* on any matter pertinent to Islamic law.

²³ Al-Dahlawī, *Hujjat Allah al-Bālighah*, Egypt, I, 289.

²⁴ For information concerning the validity of citing Hadith as evidence, see the author's, *al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlīd* (Cairo: Dar al-Anṣār), 23–24; and the chapters on ijtihad in *al-Mahṣūl*.

²⁵ See ibn al-Qayyim, *Flām al-Muwaqqīfīn*, passim.

²⁶ *Qiyās*: Legal reasoning, by means of induction, deduction, etc, from the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

²⁷ See Imam al-Shāfi'i, *al-Risālah*, Cairo, 476.

²⁸ RAA : *Rađiya Allahu 'Anhu*: May Allah be pleased with him. Said whenever a Companion of the Prophet is mentioned by name.

²⁹ Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit, I, 54; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Jāmi' Bayān al-'Ilm*, II, 134.

³⁰ The Prophet sent out a party of Muslims with the directions, "Perform the *ṣalāt al-'asr* at Banū Qurayzah." Interpreting this literally, one group of Muslims in the party continued their journey through to sunset, without stopping for *ṣalāt al-'asr* at its prescribed time. A second group, however, more inclined to follow the spirit rather than the letter of the Prophet's words, stopped short of Banū Qurayzah in order to perform the salah at the prescribed time. When informed of what each group had done, the Prophet said that both had been right. (Eds.)

³¹ *Tayammum*: The substitution (for reasons of availability, health, etc.) of sand, stone, or even snow for the usual purification by water and the ritual ablution therewith. *Janābah*: Any act which breaks the ritual purity of the Muslim; the state of such impurity. *Ghusl*: Total self washing of the body, or ritual purification in preparation for salah or burial.

³² This hadith is a well-known and authentic one, and was included by Bukhārī, Abū Dāwūd, Nasā'ī, ibn Mājah, and Alḥmad in their Hadith collections. (Eds.)

³³ This hadith is a sound one and was related by Bukhārī, Muslim, and several others in their collections of authentic Hadith. (Eds.)

³⁴ See ibn Ḥazm, *al-Ihkām*, V, 92–93.

³⁵ *Al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn*: The four rightly guided caliphs who ruled in succession after the Prophet's passing : Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, and 'Alī.

³⁶ Al-Dahlawī, op. cit, I, 315.

³⁷ There is a disagreement about the meaning of the word *kalālah*. According to some, it denotes those who die leaving no lineal heirs, neither issue nor father nor grandfather. Others, however, see it as referring to those who die without issue, regardless of whether succeeded by father or grandfather. The relevant verse in the Qur'an is found in *Sūrat al-Nisā'*, 4:176. And it was on the basis of this verse that Abū Bakr ruled as he did. Abū Bakr's reasoning was that the verse specifies that the sister of the *kalālah* is to receive a half of the inheritance; and if the father had been alive, the sister would not have inherited from the *kalālah* at all. Thus, while the Qur'an does not specify the matter, it is fairly clear that the implied meaning is that the *kalālah* is the one who dies leaving no lineal heirs in either direction. (Eds.)

³⁸ This hadith is an authentic one and was related by Bukhārī, Muslim, Tirmidhī, Ibn Mājah, Alḥmad and others. (Eds.)

³⁹ Zakah: Usually rendered as the “poor-due” or legal charity, zakah is the public welfare tax that must be paid by all Muslims whose wealth and/or income is above a certain minimum. An individual's wealth can be in the form of cash, commodities, livestock, agricultural goods and other items. *Zakah al-fitr* is another kind of obligatory dues a Muslim gives at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, shortly before the celebration of the festival of *'Id al-fitr*, which signifies the fast's completion.

⁴⁰ Abū Bakr meant to say that the interpretation he gave to the words of the hadith was not a strictly literal one. Rather, Abū Bakr felt that the creedal formula, “There is no god but Allah,” is actually to be understood topically as an indication of faith, where faith includes several articles, including zakah, in addition to profession of the creed. (Eds.)

⁴¹ *Khalifah* (pl. *khulafā'*): Vicegerent of Allah in space-time. *Khilāfah* is the institution of man as vicegerent of Allah; the institution of government as continuation of the worldly government of the Prophet.

⁴² *Bay'ah*: The nomination of the *khalifah* by the leaders of the Ummah, or the seconding of that nomination by the members of the Ummah in general; the covenant the first Muslims of Madinah entered into with the Prophet, giving him their obedience, allegiance and protection.

⁴³ Ibn al-Qayyim, op.cit.

⁴⁴ Al-Dahlawī, op. cit, I, 278.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Perhaps the most popular hadith to use this format is the one about brushing one's teeth before salah. (Eds.)

⁴⁷ *Hijāb*: The Islamic dress code for women.

⁴⁸ *Istiṣḥāb*: The consideration of circumstances in the process of adducing a legal argument.

⁴⁹ *Istihsān*: The acceptance of a more subtle *qiyyās* or analogy over one that compares less relevant terms. It is in this context that *istihsān* has sometimes been translated as “juristic preference.”

⁵⁰ *Istiṣlāh*: Legal consideration of the welfare and well-being of both the individual and society as a whole.

⁵¹ *Tābi‘ūn* (sing. *Tābi‘ī*): Literally followers; members of the first generation of Muslims to follow the contemporaries of the Prophet.

⁵² Such *ahādīth* are called individual narrations (*khabar al-wāhiid*), or, in the plural, *āḥād*. The question of status of such *ahādīth* is discussed later in this volume. (Eds.)

⁵³ Ibn Hajar, *al-İṣābah*, IV, 112; and Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, *al-Iṣṭī‘āb* (in the margins of *al-İṣābah*), 415.

⁵⁴ Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, *Jāmi‘ Bayān al-‘Ilm*, I, 33.

⁵⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khuṭat*, IV, 143

⁵⁶ This letter was narrated by Imam Bukhārī in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* without a formal chain of narrators. It was also included by Imam Mālik in his *Muwaṭṭa‘*. See al-Zarqānī’s commentary, I, 10.

⁵⁷ *Musnad*: A hadith with an unbroken chain of narrators, all the way back to the Prophet.

⁵⁸ *Mursal*: A hadith whose chain of narrators is broken at the end, i.e. one ascribed by a *Tābi‘ī* as having come directly from the Prophet. Essentially, as the *Tābi‘ī* could not possibly have heard the hadith from the Prophet, the hadith he related in this manner must have been told to him either by another *Tābi‘ī*, or by one of the *Ṣaḥābah*. But, as the *Tābi‘ī* scholar had no doubts concerning the trustworthiness of the one from whom he had heard the hadith, he felt it unnecessary to name him. For later generations of fiqh and Hadith scholars, however, the question of whether *mursal* hadith could be accepted became a serious issue. The reason for their concern was that the chain of such a hadith is, after all, a broken one; and there is no certainty that, if the *Tābi‘ī* narrator had related the hadith from another of his generation, that the other *Tābi‘ī* was a reliable narrator. For the fiqh and Hadith scholars of the early generations, however, this was not a great problem, as they were familiar with the *Tābi‘ī* narrators and the *shuyukh* from whom they had heard and narrated Hadith. Thus, both Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imam Mālik accept *mursal* hadith; while Imam al-Shāfi‘ī and Imam Ahmād reject the *mursal*. (Eds.)

⁵⁹ Quoted freely from al-Dahlawī, op. cit., I, 205–308.

⁶⁰ What the author is saying here is that these were the methodological tools unknown to the *Ṣaḥābah*, yet widely applied and employed by these two *a’immah*. (Eds.)

⁶¹ As each sect strove to outdo the other, and gain converts from mainstream Islam, they took to distorting the meanings of the Prophet’s words as recorded in the Hadith, and to manufacturing, and then ascribing to the Prophet, words and meanings designed to suit their own purposes. (Eds.)

⁶² Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, *al-Intiqā‘*, 23

⁶³ A hadith with a break anywhere in the chain of its narrators is called a *munqati'*. As it may not, therefore, be established with any certainty that the hadith was passed on from an earlier generation, and thus was not from the Prophet, such a hadith was rejected by the later *fuqahā'*. (Eds.)

⁶⁴ See note number 58.

⁶⁵ Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, op. cit., 24

⁶⁶ It should be mentioned here that Muhammad ibn al-Hasan had also studied under Imam Mālik, and that his version of Imam Mālik's *Muwatta'* is considered by many to be the most authentic. Imam Muḥammad's *Kitāb al-Radd 'Alā Ahl al-Madinah* is an eloquent expression of the differences of the methodological approaches taken by the two schools of legal thought, Mālikī and Ḥanafī, in particular, and by *ahl al-Ra'i* and *ahl al-Hadīth*, in general. Moreover, the conversation between Imam Muḥammad and Imam al-Shāfi'i quoted above is not an accurate representation of Imam Muḥammad's estimation of his first teacher, Imam Abū Ḥanifah, and may well have been among the considerable body of literature that was fabricated, by zealous followers, in praise of certain *a'immah* and in censure or depreciation of others. For more information, see Shaykh Muḥammad Zāhid Kāwtharī, *Ta'nīb al-Khaṭīb*. (Eds.)

⁶⁷ Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, op. cit, 86.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ See Fakhr al-Rāzī, *Manāqib al-Shāfi'i*, 26.

⁷⁰ Imam al-Haramayn, 'Abd al-Mālik al-Juwaynī, *Mughīth al-Khalq*.

⁷¹ Al-Zarkashī, *al-Bahr al-Muhiṭ*, MS.

⁷² Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, op. cit. 25.

⁷³ There has been little dissension on this matter. Recently, however, followers of the earlier schools of legal thought have produced some evidence that indicates that scholars before Imam al-Shāfi'i, like Imam Abū Yūsuf of the Hanafī school, did write about this important branch of the Shari'ah sciences. (Eds.)

⁷⁴ See 'Abd al-Rāziq, op. cit. 234.

⁷⁵ In his introduction to the translation of *al-Risālah*, Majid Khadduri discusses the meaning of *bayān*. He writes:

"By al-*bayān*, which al-Shāfi'i applies to Quranic communications, he means a clear declaration embodying a rule or a principle of law. The term is frequently used in the *Risāla* either in the sense of mere declaration, embodying a rule of law, or in clarifying the meaning of a certain rule of law."

Accordingly, the term *bayān*, is translated by Khadduri as a perspicuous "declaration." See Majid Khadduri, *al-Shāfi'i's Risāla: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence*, second edition, (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1987), 28. (Eds.)

⁷⁶ Khadduri, 122

⁷⁷ *Iddah*: The period of time a woman must wait following divorce or widowhood before she can remarry.

⁷⁸ Khadduri, 350–351.

⁷⁹ Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., I, 32.

⁸⁰ ‘Ādah: Custom, practice. A given community’s customs not going against the principles of Islam. Admissible as part of Islamic law.

⁸¹ By al-Muṭṭalibī he meant Imam al-Shāfi‘ī.

⁸² An edition of the section of Jaṣṣāṣ’s summary of this book was published in Pakistan by the Islamic Research Institute. The editor of that volume, however, mistakenly attributed the work directly to Abū J‘afar al-Taḥāwī. (Eds.)

⁸³ See Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 284

⁸⁴ Ibn al-Nadīm, op. cit, 299.

⁸⁵ See ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq, op. cit.

⁸⁶ Probably the only way to find it is to sift though all the manuscripts. That, however, is a daunting task.

⁸⁷ See al-Qarāfī, *Nafā’is al-Uṣūl*, I, 1-19.

⁸⁸ A fine edition of *al-Burhān*, edited by Dr. ‘Abd al-‘Azīm al-Dib, was published in 1979 in Qatar. (Eds.)

⁸⁹ See al-Ghazālī, *al-Muṣṭaqfā*, I, 187.

⁹⁰ See Brockelmann, appendix II, 963, No. 49.

⁹¹ See Makkī, *Maṇāqib al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfah*, II, 245; the introduction to *Uṣūl al-Sarkhasī*, I, 3; Qutubzadeh, *Miftāḥ al-Sa‘ādah*, II, 37; and Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*. Everyone who made this claim based his information on Ibn al-Nadīm’s comment in his biography of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan: “He has a book of *uṣūl* which includes chapters on salah, zakah and hajj.” This, however, would appear to refer to a work on *Uṣūl al-Dīn*. (In fact, it is more likely that the reference is to Imam Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan’s work on fiqh, *Kitāb al-Asl*, which was published in five volumes in Pakistan. (Eds.)

⁹² See Ḥaŷī Khalīfah Shalabī, Vol.I, 110-111.

⁹³ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s main work, *Aḥkām al-Qur‘ān*, was the subject of this editor’s thesis, and is presently being translated, along with detailed annotation, into English (Eds.)

⁹⁴ *Taqwīm al-Adillah* has been edited in ten volumes and is soon to be published, Allah willing. (Eds.)

⁹⁵ Each of these groups of scholars added something of their own to their books, though they used the same format for writing and the same method of presenting evidence and arguments.

⁹⁶ See al-Dahlawī, op. cit, I, 336-341; also his *al-Inṣāffī Bayān Asbāb al-Ikhtilāf* (Salafiyyah, Cairo) 38-40.

⁹⁷ After the first edition of this work appeared, Professor Bernard Weiss of the University of Utah published an exhaustive study of Āmidī’s work in a volume entitled, *The Search for God’s Will*. (Eds.)

⁹⁸ A further reason is the implication that the scholar is attempting to “second guess” the Almighty. (Eds.)

⁹⁹ *Ta’līl al-Aḥkām*: Rationalization of the legal verdicts in the Shari‘ah. (Eds.)

¹⁰⁰ Dr. Khālid Mas‘ūd of the Islamic Research Institute of Pakistan has published a valuable study in English of al-Shāṭibī’s work under the title of *Islamic Legal Philosophy*. Other recent studies of al-Shāṭibī’s work include Dr. Aḥmad al-Raysūnī’s, *Naẓariyat al-*

Maqāṣid ‘inda al-Imam al-Shāṭibī, fourth edition (Herndon, Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995) and Dr. Hammādī al-‘Ubaydī, *al-Shāṭibī wa Maqāṣid al-Shari‘ah* (Beirut: Dar Qutaybah, 1992) (Eds.)

¹⁰¹ Another contemporary to write on the subject was Dr. Yūsuf Hāmid al-‘Ālim whose *al-Maqāṣid al-‘Āmmah li al-Shari‘ah al-Islamiyyah* was published in 1991 by the International Institute of Islamic Thought. (Eds.)

¹⁰² See ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah*, III, 1163–64

¹⁰³ Al-Nashshār, *Manāhij al-Baḥth*, 55.

¹⁰⁴ See *Musallam al-Thubūt* and its commentary, accompanying Ghazālī’s *Mustaṣfā*, I, 9–10. The author denied that logic was like this, and claimed that the position of logic in relation to both philosophy and *uṣūl al-fiqh* was the same. He may have been influenced by the suggestion that logic is the standard of all sciences.

¹⁰⁵ See Chapter One of the present work.

¹⁰⁶ See al-Rāzī, *Manāqib al-Shāfi‘ī*, 98 ff, and Al-Nashshār, op. cit., 55.

¹⁰⁷ Imam al-Shāfi‘ī’s “new” fiqh is the name given to his legal work after he had settled in Egypt. Essentially, this represents his mature thinking following the long period of his study under both the Mālikī and the Ḥanafī schools of legal thought. (Eds.)

¹⁰⁸ See Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Rāziq, *al-Imam al-Shāfi‘ī*, 45.

¹⁰⁹ See al-Dahlawī, *al-Inṣāf*; and Abū Zahrah, Abū Ḥanīfah, 223 ff.

¹¹⁰ See *Tārīkh Baghdad*, Vol XXXI, 368, *al-Intiqā’*, 142, and *Mashāyikh min al-Balkh al-Ḥanafiyah*, 190.

¹¹¹ See Samarcandī, *Mīzān al-Uṣūl*, I, 52; Taqī al-Dīn Ghazzī, *al-Tabaqāt al-Saniyyah* I, 43; and *Mashāyikh min al-Balkh*, 193.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ See Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, *Tārīkh al-Fiqh*, 160.

¹¹⁴ See al-Khawarizmī, *Mafātiḥ al-‘Ulūm*, Vols. VI, VIII; and Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah*, III, 1125–1128, 1161–1166.

¹¹⁵ See *Miftāḥ al-Sa‘ādah*.

¹¹⁶ See al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, Vol. 1, 3, and *al-Mankhūl*; also *Shifā’ al-Ghalil fī Bayān al-Shibh wa al-Makhil wa Masālik al-Ta‘līl*, and *Tahdhīb al-Uṣūl*, all of which are important books on the subject.

¹¹⁷ A well known saying attributed to ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb.

¹¹⁸ *Maṣlahah* (pl. *maṣāliḥ*) Considerations of public interests. It is generally held that the principle objective of the Shari‘ah and all its commandments is to realize the genuine *maṣlahah* or benefit of its jurisdiction.

BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX

- 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abbās, see under Ibn
 'Abbās
 'Abd Allah ibn Abī Ja'far, 23
 'Abd Allah ibn 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, 11,
 28
 'Abd Allah ibn Mas'ūd, see under
 Ibn Mas'ūd
 'Abd Allah ibn 'Umar ibn al-
 Khaṭṭāb, see under Ibn 'Umar
 'Abd Allah ibn Yusr, 22
 'Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, 11, 28
 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dib, 18
 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Bukhārī, 52
 'Abd al-Ghanī 'Abd al-Khāliq, 61
 'Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī, 46
 'Abd al-Karīm Zaydān, 61
 'Abd al-Mālik al-Juwainī, see under
 Imām al-Ḥaramayn
 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Mahdī, 62
 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf, 11, 19
 'Abd al-Rāziq, 'Alī, 27, 60, 74, 85
 'Abd al-Rāziq, Muṣṭafā, 46, 18, 108
 'Abd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, 61
 Abū al-'Abbās ibn Surayj, 45
 Abū 'Abd Allah al-Mazārī, 47
 Abū 'Abd Allah Muḥammad ibn
 Naṣr al-Marwazī, 45
 Abū 'Amr al-Sha'bī, see under
 Sha'bī al-
 Abū Bakr al-Jassās, see under Jassās
- Abū Bakr al-Jawzaqī, 45
 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn 'Amr ibn
 Hazm, 23, 34
 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Mūsā ibn
 Ya'qūb, 11
 Abū Bakr al-Ṣayrafi, 45
 Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, 9, 11
 Abū Bakrah, 11
 Abū al-Dardā', 11
 Abū Ḥanifah, 27-28, 31-32, 37, 44,
 53-54, 62-63, 74, 109
 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Abyārī, 47
 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karkhī, 45,
 Abū Hurayrah, 11, 29
 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī al-Mu'tazilī,
 49
 Abū Iṣhāq al-Shirāzī, 50
 Abū Ja'far al-Ṭahāwī, 44, 12
 Abū al-Khaṭṭāb, 50
 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturidī, 51
 Abū Muḥammad al-Juwainī, 34, 43,
 46
 Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī, 11, 29, 47, 49
 Abū al-Nūr Zuhayr, 61
 Abū Sahl al-Nawbakhtī, 44
 Abū Sa'id al-Khudrī, 11,
 Thawr, 32, 45
 Abū 'Ubaydah, 7
 Abū al-Walid al-Nīsābūrī, 45
 Abū Yahyā al-Mālikī, 47

- Abū Ya‘lā al-Farrā’, 50
 Abū Yūsuf, 50, 54, 73
 Abū Zahrah, 61, 109
 Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī, 51, 52
 Abū Zayd al-Jazūlī, 45
 ‘Aḍd al-Dīn, 55
 Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, 32, 34, 43
 ‘Ā’ishah, 18, 27
 ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, 50
 ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq, see under ‘Abd al-Rāziq
 ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, 11, 25
 ‘Alī ibn Mūsā al-Qummī, 45
 ‘Allal al-Fāsī, 59
 ‘Alqamah al-Nakha‘ī, 28
 ‘Āmir ibn Wāthilah, 22
 ‘Ammār ibn Yasīr, 11
 Amīr Badshāh, 59
 Anas ibn Mālik, 11, 22, 29
 Armawī, Tāj al-Dīn al-, 55
 Ash‘arī, Imam al, 11, 29, 47, 49
 ‘Atā’ al-Khurāsānī, 22
 ‘Atā’ ibn Abī Rabāh, 23
 ‘Atā’ ibn Yasār, 25
- Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, see under Zarkashī
 Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr Tayyib, 46–49
 Barza‘ī, al-, 44
 Baydāwī, al-, 55
- Dahlawī, Shāh Walī Allah al, see under Shāh Walī Allah al-Dahlawī
 Dārimī, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān, 13
- Dawālibī, Ma‘rūf al, 61
 Dāwūd al-Ζāhirī, 44
 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see under al-Rāzī
 Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawī, 52–56
 Ghazālī, Imam al, 48, 49, 56, 60, 69, 89, 109, 116
 Hammād ibn Abī Sulaymān, 56
 Hārūn al-Rashīd, 26
 Hasan al, al-Baṣrī, 22, 63
 Hasan ibn ‘Ubayd Allah al-Nakha‘ī, 23
 Hudhayfah ibn al-Yamān, 11
- Ibn ‘Abbās, ‘Abd Allah, 6, 12, 21, 22, 25, 28, 29
 Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, 29, 51, 53, 63, 65, 67, 72
 Ibn Abī Dhī'b, 26
 Ibn Abī Shaybah, 27
 Ibn Amīr al-Hājj, 59
 Ibn ‘Aqīl al-Baghdādī, 50
 Ibn Dāwūd al-Ζāhirī, Abū Bakr, 48
 Ibn Dāwūd al-Ζāhirī, Muḥammad, 45
 Ibn al-Fākihānī, 45
 Ibn Hajar, 53
 Ibn al-Hājjib al-Mālikī, 55–56
 Ibn Ḥazm, 19, 34
 Ibn al-Humām, 59
 Ibn Ishāq, 7
 Ibn al-Junayd al-Zaydī, 45
 Ibn Jurayj, 26
 Ibn Khaldūn 102, 113

- Ibn Mas‘ūd, ‘Abd Allah, 11, 15, 25, 28-29
- Ibn al-Nadīm, 83, 84, 91
- Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūḥī, 59
- Ibn Qaṣṣār, 50
- Ibn al-Qayyim, 42-44, 25, 29, 43, 79
- Ibn Qudāmah, 56
- Ibn al-Rawāndī, 45
- Ibn Samā‘ah, 44
- Ibn al-Shihāb al-Zuhrī, see under al-Zuhrī
- Ibn Sīrīn, 22, 63
- Ibn ‘Umar ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Khtṭāb, 7, 22, 25, 27-29, 45
- Ibn ‘Uyaynah, 31
- Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, 15, 22-23, 25, 27-28
- Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad al-Marwazī, 45
- Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, 58-59, 99, 100
- Ikrimah, 22
- Imam Abū Ḥanīfah, see under Abū Ḥanīfah
- Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, see under Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal
- Imam al-Ash‘arī, see under Ash‘arī
- Imam al-Ghazālī, see under Ghazālī
- Imam al-Haramayn, ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Juwainī, 45, 47-49, 70
- Imam Mālik, see under Mālik ibn Anas
- Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, see under Shāfi‘ī
- ‘Imrān ibn al-Ḥusayn, 29
- ‘Isā ibn Nājī, Abū al-Qāsim, 45
- Isnawī al-, 55
- Jābir ibn ‘Abd Allah, 10
- Ja‘far ibn Rabī‘ah, 23
- Jamāl al-Dīn Afqahsī, 45
- Jaṣṣāṣ, Abū Bakr al, 44, 51-52
- Juwaynī, ‘Abd al-Mālik al, see under Imam al-Haramayn
- Kannānī, al, 44
- Karābīsī, al-Najafī al, 44
- Karkhī, ‘Ubaydullah al, 51-52
- Kawtharī, Shaykh Muḥammad Zāhid, 66
- Khālid ibn al-Walīd, 14
- Khudrī, al, 61
- Khālid Masūd, 74
- Khawārizmī, al, 75
- Kindī, ‘Ubādah ibn Nusay al, see under ‘Ubādah ibn Nusay al-Kindī
- Mahallāwī, al, 60-61
- Majid Khadduri, 75
- Makkī, 91
- Mālik ibn Anas, 31, 62
- Manṣūr al-‘Abbāsī, 26, 63
- Maqrīzī, al, 55
- Mardāwī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al, 59
- Masrūq, 26
- Maymūn ibn Mahran, 12
- Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal, 8, 9, 11
- Mu‘awiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, 11
- Muhammad al-Armawī, 55
- Muhammad Zāhid Kawtharī, 66
- Muhammad al-Zuhaylī, 59
- Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī, 27
- Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, see under Shāfi‘ī

- Muhammad Sallām Madhkūr, 61
 Muhammad Yūsuf Mūsā, 113
 Mūhibb Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Shakūr al-Bihārī, 59
 Muslim ibn Khālid al-Zinjī, 31
 Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Khāliq, 56
 Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Rāziq, see under ‘Abd al-Rāziq
 Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Sā‘atī, 55
 Nashshār, al, 60, 103, 106
 Nazīḥ Hammād, 59
 Qāsim, al, 7
 Qāsim ibn Muhammad, 25
 Qutub Zadeh, 91
 Rabī‘ ibn al-Ṣubayḥ, 26
 Rabī‘at al-Ra‘ī, 25
 Raysūnī, Aḥmad al, 100
 Rāzī, Imam Fakhr al-Dīn al, 54-55, 69, 106
 Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, 11
 Ṣadr al-Shari‘ah, 56
 Sahl ibn Sa‘d al-Sā‘idī, 22
 Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab, 25
 Sālim, 25
 Salmān al-Fārisī, 11
 Sarkhasī Shams al-A’immah al, 52
 Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, 54-55
 Sāyis, al, 61
 Sha‘bī al, Abū ‘Amr al, 25
 Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs al, 9, 31-38, 41, 47-49, 63, 74, 56, 66
 Shāh Walī Allah al-Dahlawī, 24, 25, 27, 23, 36, 59, 96, 109
 Shalabī, Ḥajī Khalīfah, 92
 Shams al-A’immah al-Sarkhasī, see under Sarkhasī
 Shawkanī, al, 60
 Shaykh al-Muṭī‘ī, 56
 Shinqītī, al, 61
 Shurayḥ, 15, 25
 Sufyān al-Thawrī, 26
 Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah, 31
 Sulaymān al-Tūfī, 56
 Taftāzānī, al, 56
 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, 56
 Ṭalḥah, 11
 Taqī al-Dīn Ghazzī, 111
 Ṭāwūs, 22
 Thawrī, Sufyān al, see under Sufyān al-Thawrī
 ‘Ubādah ibn al-Ṣāmit, 11
 ‘Ubādah ibn Nusayr al-Kindī, 7
 Ubay ibn Ka‘b, 11
 ‘Ubayd Allah ibn ‘Abd Allah, 25
 ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, 23, 64
 ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, 7, 11, 18, 28, 117
 Umm Salmah, 9
 ‘Urwah ibn al-Zubayr, 25
 ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, 11, 17, 19
 Yahyā ibn Kathīr, 22
 Yaḥyā ibn Sa‘id, 25
 Yazīd ibn Abī Ḥabīb, 23
 Yūnus ibn ‘Abd al-A‘lā, 31
 Yūsuf Ḥāmid al-‘Ālim, 101
 Yūsuf ibn ‘Umar, 45

- Zā'farānī, al, 32
Zaki al-Dīn Sha'bān, 61
Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn al, 34, 46, 56,
 60, 71
Zarqānī, al, 55
Zayd ibn Aslam 18
Zayd ibn Thābit, 9, 18-20

GENERAL INDEX

- abrogation, 3, 32, 39, 45, 54
academic councils, 67
‘ādah, 42
adultery, 13, 18
āhād, 3, 72
ahl al-Hadīth, see also under “*Mālikiyah*”, 28, 30–33, 43, 51, 62, 73
ahl al-Kitāb, 35
ahl al-Naṣr, 5
ahl al-Ra’ī, see also under “*Hanafiyah*”, 28–30, 32–33, 43, 63, 73
ahl al-Sunnah, 43, 46
al a’imma al-mujtahidūn, 24–25
al-Khulafā’ al-Rāshidūn, 20, 68, 71
alcohol, 18
‘āmm, 3, 34, 37, 54
analogical reasoning, see under “*Qiyās*”, xi, 3, 34
apostasy, 13, 19
apostates, 15, 19
aql, see under “reasoning”, 48, 64
arabic grammar, 6, 58, 61
arabic language, see under “linguistics”, vii, 47, 58, 61, 64, 66
awāmir, 48
- Banū Qurayṣah, 9, 70
bāṭin, 37
- bay’ah*, 14, 71
bayān, 36–37, 47–48, 54, 70, 72–75
chain of narrators, 3, 20, 26, 72
Companions, see under “*Sahābah*”, 5–6
compensation, payment of, 20
compulsory duties, see under “*fard*”, 39
consensus, see also under “*ijmā’*”, 3–4, 44
customs, see under “*‘ādah*”, 27, 65, 74
evidence, 1–5, 15, 24, 29, 33–34, 37–38, 40–42, 44–45, 47–50, 52, 55, 60, 62–64, 66, 68, 70, 73–74
fabrication of Hadith, 21, 29
false accusation, 18
faqīh, see under *fuqahā’*, 22, 25, 54, 67, 69, 70
fard, 38–39
fatāwā, 8, 11–12, 16–17, 22–23, 25, 27, 29, 44, 53, 62–63, 66, 70
fuqahā’, 20, 22, 24, 27, 44–45, 50, 63, 69, 73
- General, see “*‘āmm*”, 37, 44–45, 48
ghusl, 9, 70

- Hadd* punishments, 18, 49
 Hadith, see also under “*ahl al-Hadīth*”, 3, 13, 21, 23–24, 27, 29–34, 39–41, 54, 66–67, 69–73
Hajj, 8, 17, 26, 39, 70, 74
Hanābilah, 50, 53, 56
Hanafiyah, 51–52, 55, 59, 75
 Hardship, 16, 67
 History of fiqh, 4, 34
 Homosexual practices, 14

 ‘iddah, 39, 41, 73
 ‘ījab, see under “obligation”, 42
 ijma‘, 3, 15, 20, 33, 39–42, 44, 48, 65
 ijtihad, see also under “opinion” and “interpretation”, 1–2, 4–6, 8–10, 13–14, 16–18, 24, 27, 37, 40, 44–45, 58–61, 63–64, 66–67, 69–70
 ‘illah, 58
 ‘ilm al-kalām, 2, 47
 inheritance, 14, 25, 41, 71
 interpretation(s), 2, 9, 10, 24, 27, 34, 37, 40, 45, 51–52, 67, 71
 isnād, see under chain of narrators
istidlāl, 38
istihsān, 18, 27, 34, 40, 42, 65, 67, 72
istiṣḥāb, 18, 42, 65, 72
istiṣlāh, 18, 72

janābah, 9, 70
jarḥ, 3
 judgements, 1, 6, 8–9, 12–17, 22–25, 27, 40–42, 47, 54, 62–65, 67–68

kāfirūn, 35
kalālah, 13, 71
khabar al-wāhiid, 40–41, 44–45, 48, 72

khāss, 3, 34, 37, 41, 53–54
Khawārij, 20, 29–30
 legal deduction, 70
 legal judgements, 1, 12, 16, 40, 47, 62
 legal principles, 63
 legal proofs, 1, 62
 legal terminology, 36, 42
 legal thought, 2, 4, 28, 43, 45, 47, 50, 52, 59–60, 73, 75
 linguistic(s), 3, 48, 67
 logic, 2–3, 49, 62, 66, 75

madhhab / madhāhib, 2
Malikiyyah, 50, 53, 56
mansūkh, 3, 38, 43
maqāṣid, ix, 75
maṣāliḥ al-mursalah, 33, 47
maṣlaḥah, 67, 75
 methodology, x, 1, 15, 25, 27–28, 34, 41, 44–46, 49, 53–54, 63, 69
mubayyan, 3, 54
mujmal, 3, 44
mujtahid, 62, 66, 70
mujtahid muṭlaq, 67
mujtahidūn, 2, 25, 67
munqati‘, 31, 73
 murder, 13, 19
mursal, 24, 31, 72
mushrikūn, 35, 69
mutakallimūn, 50, 52–55, 59
mu‘tazilah, 34, 46, 49–51, 53

 Narrators of hadith, see also under “chain of narrators”, 3
nāsikh, 3, 38, 43, 69

- naskh*, see under “abrogation”, 3, 45, 54
nawāhi, see under prohibitions, 48
oaths, 41
obligation(s), 38, 40, 42, 54
opinion(s), see also under “ijtihad”, “interpretation” and “*ahl al-Ra’i*”, 9, 13–14, 17–20, 23–28, 30, 33, 41, 45, 48–49, 51, 53–54, 58, 60, 63, 66, 68, 70
particular, see under “*khāṣṣ*”, 3, 15, 37, 44–45, 48, 53–54
precedent, 6, 17, 37
precondition, 54
preference, 1–3, 29, 33–34, 40–41, 54, 72
prisoners of war, 15
prohibition(s), 3, 16, 35, 39, 42, 48, 65
public interest(s), 16, 65, 75
public treasury, 14, 17
purposes, legal, 10, 16, 58–59, 68
qiyyās, 3, 9–14, 18, 20, 26, 32, 34, 37, 40–42, 44–45, 48, 59, 63, 65, 67, 70, 72
Qur'an, x, 3–7, 9–10, 12–13, 15, 17–18, 20, 26, 32, 34–42, 45, 48, 51, 63–67, 69–71, 73–74, 79
Ra’i, see under “opinion”
rationalists, see under “*ahl al-Ra’i*”, 28
reasoning, xi, 2–3, 8, 16, 29, 33–34, 38, 41, 44, 59, 66, 70–71
Revelation(s), see also under “Qur'an” and “Sunnah”, vii, x, 2, 6, 10, 38, 53, 64, 70
riwāyah, 40
robbery, 19
Saḥābah, 5–8, 10–12, 14–15, 17, 19–22, 24–29, 33, 41–42, 58, 61, 63, 65, 68, 72
salah, 8, 13, 17–18, 39, 47, 70–71, 74
shāfi'iyyah, 45, 50, 53, 55–56
shahādah, 40
Shari‘ah, colleges of, 59, 61
shart, see under “precondition”, 54
Shi‘ah, 20, 29–30
shirk, 4, 69
Sunnah, x, 3, 5–7, 9, 12–13, 15, 17–21, 23–26, 30, 32, 37–41, 43–44, 46, 48, 63–65, 69–70
Sunni see under “*ahl al-Sunnah*”, 42–43
Tābi‘ūn, 20, 22, 24–25, 27, 33, 35, 68, 72
ta‘dīl, 3
tahrim, see under “prohibitions”, 42
taqlīd, 4, 44, 58, 69–70
ta‘līl, 49, 59, 75
tashrīf, 4
tawātur, 3, 5
tawhīd, 4, 43, 69
tayammum, 9, 70
traditionalists, see under “*ahl al-Hadīth*”, 28, 32
Ummah, 4, 5, 16, 64, 68, 71
Unization of Allah, see under

- Tawhid*, 4
‘urf, 27, 42

Zāhiriyah, 43
zakah, 13, 39, 71, 74

Wahī, see also under “revelation”,
6, 64
war, 13, 15
wasf, 54
wudū', 8, 70
wujūb, see under “obligation”, 54

UŞÜL AL-FIQH IS A SCIENCE WHICH IS DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN THE ISLAMIC EXPERIENCE AND ONE WHICH, THANKS TO ITS METHODS AND CONCERNS, HELPED GENERATE AN EMPIRICAL TREND IN MUSLIM CULTURE, IN TURN BENEFITING WESTERN THINKING. ITSELF A CREATION OF INFLUENCES FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT, *AL-UŞÜL*, OFTEN CALLED “THE PHILOSOPHY OF ISLAM,” INVITES BOTH REASON AND REVELATION TO WORK FOR THE HARMONY AND WELL-BEING OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

ALTHOUGH THE SCIENCE OF *AL-UŞÜL* IS MAINLY CONCERNED WITH LEGAL MATTERS, ITS RANGE AND THE ARSENAL OF TOOLS IT USES MAKES IT ATTRACTIVE TO STUDENTS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE AS WELL AS TO OTHER SCHOLARS OF ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE. THE DIFFICULTIES IT POSES ARE INEVITABLE. THIS BOOK, HOWEVER, ATTEMPTS TO SIMPLIFY THIS “MOST IMPORTANT METHOD OF RESEARCH EVER DEVISED BY ISLAMIC THOUGHT” DURING ITS MOST CREATIVE PERIOD, AND BRING IT TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF THE MODERN LEARNER, WHILE UNDERSCORING ITS IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE TO THE WORLD OF ISLAM TODAY.

DR. TAHAA JABIR AL-ALWANI

The author is a graduate of Al-Azhar University, Cairo. He is President of The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS), USA; President of The Fiqh Council of North America; Member of the OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy; and former President of The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), USA. He is also the author of numerous works including: Towards a Fiqh for Minorities; The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam; Ijtihad; and The Qur'an and the Sunnah: The Time-Space Factor.



IQRA
by ALI OMAR ERMES
© ALI OMAR ERMES 1991



COVER DESIGN
by SADDIQ ALI

£5.95 / \$9.95