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**NATIONALISM
AND INTERNATIONALISM
IN LIBERALISM, MARXISM
AND ISLAM**

Tahir Amin

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**International Institute of Islamic Thought
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Foreword

The contemporary man is essentially confronted with the same problem that had confronted his ancestors of yore --- the problem of making judicious adjustments between a multiplicity of identities, of harmonizing a variety of loyalties. For, as always, the contemporary man also has a sense of belonging to a number of collective entities, small and large. He belongs at one and the same time to his family, to his neighbourhood, to his vocational group, to a certain territorial unit, and to an ethnic or linguistic group with which he identifies. Above all, he is also conscious of belonging, apart from every other identity, to humanity.

Thus there do exist today, as there existed in the past, several focal points of man's loyalty. Thanks to this, there persists the problem of grappling with the claims of different, even competing identities on man's loyalty, and of adjusting those loyalties in a manner that would conduce to the well-being of the individuals as well as the various groups to which they belong.

I

In pre-modern times, men were generally inclined to view themselves as belonging primarily to the communities formed around devotion to a cluster of religious beliefs and practices such as Islam and Christianity. The idea that one owes one's loyalty primarily to one's nation, or to one's fatherland, hardly existed. This idea,

which came to be termed as nationalism, arose sometime in the eighteenth century and has been, since then, an extremely potent force in human history. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nationalism played a major role in re-drawing the map of Europe; in fact its influence gradually embraced a much wider area, leading to major political developments in many parts of the world. In the name of nationalism, scattered segments of humanity were integrated, as under its influence some of the bloodiest wars were fought and human beings were annihilated on a scale hardly known ever before. At no point in modern history, however, did the tension between loyalty to the nation and to other groups --- both smaller and larger than the nation -- altogether disappear. Nevertheless, loyalty and devotion to the nation has generally remained the dominant sentiment and has usually been recognized as such at least ever since the French revolution.

Gradually, however, the idea of belonging to the entire human race -- an idea that had always been alive --- assumed increasing importance, and especially so after the First World War. The phenomenal advancements in transport and communication also heightened this feeling --- and this despite the vestiges of racist doctrines --- of a common humanity. In the post-Second World War period it even began to be visualized that in the course of time the hold of nationalism would greatly weaken, that the nations of the world would move towards some kind of a closely knit international community, and the barriers dividing man from man would ultimately be demolished.

II

The developments that have taken place during the last two or three decades, however, have startled many students of politics and international relations. The countries under the influence of Western Liberalism have undoubtedly seen in many parts of the world the weakening of the nationalist feeling in its conventional sense. On the other hand, they have also witnessed the rise of movements motivated by national sentiments as well as those focused on narrower, ethnic entities. Curiously enough, they have also witnessed alongside that the rise of larger trans-national groupings such as the European Community, and an increased emphasis of the idea of an international community.

Likewise, the countries which had come under the influence of Marxism also encountered some highly unexpected developments. Under the banner of Marxism the workers of the world were expected to unite for, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, they had nothing to lose but their chains. Not only did the dream of a universal Marxist Eldorado prove chimerical, but the masses of humanity languishing under the Marxist dispensation conceived the Marxist order itself to constitute their chains and rose in rebellion against it, and did so partly under the inspiration of nationalism.

Coming to the Islamic world, the developments during the recent decades have been no less astonishing. Given the sustained prevalence of secularism across the world in the modern times, the revival of religion as the basis of group identity and statehood had begun to be conceived as well-nigh impossible. To the astonishment of many, in 1947 the fifth largest state of the world

came into existence precisely on the ground that those united by their belief in Islam had the right to a separate statehood in the South Asian Subcontinent. More recently too on a number of occasions, the world of Islam has witnessed very powerful expressions of transnational Islamic identity. At times the feeling for such an identity was felt to be so strong and intense among the Muslim masses that some political adventurers, who have been known for their brazen contempt for Islam, resorted to manipulating Islamic sentiments. Paradoxically enough, this revival of Islamic identity and this enhanced emphasis on a universal Muslim *ummah* has been paralleled, in some parts of the world of Islam, by the emergence of movements of narrow linguistic and ethnic nationalism, by the emergence of what in Islamic parlance would be dubbed as '*aṣabiyyah*'. The result was that Muslims of one ethnic or linguistic group were seen pitted against those of another.

III

In the present work, Dr. Tahir Amin has embarked on the ambitious task of surveying the twentieth century developments at the intellectual level as to how the prominent thinkers of three traditions --- Liberalism, Marxism and Islam --- have wrestled with the problem of man's multiple identities. The information and insights provided by the author should undoubtedly foster greater understanding of these three traditions and a better appreciation of the implications of these three world-views for their adherents as well as for the world at large. It is obvious that these benefits will not be exclusively confined to the realm of the intellect. The insights gained would hopefully enable the followers of these

different world-views to engage in a more meaningful dialogue and would equip them for a more fruitful interaction.

It is true that at the present Marxism seems to be speedily receding into the background to an extent that at the moment it appears to be growing into an object of historical rather than practical interest. The present decline of Marxism should, however, not detract from the fact that during the greater part of the present century it had inspired millions of people, had shaped their outlook, and had given rise to a large number of economic and political institutions in a very large part of the world. True, the current disillusionment with Marxism seems so profound and widespread that its recrudescence in the very near future would appear beyond the range of the probable. However, if history teaches anything, it teaches that ideas die hard; that they appear, disappear and then re-appear in cycles.

With the speedy receding of Marxism from the intellectual and political scene of the world, the significance of the Islamic and the Western liberal traditions will, in all likelihood, correspondingly enhance, and their interaction --- friendly or otherwise --- will assume added significance. In fact one can already see that not only the popular media of the West but even current Western scholarship have begun to give vent to an alarmist concern about Islam which is reminiscent of the scare which, not long ago, was associated with the Communist Bloc ---the mysterious world behind the iron curtains. The present Western mood about the Muslims even reminds one of the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto in which Marx and Engels had dramatically started off by saying: "A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of

Communism". With a slight change, it could be said today: "A spectre is haunting the West --- the spectre of Islam". The phobia of Islam --- "militant Islam" --- which at times assumes hysteric proportions in some sections of the Western society, and the fury and frenzy which characterize the unceasing tirade directed against "Islamic fundamentalism" only underscore the need of building bridges of understanding between the world of Islam and the rest of the world, especially the Western.

It is evident that the irrational fear of, not to speak of contempt for, Islam and Muslims that presently seems to have seized a fairly good number of people in the West is an undeniable reality. Unfortunately this remains the case despite the vogue of liberalism, and the erudition, courage and breadth of outlook of a number of Western scholars and intellectuals. It is also undeniable that Muslims, for a variety of reasons, reciprocate a good deal of the negative feelings that are expressed for them in the West. While these attitudes can be understood in terms of the historical encounter between Christendom and the world of Islam, it would seem that never before in history was it as imperative as it is today that men of different world-views should reach out to each other in an earnest effort to understand the inner dynamics of the world-views of each other and their potential to influence the relationships between human beings at the global level.

As one who has been for long interested in the problem of nationalism and internationalism, this writer feels that he has been enriched by carefully going through the present comparative study of the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism as encountered by thinkers who view problems from a Liberal, Marxist

or Islamic frame of reference. At the same time, as one who in the earlier part of his scholastic career had attempted to study the encounter between the nationalist idea and Islamic thought in the Arab world and the South Asian Subcontinent, it would perhaps not be altogether impertinent for him to highlight a few points, and to add perhaps a few observations relating mainly to the nature of the problem in the Islamic world even if they might be in the nature of adding footnotes to the contents of the learned author's work.

IV

To start with, it needs to be emphasized that it is not for the first time in its history that Islam has wrestled with the problem of competing loyalties. At the very time of its inception, Islam was faced with the challenge of *'aṣabīyah*, the moving spirit of the pre-Islamic social order. As we shall observe, *'aṣabīyah* was an idea which greatly resembled nationalism since it signified boundless and unconditional loyalty to the tribe or clan. The two bear striking resemblance in so far as while *'aṣabīyah* denotes supreme loyalty to the tribe, nationalism denotes supreme loyalty to the nation. Significantly enough, the motto of the sixth century Arabs was: "Help your brother [clansman]: right or wrong". Could anything be closer to the motto of the nationalists in the present century: "My nation: right or wrong"?

Islam strongly denounced tribal *'aṣabīyah* in the strongest terms. Whoever fights for or invites people to *'aṣabīyah*, according to the Prophet (peace be upon him), is "not from me" (See Muslim, "Imārah", 57). Rather than the tribe, Islam itself became the main

rallying-point, the major unifying force, the primary basis of communal cohesion. Thus, Muslims were held by the Qur'ān to be nothing but brothers to one another (49:10) and were declared by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to be "one hand" against all others (Abū Dā'ūd, "Jihād", 147). Was that designed to give birth to a new kind of chauvinism --- Islamic chauvinism? Was it intended to provide a rationale for Muslim self-aggrandizement?

The idea of establishing a universal entity based on common devotion to the One True God is in fact related to the basic mission of the Muslim *ummah*. Unlike a tribe, or a nation in the ordinary sense of the term, the Muslim *ummah* has not been raised to pursue its group interest, or to seek the fulfilment of its economic and political ambitions. It is an *ummah* which, rather than exist for its own sake, has been raised "for all mankind" (3:110). Moreover, they are an *ummah* with a mission --- the mission to uphold the word of God, to be witnesses of truth and justice, to constantly endeavour to promote good and oppose evil. This is not to say that collective entities other than the Muslims will never support what is good and never oppose what is evil. In the case of Muslims, however, to support what is right, to uphold what is just and to oppose what is evil constitute their very *raison d'être*, their essential mission. It is the pursuit of this mission which calls for the establishment of brotherhood among Muslims since mutual cooperation and support greatly strengthens them in the performance of their mission. This internal solidification of the Muslim ranks is primarily actuated by the desire to serve all mankind by making godliness and goodness, justice and fairplay, and benevolence and generosity prevail in human life. The Muslims have, therefore, always tended to regard their unity as a necessary means for

effectively operating in history for the realization of the higher goals set forth by Islam.

However, this idealist aspect of the outlook of the Muslims has never prevented them from giving due importance to the other ties that bind them to entities other than the Muslim *ummah*. It is not just that Islam recognizes these different entities as facts of life that are natural, and hence ought to be stoically accepted, but also as manifestations of God's infinite wisdom. "And among His signs", says the Qur'ān, "is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the variations in your languages and your colours" (30:22). Likewise, whereas the inherent oneness of all mankind is categorically affirmed by the Qur'ān, the division of humanity into such entities as tribes and nations has been attributed to God Himself; and while it is unjustified to consider affinity with any tribe or nation or race to be a true indicator of the inherent superiority of one group over the other, the division of mankind into different entities itself serves to facilitate knowing each other better (see the Qur'ān 49:13).

The teachings of Islam as embodied in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and as applied in the history of the earliest period of Islam are indicative of Islam's balanced and moderate attitude in dealing with the problem multiple collective entities to which man belongs. This is evident from the fact that the Islamic requirement to place a very high value upon the Islamic entity did not lead to denying the value of other natural groups --- the family, the neighbourhood, the clan, or the tribe. There seems no reason why what was true of these relatively smaller entities known in the early period of Islam should not be true in respect of the larger entities in vogue

in the present age such as those based on common fatherland, or common language, or common culture.

The attitude that Islam adopted in respect of the tribe is especially instructive. It is true that Islam established a trans-tribal entity --- the Muslim *ummah*. It is also true that this *ummah* had a very high degree of claim upon a Muslim's loyalty. But what was the attitude of Islam to the very existence of the entity called 'tribe' or 'clan'? In our view, this attitude may be summed up by saying that Islam did not seek to destroy tribes and clans, nor did it ask the Muslims to completely sunder their ties with those entities. Islam cultivated in the Muslims an attitude of mind that would make them transcend rather than destroy tribes or clans. What Islam in fact sought to do was to destroy *'aṣabīyah* which might be roughly translated as tribal chauvinism. For Islam was strongly opposed to was the exaggerated loyalty to the tribe in vogue in the sixth century Arabia. This was because loyalty to the tribe or clan was placed above everything else so much so that even considerations of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong were subordinated to tribal interests. Nor did Islam approve the attitude of mind which would consider the tribal tie to be of greater importance than the religious tie that binds all Muslims into one *ummah*. Thus, the essence of the Islamic position was not that of denying as such the legitimacy of all entities other than the Islamic one. The Islamic position rather consisted of according supremacy to the entity woven around devotion to the One True God, acceptance of the Qur'an as the Word of God, affirmation of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last and final Messenger of God, and belief in Islam as the true way of life for all mankind.

In the early period of Islam when Muslims appeared on the stage of history, they were a single political entity. This situation continued during the first century of Islam. But gradually the Muslim world split into a number of political entities. However, even when a multiplicity of states had become known realities of Muslim political life, Muslim scholars and thinkers never ceased to yearn for the unification of *Dār al-Islām*. Islam had provided a very solid infra-structure of unity which rested on a common world-view, common ethical norms, a common system of law, and a host of other common factors emanating from this basic unity of outlook. However, Muslim thinkers and scholars were usually not satisfied with the cultural unity that characterized their life. They generally kept up the ideal --- even if it be a remote and ultimate ideal --- of establishing a unified political framework in the form of a single Islamic state that would embrace all Muslim lands. (It seems worth exploring whether the authoritative Muslim scholars of the past were fully agreed about this or not. Further, it also needs to be explored as to what arguments were adduced from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* to support the actual position taken, whatever they might be, on the issue).

V

In the highly changed conditions of the present-day world, Muslims are faced again with some of the problems that they had faced in the earlier periods of their history. While encountering the dilemma of nationalism and trans-national unity of the *ummah* several Muslim thinkers were completely swept off their feet and succumbed to the new-fangled nationalist ideology of a chauvinist variety. This is evident from the exaggerated exaltation of territorial

and linguistic entities in several Muslim countries. Let us consider a few concrete examples. In Egypt, for instance, the innocent sentiment of patriotism that came into prominence in the nineteenth century gradually changed into a movement of Egyptian exclusivism. Under its influence many Egyptian nationalists denied all ties between the Egyptian Muslims and their co-religionists in other parts of the world, became blind to the fact that ninety percent of the Egyptians were Muslims with strong Islamic roots, and even went so far as to glorify the Pharaohs and Pharaonism and to consider them the sources of their inspiration. Likewise, the movements of Iranian and Turkish nationalism at times evinced scant respect for Islam; in fact they seemed to make it a point to play down the Islamic factors in the collective life and historical experience of the Iranians and the Turks respectively. Indeed, despite the very close relationship between Islam and Arabism in history, the movement known as Arab nationalism came into sharp conflict with almost all the socio-political ideals cherished by Muslims throughout their history, and looked upon Islam merely as one of the numerous expressions of the genius of Arabism rather than as God's final message to all mankind.

It is no surprise that nationalism of the kind mentioned above has drawn the ire of those who seek to make Islam an operative factor in the life of the Muslims both at the individual and collective levels. Such persons perceive nationalism as a dangerous ideology with the potential to de-Islamize their socio-political life; as a sinister doctrine which threatens to shatter the unity of the Muslims, making them fall an easy prey to imperialist designs; as a retrograde ideology that raises barriers between man and man, driving each nation to seek aggrandizement at the cost

of the others; as a major cause of wars and bloodshed among the nations of the world; as a major factor in transforming the world into a house dangerously divided against itself.

The first impression that one gets from reading the writings of the contemporary Islamic thinkers and comparing them with the writings of the exponents of nationalism is that any reconciliation between Islam and nationalism must be altogether excluded. This impression is not altogether false especially if nationalism is interpreted in a manner which fundamentally negates the socio-political ideals of Islam. But a more careful reading of the exposition of socio-political ideas of Islamic thinkers is likely to lead to a somewhat different conclusion. It would reveal their disposition to view the dilemma of nationalism and trans-national Muslim unity with much greater calm-headedness and realism than is generally believed. In order to illustrate this, we would like to look cursorily at the writings of some Islamic thinkers of the present and the latter part of the previous century.

We would embark on this by considering, first of all, the relevant writings of Ḥasan al-Bannā (d. 1949), the founder of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, one who fully fits into the Western stereotype of a "fundamentalist" and "militant" Islamist. Not unlike other Islamists, al-Bannā also emphasised that Islam is not merely a creed of the Muslims; it also constitutes their fatherland and nationality. He stressed that the Islamic fatherland comprises all Islamic lands. The idea that the collective identity of the Muslims is one and indivisible has also been very forcefully emphasised by al-Bannā.

Islam does not recognize these geographical boundaries and these racial and blood differences. It regards all Muslims as belonging to the same nationality and considers the Islamic fatherland one fatherland. (Hasan al-Bannā, *Risālat al-Mu'tamar al-Khāmis*, Cairo, n.d., p.48).

He went on to say that "every piece of the earth where there lives a brother who follows the faith of the Qur'ān is a part of the common Islamic fatherland". (Hasan al-Bannā, *al-Rasā'il al-Thalāth*, Cairo, n.d., p.73).

It is because of such ideas that al-Bannā supported the ideal of emancipating all Muslim lands rather than just Egypt, or at the most the Arab world from foreign domination. (See *al-Bannā Bayn al-Ams wa al-Yawm*, Cairo, n.d., p.25). On the same grounds he held that aggression against one part of the Muslim world is aggression against the whole Muslim world. (Cited in Ishaq Musa Husayni, *The Moslem Brethren*, Beirut, 1956, p.68).

All this is, however, one aspect of al-Bannā's thought. For al-Bannā's devotion to the unity of the Muslim *ummah* did not make him oblivious to the fact that he owed a special loyalty to Egypt. Al-Bannā seemed to visualize the Muslims to be living in several concentric circles so that loyalty to any one of those circles did not necessarily exclude loyalty to others. He expressed this idea by pointing out that a Muslim has, first of all, a broad, general nationality --- the Islamic nationality --- which is the fundamental and highly vital one. But alongside that a Muslim also has a particular nationality. A Muslim is thus bound by duties to both -- a general duty to the Islamic nationality and a particular duty

to the people among whom he lives. Al-Bannā enunciated this view as follows:

... the Ikhwān respect their particular nationality on the ground that it is the first foundation of their cherished renaissance. They do not consider it wrong that every person should work for his country and give precedence to it over other countries. After that, the Ikhwān support Arab unity as the next step towards the renaissance. Thereafter they strive for Pan-Islamism as a fence to protect the general Islamic fatherland. (*Risālat al-Mu'tamar al-Khāmis*, op. cit., pp.49 f.).

He supported the theory of "particular nationality" by saying that:

Islam enjoins upon every person to strive for the good of his country and lose himself in its service and render utmost service to the nation (*ummah*) in which he lives, and to give precedence to kinship and neighbourliness [in acts of benevolence]. Due to the [principle of] preferring the ones who are close ... Islam does not allow the transfer of *zakāh* beyond the limits of *qasr* except when necessary. Hence a Muslim is the most deeply patriotic person and is benevolent towards his compatriots. This is so because it has been so ordained by God ... The Ikhwān are, for this reason, the keenest of all people in their desire for the good of their fatherland; they are completely self-denying in the service of their people; they wish for this great and glorious country all power and glory and all progress and advancement. (*Ibid.*, p.46).

It is clear from Ḥasan al-Bannā's writings that while he opposed the nationalist ideology, he was emphatic about some of

those objectives which the nationalists also seek to achieve. In this connection he coined a number of terms and expressions which indicate the shared area of objectives between him and others, including the nationalists. Al-Bannā made it clear, for instance, that he was not opposed to *waṭanīyat al-ḥanīn* (the nationalism of love) by which he meant the love for one's country. Far from being opposed to that, al-Bannā regarded such a love as one ingrained in human nature. This is evidenced by the fact that Bilāl and the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to feel restless whenever they remembered Makkah after *hijrah*. Al-Bannā also does not disagree with *waṭanīyat al-ḥurrīyah wa al-'izzah* (the nationalism of freedom and glory). By this al-Bannā meant the desire to see one's country free and to inculcate the love of freedom and honour in the souls of one's compatriots. Al-Bannā also did not disapprove of *waṭanīyat al-mujtama'* (the nationalism of social welfare). This, in al-Bannā's opinion, meant strengthening the ties that bind the individuals of the same country. He believed that far from being disapproved by Islam, it was in fact encouraged by it. In like manner, al-Bannā considered *qawmīyat al-ummah* which, in his view, denoted that a person owes his primary responsibility to his people. He also considered it altogether justified that a person should serve his own people prior to serving others. (See al-Bannā, *al-Rasā'il al-Thalāth*, op. cit., pp. 16-21).

Since the nationalists in the Muslim world have been generally opposed to Pan-Islamism it would be of some interest to explore as to what form of Islamic unity was visualized by the Pan-Islamists, including Ḥasan al-Bannā. A basic fact that strikes one about the Pan-Islamic movement is that while it has represented a certain trend of thought and indicated the general direction in

which the Muslims of the world ought to move --- the direction of Muslim unity --- it has not had a well-defined and clearly formulated political programme to bring that unity about. Also, Pan-Islamism did not necessarily require that all Islamic countries should be united in the form of a single Islamic state. There is no sign that even the most forceful protagonist of Pan-Islamism, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d.1897), to quote Albert Hourani, "had it in mind to create a single Islamic state or to revive the united caliphate of early times". (Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.116). Nor did Muḥammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), the main disciple of al-Afghānī, entertain such an idea. The practical form of Muslim unity visualised by him for the present age was one that would resemble the structure of the Germanic states [in his time]. These states, although independent, were united. (See Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Ta'rikh al-Ustādh al-Imām*, vol. I, 1931, pp. 306 f.).

Coming to back to Ḥasan al-Bannā, we find that like all other Islamists, he also strongly supported the "integration of all parts of the Islamic fatherland which have been cut off from one another due to the machinations of the Western powers" (see al-Bannā, *Ilā al-Shabāb*, Cairo, n.d., p.9). And yet this integration is not conceived in terms of a single Islamic state embracing all Islamic countries. What this integration meant was that the Muslim countries should not be exclusively occupied with their own problems, but should cooperate with each other in solving the problems of the Muslims all over the world. In this connection al-Bannā wanted the formation of an Organization of Muslim Nations (*Hay'at al-Umam al-Islāmīyah*) which would embrace all Muslim nations, both Arab and non-Arab. Even though the concept of this

Organization is not very clear or elaborate, the scanty information available to us indicates that it was conceived more or less along the lines of the League of Arab States which, in this case, would cover all the Muslim countries. (See al-Bannā, *Mushkilātunā fī Daw' al-Nizām al-Islāmī*, Cairo, n.d., pp. 35 f.).

In order to illustrate the matter further, it would be worth our while to glance at what one of the most prominent jurists of the Arab world in recent years, Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, has to say on the issue of Pan-Islam. In an article entitled *al-Jāmi'ah al-Islāmīyah* (Pan-Islam) serialized in *al-Muslimūn*, Abū Zahrah addressed himself to the problem of the structure of Islamic unity. Like other Islamists Abū Zahrah also strongly pleads for Pan-Islam. Nevertheless, Abū Zahrah traces the political history of Islam in order to argue that the ideal of Islamic unity in the form of one single Islamic state did not last long. He even goes on to say that it could not last long. Such a unity was possible only when Islam had not spread beyond the "land of the Arabs". It became impossible to maintain unity in the form of a single state after the conquests brought vast territories under the Islamic domain. Abū Zahrah seems to regard this development as natural. (See *ibid.*, pp.125-27). Therefore, instead of pleading for unity in the form of a unified Islamic state, he pleads for the formation of an Islamic League comprising all Muslim states. This Islamic League should, in the opinion of Abū Zahrah, unite the Islamic world in the following manner:


1. It should lead to an Islamic political union by which Abū Zahrah means that the Islamic League should have a council

to ensure that the Islamic states follow a uniform foreign policy *vis-a-vis* the non-Muslim states.

2. It should foster economic cooperation in order to enable the Islamic countries to establish an economy which might not be dependent upon, or interlinked with the economies of Europe, U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. This object is desirable in order that Muslims might not remain an appendix of any of the world economic blocs, and may be able to apply the laws of their religion in the economic sphere of their life.
3. It should also lead to linguistic unity founded on "the language of the Qur'ān", a unity that will subsequently lead to cultural unity. (See *ibid.*, p.128).

Abū Zahrah also desires that the Islamic League should serve the purpose of maintaining Islamic brotherhood. This purpose, in his view, can be achieved by preventing Islamic countries from fighting among themselves either in war or on the political or economic fronts. (See *ibid.*, p.123).

The unity that Abū Zahrah conceives is one that would be founded on the basis of the Qur'ān and its laws. The common, unifying factor will be the Islamic faith, although individual Islamic countries should still have the right to choose for themselves the form of government they like best. According to Abū Zahrah, the same was the view of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. (See *ibid.*, p.127). (For other Muslim thinkers of the modern Islamic world who do not visualize the goal of unifying all Muslim countries into a single state see James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States*,



The Western World is moving beyond the confines of nation-states and towards the formation of a supra-national community. The Marxist World, threatened by ethno-national movements with disintegration, is going through a basic transformation and is in process of liberating itself from its intellectual legacy. The Muslim World is caught up between two trends: loyalty to the nation-state and to the wider loyalty of the *ummah*. The cold war is over, and yet - thanks to the clash of ideas and the conflict of ethnic and national loyalties - the world might be heading for a major re-shaping of its political map.

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This study seeks to come into grips with the dilemma of nationalism versus internationalism in three major traditions of the world - Liberalism, Marxism and Islam. The work underscores the necessity of a genuine international understanding and dialogue as a necessary step towards building a more peaceful world order.

