



IN SERVICE *of* GOD AND HUMANITY

The Legacy of Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali



Benaouda Bensaid

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THE LEGACY OF SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI

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HUMANITY • THE LEGACY OF
Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali

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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT
LONDON • WASHINGTON

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1437AH/2015CE

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ISBN 978-1-56564-663-6 *limp*
ISBN 978-1-56564-664-3 *cased*

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Printed in Malta by Gutenberg Press Ltd

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Foreword

IN HIS PASSIONATE DEVOTION to the task of inviting others to Islam, Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917-1996) provides Muslims with a powerful critique of themselves, not only in their endemic failure to project Islam in the best, most reasoned light, but also in their betrayal of the Qur'an's spiritual principles and the highest standards set by the Prophet Muhammad (ṢAAS).*

This work analyses in detail both al-Ghazali's critique of *du'āt* (those inviting to Islam) and the practice of *da'wah* work itself (the call to Islam). It also examines al-Ghazali's methodology and various proposed solutions as well as the juristic responses to his perspective.

If *da'wah* is a wall, then for al-Ghazali *du'āt* would form its bricks, for a sound construction requires sound material. Blind to their moral, educational and organizational imperfections, rightly magnified under al-Ghazali's angry radar, “gung-ho,” “have-a-go,” and would be *du'āt*, as well as those “trained” for the role, woefully out of touch with the world around them, and outmoded in their thinking, are severely criticized by al-Ghazali for the damage their ignorance (and blundering moral conduct) is causing. And one can understand why. On one level nothing is more deterring in the province of ideas than the questionable analytical, moral and spiritual status of the deliverer and his/her *modus operandi*. After all, seeking God is an intellectual as much as it is a spiritual, moral exercise. Not surprisingly therefore al-Ghazali discusses *da'wah* in terms of a studied discipline and an

* (ṢAAS) – *Ṣallā Allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam*: May the peace and blessings of God be upon him. Said whenever the name of the Prophet Muhammed is mentioned.

ability to contextualise in terms of both mastering and combining what has been termed as the two ‘readings’, by which is meant the reading of Revelation and the reading of the real existential or time-space reality of man’s existence. It is a hugely important element with regards to the way we make sense of, or ‘read,’ the world around us and interact with it. Unfortunately it is also a dimension largely missing in the training of *du‘āt* as well as Muslim scholars and imams who by the very nature and social impact of the work they perform should be among the foremost in awareness and implementation of it.

On a second, more profound level, al-Ghazali takes the long-term view, in that he cares for humanity and where it is heading. For him the consequences of Muslim ineptness, and refusal to recognize their deficiencies, is nothing short of devastating. And modest success here and there is not good enough. The urgency has become extreme. In our own times, the resultant damage has potential repercussions greater than even al-Ghazali would have dared imagine, much of which we are witnessing today. With an Islam held hostage to a global censure that is increasingly seeing expression in acts of violence and brutality, and a media internationally vocal in its castigation of Islamic prescriptions and any tendencies Muslims would seem to express in their favor, it is vital more than ever that the faith is represented in its finest, authentic form, by those true to the example and teachings of the Prophet. They need to be articulate and intelligent, sincerely communicating with concerted effort (conforming to a high moral code without moral smugness), so that people can be guided to God and something of this determined anger at Islam and Muslims mitigated.

In sum, al-Ghazali understood one thing clearly, wavering little in his vision: in matters of faith we are to observe the highest ethical standards, exude the best of reasoned, intelligent, and informed discourse, and widen our scope, using to the best of our ability the materials available to us. For him, wandering like babes in the wood desperately in need of intelligent, authentic

guidance, and a clear exposition of God, humanity, particularly in the age of rational humanism, was instead being seduced into the arms of an increasingly sophisticated secularism, using scientific truth as the basis of all truth for modern man. In response taking a rather lukewarm, narrow approach, Muslims seemed more intent on focusing on their own daily minutiae and internal disagreements, than expending what is in fact required – intellectual responsibility and a great broad based effort, which involves overcoming poor economic and educational standards as well as the overall social and ethical decline of Muslim societies.

Note, those internal disagreements of al-Ghazali's time have evolved also in our time into dangerous volatility as anger is being channelled into avenues of extremism and lawless violent action in response to the many challenges facing Muslim society, both internally and externally. Fuelled, amongst other elements, by persistent political and economic corruption, and virtually naked misuse and abuse of power, a huge and serious backlash is today engulfing the Muslim world. A war-torn world so bedeviled with illiteracy and decline, so removed from the Qur'an, that the language it chooses to interpret its definitions and solutions by is that of violence. And not just violence towards the Other but also, in some societies, in its unjust treatment of women, in complete and outright contradiction to the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In this regard worth reading is AbdulHamid AbuSulayman's *Marital Discord: Recapturing Human Dignity Through the Higher Objectives of Islamic Law* which examines the sensitive issue of marital discord and the "chastisement" (*ḍarb*) of wives with a deep respect and appreciation for the position and status of women in society.

In addition, hypocritical radical elements who have clearly abandoned the Qur'an, clothe themselves in the garb of faith to hijack debate and give the false impression that Islam endorses violence, flying in the face of Muslim condemnation worldwide – caring little that this anti-*da'wah* is a serious threat to Muslim communities living as minorities, sparking not only a shunning of

the faith by non-Muslims, but racial tension and hatred, ending ultimately in violence.

This not only corrupts the essential message of Islam but also bolsters, as intended no doubt, political, sectarian, economic as well as theological divide. Political as well as religious differences, deliberately created, and motivated largely by rivalry and grab for power, are falsely played out in the name of Islam to give them pseudo-legitimacy. Just as one cannot steal or fornicate in the name of God, making a mockery of scripture, one cannot commit acts of savage bloodshed or killing in the name of Islam.

For Muslims all roads lead to the Qur'an. The Muslim dilemma on both a micro- and macro- level, from the inner self to the world at large, is such that it would seem to suggest the Muslim ship has let loose its moorings and sailed far from shore. Allah's words lie easily on our tongues yet fail to migrate to the heart. And al-Ghazali thundered against Muslims because he knew they were well aware of humanity's destiny, but were limiting by hypocrisy, complacency, nepotism, and laziness, their own potential, and central role in this regard.

The Bedouin say, "We have attained to faith." Say [unto them, O Muhammad]: "You have not [yet] attained to faith; you should [rather] say, 'We have [outwardly] surrendered' - for [true] faith has not yet entered your hearts. But if you [truly] pay heed unto God and His Apostle, He will not let the least of your deeds go to waste: for, behold, God is Much-Forgiving, a dispenser of grace." (Qur'an 49:14)

The goal of Muslims is to read Revelation holistically and live according to its requirements, critically and minutely observing their actions, with the primary purpose of bringing to mankind's attention the fact that it will come face-to-face with its Creator, and be judged. Admittedly al-Ghazali's assessment is harsh but tearing the veils of illusion is not a delicate matter. In this vein of realism, facing facts in the face, al-Ghazali elaborates much on poverty and educational standards. One can hardly be expected

to champion the truth when wandering where the next meal is coming from, or engage in erudite debate when the educational system is utterly deficient, and the illiteracy rates of the poor, and women in particular, staggering. Al-Ghazali rightly looked to reform of the education system as a key element of any meaningful change. There is real education and then there is the illusion of education and it would be foolish to mistake the one for the other. Real education should be free, universal, of the best organizational and intellectual standards, irrespective of class or income bracket, tailored not only to the specific needs of the Muslim people and their socio-cultural realities, but also fundamentally to the service of humanity as a whole. And cardinally not preclude reference to the Divine.

In al-Ghazali's opinion thus the issue of *da'wah* is one of immense importance, requiring a multifaceted and multiskilled approach, primarily because he connects this to mankind's need for a belief in God in the first instance, and a barometer measuring the general degeneration of Muslim spiritual thinking in the second. Religion to modern man, now simply reduced to the question of whether God exists or not, has become increasingly irrelevant, making of life for many a meaningless counting of days. Muslims strongly share the blame here. And the wonder of it all is that there need be no irresistible progression in this sad state of affairs, for by simply tailoring one's behavior to reflect Qur'anic ethical standards and values much can be achieved. Al-Ghazali's frustration is therefore, understandable. He rightly points to the misuse and abuse of Hadith, the misinterpretation of Qur'anic verses taken out of context to fit preconceived agendas, the setting aside of attitudes of welfare, to favor those of rigid, archaic, even harsh understanding of issues, weaving a web of confusing complexity sadly around what is essentially a clear, focused message.

Al-Ghazali wrote a somewhat unique exegesis on the Qur'an for readers to have a better comprehension of, and closer affinity with the sacred text. In *A Thematic Commentary on the Qur'an*

he focuses on the organic unity of each surah highlighting the logic or inherent reasoning that courses through each surah and unifies its various components and images. He also places the Qur'anic subjects within their proper historic and cultural context. This has the effect of relating the Qur'anic subject matter not only to the life of Prophet Muhammad, but also to aspects of today's world, thereby transforming it into a source of practical guidance and a ready reference for dealing with contemporary issues.

There is little doubt that al-Ghazali touched off much needed debate, significantly increasing understanding of the issues and complexities involved in real dialogue and engagement. And beyond question is the fact that his philosophy and analysis is extremely useful and positive with regards to final outcome. Al-Ghazali provides both a methodologically descriptive as well as methodologically practical solution, attractive for the coherence of its logic and constant focus on reason. Despite drawing criticism from certain contemporary scholars for factors including being at times too harsh in censure of Muslims, and too accommodationist of the faith with regards to western perceptions, nevertheless the core of his thesis was recognized as valuable and his works hence changed attitudes and influenced a large number of youth, indisputably advancing the cause of *da'wah* practice.

Although the face of *da'wah* in our times has seen a radical transformation in terms of online discussions and social media, al-Ghazali's basic precepts still strongly apply. Both individual, group, and state sponsored *da'wah* activities, as well as the organizational elements which govern them, despite in some respects having changed in form, nevertheless still fall under the scope of his analysis and recommendations with regards to reform and improvement. And not only in the Muslim world, but today also outside it with Muslims residing in diverse communities and countries across the world. Al-Ghazali was without doubt one of the foremost Muslim thinkers of his time. Observing within himself the high standards he set for others, he

Foreword

may perhaps have advanced the cause of *daʿwah* by decades, all in the service of God and humanity.

This book is intended to benefit both general and specialist readers alike, increasing awareness of the question of *daʿwah*. Doubtless readers may agree with some of the issues raised, and disagree with others, but it is hoped that for the most part they will benefit from the perspective offered and the overall issues examined.

Dates cited according to the Islamic calendar (hijrah) are labelled AH. Otherwise they follow the Gregorian calendar and labelled CE where necessary. Arabic words are italicized except for those which have entered common usage. Diacritical marks have been added only to those Arabic names not considered contemporary. English translations taken from Arabic references are those of the author.

The IIIT, established in 1981, has served as a major center to facilitate serious scholarly efforts based on Islamic vision, values and principles. The Institute's programs of research, seminars and conferences during the last forty years have resulted in the publication of more than four hundred and fifty titles in both English, Arabic and other major languages.

We express our thanks and gratitude to the author for his cooperation throughout the various stages of production. We would also like to thank the editorial and production team at the IIIT London Office and all those who were directly or indirectly involved in the completion of this book including, Shiraz Khan and Sara Mirza. May God reward them for all their efforts.

IIIT LONDON OFFICE

December 2015

Abstract

THIS STUDY IS AN INQUIRY into Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali's model of *da'wah*. It examines Shaykh al-Ghazali's life, education, career, association with the Muslim Brotherhood, intellectual and professional contributions to *da'wah* and society, as well as personal character traits which would help explain the stylistic elements of a presentation which earned him some criticism. An attempt will be made to show how al-Ghazali, as a traditional scholar with an in-depth understanding of the philosophy, dynamics and implications of Islam, also employed a modern approach with regards to analyzing religion, society, and contemporary *da'wah*, demonstrating a critical, and intelligent grasp of the issues involved. The study also examines al-Ghazali's conceptual framework of *da'wah*, including its concepts and characteristics, as well as the Prophet's *da'wah* as described in the Qur'an, the question of innate human nature (*al-fiṭrah*), the People of the Interval (*Ahl al-Fatrah*), and the universality of *da'wah*. Also examined are the effects of society and culture on *da'wah*, and how al-Ghazali understood *da'wah* in light of the Revelation, as well as the implications and effects of socio-economic and political factors concerning its development.

The most important catalyst for effective *da'wah* is the *dā'iyyah* (sing. one who undertakes it, literally one who invites, pl. *du'āt*) and in al-Ghazali's framework of analysis this role is addressed in detail. For him, a *dā'iyyah*'s various spiritual, moral and educational competencies are essential for a positive undertaking of *da'wah*. His exposition also reflects an ambitious quest to bridge the prevailing gap between the ideals of Islam and the reality of

Muslim life. It remains a challenging endeavor. As in his time, so in ours, the problems affecting Muslim societies are entrenched and profuse, particularly in areas of education, society, economics, culture and development. Al-Ghazali's approach throughout the study of *da'wah*, was vigorous and highly critical. In evaluating the work of *du'āt* and their contributions he at times adopted a harsh tone and caustic language.

This research also considers al-Ghazali's methodology, *du'āt* approach to *da'wah* and, most importantly, al-Ghazali's notion of *fiqh al-da'wah* (legal methodology related to *da'wah*) associated with the priorities of contemporary *da'wah* in light of al-Ghazali's understanding of the best interest of *da'wah* (*maṣlaḥah al-da'wah*). Al-Ghazali often draws on the principle of *maṣlaḥah* to justify his criticism of jurists' legal interpretations as related to various questions of *da'wah*. He does this based on a re-interpretation of religious texts or re-evaluation of legal juristic dictum, without consistently adhering to a systematic methodology assuring a uniform approach to the problems and challenges of modern *da'wah*. His discussion of *da'wah*'s legal methodology, however, shows a deep preoccupation with western impressions of Islam and Muslim societies and culture.

An evaluation of the many criticisms levelled by certain scholars and *du'āt* at al-Ghazali's work on *da'wah* reveals a focus on his general, literary, speculative and even negative thinking as affecting the healthy development of Muslims. Nevertheless, al-Ghazali's contributions were significant and still viewed by many as positive and authoritative. His ideas continue to attract many researchers, nourish modern *da'wah* thought, and will likely continue to gain increasing academic and intellectual attention, especially on issues concerning modern models of *da'wah*, and reviews of available legal and theological literature in regards to the future prospects of *da'wah* or dialogue between civilizations.

Introduction

THE FIELD OF MODERN *daʿwah* studies often highlights existing models of *daʿwah*,¹ with each reflecting respective historical backgrounds, philosophies and methodologies, such as those of the Sufis, the Tablighi Jamaat, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat-i Islami or the Ahl al-Ḥadīth. Yet, notwithstanding shared fundamentals and despite the various contributions these *daʿwah* models have made, debate continues over which one of these models most effectively advances the cause of Islam and whether they could develop a synthesis between religious norms and the complex challenges of modernity. This question has, and continues to preoccupy, notable Muslim thinkers such as Fathi Yakan,² Muhammad H. Fadlallah,³ Mustafa Mashhur,⁴ Abd al-Rahman Habannakah al-Maydani,⁵ and many others who recognized the need to review current approaches to *daʿwah*, address pitfalls inherent in contemporary *daʿwah* theory and practice, and develop for *daʿwah* a more sophisticated and dynamic role. This, however, is no easy endeavor. What is required is not only an in-depth understanding of the Islamic theory of *daʿwah* but also a critical analysis of contemporary *daʿwah* practices in light of the socio-cultural contexts of Muslims and the ways according to which *daʿwah* can best respond to the challenges of modernity whilst abiding by the fundamental tenets of Islam.

Contemporary *daʿwah* studies have also given rise to new perspectives on the subject, generally geared to the systematic review of understanding and delivery of *daʿwah* practices, revisiting the legal interpretations associated with it, and drawing on religious tenets to sustain effective *daʿwah* models in

contemporary societies. One of these models, giving an insightful analysis of the subject, was developed by the late scholar and preacher Muhammad al-Ghazali.

Al-Ghazali graduated from Al-Azhar University, Cairo in 1943, gradually acquiring a reputation for being an independent thinker, rigorous jurist and freelance writer. Despite being a man of letters, a thinker, researcher and traditional scholar, he was particularly drawn to the study of *daʿwah*.⁶ Writing extensively on the subject he authored some fifty books, most of which approached modern *daʿwah* critically and unconventionally.

Muslim intellectuals as well as ordinary Muslims view al-Ghazali's scholarly contributions as significantly authoritative. This is attested to by the wide circulation of his writings, the many translations of some of his works,⁷ awards presented to him,⁸ conferences organized and research undertaken in relation to his contributions to the study of Islamic thought,⁹ as well as the reaction that his works continue to provoke in the field of hadith studies, Islamic jurisprudence and *daʿwah* in general.¹⁰ Al-Ghazali's vision of modern Islamic reform has been adopted by some of the most educated, apolitical, moderate and modern thinkers, many of whom advocate rational change.¹¹

Al-Ghazali's extensive discussion of *daʿwah* reflects his own thinking and varied level of experiences. For example, his social experience of rural Egypt, training in the Muslim Brotherhood (1937-1953), Azharite academic education, government positions held (1971-1981), as well as his active membership of many Islamic and charitable organizations, and even personal stories and travels.¹² According to Abu-Rabi, al-Ghazali's unwavering support for a critical interpretation of Islam in the modern age, has placed him at the forefront of the most advanced movement of modern Islamic criticism pioneered by reformers of the nineteenth century.¹³ What is particularly interesting with regards to al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* perspective however, is that it developed over a long period of time and an extended course of life, affected in the course of that life by the variety of the offices

and positions he held, as well as the local and international political circumstances and changes he experienced. Thus, for example, al-Ghazali served as a preacher at Al-Azhar University, an official in the Ministry of Endowment (*wizārah al-Awqāf*), wrote prolifically on *daʿwah*, provided religious guidance in various Egyptian mosques, and was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Historically, he lived in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, and witnessed the European occupation of various Muslim countries. His thought therefore reflects a wide spectrum of socio-historical experiences belonging to different political eras and reflecting regional and global developments of the time. Al-Ghazali's contribution is nonetheless held within a framework of analysis embracing regional and global developments. His literary works provide an analysis of the broad range of modern Islamic thought, as well as Muslim society and culture, in an attempt to lay solid foundations for successful *daʿwah* practice.

Studying al-Ghazali therefore poses a challenge owing to the changing circumstances of society around him, as well as the changing economic and political factors which he witnessed, some going back to 1950s Egypt and reflecting the socio-political conditions of the time, whereas his later affiliations caused him to change or abandon some of his ideas.

Over the course of an active career, al-Ghazali wrote approximately sixty books, including such important works as *Khuluq al-Muslim* (The Moral Character of the Muslim), *Al-Islām wa Awḍāʿunā al-Iqtiṣādiyyah* (Islam and our Economic Affairs), *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī* (Islam and Political Despotism), *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah al-Thaqāfiyyah* (A Constitution for Cultural Unity), *Al-Taʾaṣṣub wa al-Tasāmuḥ bayna al-Naṣrāniyyah wa al-Islām* (Prejudice and Tolerance between Christianity and Islam), and *Taʾammulāt fī al-Dīn wa al-Ḥayāt* (Reflections on Religion and Life). His works sought to integrate religious education with Islamic reform, and showed interest in problems of modernity as well as the moral improvement and economic

welfare of Muslims as a necessary step for *daʿwah* progress. The bulk of his writings however reflect a genuine preoccupation with the progress of *daʿwah* and socio-cultural developments in Muslim and non-Muslim societies alike, and provide positive insights crucial to many questions related to the development of a *daʿwah* framework, methodology, challenges and prospects.

Combining a “traditional” Azharite learning with a grasp of modern thought and history and an insight into Muslims’ problems and challenges, al-Ghazali broke new ground in the study of *daʿwah*. He did this through reviewing *daʿwah* concepts in light of the divine revelation, as well as paying close attention to the position of innate human nature (*al-fiṭrah*), the intellect (*al-ʿaql*) and the concept of a Muslim role model (*al-quḍwah*) in both the understanding and undertaking of *daʿwah*. He also employed a critical approach to analyzing *daʿwah* practices, challenges and prospects. Thus, al-Ghazali transcended the usual description of *daʿwah* themes to include a broadly critical perspective taking into consideration the urgent need for *daʿwah* to be reviewed, revisiting legal interpretations on *daʿwah*, whilst taking into account western scientific progress, and the pressing changes required in the economic and socio-cultural conditions of Muslim societies.

This inquiry relies primarily on al-Ghazali’s own writings, supplemented by secondary sources which, either favorably or unfavorably, address his contribution to *daʿwah* and to Islamic thought and culture in general, including critical studies focused largely on his recent work *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (The Sunnah between Muslim Jurists and the Traditionists, 1989). Despite the contributions these studies have made towards a better understanding of al-Ghazali’s perspective on hadith, Islamic jurisprudence and thought, nevertheless his *daʿwah* thought has yet to be adequately studied and examined. Some of the studies have failed to address important issues such as al-Ghazali’s stand on traditional learning and pedagogy, the effect of the Muslim Brotherhood on his thinking, and

the influence of his own personality on his critical perspective of *daʿwah*. Other studies, colored by emotional attachment, have not addressed his perspective with complete objectivity. For example, Fathi Malkawi¹⁴ who describes al-Ghazali as being a true master of *daʿwah*, one who undertook *daʿwah* with guidance (*baṣīrah*),¹⁵ and al-Qaradawi, who in great admiration of al-Ghazali states: “If water does not become impure when it reaches two jars in volume, then what of when it is an ocean that can never become impure?”¹⁶ Abd al-Rahman Adawi finds himself not only before a great intellectual leader, religious guide and prominent master of *daʿwah* and reform, but also a comprehensive school of unique *daʿwah*, thought and reform, one so distinct in character and methodology, that it awaits further study to explore its characteristics, perspectives and impact.¹⁷

Gharib in his *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī: Ḥayātuh, ʿAṣrüh, wa Abraz man Ta’aththarra bihim* (Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali: His Life, Era, and the Persons who Most Influenced Him) provides a closer look at al-Ghazali’s life, personality, writings and the people who influenced him the most. Gharib’s second work entitled, *Maḥāwir al-Mashrūʿ al-Fikrī ladā al-Shaykh* (Themes of al-Ghazali’s Intellectual Project) discusses major themes in al-Ghazali’s intellectual contribution as well as addressing issues of women, political despotism, deceitful religiosity, occupation, secularism, communism, cultural conquest, missionaries and western civilization. Although the discussion is useful in that it helps us to understand al-Ghazali’s proposed reforms, it nevertheless fails to discuss al-Ghazali’s *daʿwah*.

Fallusi’s rather lyrically entitled work, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī: Ghuṣn Bāsiq fī Shajarah al-Khulūd* (Al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali: Lofty Branch in a Tree of Eternity) provides a synopsis of al-Ghazali’s life, personality and intellectual contribution, but does not give attention to al-Ghazali’s *daʿwah* thought. Similarly, Uways’ *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī, Tarīkhuh, wa Juhūdih, wa Ārā’uh* (Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali: His Life, Struggles and Perspectives) surveys al-Ghazali’s life and history to

examine his views on diverse issues including those of revelation, politics, women, and western civilization. Despite Uways' belief that al-Ghazali is considered one of the greatest *du'āt* in modern history, he only provides us with a brief overview of his *da'wah* thought and contribution to Islamic studies.¹⁸ Imarah's *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī: Al-Mawqī' al-Fikrī* (Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali's Intellectual Position) discusses the intellectual position of al-Ghazali vis-à-vis contemporary Islamic reforms and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, despite stating that he is writing about al-Ghazali as a *dā'iyyah* and servant of Islam, he pays no attention to al-Ghazali's *da'wah* thought.¹⁹

A conference held in 1996 on *Al-ʿAtā' al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* (The Intellectual Contribution of Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali), organized jointly by the International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Royal Assembly of Research on Islamic Civilization in Jordan, provided academic insight into al-Ghazali's life, thought and contributions. With regards to the proceedings of the conference, the sections most relevant to our inquiry are those on al-Ghazali's biography, his personal and moral qualities, and al-Qaradawi's chapter entitled "Al-Ghazālī Rajul Da'wah" (Al-Ghazali: A Man of *Da'wah*), which is not too different from his work *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī Kamā ʿAraftuh* (Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali as I Knew Him). In 1996, *Majallat Islāmiyyat al-Maʿarifah* (Journal of Islamization of Knowledge) dedicated a full issue to al-Ghazali, with topics including al-Ghazali's life, political thought and views on contemporary Islamic reform.

Al-Qaradawi's book *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī Kamā ʿAraftuh: Riḥlat Niṣf Qarn* (Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali as I Knew Him: A Journey of Half a Century) explores al-Ghazali's life, history, qualities, *da'wah* and reforms. The book addresses al-Ghazali's examination of *du'āt*, lectures and sermons, contributions to the media, and intellectual struggles against occupation, communism, secularism, materialism, and non-Muslim proselytization. Al-Qaradawi also briefly discusses the foundations of al-

Ghazali's *daʿwah* thought, namely the Qur'an and the Sunnah, global history, culture and every day reality, providing us with a better understanding of al-Ghazali's personality and contribution to modern Islamic thought. Nonetheless, he does not address his *daʿwah* in any comprehensive or systematic manner.

Muhammad Yunus in *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī ʿalā Mashārif Qarnin Jadīd* (Revival of Islamic Thought on the Onset of a New Century) examines al-Ghazali's thought versus modern Islamic reform. In chapter five, Yunus discusses al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* experience using the perspective of modern mass communication. Here the author refers to al-Qaradawi's discussion of al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* foundations, and examines discussion on the Friday sermon (*khutbah*), introduced by al-Ghazali as a model of successful communication.²⁰

In his *Contemporary Arab Thought*, Ibrahim Abu-Rabi however considers al-Ghazali to be a freelance Islamist critic,²¹ and points to his critique of several issues and themes including those of theology and clerics, Islam and politics, Arab liberals, inner enemies of Islam, views of the West and nationalism. Abu-Rabi also discusses in brief the mission of *duʿāt*, who according to al-Ghazali,²² are required to discover methods of analysis and criticism.

In order to avoid some of the shortcomings of secondary studies on al-Ghazali's *daʿwah*, I attempt to examine a series of interrelated questions. The major question of the current study is however: What model of *daʿwah* did al-Ghazali develop for modern Islam? In tackling this question, I address a number of secondary significant issues: What was al-Ghazali's understanding of the position of innate human nature (*al-fiṭrah*) vis-à-vis *daʿwah*? What are the effects of socio-cultural developments on *daʿwah*? And, what is the role of freedom and religious pluralism in enhancing *daʿwah*? Also discussed is the impact of role models in the process of advancing *daʿwah*, as well as other related questions, such as *daʿwah* and peace, and the relationship between Arab nationalism and the universality of *daʿwah*.

In order to answer these questions, I draw upon al-Ghazali's socio-economic and political background so as to provide an understanding of his intellectual history. Examination of his childhood, education, personality, intellectual works and professional career are critical to an understanding of his perspective on *da'wah*. An interesting question needs to be raised: What was the genesis of al-Ghazali's thought? What were the major factors contributing to his intellectual formation? An examination of influential personalities, political developments in Egypt, events or crises that could have influenced al-Ghazali's thought allows us to reconstruct the genealogy of his *da'wah* model. In the context of these questions, this study addresses aspects of al-Ghazali's originality, and the degree of convergence or divergence he experienced with the Muslim Brotherhood and University of Al-Azhar. The prevailing conditions of Egypt and the Arab/Muslim world in al-Ghazali's lifetime, including the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (1922), the dominance of occupiers over the Muslim world, the subjugation and exploitation of their human and natural resources, the rampant political despotism of the Arab world, the occupation of Palestine in 1948 etc. these and other critical issues are vital to an understanding of al-Ghazali's *da'wah* thought.

This research consists of an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter deals with al-Ghazali's childhood and education, early days, social life, religious learning and personal characteristics. It examines al-Banna's religious and spiritual impact on al-Ghazali, the effects of al-Ghazali's association with the Muslim Brotherhood (1937-1952), and finally his school of thought. Chapter two provides a theoretical analysis of *da'wah* including some of its basic concepts including the role of innate human nature (*fiṭrah*) and the universal nature of *da'wah*. It also examines the relationship of *da'wah* to freedom and the effects of society and culture on *da'wah*. Chapter three discusses responsibilities of *du'āt* including their acquisition of spiritual, moral and educational credentials alongside their problems and

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challenges and a critical evaluation of their *daʿwah* practices. Chapter four discusses al-Ghazali's perspective on the methodology of *daʿwah*, including the approach to *daʿwah*, his legal methodology of *daʿwah* known as *fiqh al-daʿwah* (where the question of the interest of *daʿwah* is elaborated according to al-Ghazali's perspective on religious progress and Islamic reform) and finally the question of women and *daʿwah*.

Chapter I

The Life, Educational Background and Contributions of Muhammad al-Ghazali: *Islamic Reforms (1917-1996)*

INTRODUCTION

PRIOR TO A DETAILED study of al-Ghazali's life, it would be useful to present a brief portrait of what shaped his ideas and style of thinking. The first thing to note is that al-Ghazali often, and unusually, drew on a multitude of stories, personal accounts and events to convey his message, which though at times appearing irrelevant to readers in terms of the study of *daʿwah*, were important for their influence in developing his thought.¹ For example such influence can be observed in the vivid depictions he would give of his home village (Nikla al-Inab),² the *kuttāb* or Egyptian elementary schools of 1927, Al-Azhar University in which he had been involved, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) his teacher, the distressing days he spent in prison (Tur 1951 and Turrah 1965),³ the numerous discussions and debates he held on diverse intellectual and social issues, his many travels, and even the songs and news reports he listened to on BBC radio. All these contributed to a vast repository of sources and case studies, drawn upon in his discussions and analyses of issues pertaining to *daʿwah*, Muslim culture and reform.

Al-Ghazali's careful selection of events from memory to substantiate his critical examination of Muslim conditions and *da'wah* served him well. It was a masterful approach, used skillfully and to good effect in the various intellectual discourses he participated in. Favoring certain interpretations and criticizing others al-Ghazali was also able to draw upon both local and international events to entrench his arguments. A further review of his critiques reveals an ability to select and categorize events according to a certain internal framework of analysis, one that was personal, complex and profound, a filter of sorts, through which incidents, stories and memories were collected, evaluated and interpreted. Indeed al-Ghazali seems to have been engaged in continuous active observation supplying him with a massive databank of information, though it seems that only particular weighty problems and issues were key in his analysis. Examples of the latter are found in personal memory and in his examination of socio-political problems such as poverty, occupation, western scientific progress whilst Muslims were in decline, religious deception, his views on the Muslim Brotherhood, political despotism, the status of women, religious learning and the problems of culture – major themes recurring throughout his work.

Al-Ghazali felt that certain events forced recollection whilst others, though knocking on the door, would be denied entry.⁴ The following three examples reflect the former, each with a message in accordance with his internal framework of analysis and regarding genuine concern for reform. The first critiques religious scholars, smugly comfortable with their own approach to religious exposition, preferring to take their views for granted and making not the least effort to update or improve their methodologies of disseminating religious teaching. Al-Ghazali draws on the image of a fruit-seller pushing a small carriage:

On it – the carriage – sit orderly and well coordinated rows of fruit... The look is truly attractive even if it may not invite purchase. The grocer had done his utmost to present his commodity well. A thought passed promptly

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across my mind, and [I] heard a question whispered from the bottom of my soul asking: “Did you, as a religious scholar, organize your commodity for the public? Did you present it in a way attractive to both the eyes and minds of people?” My response was perplexed; and that reflects its negativity. It appears to me that we Muslim scholars are only satisfied with ostentatious names and superior statuses, without making the least effort to present our product in an appealing fashion.⁵

Al-Ghazali’s second story entitled “Had the religion been free of those people...” draws readers’ attention to the crucial relationship between the inner dimension of Islamic worship and its outward forms, and the damage caused by religious formalities and rituals, especially when stripped of their inner spirit. The story is a telling commentary on those committed to worship and devotion, yet seeking public attention. Leaving aside the question of personal intentions, al-Ghazali argues that such people commit actions, both in public and private, that contradict the teachings of Islam. Strangely, al-Ghazali even wishes these type of worshippers to abandon their worship, reasoning that not only do they not benefit from their worship, but rather, cause a distorted impression of religious rituals. Al-Ghazali describes such people remarking:

I noticed one of them praying. I sincerely wished he would refrain from prayer and leave the mosque altogether without any attempts at prostration or connection with God. I said: “For this person, the verse is reversed. Worship is not purifying him; instead it is he who is corrupting worship!”⁶

The third story recounted by al-Ghazali and which also caused him great distress, concerned a foreign resident inspecting his property. What concerned al-Ghazali was not the property, but rather the abject Egyptian servant meekly following his foreign master around wherever he went:

One of the most humiliating scenes was that of the barefoot servant,

dressed in dirty clothes, exhausted pursuing his master's donkey as he rode it. An enslaved Muslim running behind a foreign master!⁷

Al-Ghazali yearned for laws to prevent the humiliation of Egyptian citizens. He argued that what pained him most was to see an Egyptian doing demeaning jobs for foreigners. Al-Ghazali maintained that such attitudes could only be changed through education.⁸ The latter account reflects the privileges enjoyed at the time by foreigners in Egypt. According to Hopwood, they often had higher standards of living and higher positions in Egypt than could have been expected in their own countries. Life was made easier by numerous servants, polo, tennis, and gossip at European clubs. Foreign residents were protected by what were known as the Capitulations – legal agreements giving them the right to be tried in their own Consular Courts.⁹

The aforementioned examples, in essence, revolve around religious presentation, inner and outer religious observance, and the Egyptian attitude towards European residents. The first according to al-Ghazali required a review of religious methods of presentation and a proper assessment of contemporary religious order. The second was a critique of contemporary forms of worship where significant attention is given to outer manifestations and formalities, while insufficient focus is given to the inner dimensions of worship. The last reflects al-Ghazali's concern regarding the dignity and respect of Egyptian citizens and their attitude towards foreign occupiers.

[I] Al-Ghazali's Childhood and Educational Background

a) Al-Ghazali's Childhood

Muhammad al-Ghazali al-Saqqa was born on September 22, 1917 in the village of Nikla al-Inab located in the province of al-Buhayrah (Northern Egypt).¹⁰ His father, Ahmad al-Saqqa, was a religious man who laid great hopes on al-Ghazali's future, to

the extent that whenever he encountered a crisis or fell sick, he would comfort his wife saying: “I have left you Muhammad al-Ghazali, and with him you shall find all help.”¹¹ Before marriage, the father claims to have had a vision in which Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī appears requesting him to adopt for his future son his own name. Thus al-Ghazali was named after the great scholar Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī of Baghdad (450-505 AH/1058-1111 CE). In contrast Alalwani believes that al-Saqqa named his son Muhammad al-Ghazali because of the high esteem and reverence in which he held Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.¹² It may be noted that neither his namesake nor his father’s Sufi inclination seem to have affected al-Ghazali’s intellectual formation. He writes regarding this issue:

The name of al-Ghazali was attached to me, yet it did not affect my thinking. I benefited from the legacy of both Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, the author of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (Incoherence of the Philosophers) and his opponent Ibn Rushd¹³ in his *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī was a philosopher whereas Ibn Rushd was a jurist. I consider myself therefore a student in the schools of philosophy and jurisprudence.¹⁴

Al-Ghazali did not see himself as a Sufi rejecting any affiliation with Muslim groups.¹⁵ He did, however, possess a Sufi heart and spirit, enjoyed seclusion and adhered to the rituals of the remembrance of God (*awrād al-dhikr*), practices engaged in by Sufis.¹⁶ In his *Al-Jānib al-Āṭifi min al-Islām* (The Emotional Aspect of Islam), al-Ghazali states that some will describe him as a Sufi while the Sufis accuse him of misguidance.¹⁷ Nonetheless he believed Sufism to be an aspect of Muslim culture that ought to be heeded, for it did not attract adequate attention from Muslim jurists and theologians.¹⁸

In his search for the historical conditions surrounding his birth, al-Ghazali reflected on his early life in Nikla al-Inab. He believed the century in which he was born to be the most

deplorable of all as far as the Islamic faith was concerned. His reflections have some supportive evidence: he was born during a time in which Islam was historically in decline, specifically during the occupation of Egypt (1882-1952) and other territories.¹⁹ Al-Ghazali even went so far as to equate his time with the eras that bitterly witnessed the fall of Baghdad (655 AH/1258 CE) and Granada (897 AH/1492 CE).²⁰ That is he did not feel that he was living in the present (for him 20th century) but rather in a time in which the Tatars were conquering Baghdad or the crusaders invading Jerusalem.²¹ He describes his feeling towards the state of affairs surrounding his birth as follows:

Nobody is questioned about the fact that they were born at a certain time or place; for this is a predestined divine decree towards which we hold no control. What draws my attention however is that I was born during a decline in the history of Islam, during the miserable days of the occupation of Egypt...²²

This unhappy comparison between the circumstances surrounding his birth and a defeated Muslim past was probably drawn in order to discover inherent similarities between modern occupation movements and the crusades on the one hand and medieval and modern Middle Eastern tyrannies, on the other. Al-Ghazali may have also intended to draw attention to underlying historic patterns affecting the general decline of Muslims, and/or to assure Muslims that their current dismal state of affairs was nothing new. Incidentally, al-Ghazali later indicated that he was no longer discomfited with regards to the latter, that is the Muslim predicament of his own time, having realized the similarities that existed between his era and that of Ibn Taymiyyah.²³ He says in this regard:

When I grew up and I read – about the conditions of Ibn Taymiyah – I did not however, feel awkwardness over the conditions surrounding my birth! I learned that Ibn Taymiyah was born and raised in similar conditions

during the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate, the increasingly fierce assaults of the Tatars, which forced him to flee from one city to another and follow a road full of victims of aggression, loss and defeat.²⁴

Going back to the issue of al-Ghazali and his illustrious namesake, al-Qaradawi suggests that the advent of Muhammad al-Ghazali symbolized the dawn of a second “proof of Islam” (*Ḥujjat al-Islām*), the honorific title that was conferred almost one thousand years earlier on Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. For him, the al-Ghazali of the fourteenth century AH (20th century CE), carried within himself the spirit of the al-Ghazālī of the fifth century AH (12th century CE) with regards to religious reform and the restoration to life of an inert Muslim Ummah. The two al-Ghazalis were, however, unique in their ways. The earlier al-Ghazālī, for example, was particularly concerned with the philosophical, juridical, and mystical foundations of Islam, whereas the later al-Ghazali’s interests ranged over a wide array of issues of Islamic thought – though not to the same depth – and were much more concerned with the political and socio-economic reforms of Muslims.²⁵ Al-Qaradawi’s discussion on the similarity between the two al-Ghazalis reveals a rather personal emotional attachment to the contemporary al-Ghazali founded to some extent on the name he shared with his illustrious forebear.

Gharib finds a resemblance between the two al-Ghazalis in terms of their discussions of reason versus doubt and certainty, their seclusion, encyclopaedic reading and writing, and also in their treatment of forged religiosity (*al-tadayyun al-maghlūt*) and dishonest Sufism (*al-taṣawwuf al-maghshūsh*).²⁶ Such a comparison, however, cannot be sustained as far as the nature of their intellectual contributions is concerned. Furthermore, despite al-Ghazali’s desire to be associated with notable medieval scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1350), Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200), or Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE), he did not produce works of parallel scholarly merit. Thus with regard to

seeming resemblances between the two al-Ghazalis, in actual fact they cannot be found to provide a solid basis on which the impression of similarity may be substantiated, as the defining features are too broad and may be applied to a number of other scholars.

While al-Ghazali's name may have not affected him as largely as some would have us believe, it is quite apparent that the site of his birth did shape him, to a certain extent, into the man he was to become. Al-Ghazali grew up in Nikla al-Inab,²⁷ a place where religious emotions pervaded everyday behavior, and echoed, to a large extent, the concerns of society at large.²⁸ Al-Ghazali's narratives point towards the religious conservatism of his local community, its keen interest in the memorization of the Qur'an, its prowess in learning Islamic studies and ability to produce scholars.²⁹ It can safely be said that al-Ghazali's memories of his home town had a large impact on his upbringing and to an extent the development of his character. One of al-Ghazali's foremost memories of his village concerns an insurrection mounted against the occupiers (1919). He recalled villagers revolting by cutting telephone lines and also, more vividly, occupying soldiers surrounding a mosque and killing a peasant who refused to abide by martial law.³⁰

The economic conditions surrounding al-Ghazali's birth can only be described as very difficult.³¹ Al-Ghazali grew up in an exploited and rural neighbourhood subjected to oppression and repression by Pashas and princes. Injustice and exploitation at the hands of landlords³² was rife as was the abuse of peasants, who received very little for their hard toil.³³ Not surprisingly these social injustices gave rise to privileged social classes and in Egyptian society a huge gap between rich and poor, with income inequality such that some people planted grain but ate hay, grew cotton but dressed poorly, built tall buildings yet lived in poverty etc. These conditions caused al-Ghazali to empathize greatly with the suffering, exploitation, and maltreatment of the general populace.³⁴

By 1914, small owners represented over 90 per cent of all landowners and yet possessed only a quarter of the land. The large land owners formed a group with common interests and landownership gave them a privileged position at the top of Egyptian society. During the 1920s and 1930s, three agricultural crises arose that culminated in the Great Depression of 1929-32. The position of the underprivileged did not improve during this period. The population increased from 10 million in 1897 to 19 million in 1947. Population density which in 1927 was 420 to every square kilometre rose to 845 by 1966. Annual per capita income estimated at £12 in 1913 was estimated at £8 in 1937. This increase in the man-to-land ratio naturally had a depressing effect on the average income, and low incomes prevented Egyptian villagers from expanding. Agricultural land was too expensive to purchase. The peasants at the bottom of the scale continued to suffer debilitating diseases, poverty, and undernourishment.³⁵

Such socio-economic conditions had a profound impact on al-Ghazali's thinking, leading him to conclude that religion could not flourish in such wretched circumstances, that is of poverty, disease and ignorance.³⁶ This harsh way of life also led him to become preoccupied with ideas concerning the relationship between religious progress and the environment, and also between economic improvement and *da'wah*. One particular account which al-Ghazali mentions illustrative of this aspect was that of a peasant lying on his death bed pleading for verses of the Qur'an to be recited over him that would cure him of his ailment. Al-Ghazali's response to the man's entreaty is illustrative of his approach to *da'wah*. He wrote: "I shook my head while my heart was bleeding." Al-Ghazali goes on to state that certain wicked people had consumed the wretched man's harvest and that of his grandparents, causing the man's acute illness, and that the use of amulets (*tamā'im*) and spiritual healing in the name of religion, akin to prescribing medication for a peasant's empty stomach, could not ward off such unfavorable conditions.³⁷

b) Religious Education

Not only does a review of al-Ghazali's educational background acquaint us with his intellectual preferences, but it also illuminates his perspective on religious learning, while shedding light on his understanding of the relationship of education with *da'wah* and *du'āt*. Al-Ghazali's education took place in a variety of settings, from the *kuttāb*, to the Alexandria Religious Institute and the University of Al-Azhar. At the age of five, al-Ghazali was enrolled at the local *kuttāb* to memorize the Qur'an.³⁸ Landau describes attendance in the *kuttāb* as voluntary, with no precise age limit: pupils enrolled at the age of four and five or above and in general studied for a period of two to five years. All pupils studied in the same room, as there was seldom – if ever – division of students according to age groups. Each pupil progressed at his own rate, and instruction was usually carried out from sunrise to sunset (or earlier) daily.³⁹ By the age of ten, al-Ghazali had memorized the entire Qur'an,⁴⁰ and had learned the basic principles of mathematics and dictation.⁴¹

Learning in the *kuttāb* resulted ideally in the students' literal incorporation of the Qur'anic text, and accordingly teaching was ordered around the meaning and power of the words. The skills of reading and writing were always secondary to the acquisition of the skills of exactly reproducing the recited words of God through daily exposure to and repetition of sacred verses. A young boy could within the space of a few years gain the ability to repeat the text by himself.⁴² Instructors frequently adopted a carrot and stick approach, beating the lazy and unruly.⁴³ Such disciplinary measures were fully supported by parents and it was often said that the teacher's stick came from paradise.⁴⁴ Al-Ghazali vividly remembers the punishment he received in the *kuttāb* when he erred. Frustration sometimes led to uncertainty, but as soon as the stick rose, al-Ghazali paid attention and continued reading in order to escape the impending strike.⁴⁵ Al-Ghazali even remembers the verses and chapters of the Qur'an where his teacher commended him, or chastised him.⁴⁶

In 1927, at the age of ten, al-Ghazali began to attend the Alexandria Religious Institute, where he studied for a period of nine consecutive years.⁴⁷ At the Institute, students received a monthly stipend of thirty piastres (*qirsh*) for food expenses, which proved helpful, particularly when his father's bankruptcy forced him to return to his home village.⁴⁸ Study at the Institute was carried out from morning until late afternoon on a daily basis, and classes included both religious and 'secular' sciences. At the Institute, students would wake up at dawn, review their lessons after the morning prayer and prepare and explore their lessons before class time.⁴⁹ The study program was of a high standard, yet not fully religious, since 'secular' sciences were also taught at an academic standard not inferior to that of the public school system. The only difference, however, was the lack of instruction of foreign languages.⁵⁰ At the Institute, al-Ghazali favored certain academic subjects and textbooks over others. He had a preference for linguistics and Arabic literature. In reference to his studies, al-Ghazali recalls that he particularly disliked *Nūr al-Īdāh*, *Matn al-Qaddūrī*,⁵¹ *Majma' al-Anhur 'alā Multaqā al-Abḥur*,⁵² and was disconcerted with the books of Nasafī and Abū Sa'ūd.⁵³ In the meantime, al-Ghazali took advantage of his father's bookstore.⁵⁴ His father often encouraged him to read, but discovered, to his regret, that al-Ghazali preferred foreign novels over religious books. For example, he favored *Alf laylah wa laylah* (One Thousand and One Nights)⁵⁵ and ignored the religious material his father set aside for him,⁵⁶ including *Daqā'iq al-Akhhār fī Dhikr al-Jannah wa al-Nār*,⁵⁷ *Al-Rawḍ al-Fā'iq fī al-Wa'z wa al-Raqā'iq*,⁵⁸ *Tanbīh al-Ghāfilīn*,⁵⁹ *Qīṣaṣ al-Anbiyā*, *Al-Khamrah al-Ilāhiyyah*, and *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah*.⁶⁰ One of the reasons he gives for this partiality – though he mentions this in retrospect – is that these works were full of fabricated and unauthenticated hadith, and absurd myths.⁶¹

In the fields of spirituality and ethics, al-Ghazali was influenced to a great extent by Abū Ḥamid Ghazālī, Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn 'Aṭā'uAllāh al-Iskandarī.⁶²

During this period, at least, al-Ghazali was not attracted a great deal to legal studies,⁶³ and his literary preferences were more disposed towards the fields of psychology, sociology, education, philosophy, literature, beliefs and religious sects. It was in light of this interdisciplinary inclination that he pursued the specialty of *daʿwah*.⁶⁴

In 1937, al-Ghazali enrolled in the Faculty of Theology, Al-Azhar University.⁶⁵ After four years of study, he obtained his Licentiate (*ʿĀlamiyyah*) and pursued a two-year Masters Degree in *Daʿwah* and Religious Guidance (*Daʿwah wa al-Irshād*).⁶⁶ During his tenure at the Faculty, al-Ghazali worked as an Imam (religious cleric) at the Masjid of al-ʿAtabah al-Khaḍrāʾ.⁶⁷ Throughout this period of learning, al-Ghazali was greatly influenced by scholars such as Abd al-Azim al-Zarqani, author of *Manāhil al-ʿIrfān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān*. It appears, however, that al-Zarqani was not the only instructor who left an impression on al-Ghazali's mind. Two other influential teachers were Ibrahim Gharbawi and Abd al-Aziz Bilal, both of whom deeply impressed him with their spirituality.⁶⁸ Of all his teachers, al-Ghazali admired Gharbawi and Bilal the most. Al-Ghazali commended them for their spirituality. Diraz greatly influenced al-Ghazali's thematic commentaries on the Qur'an.

Al-Ghazali spoke of ideal teachers who genuinely cared for their students and understood the hardships and challenges which they faced. He has little or nothing to say of his other teachers. These included Amin Khuli, Abd al-Wahhab Azzam, Muhammad Bahi, Muhammad Musa, Muhammad Awdan,⁶⁹ Muhammad Rayyan,⁷⁰ Abd Allah Diraz, Muhammad Abu Zahra,⁷¹ Muhammad Ghamrawi, Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf, Muhammad Hussayn, Muhammad Mahdi⁷² and Mahmud Shaltut.⁷³ Not all of these names seem to have left a mark on al-Ghazali's mind. Students tended to dislike their teachers because their relationship with them was often strictly formal.⁷⁴ This was in sharp contrast to Taha Husayn,⁷⁵ who often invited his students to the Faculty of Literature (*Kulliyah al-Ādāb*) for tea

parties and showed concern for their welfare even after their graduation.⁷⁶

Al-Ghazali often draws on his early education and associated problems to make the point that improvement of the education system was absolutely vital, in fact an inescapable prerequisite, for modern Islamic reform. He also used his educational experience to assess and point to *du‘āt*’s education problems, that is the integral relationship that exists between religious learning and *da‘wah* in addition to the link between effective education and religious progress. Al-Ghazali draws examples from his own learning experiences in the *kuttāb* and Al-Azhar University, as well as the instructional methods and practices prevailing in Muslim societies during his time.

In an attempt to critically review his own educational experiences and schooling, al-Ghazali begins with a general appraisal of reading classes. He describes them as insignificant,⁷⁷ even stating that he needed to rid himself of their effects because, this traditional Islamic literature was largely beneficial to the period in which it first emerged, catering to the spiritual and economic problems of the time, not to those of his own. Furthermore, Muslims recognize the pressing need to understand Islam in a way that meets their present emotional needs.⁷⁸ Al-Ghazali also felt that unbalanced reading only yielded distorted thought, and that extensive study of a discipline in isolation from other related disciplines did not produce a healthy culture.⁷⁹ He argued that although religious commentaries and illustrations are abundant, religious scholarship is not made simple or easy to digest. The situation being such that contemporary Islamic literature embraces authentic knowledge, but the poor medium of delivery and style renders that literature ambiguous. Al-Ghazali firmly believed that much of the religious literature used by the public, including that issued by Al-Azhar itself, was both poor in content and style, and had put Muslim culture at a great disadvantage.⁸⁰

Al-Ghazali decries the problem of Islamic education, which had become a refuge for mediocre students unable to succeed in

academic areas requiring excellence.⁸¹ For instance, the field of *daʿwah* only attracted the least qualified students.⁸² Furthermore, conditions surrounding students of *daʿwah* were so ‘stressful’ it made it near impossible to develop any success in the field.⁸³ In his work *Min Maʿālim al-Ḥaqq* (Signposts of the Truth), al-Ghazali draws on a real-life example which he claims to have repeatedly encountered:

The son of a wealthy man suffers from an eye infection. Consequently, the father decides to enrol him in Azhar [as] soon as he completes his memorization of the Qurʾan. The child starts reciting and memorizing the Qurʾan under the guidance of a skilful, blind teacher. Surprisingly, later on the child regains his sight and becomes well. The father panics! Soon the blind teacher loses his job, and the father enrolls his child back into a non-religious school.⁸⁴

This, however, is understandable, in view of the fact that from the late nineteenth century onward, privileged families deserted Al-Azhar for state or private schools, and for better career opportunities. A survey of senior students at Al-Azhar and Cairo universities in 1962 shows that Azharis were generally poorer, more provincial, more rural, and from less educated families than their Cairo University counterparts.⁸⁵ Unfortunately, al-Ghazali did not elaborate on the conditions of the incompetent students, why they were ‘impaired,’ or what differences existed between Azharis and students from state or private schools. He did not share his views on excellent students nor on non-religious schools. One can only suspect that his expectations of the mettle of religious students was theoretically high, to say the least, in view of the broad and complex reform which he discussed extensively, alongside the personal, moral, and educational requirements of modern *duʿāt*.

Nevertheless, al-Ghazali gives special attention to the position of the *kuttāb* in religious education, probably due to his growing interest in developing a sound methodology of under-

standing the Qur'an, as shown in his works *Kayfa Nata'āmalu ma'a al-Qur'ān?* (How to Approach the Qur'an?), *Al-Mahāwir al-Khamsah li al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (The Five Themes of the Glorious Qur'an), or his critique of religious literalism, which preserves the letter but cares little for its meaning and spirit. In his discussion of the *kuttāb*'s contribution to the moral and intellectual development of Muslim children, al-Ghazali questions the usefulness of its teaching methods, yet he does not clearly discuss its disadvantages. On the one hand, al-Ghazali considers the *kuttāb* as a bright episode in Muslim history and civilization.⁸⁶ Yet, on the other, he argues that the *kuttāb* were boring because of the large number of students, ranging between the ages of six and sixteen, who were made to sit in a single hall, either reading or writing.⁸⁷ For al-Ghazali, the *kuttāb* suppressed the activity of children and restrained their fun, leaving them with emotional problems.⁸⁸ In addition, al-Ghazali considered the use of the 'stick' as damaging to the student, because a child's education requires compassion, patience, tolerance, and strictness without cruelty.

Al-Ghazali believed that despite their good intentions, some *kuttāb* were producing little more than "recording tapes" instead of effective role models. By this he meant that when studying in the *kuttāb*, students were mostly preoccupied with the mastery of rules of recitation, than intellectual development,⁸⁹ leaving them with a perfect memory of Qur'anic words, yet ignorant of its spirit, meaning and teachings.⁹⁰ To support his view, al-Ghazali drew on personal experience where the method of memorizing Qur'anic words had caused him to overlook many of its meanings even up to an older age. Al-Ghazali narrates how he used to rid himself later from this preconception that he had inherited through memorization.⁹¹

Al-Ghazali also believed that children's television programs mostly excluded a child from using his/her mind, because these only sought to satisfy children's imagination. This belief led al-Ghazali to conclude that modern education also excludes reason

in favor of satisfying imagination only. In this case he asks why should we not then simply be satisfied with memorizing words? Not content with this he further queries: "What is the point of memorizing words and producing parrots for society?"⁹² His major concern was for the Qur'an to be implemented in all spheres of life. People in the Maghreb he points out were ironically perfect memorizers of Qur'anic words, the Egyptians its superb reciters, and the Turks its excellent writers; yet the Qur'an was not being implemented at the personal, social, and state levels. So how then could the Qur'an be used to purify minds and souls, disseminate kindness and cooperation, or establish justice and truth in the affairs of the state?⁹³

Still, despite criticism al-Ghazali does not propose a method by which students are to memorize parts of the Qur'an whilst simultaneously understanding its meaning. Also, despite his discomfort with the idea of rote learning alone (that is, producing 'recording tapes') al-Ghazali remained an advocate of the traditional Qur'anic transmission method. It is worth noting that despite technological advances, the tradition of memorization has its own significant advantages and is still needed because it a) teaches children the vocabulary and style of the Qur'an, b) enhances their mastery of the Arabic language, c) preserves the oral authenticity of the Qur'an (*al-tawātur bi al-mushāfaha*), and d) helps Muslims recall verses in prayer. Therefore, with no immediate solution to the problem of *kuttāb* learning, al-Ghazali proposes a multidisciplinary approach, exhorting experts in the fields of education and child psychology to discuss and review this problem.⁹⁴ And as a result, he leaves us with no solution that would integrate both the memorization and understanding of the Qur'an in the *kuttāb*. However, if the integration of both memorization and understanding could be effected in the *kuttāb*, its learning methodology, which is primarily concerned with oral tradition as the guiding force of learning, would have to drastically change. Having said this, one should be aware that al-Ghazali's focus was largely on the post-*kuttāb* stage, where

Muslim students developed as little more than ‘tape recorders’ with no attention paid whatsoever to any understanding of Qur’anic verses. Having said this, like many other prominent scholars, al-Ghazali himself was a product of the *kuttāb*, albeit an exception, to say the least.

On a broader scale however, religious learning had fallen to its lowest level during al-Ghazali’s time, and he felt that it neither served Islam nor attracted competent students. Al-Ghazali drew attention to the following three problems in religious education: a) a lack of emotional and intellectual intelligence on the part of religious scholars,⁹⁵ b) early academic specialization before acquisition of a requisite knowledge base in human and scientific subjects,⁹⁶ and c) poor understanding of Islamic fundamentals, and excessive attention to trivial issues.⁹⁷

According to al-Ghazali, Al-Azhar had for about thirty years or so been academically and pedagogically in decline. He states that the “jurisprudence of nomads” (*al-fiqh al-badawī*) and a theologically immature childish interpretation of beliefs and laws had become widespread.⁹⁸ Similarly, Crecelius notes that despite continuous reform, the influence of Al-Azhar – its moral leadership, scholarship and position at the center of the nation’s life – were continuing to erode at a rapid pace.⁹⁹ Thus the case was established. Reform was unavoidable, and had to occur through the incorporation of subjects such as Islamic creeds, ethics, morals, philosophy, the study of other religions, and human and social sciences. Also, in order for Al-Azhar to resist atheism, its teaching methodology had to embrace study of the divinely established universal laws (*sunan Allāh fī al-āfāq*), a critique of modern schools of thought, as well as the study of psychology, philosophy, education, and classical and modern history.¹⁰⁰

To substantiate his contention regarding ineffective teaching methods present in Islamic studies, al-Ghazali draws on the approach by which, over a very long period of time, he learnt the legal aspects of prayer, of which he memorized seventeen legal

obligations, over fifty desirable acts, and some other requirements and conditions. However, this stage did not equip him to grasp the spirit of prayer or to understand the glory which should have filled his heart as he connected with the Divine.¹⁰¹ Similarly, despite fifteen years of study at Al-Azhar, al-Ghazali maintains that he had, for example, learnt little about modern Islam in South-east Asia, North or West Africa.¹⁰² He mentions instruction in Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) and Sunnah studies as being poor, one may presume, at the Alexandria Institute or Al-Azhar. In addition, the science of hadith was taught as a set of rules and maxims in a sterile, lifeless way without any demonstration of their respective applications.¹⁰³

Again, al-Ghazali is not clear as to whether the problem lay in the curriculum, instructors, resources, or learning atmosphere. On the one hand, we are told that the curriculum itself was not poor (in fact, the Faculty of Theology's curriculum was of a high standard, only requiring competent instructors to produce skilled *duʿāt*), and on the other al-Ghazali argues that introducing Islam through the same teaching methods as those used in the sixth or seventh century AH was unreasonable, and reflected an acute crisis in talent and will.¹⁰⁴ For example, he states that Al-Azhar was prosperous during his tenure, particularly during the time of Mustafa al-Maraghi¹⁰⁵ and Ahmad al-Zawahiri (1878-1944 CE).¹⁰⁶ This was probably due to the introduction of scientific subjects such as nature, chemistry, biology, algebra, mathematics, and geometry, alongside a broad examination of Islamic, regional, and global history as well as geography.

Al-Ghazali's discussion of the pitiable state of religious education reflects a genuine interest in its modernization through the inculcation of contemporary disciplines. For him, graduates of Islamic studies should not only acquire traditional knowledge, but also understand modern science. This would aid them to utilise a modern perspective in introducing Islam whilst advancing the cause of *daʿwah* working in parallel with scientific progress. This modernization of education, however, is geared

towards a broad spectrum of reform wherein traditional knowledge would amend the existing dichotomies of religion and science, and this worldly life and the Hereafter, in addition to relationships between body, mind and spirit. From a different angle however, al-Ghazali's approach to learning can be seen to depend on the perspective of the social functionality of *da'wah*, which endorses effectiveness and excellence in a multitude of academic disciplines and fields. Learning appears to be evaluated in terms of improvement of public life, assisting people to embody the values of Islam in their daily lives, or enhancing a smooth social change needed for reforms. This is well illustrated in al-Ghazali's perspective of what constitutes ideal education, one that would enable Muslim society to proceed gradually and according to a spiritual and practical scheme spreading harmony across cities and villages and amongst the youth and elderly.¹⁰⁷

c) An Exploration of al-Ghazali's Personality

Did al-Ghazali's personality influence his critical evaluation of *da'wah*? To what degree was it responsible for his tone or style, and seeming inclination to hold 'pessimistic' or negative views concerning the future of Islam? Examining al-Ghazali's personal traits allows for a better understanding of his feelings towards questions of *da'wah* such as those related to freedom, justice, openness, transparency, cooperation, compassion, and tolerance. Such exploration also helps to elucidate some of the basic concepts underlying al-Ghazali's perspective of *da'wah*, i.e. his personal preferences, motives of criticism, and even his juristic preferences or interest-based approach to *da'wah*. This can be accomplished by examining al-Ghazali's autobiographical notes and descriptions of both his supporters and opponents.

During a 1996 conference on al-Ghazali and his contributions, he was described as a man of courage, pride, humbleness and devotion. The key personality traits that perhaps really define him involve confidence, a commitment to truth, advocacy of justice and equality, and struggle for freedom from exploitation

and humility.¹⁰⁸ Interestingly, through his discussion of the character of the ideal *dāʿiyah*, al-Ghazali describes his own personal characteristics as follows:

I cannot stand rigidity. I would have ultimately failed had I tried to act rigidly. I rather prefer to behave according to my personal dispositions in the course of either adopting things or leaving them. I care less about formal traditions – in this regard – where it is commonly known that silence is the outstanding character of a religious scholar. I am inclined to fun, and I search for it in everything around me. I like to live happily and be humorous, even when people expect me to show sorrow so that they may remember the next life and see in my appearance a warning of hellfire. I am also inclined to be popular in my actions. Had I been a king, I would have certainly joined the ranks of free brotherhood with people around the world.¹⁰⁹

Al-Ghazali considered a caring attitude to be particularly critical to human progress, and disliked rudeness, aggressiveness, or cold-heartedness. In his view, were he to encounter rude people in shops or public services, he would never return. However, it must be noted that the worst thing in his eyes was to see ill-mannered people such as these acting as religious leaders, preachers, or *duʿāt*. For al-Ghazali, they represented a serious concern.¹¹⁰ Although al-Ghazali loved forbearance and patience, he did on some occasions lose control, especially when seeing ignorant people addressing public matters, issuing damaging statements, or engaged in futile controversies.¹¹¹ He was straightforward, a trait evident in his critical comments. In his approach to the various problems associated with *daʿwah*, al-Ghazali downplayed both customary and cultural conventions. He insisted that he interacted positively with true emotions, but ignored them as soon as they exceeded the boundaries of the intellect.¹¹² For example, he recalled an occasion during his early life, when despite financial constraints, he had strongly desired to perform pilgrimage (hajj). His actual motivation then being the hope that

his supplications would be answered. Only later did he realize that He who listens to prayers in Makkah also listens to them in Egypt.¹¹³

Al-Qaradawi describes al-Ghazali as both a lover and advocate of freedom, in addition to being a foe of tyranny in any form, especially when this took the guise of religion.¹¹⁴ Al-Ghazali rejected as inhumane any act that ever denied even an atom of freedom to the intellect or consciousness.¹¹⁵ It was this belief in freedom that led him to frankly criticize religious formalities as well as many manifestations of religious and socio-cultural life. In relation to this, al-Ghazali describes his feelings concerning the etiquette of a young Muslim scholar expected to observe the strictest code of religious authority, stating:

My appearance when I was young must have been funny! That is why, and for a long time, I continued to dislike the traditional uniform. I became Shaykh Muhammad before the age of puberty! I loved playing, but how could a Shaykh play? Besides, I was a person of laughter, something which caused me a great deal of trouble and blame.¹¹⁶

Al-Ghazali's desire for fun, however, did not last. He experienced changes caused by difficult living conditions which he admitted changed him, with the difficult times which had driven him into depths of stress also teaching him lessons, and to watch his step as though he were avoiding traps.¹¹⁷

Al-Ghazali also draws our attention to the crucial role played by innate human nature (*fiṭrah*) in the correctness of attitudes and actions. He is especially keen upon this and prefers to act upon its judgment. Consequently, he professes his dislike for artificiality and drama.¹¹⁸ He also views the intellect as the structural foundation of religion because intellectual proofs according to him possess overwhelming weight, and it is only through the intellect that one may recognize God, identify the truths of revelation, and realize man's accountability in the Hereafter.¹¹⁹

Examining al-Ghazali's personality more deeply, it becomes apparent that his intellectual freedom led him to raise numerous critical questions concerning Muslim life and Islamic disciplines such as belief, jurisprudence, and history. Al-Ghazali shares with the reader his own religious quest, including a period of religious doubt and confusion during which time he questioned the very fundamentals of Islamic belief and rituals.¹²⁰ Al-Ghazali describes his journey of faith: how he first inherited Islam, and how he later reflected on that inheritance and began searching for the secrets of higher and lower existence.¹²¹ Having learnt the fundamentals of the religion from his parents, a time came when he discharged himself of all beliefs to leave the final judgment to the authority of the intellect.¹²² This state of religious doubt led him to set every belief aside leaving his intellect to choose whether to take them up again or to abandon them.¹²³ Throughout this process, al-Ghazali closely observed the effects of ideas and ideologies, comparing and choosing positions and arguments, welcoming doubts and considering them calmly.¹²⁴ He writes:

I inherited the religion [of Islam] from my parents in the same way I have inherited language, (i.e.,) through reception and teaching devoid of a profound contemplation. When I grew up, however, I experienced a state of doubt that wiped out all my knowledge, and led me to contest those inherited beliefs, virtues, and traditions. I do not recall however, how long that lasted.¹²⁵

As soon as al-Ghazali had safely crossed this stage of doubt to a point of rational affirmation, he realized that his recovery had been made possible through the aid of a mastery of the Arabic language and critical study of the Qur'an, as well as other sources.¹²⁶ Following this journey, al-Ghazali concluded that God is One, True, Merciful, does not let His servants go astray, and that He has sent Messengers as teachers and *du'āt*. Throughout his struggle, however, al-Ghazali relied upon the intellect,

and examined various religions to choose that which glorified God and illustrated His divine names and attributes the most. This explains how he was first a religious follower who, based on research, examination, and comparison, became a convinced Muslim.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, al-Ghazali's account immediately raises the issue of similarity with Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's famous narrative in his *Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl* (Deliverance from Error).¹²⁸ This leads us to question Muhammad al-Ghazali's own account, and whether it was an attempt to endorse his scholarly merits and/or forge a spiritual bond with the great scholar Abū Ḥāmid. We soon discover that Muhammad al-Ghazali's examination of numerous religious issues, theological and juristic, followed similar patterns in his works, eventually causing a great deal of trouble, particularly with *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*.¹²⁹ Al-Ghazali's journey of faith, nonetheless, provides a good case for his independent character and open mindedness in dealing with one of the most challenging yet sensitive theological questions. Al-Ghazali asks, "Why can't I be wrong while others are right?"¹³⁰ A question hardly ever asked by a "traditional" scholar as far as theological persuasions are concerned. Questions such as these placed al-Ghazali in a position of independence within the Islamic orthodoxy and within the scholarly community.

In addition to these qualities, it is also worthwhile examining al-Ghazali's problematic use of a negative and at times harsh style of language, with a view to understanding what might have led him to do so. First, we note that al-Ghazali grew up in an ordinary rural community, retaining wonderful memories of his family. Al-Ghazali states that his childhood was ordinary, there being nothing exceptionally unusual, and that he loved reading in all conditions.¹³¹ The community, despite its difficult economic situation, does not seem to have caused him any major problem. His intellectual journey, whether in the *kuttāb* or at Al-Azhar, also provides no justification for his harsh or negative

reactions towards traditional religious pedagogy. What appears to have most drastically affected him in the analysis of *da'wah* is the occurrence of major events such as the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, the foreign exploitation of the Muslim world, the occupation of Palestine, and the stagnant conditions affecting the Muslim world.

Al-Ghazali, nonetheless, believed there was a clear difference between harshness and emotional reaction.¹³² Al-Ghazali acknowledged himself to be emotional because he disliked the cold treatment of ideas and people, and also because he felt that abstract belief could only be dynamic when steered by emotions.¹³³ Nevertheless he does apologize to his readers for the bitterness and anger found in the lessons he draws from history, and for the harshness detected throughout his discussion of Muslim failures¹³⁴ explaining that had his works been edited, his words would have been softer.¹³⁵ His apologies, however, fail to justify the generally harsh or demeaning language found in many of his works, not only in his writings, but also his lectures.

Sometimes al-Ghazali's statements appear to be pessimistic, leaving no room for hope. His description of the century into which he was born as being the worst as far as Islam is concerned stands out as one example.¹³⁶ It was his belief that were events to continue and evolve at the same pace, darkness would encompass everything and only religious groups blamed for the loss of faith.¹³⁷ Further, the conditions of Muslims could deteriorate even worse in the future, with new catastrophes befalling them. Al-Ghazali states: "I wonder if there is any need to prove the ominous future awaiting Islam, and that every passing day hastens its decline and that there is no hope in any struggle versus this decreed destiny!" Al-Ghazali personally felt that he was experiencing defeats surrounding Islam both in the past and present,¹³⁸ and regretted that Islam was an orphaned religion having no spiritual or cultural guardianship.¹³⁹

This emotional cynicism resulted from a comparison of the Muslim world's prevailing conditions with those of other

nations,¹⁴⁰ and a discomfort with regards to conditions of sorrow and humiliation.¹⁴¹ Al-Ghazali dreamed of seeing Islamic ideals implemented, but when he contrasted these dreams with the poor conditions of the Muslims around him, he constantly experienced sadness, sorrow, and anger.¹⁴² His outspoken anger in some of his speeches was also the result of seeing ineffective *duʿāt* failing to present the Islamic faith properly and seeing incompetent individuals joining *daʿwah* and religious learning, artisans, uneducated people who despite their professional incompetence put it upon themselves to address religious and juristic problems.¹⁴³ The following statement illustrates the point further:

What makes me speak with some anger is when unsuccessful *duʿāt* fail to properly introduce the religion of Islam. I acknowledge that I sometimes lose my temper especially when uneducated people address public matters or give ineffective instructions leading others to drag the religion into losing battles, or giving others the opportunity to attack the religion.¹⁴⁴

What might have caused al-Ghazali's negative reaction was an increased degree of anger at the deteriorating socio-cultural reality of Muslims. For example, al-Ghazali was upset and even angry at Islam being interpreted as a vague belief in the unseen or having it regarded as an adherence to ambivalent emotions, or when belief was perceived as some sort of stagnant submission to the unknown as opposed to depictions of atheism as being in contrast dynamic, and devoted to the search for the secrets of the universe.¹⁴⁵ What might also have caused his anger was the pretext of scholarship used as a cover for imperfect work, which developed into a sophisticated tool of deception.¹⁴⁶ Another reason for his passion was his dislike of cold attitudes and his view that religious belief is inert unless supported with emotion as mentioned earlier.¹⁴⁷ Al-Ghazali believed that when falsehood drowned out most voices, it was vital to defend issues of faith emotionally and angrily.¹⁴⁸ This made him wonder how a

Muslim could smile especially when diverse threats targeted the heart of Muslim society. Al-Ghazali argued: "Had the scale of power and resources been equal, we would have spoken with a smile. How much do our hearts long for fun and smiles! We should not be blamed for anger when the impostors' claims are many."¹⁴⁹

Al-Ghazali's supporters acknowledged that he easily lost his temper in his writing, and that his anger resembled the ocean or a volcano; a fact attested to by al-Ghazali himself, and witnessed by those who lived with him. Al-Qaradawi justifies the problem of style in terms of al-Ghazali's abhorrence of injustice and humiliation. For him, al-Ghazali did not set out to offend others nor did he take offence, and would not humiliate others nor accept being humiliated. Al-Ghazali could not stand wrongdoing, especially in the areas of piety or religion, yet he was not ill-mannered in his debate nor did he wish ill for others. He quickly acknowledged the truth and admitted his mistakes in public.¹⁵⁰ His opponents on the other hand suggest that al-Ghazali's tough personality and angry style led him into a critical minefield of his own making, and disqualified him from dealing with current issues in any constructive manner.¹⁵¹ Even in the absence of external influences, conversations with him were often characterized as hot and harsh, mostly due to his temper and anger.¹⁵² They argue that al-Ghazali was proud, and would cast off his opponents accusing them of legal incompetence (*quṣūr fiqhī*). He would often describe some *duʿāt* as so incompetent that they should remain silent so as not to affect the religion with speech they themselves did not understand or that they had grasped in a fashion contradictory to the apparent meaning of the Qur'an (*ẓāhir al-Qurʾān*).¹⁵³ Al-Ghazali's problem of style is illustrated in the graphic language he uses in the following statement:

The men who now lead the defence of Islam are, without exception, bringing shame to themselves and their cause... The service of God and

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Mammon cannot be combined... It requires a really deranged mind to bring these opposites together in any system of human life. Such must be the minds of those Azharites who grow fat while Islam grows thin, and repose in comfort while [Muslims] suffer in anguish. These deceivers have devised devilish means for escaping the genuine duties of Islam. They are more crafty and sly than hashish smugglers who escape justice and the police. On the one hand, we have a group of men satisfied merely with the performance of personal worship. When they are asked to take care of the public, or observe the social duties of Islam, they answer despondently, 'politics is not our business.'... On the other hand, we have a group that fights sectarianism and worship of the dead, yet its members profess to belong to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab... We have seen many leaders of Azhar who did not leave their office chairs until their pockets bulged with riches, though they claimed to be the "spiritual continuation" of the legacy of Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.¹⁵⁴

The problem of al-Ghazali's style to a degree reflects the de facto reality of Muslim culture and society. It demonstrates the high expectations he has of scholars and *du'āt* while calling upon Muslims to reflect and concentrate on the real and fundamental problems that lead to progress. It also endorses al-Ghazali's independence from religious formalities, that is, the little attention he pays to the bitter reactions of the scholarly community or Islamic movements. Besides, al-Ghazali was no exception to the trend of criticism that has grown in modern Muslim societies. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi argues that this criticism very often flourishes in reaction to a severe status quo, and that there had been a sustained effort on the part of a small portion of the Muslim intelligentsia to glorify the Muslim critical spirit, including Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Qadir Awdah, Muhammad Baqir Sadr, and Muhammad H. Fadlallah.¹⁵⁵

[II] Al-Ghazali and the Muslim Brotherhood

a) Association and Conflict

Al-Ghazali's association with the organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood is essential to our inquiry because it highlights its founder, Hasan al-Banna's influence upon him, the concepts and methods of *daʿwah* that he learned from the Brotherhood, al-Ghazali's possible intellectual transformation during and after his membership to the organization and its effects on his ideas of *daʿwah*. Al-Ghazali knew Hasan al-Banna¹⁵⁶ when he was a student at the Alexandria Religious Institute,¹⁵⁷ and later, at the age of twenty, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood, being an active member for a period of seventeen years.¹⁵⁸ Three years after joining, al-Banna appointed him as under-secretary of the *Majallat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (Journal of the Muslim Brotherhood).¹⁵⁹ In 1945, al-Banna wrote him a note of appreciation:

Peace be upon you. I have read your recent article "Muslim Brotherhood and Political Parties" in the Journal of the Muslim Brotherhood. I was attracted to its succinct expressions, well-defined meanings, and excellent literary style. This is how Muslim brothers should write! Continue to write, the Holy Spirit shall support you, and God be with you. Peace be upon you.¹⁶⁰

Al-Banna was not alone in valuing al-Ghazali's excellence as a writer. Al-Ghazali's writing talents in fact qualified him for the honorific title of *Adīb al-daʿwah* (the writer of *daʿwah*) among the Muslim Brotherhood, and his literary skills and intellectual competence were manifest in their publications.¹⁶¹ Al-Qaradawi describes al-Ghazali's contributions to the "Free Ideas" column as inspirational, eloquent, and ridiculing; these qualified him to be a Muslim *dāʿiyah* and an extraordinary man of letters.¹⁶² It was in the Masjid of al-ʿAtabah al-Khaḍrā' in 1941, however, that al-Ghazali's contribution to the Muslim Brotherhood increased. During this period, he was both an active member of the organization and also an official scholar in the Ministry of Endowments.¹⁶³

It was during his period as a student at Al-Azhar however that al-Ghazali accompanied al-Banna,¹⁶⁴ collaborated with him,¹⁶⁵ and learned and benefited from his guidance.¹⁶⁶ Often in his writings al-Ghazali refers to al-Banna as his first teacher and mentor,¹⁶⁷ acknowledges his finest qualities, and portrays him as an ideal model of *daʿwah*.¹⁶⁸ He regarded al-Banna as an inspiring modern reformer, who laid out the course for future *duʿāt*.¹⁶⁹ Throughout his academic career, al-Ghazali believed that God had granted al-Banna the skills of al-Afghani,¹⁷⁰ Abduh,¹⁷¹ and Rida.¹⁷² His memories of al-Banna were always positive, probably the most wonderful he had of any person, and it is clear that he dearly loved al-Banna. Al-Ghazali supported al-Banna's *daʿwah*, acknowledging his debt to him for the lead he took in contemporary Islamic reforms.¹⁷³ Al-Ghazali also praises al-Banna in print and speaks of him with reverence, describing him as a scholar of high calibre, a man who had influenced him the most, and a speaker who addressed fundamental and real issues.¹⁷⁴

Yet, despite this high regard for al-Banna as an ideal *dāʿiyah*, and his profound attachment to the example he set, al-Ghazali nevertheless rejected the assumption that al-Banna had been the first to call for resistance in modern times. His reasoning being that many earlier reformers in the Middle East, the Maghreb, India, and Indonesia, had already preceded him in the struggle, calling for reform in politics and education, as well as contributing much to the service of Islam and the Ummah.¹⁷⁵ According to al-Ghazali, al-Banna's Twenty Principles (understanding Islam within the bounds of twenty concise principles to form the basis and starting point of the Islamic revival) represented neither the first nor the final formulation of the reform plan set for the service of the Ummah. They were not the final word in carrying out cultural reforms, and only represented proposals resulting from al-Banna's experience in uniting Muslims and correcting their failures. Those who had better alternatives, al-Ghazali remarked, should bring them forward.¹⁷⁶

Soon after al-Banna's assassination in 1948, problems within the organization surfaced. Al-Ghazali's disagreement with the newly appointed leader, Husayn Hudaybi (1891-1973 CE),¹⁷⁷ resulted in his dismissal¹⁷⁸ and led to an exchange of accusations.¹⁷⁹ Al-Ghazali's conflict with Hudaybi was harsh. He described Hudaybi as very soft in dealing with the parties responsible for al-Banna's assassination, and for al-Ghazali this softness then turned to persecution and increasing propaganda and accusations against innocent people. Al-Ghazali wrote:

Should we let obscure forces play with the future of the mother Islamic movement (i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood) and jeopardize its activities in the various spheres of life and struggle as it happened three years ago? Should the religion of Islam bear the burdens of weak and shaken leadership that disguise its weakness by way of dictatorship and ill-treatment? Who is benefiting from all of these?¹⁸⁰

Although the reasons for his dismissal were, in al-Ghazali's opinion, motivated by personal conflict, yet others saw them as ordinary.¹⁸¹ What led to al-Ghazali's dismissal was disagreement over the Brotherhood's decision to boycott the government of Jamal Abd al-Nasir.¹⁸² In December 1953, al-Ghazali was dismissed from his position in the Brotherhood's founding body (*al-hay'ah al-ta'sīsiyyah*), reportedly after attempting, with two other prominent members, to unseat Hudaybi as leader of the organization.¹⁸³

The sequence of events according to al-Qaradawi occurred as follows: Nasir seized power on July 23rd 1952. Al-Ghazali supported the Revolution and was not alone in this. The Muslim Brotherhood as a whole also greatly supported it. Then the Brotherhood, and particularly Hudaybi, soon discovered that Jamal Abd al-Nasir had only planned the Revolution for his own personal gain, and was planning to strike against the Brotherhood. Al-Ghazali never suspected Nasir's intentions. Along with some elder members of the Brotherhood, al-Ghazali took a

stance against the movement's opposition to the government, as this would only lead to bloodshed and instability. Al-Ghazali believed flexibility towards the Revolution would be a wiser position, given that Abd al-Nasir until then had not shown any hostility towards the Brotherhood. During this time of confusion, misunderstandings surfaced between members leading to al-Ghazali's and other members' dismissal. Al-Ghazali only realized of Abd al-Nasir's mischief later.¹⁸⁴

In reality, however, al-Ghazali's conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood had started much earlier, precisely during his imprisonment in Tur (1951). Al-Ghazali's criticism at the time had not been welcomed. What disturbed al-Ghazali the most whilst imprisoned was that the Brotherhood in general had rejected any criticism of their strategies. Al-Ghazali pointed out that soon after their defeat at the Battle of Uhud (3 AH/625 CE), even some of the Companions of the Prophet had been blamed, and bearing this in mind Brotherhood members should have re-evaluated their personal and public conduct. A few years later al-Ghazali described these moments as follows:

I thought the Brothers, especially after the assassination of Banna and the ban on the Organization under extremely dismal political conditions, would learn from their experience and focus instead on assuring human dignity and civil liberties. But, did that ever happen? Regrettably not. The course had taken a different path instead.¹⁸⁵

Despite these differences with the Brotherhood, al-Ghazali nevertheless forgave his adversaries and decided to ask God for forgiveness and to start a new page.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, seeing Hudaybi steadfastly upholding the faith, during his 1954 trial, raised him in al-Ghazali's eyes, for the catastrophes that befell Hudaybi and his family neither affected his judgment nor diverted him from the methodology of the Brotherhood.¹⁸⁷ Al-Ghazali also commended the steadfastness of the movement's members and was sympathetic, helpful, and supportive.¹⁸⁸

Following his dismissal, al-Ghazali discovered his own talents and decided to commit the rest of his life to the field of *daʿwah* and writing. His concern with *daʿwah* of course predated his expulsion. After his release from prison in 1949, al-Ghazali became the foremost spokesperson of *daʿwah* and the principal defender of Islam.¹⁸⁹ During this period, al-Ghazali's writings contributed to awakening minds, stirring emotions, and paving the way for a revolution against injustice. Regarding this particular transition, al-Ghazali states:

I decided to work in the field of *daʿwah*, in the way I personally choose, and in the best approach possible. There are two broad areas before me: writing, where God grants me success, and mosques, where I could lecture, deliver sermons, and lead thousands of Imams to the best methods and results.¹⁹⁰

Had al-Ghazali maintained a political affiliation with the Brotherhood, his contribution might have taken a different course. As it happened his formal dissociation from a structured Islamic movement provided him with the freedom necessary to address the subject of *daʿwah* independently, critically, and broadly.

Al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* career knew no boundaries and was impartially communicated to all segments of society, including Islamic movements, governments, scholars, Sunnis as well as Shiʿites,¹⁹¹ the elite and the masses. Al-Ghazali benefited from the general ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and largely shared their historical and emotional background, yet learned from others and developed his own intellectual identity and initiative.

b) Al-Ghazali's School of Thought

Was al-Ghazali the Muhammad Abduh of the contemporary era?¹⁹² A genius who developed his own program of Islamic reform? Or a prolific writer who skilfully blended contributions of the Muslim Brotherhood with the ideas of modern Muslim

reformers? In order to identify al-Ghazali's intellectual position, his notes on al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood and some prominent modern Muslim reformists need to be examined, together with a summation of the main themes that preoccupied him most as well as the possible changes he advocated throughout a long career in education and *da'wah*.

In the context of Islamic scholarship, there may be a tendency to categorize thinkers according to static and rigid taxonomy. In the case of al-Ghazali, however, we should acknowledge that such attempts at taxonomy are in no way final determinants of his intellectual position. For example, his thinking changed and developed over the course of his career, therefore any attempt to place him within the framework of modern Islamic thought must consider these changes and developments; arguably, developing convergences with or divergences from preceding Islamic reforms to diversify the search for knowledge – a process which transcends intellectual positions and involves tremendous efforts of assimilation, adaptation, creativity and transformation. The quest for scholarly taxonomy sometimes appears to be an exciting intellectual game because it tends to provide us with an ultimate rational satisfaction and intellectual ease, when all doors of inquiry are supposedly closed. Yet at its core, the problem still challenges our inner curiosity. Of course, because of our inadequate analyses, we only tend to trace intellectual responses that resonate with external processes of assimilation, assess their nature, and place the entire diversified contribution into a general class of thought. Beyond this, guessing hidden internal thoughts and emotions then becomes a 'subjective' exercise as it only yields conjecture. Yet our supposedly 'objective' classification of scholarly contributions is not objective either because it involves much confusion, vagueness, and guesswork.

What makes a scholar puritanical, conservative, progressive, fundamentalist, liberal, traditionist or a modernist? Are these categories sophisticated enough to perfectly match their recipients or are they approximate descriptions embracing overall

intellectual contributions and characteristics of their recipients? Whatever the answer might be, this exercise requires a fresh taxonomy that is unbiased and flexible, and free from the political connotations of those categories and labels.

Al-Ghazali's case is an ideal example of the inherent deficiency of taxonomy as a tool of analysis. Because, according to our general framework, al-Ghazali easily fits the mould of a traditional Azharite scholar, rational modernist, an Ash'arite yet Salafi, a Sufi, and an *ikhwānī*! Thus it is difficult to simply classify his total diversified contributions unless those labels are stripped of their negative or political connotations, and unless we continue to examine his thinking within a broader perspective without necessarily resorting to a 'final' judgment on his contribution. Let us nonetheless look at some of the manifestations of his intellectual stance. Al-Ghazali's positive attachment to al-Banna did not result in any literal adherence to or interpretation of his methodology.¹⁹³ Al-Ghazali in fact disagreed with al-Banna and criticized him,¹⁹⁴ and despite their close relationship, there is no indication whatsoever of al-Ghazali's continuing loyalty to the Muslim Brotherhood. He writes: "Let me off the Brothers. I have washed my hands of those titles. I only speak for the religion of Islam, its current status, and the broken Muslim nation."¹⁹⁵

I am one of the Azharite scholars who worked among the Muslim Brotherhood for nearly twenty years. I find no pride in associations to this or that. My association with genuine Islam is worth more than that with an institute from which I graduated, or a group I was associated with. I have observed however, that the conditions prevailing in both groups are warped, and that the criteria of Islam are not allowed to operate freely as far as the guidance and judgement of people and matters are concerned.¹⁹⁶

Al-Ghazali's work, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah al-Thaqāfiyyah* (The Constitution of The Cultural Unity) provides further testimony as to his growing independence vis-à-vis major areas of concern for the Muslim Brotherhood as epitomized in al-Banna's Twenty

Principles.¹⁹⁷ In *Dustūr*, not only did al-Ghazali elaborate on al-Banna's principles, but also substantiated them and developed new tenets required for modern Islamic change:

My work was to explain and substantiate al-Banna's principles in light of the experience I gained during a period of forty years of *da'wah*. I spent some of those years with al-Banna and his disciples, and some others with sincere believers concerned about the religion, who struggled for its cause and resisted all sorts of aggression.¹⁹⁸

Al-Ghazali formulated the following ten new principles required for implementing modern reform: 1) That women and men are partners (*shaqā'iq*); 2) The family represents the moral and social foundation (support) of society, and the natural center for educating generations; 3) The moral and economic rights of people should be assured and safeguarded; 4) Rulers, whether kings or presidents, are simply agents acting on behalf of their respective nations; 5) Mutual consultation (*shūrā*) is the basis of government; every nation must choose the method that best realizes its interests; 6) Conditions and rights of private property should be protected. The nation is one single body which does not tolerate neglect or subjugation; 7) Muslim countries are responsible for *da'wah*;¹⁹⁹ 8) Religious differences should not cause enmity or fighting; 9) The relationship of Muslims with the international community should be guided by agreements of human brotherhood. Muslims should carry out *da'wah* through debate/persuasion far from any harm; and 10) Muslims need to contribute to the moral and material well-being of humanity.²⁰⁰

These principles, whether of al-Banna or al-Ghazali, are aimed at religious reform in Muslim societies. Al-Banna's principles are largely geared toward purity of belief, religion, piety, and Muslim etiquette regarding legal differences. They seek to purify the actions and minds of Muslims from practises found contradictory to the teachings of Islam. Al-Ghazali however, seems to be preoccupied with rather different issues such as

women, family, education, human rights, a consultative political system, protection of private property and law, the discharge of *da'wah* as a collective duty and state responsibility, stressing religious tolerance, Muslims' relationship with the international community, peaceful *da'wah*, and the contribution of Muslims to the well-being of humanity. Al-Ghazali's ten principles show new areas of interest in modern Muslim reform, and deal mostly with issues considered major as compared to al-Banna's. Taking al-Ghazali's statements at face value, we venture to say that al-Ghazali's new principles represent a further profound 'extension' for social and political change following the implementation of al-Banna's reform in areas of belief, law, and piety.²⁰¹

According to Taha J. Alalwani, al-Ghazali's lectures at Al-Azhar, in various Egyptian mosques, as well as those delivered at the University of Umm al-Qurā and El-Emir Abdel-Kadir, represented a merger or a synopsis of al-Banna's lectures and the lectures of modern Muslim reformers, synthesized with al-Ghazali's own thought and knowledge.²⁰² Pioneering reformers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) are all noticeably present in his intellectual work.²⁰³

Mohammed Imarah, on the other hand, views al-Ghazali's intellectual position differently. He argues that the school of Al-Manār (*The Beacon*, pioneered by Afghani, Abduh and Rashid Rida) is the only cradle of modern Islamic awakening, and that Afghani, Abduh, and Rida are pioneers in modern Islamic thought.²⁰⁴ Imarah finds it difficult to define al-Ghazali's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. For him, al-Ghazali's position is rather to be found in a third category that combines characteristics of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Rashid Rida.²⁰⁵ Based on al-Ghazali's own account that he was a member of al-Banna's school,²⁰⁶ and keeping in mind that al-Banna was a disciple of Rida who learned under Abduh, Imarah concludes that al-Ghazali was a leading figure in the school of al-Jāmi'ah al-Islāmiyyah.²⁰⁷ This school benefited from many

intellectual movements and schools in Muslim history, and also from the findings of psychology, sociology, political sciences, economics, and history; al-Ghazali combines all of the above, yet with a deeper understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunnah.²⁰⁸

Muhammad Yunus views al-Ghazali's life as a real interface of two converging schools of Islamic reform. Al-Ghazali's intellectual life began with the school of al-Afghani, Abduh, and Rida, and continued with the institution of Al-Azhar led by Mustafa al-Maraghi (1881-1945). It was the same idea that al-Banna attempted to translate into reality, struggling to raise its profile, realize its mission, and ensure its pre-eminence through the publication of the periodical *Al-Manār* after Rida.²⁰⁹

On the other hand, Uways views al-Ghazali's school of thought differently. For him, it stands in the midst of all Islamic movements, abides by the Qur'an and the Sunnah, rejects partisanship, advocates cooperation among Muslim workers, sets brotherhood above legal differences, looks for a comprehensive civilization, and encourages understanding amongst the elite and the public.²¹⁰ Al-Ghazali was not affiliated with any group, nor was he resolute about any Muslim school of jurisprudence, but instead regarded Qur'an exegetes, hadith experts, legal theorists, philosophers, theologians, and Sufis with due respect.²¹¹ He appreciated the benefits of the *kalām*, mysticism, and ethics,²¹² adhered to scholarly consensus and to the larger Muslim community,²¹³ and showed great respect for religious authorities.²¹⁴

Some of al-Ghazali's main concerns include interrelated problems such as the fragmentary presentation of Islam, the current state of Muslim culture, a negative attitude towards life, fatalism in the Muslim world, misunderstanding the principle of causality, traditions of showing off in Muslim societies, status of women in periods of weakness and decline, poor level of Arabic literature, wealth mismanagement, and political corruption.²¹⁵ Al-Ghazali's writings show that he drew his understanding from primary sources, and paid little or no attention when scholarly

opinions conflicted with his understanding of Islam or when he sensed that they impeded *daʿwah*'s progress. He was willing to sacrifice culture and customs when they hampered or distorted Islam's image. Al-Ghazali's concern was that the divine should stay above human concepts. Thus he did not fit into any Muslim movement, for his constant criticism could only be accommodated in an atmosphere of freedom and independence.²¹⁶

The effects of contemporary Muslim reformers are however discernible throughout al-Ghazali's writings; his distinct contribution to modern thought and *daʿwah*, however, is manifest through a review of modern religious and socio-political problems, as are his critique of *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* and the implications of their understanding for contemporary *daʿwah*, and his discussion of *daʿwah* through a broad perspective of modern Islamic reform. Al-Ghazali maintained a traditional viewpoint when examining problems of culture and society in light of the original sources in the Shariʿah, while remaining aware of the major areas of reform. Al-Ghazali did not, however, duplicate the works of Afghani, Abduh, or Rida, nor did he attempt to continue the work of the Muslim Brotherhood. His concern was to review and decontaminate understanding of the sources of Muslims' interpretation in order for Muslims to regain their position of leadership amongst humanity.

[III] Al-Ghazali's Contribution to Islamic Knowledge

a) *Al-Ghazali's Scholarly Works*²¹⁷

Al-Ghazali's works are essentially geared to personal and cultural purification, fighting deceitful religiosity, the struggle for freedom and social justice, Muslim unity, women's role in society, scientific progress, Islamic awakening, the struggle against political despotism, and fighting backwardness. They also seek to preserve the purity of the religion and protect Islam against the forgeries of religious extremists, the myths of its foes, to refute the interpretations of religious extremists and the doubts raised

by adversaries. With the exception of his book *Maʿa Allāh: Dirāsah fī al-Daʿwah wa al-Duʿāt* (In the Company of God: A Study of *Daʿwah* and *Duʿāt*),²¹⁸ al-Ghazali's works are less interested in systematic or methodological analysis of modern issues. In fact al-Ghazali clearly points out that his works are not purely historical or academic, for they are only intended to rescue people and steer life; his endeavor was only to integrate religious and historical facts in a literary style geared to people's guidance.²¹⁹ Al-Ghazali's works, however, draw attention to a wide-ranging number of problems, challenges, internal failures, misconceptions and practices impeding the progress of *daʿwah* in modern societies. Al-Ghazali's keen interest in a broad-based *daʿwah* forced him to deal with diverse issues of belief, ethics, reform, politics, culture, history, and jurisprudence, and led him to approach various socio-cultural, religious, and political issues through the concerns of *daʿwah*.²²⁰

Al-Ghazali believed his works to reflect inspiring realities. They were meant to stimulate the consciousness residing in the hearts of believers, and to provide keys to various meanings invaluable to Muslims.²²¹ His writings concurrently respond to the intellectual and emotional needs of the individual and society.²²² His writings also provide both clear and ambiguous exposition of thoughts and emotions, affected mostly by passionate feelings and enthusiastic presentation.²²³ They reflect both calmness and aggressiveness, tending to be vocative while avoiding technical academic terminology, uttering harsh words so damning as to cause anger and hurt. This probably fits with al-Ghazali's writing strategy, sometimes he wrote on *daʿwah* and Islamic culture and at other times on the struggle of *daʿwah* and strategies of social reform.²²⁴ Al-Ghazali describes this strategy as follows: "In the process of writing, I split my thought and feelings into two; the first carefully detects Muslims' conditions whether manifest or hidden, while the second searches religious guidance to heal diseases and strengthen existence."²²⁵

b) Al-Ghazali's Professional and Intellectual Life

Soon after his graduation from Al-Azhar in 1943, al-Ghazali was appointed as a cleric (*imām*), a teacher (*mudarris*), and a preacher (*khaṭīb*) at the ʿAzabān Mosque located in al-ʿAtabah al-Khaḍrāʾ, a relatively small but strategic area in the heart of Cairo.²²⁶ In his “Interesting Discovery” al-Ghazali describes those moments as follows:

It was just one month after my appointment as Imam that I realized I was ignorant. My knowledge was all used up in a period of just a few weeks. I realized that if I did not renew myself and draw on the sources of knowledge, I would ultimately face embarrassment. I was deceived by the number of talks I mastered earlier and delivered during my travels across the country. Now I was responsible for one pulpit visited by people from all walks of life, and I had to deliver daily lectures and weekly sermons.²²⁷

Al-Ghazali gradually rose in the administrative hierarchy of the Department of Islamic Propagation within the Ministry of Endowment in Egypt. He was appointed as a supervisor of mosques, as a preacher in Al-Azhar, as a Director of mosques and training, and finally a director of *daʿwah* and *irshād*.²²⁸ In July 18th 1971, Abd al-Aziz Kamil, the then minister of endowments and affairs at Al-Azhar, appointed him as an undersecretary at the ministry. In March 1981, Anwar al-Sadat, the Egyptian President (1970-1981), appointed him as an undersecretary of *daʿwah* in the Ministry of Endowments.²²⁹ Through writing, speeches, sermons, lectures, radio and television broadcasts, al-Ghazali is said to have left a manifest influence upon the minds of Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere.²³⁰ During his tenure in the ministry of Endowments, al-Ghazali travelled extensively to various cities in Egypt to meet *daʿwah* workers and to share with them the best ways to discharge their religious duties.²³¹ He worked closely with Sayyid Sabiq to improve the teaching and guidance of Imams and public attendance in mosques. They established non-profit societies for mosques that would help

Imams improve their performance,²³² supplied mosques with Islamic libraries, and recommended teaching literature for the Imams' weekly programs.²³³ Despite resistance, al-Ghazali assured women's attendance in many mosques in Egypt.²³⁴

Al-Ghazali's typical day was busy. On Thursday afternoon he would leave home to give a lecture in Minya in the evening. He would then deliver the Friday sermon in Manfalut, and give a lecture in Asyut and another one in Suhaj after 'Ishā' prayer. The next day, al-Ghazali would arrive at work in Cairo before his work colleagues. Each day would be full of discussions with *du'āt* and scholars from Al-Azhar and the ministry of Endowments. He was often visited by Tantawi, teachers from the faculty of *Uṣūl al-Dīn* and Arabic Language, ministers of endowments from Islamic and Arab countries, and *da'wah* workers from all over the world.²³⁵

Al-Ghazali was assigned to lecture at the Mosque of 'Amrū ibn al-Āṣ. There, and through Friday sermons (*khuṭbahs*), he provided a series of sessions on a thematic commentary on the Qur'an, beginning with the first chapter of the Qur'an. However, his commentary on Surah *al-Nisā'* (The Women) coincided with a discussion on Islamic family laws taking place in the Egyptian parliament, giving the impression that he had selected those particular verses on purpose, that is, to reveal how the proposed laws violated the Qur'an. Al-Ghazali was consequently banned from giving Friday sermons.²³⁶

Al-Qaradawi's explanation suggests that al-Ghazali's lectures evolved into a distinct trend of thought, one that was enlightened and moderate. Al-Ghazali's lectures and publications contained sharp criticism of conditions in Egypt, and unveiled conspiracies against Islam and Muslim society, which did not please the Egyptian authorities. Al-Ghazali was warned but nevertheless chose to continue, and this led to a ban on his religious activities, and to his being blacklisted by the Egyptian Government in 1974.²³⁷

Following his suspension from delivering *khutbahs* in the ʿAmrū ibn al-ʿĀṣ Mosque, al-Ghazali obtained a position at King Abd al-Aziz University, Jeddah,²³⁸ and later in Umm al-Qurā University, Makkah, Saudi Arabia.²³⁹ There, he continued his *daʿwah* work through broadcast programs and newspapers, whilst also teaching and supervising graduate students, serving on various academic councils in Muslim universities and participating in *daʿwah* agencies.²⁴⁰ In Qatar, for example, al-Ghazali most notably contributed to the development of the University of Qatar’s Shari‘ah Faculty, and to the dissemination of Islamic awareness through media, mosques, and associations.²⁴¹ In 1984, al-Ghazali was appointed as chairperson of the Academic Council of El-Emir AbdelKadir University in Constantine, Algeria. His lectures largely focused on a thematic commentary on the Qur’an. Al-Ghazali acted both as a guide and a juristconsult, and continually received visitors both in his office and at home. He participated in a weekly state television program, and delivered dozens of religious lectures and Friday sermons all over the country.²⁴² He regularly contributed to the conferences organized by the Council of Religious Affairs in Algeria.²⁴³

In 1989 and after five years in Algeria, al-Ghazali returned to Egypt. According to Alalwani, some of al-Ghazali’s supporters and students believed he should return to Egypt either as a Rector (Shaykh) of Al-Azhar University or as a guide (*murshid*) of the Muslim Brotherhood. The rectorship proposal was declined on the pretext that Al-Azhar required someone strictly involved in academia, which was not the case with al-Ghazali.²⁴⁴ Egyptian authorities believed that al-Ghazali had incited public protest in support of the Islamic Family Laws and had opposed a demonstration led by secularists in Cairo.²⁴⁵ Besides, his rivals had also not forgotten his criticism of the government’s mishandling of the war in 1967. These issues mitigated against the idea of offering him an appointment at Al-Azhar.²⁴⁶ The proposal that he should lead the Muslim Brotherhood was also declined on the pretext that Abu Hamid Abu Nasr was older, and that al-

Ghazali had been imprisoned for a short period of time because of his attitude towards the opposition of Jamal Abd al-Nasir, and lastly that he had clashed with Hudaybi, leading finally to his dismissal in 1953.²⁴⁷ With both these proposals declined, there was a third alternative – that of leading the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Cairo as a consultant and chair of its academic council there.²⁴⁸ The Institute involved prominent thinkers such as Ahmad Kamal Abu al-Majd, Tariq Bishri, Muhammad Imarah, Muhammad Uthman Najati, Muhammad Salim al-Awwa, Jamal al-Din Atiyyah, Sayyid Dasuqi Hasan, Ali Jum‘ah, Abd al-Wahhab al-Masiri, and Zuhayrah Abidin.²⁴⁹ Al-Ghazali participated in many of the Institute’s conferences and research projects.²⁵⁰

During his final stay in Egypt, al-Ghazali undertook serious research work on the methodology of study of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, Muslim intellectual heritage, and contemporary Muslim problems. His efforts resulted in the publication of *Kayfa Natā‘āmalu ma‘a al-Qur’ān?* (How to Approach the Qur’an?), *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (The Sunnah of the Prophet between Jurists and *Muḥaddiths*), *Turāthunā al-Fikrī fī Mizān al-Shar‘ wa al-‘Aql* (Our Intellectual Legacy in the Perspective of the Shari‘ah and Reason), and *Nahwa Tafsīr Mawḍū‘ī li Suwar al-Qur’ān* (A Thematic Commentary on the Qur’an). What characterised this period of time is that prior to publication al-Ghazali’s ideas were discussed in both group sessions, seminars, and forums at the Institute.²⁵¹ They appear to have directly served the Institute’s vision of Islamization concerning the need for a thorough examination of the methodology used to approach revelation as a source of knowledge, and for a review and analysis of Muslim traditions. Particularly in his *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* (The Sunnah of the Prophet) al-Ghazali was remarkably deliberate about issues of juristic preferences and interpretation of traditions.

Throughout his academic career, however, al-Ghazali consistently maintained a keen interest in *da‘wah*. He participated in

many international conferences and seminars, and supervised several graduate theses.²⁵² Al-Ghazali's *da'wah* efforts were diverse. He wrote in the Muslim Brotherhood's weekly journal, *Majallat al-Mabāḥith*, of the Muslim Brotherhood after their release from prison in 1949, and contributed to the *Da'wah Journal* founded by Salih al-Ashmawi, *Liwā' al-Islām* in Egypt, and *Majallat al-Ummah* in Qatar. He was also a regular writer for *Al-Sha'b* newspaper in Egypt, and for *Al-Muslimūn* magazine in Saudi Arabia.²⁵³ Al-Ghazali's televised and public lectures around the world exposed him to a wide Muslim audience. His attachment to Muslim universities particularly affected the Muslim elites. He mediated in international crises, including the release of Egyptian soldiers from Iran, and visited Muslims in Bosnia,²⁵⁴ traveling also to Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia. Here, and elsewhere, he was regularly invited to attend conferences organized by Muslim youth.²⁵⁵

Any understanding of al-Ghazali's real contribution however cannot be complete without understanding the history of traditional and modern reform movements since the mid-19th century. Al-Ghazali's intellectual life can be analyzed with reference to two great conflicts in modern Islamic thought: one against literalism, superficiality and intellectual decline, and the other against traditionalism in defence of religious principles and faith against attempts at the westernization or even destruction of belief.²⁵⁶ Within the context of these battles, al-Ghazali's *da'wah* provides a religious perspective which addresses many aspects of Muslim intellectual, cultural, and socio-political life, and looks into the underlying causes of religious and social problems. For Abu-Rabi, al-Ghazali's contribution lies in the fact that throughout his intellectual career as a writer and a theorist, he used the tools of critical Islamic thinking to approach the issues of the time. Whether considering the Qur'an and the Sunnah, discussing the economic and social conditions of modern Muslims, critiquing inner stagnation and the weakness enveloping modern Muslim societies, proposing a sophisticated

philosophy of Muslim self-criticism, critiquing imperialism, or presenting his views on matters ranging from Islamic knowledge to the responsibilities of Muslim intellectuals in the contemporary age, al-Ghazali brought a rigorously intellectual style of analysis to the task. Al-Ghazali began his life as an ideologue of the Islamic movement in Egypt, and ended it a freelance Islamicist critic.²⁵⁷

Al-Ghazali's contribution, whether through the Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim universities, or in the Ministry of Endowment, was made on behalf of traditional Islam. His traditional approach, however, advocated new perspectives, supported modern changes, de-emphasized religious formalities, and criticized modern religious order. He critiqued Muslim life with all its ills and problems, and was attentive to the various proposals of how to develop new perspectives for change. And this explains al-Ghazali's popularity in *da'wah*, that is his contribution was not purely traditional. Besides al-Ghazali was never disconnected from the social and political events occurring in the Muslim world, but rather, existed at the heart of the Islamic movement through continuous interaction with members and representatives of various religious societies in the field of *da'wah*.

Al-Ghazali's contributions did not go unnoticed. Many Muslim governments, including those of Egypt, Mauritania, Qatar, Algeria, Pakistan, and Malaysia, honored him. The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia awarded him the King Faisal International Award for Distinguished Service of Islam in 1989. Al-Ghazali died in 1996, and was buried in the Muslim holy city of Madinah, Saudi Arabia.²⁵⁸

c) Conclusion

Al-Ghazali's life and works show him to have been a distinct scholar with an open yet critical mind, one who integrated traditional knowledge with modernity, and who developed a keen interest in *da'wah*. His background and experience played an important role in preparing him to address the problems of

da'wah and of *du'āt* with reference to the revelatory sources of Islam, yet without losing sight of both the socio-economic and political implications of *da'wah*. His extensive intellectual background and diverse experience also translated into the development of *da'wah* concepts, studying cultural impediments to *da'wah*, reviewing *da'wah* legal implications, and critiquing contemporary *da'wah* attempts by untrained, unprepared, mentally ill-equipped and narrow-minded *du'āt*. More importantly, however, was the serious attention he gave to the question of *da'wah*-based interest (*maṣlahat al-da'wah*). He exercised a great deal of independent reasoning on this question, and received the most intense criticism from scholars and *du'āt*.

Al-Ghazali translated his criticism of the *kuṭṭāb* into a condemnation of literal memorization, and of religious formalities and acts devoid of rational content or positive impact on the lives of the individual or society. Al-Ghazali's critique of religious literalism, and the serious attention he gave to the essence of acts instead of their forms and letters, deeply informed his analysis of *da'wah* and his criticism largely shaped his approach to the goals, approach and methods of *da'wah*. It also appears that he extended his critique of scholars, religious institutions, society and culture into his analysis of *da'wah*. Al-Ghazali's multifaceted knowledge and education, background, and experience produced a fresh perspective on *da'wah* in modern societies. His preoccupation with various aspects of reform, and his busy attention to a multitude of issues both at the local and international levels, affected his discussion of *da'wah* in such a way that it appears broad, in many ways coming close to reform.

We must acknowledge however, that his critique of education and the various socio-economic and political problems of Muslim society all served to affect his examination of *da'wah* and *du'āt*. Al-Ghazali's discussion of *da'wah* as illustrated in many of his works, instead of being narrowly focused, enriches our understanding of the many dimensions and perspectives of the subject.

The importance of al-Ghazali's understanding of society and culture, religion and *da'wah* cannot be understated. His works depict the problems of society and culture, attempt to diagnose inherent weaknesses and failures, and highlight the responsibilities and challenges faced by *da'wah*. His works also establish a logical relationship between the sacred and secular, religion and modernity, and religious and mundane life. His thought translated key ideas of contemporary Islamic reform, including the views of his teacher Hasan al-Banna, with regards to the comprehensive nature of Islam and the false dichotomy posited between the religious and mundane world. Yet, instead of speaking in broad religious terms, al-Ghazali chose to shift attention to a new fundamental relationship between *da'wah* and life, hence putting the challenges of modernity at the center of his thesis on *da'wah*.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Analysis of *Da'wah*

INTRODUCTION

THIS CHAPTER CONTENDS that the conceptual framework put forward by al-Ghazali for *da'wah* highlights and underlines religious, cultural and socio-economic contexts. Al-Ghazali linked *da'wah* to two crucial concepts. The first, innate human nature and the attempt to explore and discover ways according to which *da'wah* practice conforms to human nature. The second, the socio-economic and cultural context of *da'wah*, which not only includes a discussion of social and economic problems impeding current *da'wah*, but also a synergy between the fundamental character of *da'wah* and the ever-changing nature and needs of societies. In this context, pressing questions are raised regarding the proportionate relationship between *da'wah* and freedom, and the extent to which al-Ghazali's development of *da'wah* universality allowed him to examine *da'wah* beyond the geographical boundaries of the Muslim world.

Discussion of al-Ghazali's conceptual framework for *da'wah* requires examination of major concepts and definitions, interpretation of *da'wah* related Qur'anic verses, exploration of the scope and objectives of *da'wah*, and an understanding of the relationship of *da'wah* to issues such as religious universality and freedom.

This level of analysis allows us to elaborate on al-Ghazali's model of *daʿwah* whilst demonstrating how during assessing *daʿwah*, al-Ghazali carefully draws on the cognitive, emotional, moral and physical dimensions of human existence. In other words, al-Ghazali was keenly aware of the need to focus on cultural and socio-economic contexts, which unless improved, negatively affect *daʿwah* progress, in addition to focusing on concepts and issues of *daʿwah* in light of the revelation. For example, in his discussion of theological questions such as innate human nature (*fiṭrah*) and the People of the Interval (*Ahl al-Fatrah*), al-Ghazali was seriously preoccupied with the de facto reality affecting the understanding and development of *daʿwah*.

This chapter traces al-Ghazali's conceptual framework and the contribution of his approach to the study of *daʿwah*. It also discusses his understanding of the problem of human nature, and how this affected his perspective on *daʿwah*, particularly as he was deeply concerned with presenting a positive and bright image of Islam to western societies.¹

Also explored are important issues of society, freedom, universality and peace. These point to al-Ghazali's major interest in paving the way for a contemporary and intelligent *daʿwah* practice to emerge and flourish, as well as highlighting his interest in comprehensive reforms needing to take place to improve the living conditions of not only the caller to Islam (*dāʿiyah*) and the called upon (*madʿū*), but of humanity in general. Discussion draws on al-Ghazali's works and makes reference to a number of Qur'anic commentaries, as well as other relevant medieval Islamic works.

[I] Conceptual Framework

Al-Ghazali views the Qur'an as an illustration of the essence of *daʿwah*, a comprehensive account of its progress and a description of the difficulties endured in the transmission of the religious message.² Stories in the Qur'an especially provide an account

for *daʿwah* since the beginning of the creation, spell out obstacles facing it, and illustrate its various methodologies.³ Al-Ghazali's basic concept of *daʿwah* however, is drawn from those Qur'anic verses that specifically address its characteristics and surrounding conditions,⁴ as seen in verses fifteen in Surah *al-Shūrā* (The Consultation), in sixty-eight and one hundred and eight of *Yūsuf* (Joseph), sixty-seven of *al-Ḥajj* (The Pilgrimage), one hundred and twenty-five of *al-Naḥl* (The Bee), thirty-three of *Fuṣṣilat* (Explained in Detail), one hundred and forty-five of *al-Aʿrāf* (The Heights), and twenty-five of *Yūnus* (Jonah).⁵ In fact, in light of these verses, al-Ghazali inferred the following interesting principles concerning the legitimacy, nature, approach, and function of *daʿwah*: *daʿwah* to God implies the truth;⁶ *daʿwah* is divinely ordained (*tawqīfiyyah*), i.e., it draws neither on the personal reasoning of prophets nor on human rational philosophy;⁷ *daʿwah* is an everlasting obligation;⁸ prophets share *daʿwah* partnership, exercising *daʿwah* prior to Prophet Muhammad;⁹ prophets were sent with good tidings and warnings to introduce people to God and to His commands whilst guiding them to piety;¹⁰ *daʿwah* reflects and simultaneously serves the current needs of the public;¹¹ it is straightforward,¹² and free from material incentives;¹³ *daʿwah* is all-encompassing and embraces all disciplines that people require to understand the meaning of life and discover the signposts of guidance;¹⁴ the undertaking of *daʿwah* is a fundamental human right in Islam;¹⁵ and God endows *daʿwah* with ingredients from preceding religions.¹⁶

Yet in order to provide a clearer understanding of *daʿwah*, al-Ghazali draws on the *daʿwah* models set by earlier prophets, whom he views as *duʿāt* throughout time, and whose efforts he views as the foundation of faith and goodness.¹⁷ For al-Ghazali, prophets assisted and guided people¹⁸ while removing the accretions of superstition and material desires from their path.¹⁹ Prophets also watched over the divine guidance, their speech enfolding wisdom, and as role models of that guidance, their lives exemplified its message and requirements, with harmony of

inner and outer being. Prophets were also transparent, holding no hidden versus public image, and their personal lifestyles concurred with their styles of *daʿwah*.²⁰ In the light of Qurʾanic narratives on the prophets Nūḥ, Ṣāliḥ, Lūṭ, and Shuʿayb, al-Ghazali argues that *daʿwah* fights superstition and the worship of idols or creatures to open up human insight to recognize the Creator.²¹ Still, al-Ghazali discusses the nature of *daʿwah*, and how it should be constructive and persistent. To substantiate this, he expounds on the reaction of the prophets to obstacles and challenges endured in the course of giving *daʿwah*; the ways in which their respective nations embraced or rejected their message; and the end result of the conflict between guidance and evil.²² Prophets showed determination and perseverance, and despite increased opposition to their message, continued in construction instead of destruction, good than harm, and persisted in teaching and education.²³

Qurʾanic accounts concerning *daʿwah* with regards to the prophets, illustrate that throughout transmission of the divine message, prophets continually emphasized one principle, namely that no material compensation or reward was expected in return.²⁴ Prophets were neither sellers of talk nor claimants of fame.²⁵ They gave but did not take back, and chose to sacrifice without seeking any advantage or credit.²⁶ For al-Ghazali these examples prove that the undertaking of *daʿwah* should be free from worldly purposes.

Furthermore, prophetic *daʿwah* was straightforward, simple, understandable, sincere, and compassionate.²⁷ The transparency inherent within *daʿwah* is shown in their clear and unambiguous message.²⁸ Prophets met all people, friend or foe, irrespective of the individual, and did not withhold any piece of their religious message.²⁹ Thus *daʿwah* is open and transparent, with its questions, fundamental or secondary, being known to all, the general public or masses, and elite alike. *Daʿwah* should not cloak any secret question nor conceal certain aspects and disclose others.³⁰ This open and transparent nature of *daʿwah* is partly based on

the example of the Qur'anic account of the prophet Yūsuf (Joseph).³¹

These characteristics of *da'wah* discussed within a revelatory framework, and which draw heavily upon prophetic example as ideal models for modern *du'at*, provide a definition of *da'wah* drawn from the character and implications of the Islamic message itself, whereby harmony and integration exist between belief and legislation, faith and worship, and finance with politics.³² Such integration however necessitates a definition of religion, faith, and the religious message. Firstly, religion, in al-Ghazali's view, implies belief in God, with a deep rooted appreciation of human vicegerency (*istikhlāf*) and supremacy over the universe.³³ Religion is also seen as a profound thought, a heart full of lively emotions, an intelligent mind, and emotions abounding with genuine feelings.³⁴ Faith however is considered to be the ultimate result of intellectual persuasion, emotional satisfaction, and discovery of truth.³⁵ Hence, faith does not and cannot dwell in a closed mind.³⁶ In fact al-Ghazali believed that the greatness of the message is manifested in its appreciation of the intellect, total rejection of conjecture and suspicion, and adherence to certainty and truth. Religiosity as such, does not saturate the intellect with the unbearable, nor does it submerge it in the world of imagination.³⁷ It is probably based on these theological persuasions that al-Ghazali continually seeks to associate the spirit of *da'wah* with the logic of science, so as to further enhance religious understanding and interpretations while engaging *da'wah* with the fold of scientific research. In fact for al-Ghazali, the bridge between religiosity and science is critical because religion would lose its *raison d'être* once it overlooks science, downplays reason, or resists the reconciliation of religion with the mundane world.³⁸

According to al-Ghazali, *da'wah* stands with the intellect in shunning materialism and absurdity.³⁹ His belief further strengthens the interests of genuine religiosity in the form of a healthy moral system that is immune to distortion and artificiality.⁴⁰

Religiosity for al-Ghazali is not simply a process through which purifying spiritual elements are introduced; but rather, an establishment of measures to preserve human nature. This is probably because when religiosity is associated with corrupt human nature it simply connotes lies and deception.⁴¹

In addition to the above interesting notes, al-Ghazali discusses some social dimensions of Islam. For him, Islam is neither a dream of a philosopher nor an attitude of a mystic; but rather a religion through which lives change, and by means of which societies transform according to the divine.⁴² Had Islam started out as a purely moral philosophy, it could have been spread by preachers and educators alone; and had it been simply a political system, it could have been the task of politicians alone. As a matter of fact, Islam combines both aspects, and this implies that religious adherence is made by way of a comprehensive formulation.⁴³ The religious message addresses divine and human rights together, and preserves a harmonious tone between worldly life and the hereafter.⁴⁴

Al-Ghazali's approach to issues such as religion and religiosity however, points to existing objectives and layers underlying his concept of the religious message, including the need to oversee revelation and keep it at the forefront by means of dissemination of goodness, advocacy of righteousness, protection of faith, and rendering revelation as a nourishing source for virtues,⁴⁵ in addition to the further conveying of great meanings to nations in need. The religious message seeks to sustain justice and freedom for those oppressed and deprived nations, imparts certainty and piety through motivation and guidance,⁴⁶ awakens the hearts that have forgotten God, and sets static ideas in motion.⁴⁷ The message of Islam illustrates its religious principles, supports others to discover them while setting people free to either embrace them or reject them.⁴⁸ It abhors evil, condemns wrong,⁴⁹ understands the wisdom in the divine decree versus religious differences, and opens up a door for repentance and hope.⁵⁰ These basic religious concepts help create a positive change for both the

individual and society, and also lay out a functional perspective of *da'wah*. The application of this perspective means that religion should not remain as a series of simple rituals of worship devoid of any social effects, forms of worships transmitted by way of inheritance, or prayers shared through inspirations.⁵¹

Based on this description of religion and religiosity, al-Ghazali further depicts *da'wah* as being born with the birth of faith; it is the twin of faith, rituals and morals.⁵² *Da'wah* for him is a guidance to the most precious truth in the universe, an orientation to goodness, and a salvation from destruction.⁵³ In addition, it represents a process of clarification, perseverance, exchange of opinions, and an inspection of doubts.⁵⁴ What *da'wah* essentially does is that it reminds people, stimulates the apathetic and inactive, monitors verities, sets itself against evil, and alienates myths and desires.⁵⁵ *Da'wah* is a set of emotional virtues and legal duties;⁵⁶ it thus requires patience, endurance, intercession,⁵⁷ and enfold assistance, salvation, and empowerment.⁵⁸ *Da'wah* helps nations discover the path to divine guidance while guarding them from evil desires, and helps them discover a course of guidance and mercy that is deeply-rooted within the heritage of God's prophets and messengers.⁵⁹ *Da'wah* is furthermore the comprehensive exposition of Islam, and an illustration of the divine book which is a guide in all states of human affairs.⁶⁰ This means that *da'wah* transcends the mere act of preaching or calling upon the public to the folds of virtue and worship, and rather engages in teaching and dialogue.⁶¹ The duty of *da'wah* however is found associated with several institutions of society, and this implies that prayer, together with charity, honesty, or chastity, collectively contribute in the transmission of faith.⁶² This is a call for Muslims to develop institutions and initiate strategies in order to discharge the responsibility of *da'wah*.⁶³ This also makes *da'wah* a large-scale program of prevention, which seeks to further foster strategies of broad reform and uprooting of evil.⁶⁴

Al-Ghazali argues that reducing the scope of *da'wah* to a singular activity is unjustifiable.⁶⁵ As a result, he criticizes those who

understand *daʿwah* as fiery sermons, excited emotions,⁶⁶ casual speech, a ruse to fight,⁶⁷ or even fail to understand that preaching is one single aspect in a much broader religious engagement.⁶⁸ With this view in mind, al-Ghazali disapproves granting the title of *dāʿiyah* exclusively to preachers or Imams.⁶⁹ *Duʿāt* for him rather include the just ruler, the competent lawyer or legislator, the guided writer, the faithful preacher, and those challenging injustice and tyranny.⁷⁰ Each individual is able to contribute either individually or collectively to religious, social, cultural, or political life.⁷¹ Such an engagement, however, shows that Islam is not confined to a particular area of reform⁷² and nor should *daʿwah* be limited to certain aspects of human conditions.⁷³ Al-Ghazali's perspective thus broadens the social basis of Islamic activism, and diversifies the religious, social and civic portfolios of individuals and groups. On the one hand, it develops a strong sense of responsibility at the individual level, and bridges the *daʿwah* gap between traditional religious scholars, thinkers, professionals and artists. The end result, however, becomes not so much an act of pure religious or spiritual transmission, but rather, a diversified form of Islamic reform carried out for the good interest of religion and progress of the nation. On the other hand, this approach to *daʿwah* and *duʿāt* breaks with the notion that Muslim scholars, jurists or Imams alone can speak on behalf of Islamic orthodoxy. In al-Ghazali's view, *daʿwah* is a strategic tool of reform that engages all types of workers and volunteers.

Just as Islam transcends time and space, *daʿwah* is boundless in scope. This understanding is drawn from the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and deeds of the Companions of Prophet Muhammad.⁷⁴ *Daʿwah* places religion in the context of the whole of creation and addresses the salvation of the individual and the nation. What makes Islam broader in scope is the fact that it engages various institutions – whether those of education, law, military, economics, or international diplomacy – alongside the deployment of multiple social efforts as a religious mobilizing force.⁷⁵

Thus, according to their competencies, Muslims need to serve this broad-based *daʿwah* through diverse scientific and economic contributions.⁷⁶ Al-Ghazali appears to have once again approached the scope of *daʿwah* through the implications of the message of Islam, including the responsibilities of Muslims to sustain mercy at the local and international fronts, in addition to the assistance of oppressed and destitute people.⁷⁷ It appears that al-Ghazali's earnest interest in undertaking Islamic change through legitimate methods was the component that caused him to draw in various social factors as a means of advancing Islam and supporting *daʿwah*. Similarly, the decline in human development in Muslim societies also necessitates broad-based moral, cultural, economic, and political reforms; these prompt *duʿāt*'s due attention to these serious needs and problems.⁷⁸

Yet to better appreciate al-Ghazali's perspective on *daʿwah*, examining some current definitions may be worthwhile. First, *daʿwah* is a homonym (*mushtarak lafẓī*)⁷⁹ that connotes both the religion of Islam and the process of its promotion. It means dissemination, the discipline through which are identified the many attempts to convey the Islamic faith, including belief, laws and morals. Thus *daʿwah* is a process of dissemination and conveyance, involving religious explanation and understanding of its characteristics as well as of the means through which dissemination is achieved. Besides this, *daʿwah* also connotes the religion which God has chosen for humanity, and for which He sent down the revelation to Prophet Muhammad. *Daʿwah*, accordingly, implies a submission to God and an implementation of the teachings of Islam.⁸⁰ On this occasion, Yunus argues that scholarly differences in regards to *daʿwah* are due to the fact that some use *daʿwah* in reference to the Islamic religion per se; whereas others use it in reference to the process of dissemination itself. He further argues that there exists a subtle difference between these interpretations because the first views *daʿwah* as an academic discipline having an independent subject matter, characteristics, and goals, whereas the second sees it as a set of precepts and laws.⁸¹

Al-Ghazali however, does not supply one single definition of *daʿwah* but, rather, chooses to approach the content of *daʿwah* via the dimensions and implications of the religious message, and eventually with a serious concern for social reform. His contribution however, lies in his attempt to draw the essential features of Islam in a *daʿwah* pattern through the example of prophets, probably to sustain his *daʿwah* model with a religious base, common to all monotheistic faiths.⁸² Al-Ghazali, thus, did not limit himself to a technical definition, but was rather flexible, independent, and even creative. His approach merged the act of enjoining good and forbidding evil into *daʿwah*, rather than keeping the two dispersed, thus rendering *daʿwah* and the act of enjoining good and forbidding evil together key characteristics of the religious message.⁸³ Al-Ghazali's various interpretations however, call upon perspectives and functions of *daʿwah*, including the meanings and implications of religion itself, the necessary spiritual and economic reform alongside the empowerment of Muslims in contemporary societies.

Al-Ghazali's understanding of *daʿwah* appears to be holistic, and reflects his broad approach to Islamic reform.⁸⁴ His broad view of *daʿwah* however, entails a close relationship between *daʿwah* and the notion of change whereby *daʿwah* involves not only the transmission of religious teachings or the interpretation of the scripture to the Muslim community, but also embraces the many contributions of those engaged in social reform. His extension of the notion of *daʿwah* and his expansion of its mandate and scope to embrace broader social change is based on his belief in the comprehensive nature of Islamic precepts, and is based on his conviction that the understanding of religion should not be fragmentary.⁸⁵ His broad-based approach to *daʿwah* may be reminiscent of the notion of comprehensive Islamic change (*shumūliyat al-ḥall al-islāmī*) advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood. His approach nonetheless reflects a personal appreciation of the need for major change affecting all facets of Muslim socio-political and cultural life, to counter the forms of secular

dichotomies existing between religious and mundane life, and which have profoundly affected the progress of *daʿwah*, religion and morality in general.

[II] *Fiṭrah* (Innate Human Nature)⁸⁶

Al-Ghazali's works show serious preoccupation with the state of *fiṭrah* (innate human nature) as a critical pre-requisite for the positive understanding and undertaking of *daʿwah*. The concept of *fiṭrah* plays a central role in his thesis for the reason that al-Ghazali uses it to set *daʿwah* within a framework of original human dispositions and ascension towards the divine ideals. The discussion of *fiṭrah* brings to attention a number of theological and theoretical issues including the intellect, common sense, the influence of environment, the interpretation of religion, and the progress of civilization; the proper approach to these issues in the undertaking of *daʿwah* presumably engenders positive results in *daʿwah* that are reflective of and harmonious with the very essence of human yearnings and development.

Al-Ghazali has confidence in innate human nature.⁸⁷ His preoccupation with the course of human nature however has profound implications for *daʿwah*. Al-Ghazali persistently sought to forge an intimate relationship between *daʿwah* and the characteristics of innate human nature on the one hand, and on the other hand to develop a genuine yet proportionate equation between religious development and sound *fiṭrah*. The basic assumption however, is that *daʿwah* facilitates a supportive environment for human ascension towards spiritual, moral, and religious perfection in general, whilst providing a finishing touch to an already existing intuitive knowledge yet without necessarily contributing any new teaching to it. This issue however, raises some other questions concerning whether the *daʿwah* process acquires any advantage through intimate association with human nature, and how could such an association prove to be understandable and workable. Some other relevant questions concern the criteria al-

Ghazali employed to determine forms and manifestations of intuitive knowledge, and why al-Ghazali advocates this association so passionately and tenaciously. Prior to discussing these questions however, it is important to understand the concept of *fiṭrah* first.

Fiṭrah is one of the original concepts in the Islamic tradition. It is attributed to God (*fiṭrah Allah*), and is thus praiseworthy (*maḥmūdah*).⁸⁸ The Qur’an and the Hadith use the word *fiṭrah* on numerous occasions. The Qur’an for example says: “And so, set thy face steadfastly towards the [one ever-true] faith, turning away from all that is false, in accordance with the natural disposition which God has instilled into man: [for,] not to allow any change to corrupt what God has thus created this is the [purpose of the one] ever-true faith; but most people know it not.”⁸⁹ Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: “Every child is born into *fiṭrah* ...” Early medieval Muslim theologians have extensively discussed the nature and function of this concept. Among them is Ibn Taymiyyah who views *fiṭrah* as both the divine order in every created being and God’s creation of the body and the intellect. He argues that drawing conclusions from their premises is a rational *fiṭrah*. Ibn Taymiyyah considers *fiṭrah* as a set of qualities, characteristics, attributes, according to which God the Exalted created humans.⁹⁰ Qur’an exegetes likewise reached different conclusions with regards to the meaning of *fiṭrah*. Al-Ṭabarī for instance argues that the above verse exhorts Prophet Muhammad to turn his face to where God has directed, that is, to the worship of God and towards the religion of Islam. The pattern in which God has made humans, is the *fiṭrah* of God out of which He has created humans.⁹¹ Al-Ṭabarī cites the following tradition in support of his point. He states: “The *fiṭrah* of God is the religion of Islam, in which, there is no change.”⁹²

Al-Qurṭubī argued that the term *dīn* (religion) mentioned in the Qur’anic verse (And so, set thy face steadfastly towards the [one ever-true] faith) means Islam, and that the standard religion

(*al-dīn al-qayyīm*) is the religion of Islam. Both the terms “religion” and “Islam” however, are used interchangeably in view of the belief that Islam is the final religion. Al-Qurṭubī however, maintains that scholars disagreed about the meaning of *fiṭrah*. Some believe that it implies the state of beginning or inception (*ḥālat al-badā’ah*) in which humans were created – that is to say, that God created humans to live and die, to be happy or miserable, and to be what they will be at the age of maturity (*sinna al-bulūgh*).⁹³ Some others however argue that *fiṭrah* only concerns people of faith. Had the case been otherwise, it is argued, all people would have believed and nobody would have committed disbelief.⁹⁴ Ibn Taymiyyah in contrast, maintains that *fiṭrah* applies to all, believers or disbelievers.⁹⁵ The above mentioned verse also means that God does not change His will. Hence, those who were created to be happy shall never be miserable, and those created for a miserable destiny shall never taste happiness.⁹⁶

One of the many meanings of *fiṭrah* is that it represents the knowledge that God inculcates in new born children, which results in children being born in a state that qualifies them to know God at the age of understanding. This, Ibn Taymiyyah names sound *fiṭrah* (*fiṭrah salīmah*).⁹⁷ It does not however, mean that children are born aware of religion or that they want it at the time of birth.⁹⁸ It simply means that *fiṭrah* necessitates the religion of Islam. This very *fiṭrah* leads to acknowledging of and devotion to God. Despite however the perfection of *fiṭrah* and its immunity from negative effects its requirements are nonetheless gradually met.⁹⁹ Parents for instance invite, encourage, and educate their children, and do what any educator or teacher does with their students.¹⁰⁰ Their influence on *fiṭrah* however, is only rendered possible by the will and decree of God.¹⁰¹

Fiṭrah also stands for the primordial covenant of God made with the children of Adam in a pre-existent dimension. This meaning is drawn from the following Qur’anic verse which states: “When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam –

from their loins – their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): ‘Am I not your Lord (Who cherishes and sustains you)?’ – They said: ‘Yea! We do testify!’ (This), lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: ‘Of this we were never mindful’. Or lest ye should say: ‘Our fathers before us may have taken false gods, but we are (their) descendants after them: wilt Thou then destroy us because of the deeds of men who were futile?’”¹⁰² This covenant indicates the *fiṭrah* which God implanted in human souls,¹⁰³ or designates those that acknowledged faith and knowledge prior to the creation of their physical bodies.¹⁰⁴ The notion of a primordial covenant finds support in a tradition of the Prophet which states: “Allah said: I created my servants monotheists (*ḥunafā*’), but the devils came to them and deviated them from their religion.”¹⁰⁵ This tradition implies that humans were created equipped with divine knowledge and with a belief in God, and were born in a state of religion.¹⁰⁶ Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (368 AH/978 CE) argues that some Muslim scholars have explained the *fiṭrah* cited in the tradition “every baby child is born in *fiṭrah*” as meaning being born with faith which tends to acknowledge the belief in God or inclines to the denial of belief. For al-Ghazali however, it rather means that every child is born in a perfect state, whether in form or character, without necessarily embracing any faith or disbelief, or adopting knowledge or denial. Humans only adopt faith or disbelief when they reach the age of distinguishing (*sinn al-tamyīz*).¹⁰⁷ Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr states: “*fiṭrah* means soundness (*ṣiḥḥah*) and righteousness (*istiḳāmah*); both meanings are supported in the tradition which says: ‘I have created my servants *ḥunafā*’;’ that is, on righteousness (*istiḳāmah*) and wellness (*ṣiḥḥah*).”¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, the Mu‘tazilites maintained that human beings are not born as Muslims, and that God creates humans with neither belief nor disbelief. Rather, some people cause disbelief while others opt for belief in Islam, without God affecting any of them. God invites them to the religion of Islam, removes their ineptness, and provides them with opportunities that qualify

for faith or disbelief. God does not privilege believers with any favorable condition leading to faith, for that would be unjust were it to happen. Some of the later Muʿtazilites however, argued that God provides believers with the call of faith (*dāʿī al-imān*) and the faculty for faith, which in turn causes faith.¹⁰⁹

At the most basic level however, al-Ghazali views Islam as essentially a religion of *fiṭrah*.¹¹⁰ This implies that being a Muslim stands for adherence to the natural religion (*al-dīn al-ṭabīʿī*), which cherishes human nature, esteems its virtuous predispositions, appreciates the intellect, and is characterized by tolerance towards human error.¹¹¹ Religion is sound *fiṭrah* before this becomes contaminated by defective customs or thoughts.¹¹² This perspective however leads to the rejection of any religious understanding that is found to be at odds with human nature or the human intellect.¹¹³ Given the present connection between *fiṭrah* and religion, al-Ghazali criticizes *duʿāt* who portray Islam as a religion strange to or at odds with *fiṭrah* and the yearning of man.¹¹⁴ The perspective of *fiṭrah* also implies that people with sound *fiṭrah* alone hold on properly to religion;¹¹⁵ whereas, those lacking sound intellect and pure consciousness can hardly be associated with faith.¹¹⁶ It also implies that religion wanes as soon as *fiṭrah* becomes corrupt (*fasād al-fiṭrah*), and revelation is misunderstood when the intellect is poor or defective.¹¹⁷ Not only this, but also any religious life associated to a corrupt *fiṭrah*, al-Ghazali argues, is absurd because it obscures human reality¹¹⁸ and causes revelation to be less effective.¹¹⁹

According to al-Ghazali, *fiṭrah* consists of a sound intellect and pure heart.¹²⁰ He argues that when the term *fiṭrah* is used in the context of *daʿwah*, it designates the sound *fiṭrah* alone.¹²¹ To substantiate this view, al-Ghazali draws on the primordial covenant of *fiṭrah* (*mithāq al-fiṭrah*), which humans are bound to since the inception of life, and which establishes monotheism (*tawhīd*) as the genuine belief, defies the temptations of polytheism while connecting humanity to the Creator.¹²² It is on this

occasion that al-Ghazali sees the Qur’an as a reminder of that which should not be neglected; of the consciousness and what it should judge; and of the genesis of humanity and its strong bond with the Creator.¹²³ The Qur’an is called remembrance (*dhikr*)¹²⁴ because it complements *fiṭrah* in such a way that the knowledge of the latter occurs after a stage of complete ignorance.¹²⁵

To provide a better understanding of the nature of *fiṭrah* however, al-Ghazali enumerates some of its physical forms and manifestations. These reflect the ultimate role of *fiṭrah* in revitalizing the primordial covenant taken in a dimension of pre-existence. Seeking refuge in God during times of affliction, being conscious of the eventual return to Him, cherishing virtues and virtuous people, opposing crimes and criminals, and admiring truth and justice – all of these are deeply rooted in sound *fiṭrah*.¹²⁶ Given *fiṭrah* and the natural human yearning for religion, there is no need to resort to violence.¹²⁷ To substantiate the notion of human capability to determine moral acts, al-Ghazali argues that humans are both born with sound reasoning that guides them to the Creator, and also with an understanding that corruption is evil and shameful and needs to be kept distant.¹²⁸ This goes along with al-Ṣan‘ānī’s view that, despite differences of religion and tradition, nations agree on praising truthfulness and truthful people and condemning lies and liars – a condition which still applies. The literature of these nations points to an appreciation of kindness and a condemnation of mischief, using different terms such as *ḥikmah* (wisdom), *safah* (foolishness), *maṣlahah* (interest), or *mafsada* (harm).¹²⁹ To support his contention with regards to the human capability and potential to distinguish the good from evil, al-Ṣan‘ānī provides the following example:

If one sees a person approaching a miserable, weak, sick, thirsty and poorly dressed man with food, drink, and clothing; then afterwards sees another person stealing that food, drink and clothing, and insulting and beating the poor man, then which mind would praise the actions of the second person,

refusing to blame him, and claim no difference between the [two] persons' actions, or even describe their praising or blaming as akin? He who says so is simply foolish.¹³⁰

The theological question of the human potential to distinguish the good from evil, however, leads to the question of determining actions as good (*taḥsīn*) or vile (*taqbiḥ*) and to the question of the position of reason versus revelation. For al-Ghazali, the divine commands are the highest authoritative source for legal rulings.¹³¹ Neither reason nor revelation disagree in their definition of good or evil because both stand on equal footing in their determination of good and evil.¹³² Lies or truthfulness, justice or aggression, were equivalent values prior to the advent of revelation.¹³³ Along with the majority of Muslim scholars however, al-Ghazali maintains that the determination of moral acts eventually implies a rejection of rational philosophy about human actions, which pays no heed to revelation and only causes arbitrary approvals or denials.¹³⁴ It is on this basis that al-Ghazali associates *daʿwah* with the criteria of distinguishing good from bad, so as to make the moral determination of acts as an inherent characteristic of *daʿwah* thought.¹³⁵

According to al-Ghazali, an unerring sense of self-direction to God and perfected morality is instilled at birth. For him, children are born ready to develop towards perfect morality, yet are like fruit, which only grows sweet when sufficient care is taken against disease.¹³⁶ This implies that left to personal choice human beings would eventually be guided to their Creator, discover divinely inspired inner motivations,¹³⁷ prefer marriage to fornication, remain alert rather than drunk, act generously rather than with selfishness, and sincerely rather than deceitfully.¹³⁸ It is by virtue of *fiṭrah* that humans realize that justice is good, evil is bad, knowledge is an honor, ignorance is a disgrace, chastity is an ascension to perfection, and immorality is a corruption.¹³⁹ Even with little divine knowledge, explains al-Ghazali, the purity of *fiṭrah* leads people to know God and acknowledge His rights.¹⁴⁰

Humans are born with a readiness, that is with a preference and a motivation, to follow the course of *fiṭrah* and to accept and follow belief and virtue. *Fiṭrah* however, does not mean being born into a conscious state of belief or virtue, otherwise religious responsibility becomes pointless. Rather, it means that humans are born with a certain preparation and preference for the course of *fiṭrah*.¹⁴¹ This natural predisposition nonetheless, occurs with no prior learning since humans are steered to many truths without prior knowledge, and were at certain points in time, predisposed to acknowledge and identify other truths. However, under certain circumstances humans lose track of those truths. Once these are brought back, the intellect immediately recognizes them.¹⁴²

In the beginning note, *fiṭrah* is fragile and requires a constant infusion of warmth until it acquires strength and is able to overcome material inclinations. In other words, the environment of *fiṭrah* requires delicate care until such a time that *fiṭrah* becomes independent and self-sufficient – that is, *fiṭrah* requires safeguards until it acquires perfection.¹⁴³ On this particular issue, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that *fiṭrah* enfolds a power leading to faith in the same way the power of a healthy body looks for healthy food. Ibn Taymiyyah raised the question as to whether the power of readiness and capability are by themselves sufficient to lead to knowledge or do they rather require additional learning from the external world.¹⁴⁴ He explains that necessary knowledge (*‘ilm ḍarūrī*) is acquired through internal evidence, like that reflected in the soul, yet is acquired without assistance of external evidences. Souls with *fiṭrah* cause their own reflections (*naẓar*) and reasoning (*istidlāl*) without the interference of external evidences. As a conclusion, the *fiṭrah* of children implies their possession of learning.¹⁴⁵

Yet in spite of the fact that humans are born with a sound intellect directed to one God, negative traditions however, do affect the growth of *fiṭrah* and can lead it to a different direction.¹⁴⁶ Humans are guided to the Creator, particularly when the

surrounding conditions are favorable¹⁴⁷ because obstacles only divert humans from their ultimate destiny.¹⁴⁸ God endows *fiṭrah* with characteristics to resist falsehood. The disregard of those qualities causes failure and justifies just examination on the Day of Reckoning.¹⁴⁹ Those characteristics include the capability to resist, refuse and object to superstitious thinking, to uphold the truth, to reject immorality, and to act kindly and righteously.¹⁵⁰ Given the above, religiosity is not a process through which new elements that purify the soul are introduced but, rather, an introduction of measures that safeguard the pure nature of *fiṭrah*.¹⁵¹ In other words, religion does not simply set new teaching components – but rather consolidates *fiṭrah* through supportive measures.¹⁵²

Al-Ghazali discusses some implications of the sound *fiṭrah*, but provides no supportive evidence. Overall, those implications appear to reflect his personal view about what defines good human life and positive social interaction. For him, sound *fiṭrah* requires people to avoid transgression and not adore themselves or advance their personal egos. It also implies that life is a right shared by all and requires abstaining from hatred, lies, deception, and false accusations. Sound intellects also require abiding by the truth, and appreciating proofs while rejecting superstition and myth.¹⁵³ Arguably, al-Ghazali's open boundary *fiṭrah* is problematic because it does not clearly set the terms of *fiṭrah* content and is open to thoughts or impressions that may not necessarily be consistent with *fiṭrah*. Under the effects of the many intellectual, cultural, and social changes that people often undergo in life, what might be defined as *fiṭrah* at an early stage of life might later appear totally detrimental to it. Al-Ghazali describes how he monitors the statements and actions of people using the criteria of *fiṭrah*, to accept that which is good and reject that which is evil.¹⁵⁴ Yet, he does not seem to clearly define what makes an action or a behavior *fiṭrah*-oriented, and this has caused critical problems in his discussion of *da'wah*.

Al-Ghazali's understanding of *fiṭrah* becomes a little clearer when he argues that *fiṭrah* reflects its purity in proportion to emotional health, security, and economic stability, or might show its presence in many great works and achievements – even when partially mixed with material desires, injustice, or confusion.¹⁵⁵ For him, *fiṭrah* is favorably manifested in nations that indulge less in artificiality and showing off.^{156, 157} Any civilization that is closer to *fiṭrah* gets nearer to the nature of Islam.¹⁵⁸ Not only that, but modern Western civilization according to him, is closer to *fiṭrah* than those religious teachings that suppress or humiliate the human body.¹⁵⁹ Specifically, modern traditions of the West, especially in politics, are nearer to the religion of Islam.¹⁶⁰ In contrast, any civilization that inclines to artificiality eventually deviates from Islam even when it appears to be so close.¹⁶¹ This explains why the negligence of Muslims to act according to *fiṭrah* caused their backwardness¹⁶² because the religion of *fiṭrah* has been replaced by restrictions, superstitions, and worldly desires, these having negatively affected *da'wah*.¹⁶³

Al-Ghazali's understanding of *fiṭrah* transcends conventional religious definitions to consider more universal values as valid indicators of a sound *fiṭrah*. His objective was to lay out a *fiṭrah* basis for *da'wah* and to reach a common background with humanity. Al-Ghazali states that respect for human nature yields agreement on common terms.¹⁶⁴ His perspective however, requires the understanding of his position towards humanity and humanism. According to al-Ghazali, both sound hearts and minds are familiar with humanism. Al-Ghazali shares the struggle of humanity against political despotism, religious fanaticism, extremism, racism, or social stratification, and its quest for justice, tolerance, brotherhood, and compassion. He further states that he accepted humanism as a title and subject matter and that he thinks that the call of humanism signifies that humanity has returned to its origin and seeks its innate nature, which it has been missing. Besides, the religions conveyed by the prophets, according to al-Ghazali, are nothing save the guided humanism

which respects reason, conscience, and the pure heart as a moral determinant of good and evil. The true religion is the humanity on the right track (*al-insāniyyah al-ṣaḥīḥah*), which includes the intellect's determination of the truth through science and withstands myth and superstition.¹⁶⁵

Connecting *fiṭrah* to humanism places *daʿwah* in a position where *duʿāt* are not so much concerned with educating others about the religion as with identifying the natural echoes of *fiṭrah* in modern societies. On the one hand, this perspective broadens the base of *daʿwah* to include any human endeavor that is "sound" and, on the other hand, implies a critique of current *daʿwah* approaches in view of a progressing humanism. In more concrete terms, we are left with no specific details as to how to reform *daʿwah* or integrate these concepts into *daʿwah* thought. Al-Ghazali raised problems along with their profound implications, yet is not committed to developing a working formula that translates his own perspective and concepts. Given many supportive traditions, al-Ghazali is theoretically justified in his attempt to rebuild *daʿwah* on the basis of *fiṭrah*; his task however remains incomplete. Al-Ghazali is concerned with *fiṭrah*-based *daʿwah*, which is interconnected with peace, security, and emotional stability, being seriously affected by distortions or superstitions. It is one that is harmonious with the intellect and science and appreciates human discoveries. His definition however, is not clear enough as to what constitutes the contents of *fiṭrah*, and what are the boundaries of *fiṭrah* thought. His understanding of *fiṭrah* is identified, not only with revelation, but also with experience, philosophy, and science. All however, fall short of providing mature criteria for the proper application of *fiṭrah*.¹⁶⁶

Having said that, al-Ghazali's discussion of *fiṭrah* shows that his contribution lies in the proportionate relationship between healthy religious growth and social prosperity, and his attempt to strongly incorporate the component of *fiṭrah* in a *daʿwah* thought system. On the one hand, the development of *fiṭrah*-based *daʿwah* expands the philosophical grounds of thought on

da‘wah and has the potential to extend beyond religious circles, to embrace achievements in the various human fields of philosophy, morality, and science. Besides this, his perspective on *fiṭrah* appears to be an attempt at “humanizing” *da‘wah*, because it constantly solicits harmony with human contributions that are still undistorted or uncontaminated. On the other hand this relationship prepares fertile ground for *da‘wah* progress as it opens up new boundaries before genuine human contributions, and creates a logical concordance between the realism of *du‘āt* and their audiences. On the side of the *dā‘iyah* however it critically raises the challenges of harmonizing *da‘wah* with human reality, which carries further theological, moral and legal implications. On the side of the audience, it naturalizes the task of *da‘wah* since it draws on human logic, common sense, and experience.

[I I I] People of the Interval (*Ahl al-Fatrah*)¹⁶⁷

The theological question of the People of the Interval (*Ahl al-Fatrah*) deals with those who were not exposed to *da‘wah*. What will their status be on the Day of Judgment? The term *Ahl al-Fatrah* designates a category of people not exposed to religious information effectively, motivating them to further religious exploration, or those who, while acknowledging some of the prophets, were not properly educated as to their teachings. That is, they are like the *ḥunafā’* among the early Arabs, meaning they had a general belief in the prophecy of Abraham and Ishmael, yet lacked proper understanding of their religious message.¹⁶⁸ The Qur’anic points of reference on the question of the People of the Interval are these: “nor would We visit with Our Wrath until We had sent an apostle (to give warning)”¹⁶⁹ and “Lo! Those who believe (in that which is revealed unto thee, Muhammad), and those who are Jews, and Christians, and Sabaeans, whoever believeth in Allah and the Last Day and does right, surely their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve.”¹⁷⁰

The question of *Ahl al-Fatrah* is interesting, especially in that it involves the sub-question of whether humans are capable of discovering and believing in God through the intellect. Al-Ghazali asks: "What is the ruling of those who lost sight of the right path or missed the path of the religion? What is the ruling of those who were not exposed to the teaching of Prophet Muhammad, or have rather received a deplorable image unable to motivate them or open up their hearts to faith?"¹⁷¹ Al-Ghazali showed keen interest in the relationship of *da'wah* to the People of the Interval, and preoccupation with the notion that contemporary *da'wah* would not benefit them. He examines *da'wah* in the context of their needs, such as the changes required to discharge religious responsibility effectively. But what constitutes that satisfactory delivery of *da'wah*? Furthermore, how can *da'wah* be kept practical and free from theological assumptions?

Interestingly enough, al-Ghazali introduces the question of *Ahl al-Fatrah* through a description of the stagnant state of *da'wah*, including Muslims' negligence of their religious duties, and failure to adhere to the example of *da'wah* set by the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁷²

In his discussion of this question, al-Ghazali quotes Abduh and Rida's commentaries on the following verse: "Lo! Those who believe (in that which is revealed unto thee, Muhammad), and those who are Jews, and Christians, and Sabaeans, whoever believeth in Allah and the Last Day and does right, surely their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve."¹⁷³ According to Abduh, there is the view of *Ahl al-Sunnah* that the category of *Ahl al-Fatrah* includes those who were not exposed to any *da'wah*, they will be saved since there is no legal responsibility in the absence of revelation.¹⁷⁴ Al-Ghazali however, includes amongst *Ahl al-Fatrah* those who were exposed to a type of *da'wah* that failed to stimulate their thought, or who, having learned about some prophets, acquired a general belief, yet were not exposed to any of the prophets' specific teachings.¹⁷⁵

For a better exposition of this theological question al-Ghazali draws on Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's division of the saved group into three categories, depending on their positions vis-à-vis the Messengers. The first group (*nājūn*) includes those who never heard of any prophet's message. The second shall be held accountable (*mu'ākhadhūn*), and includes those who were exposed to the message of the Prophet yet, because of negligence, pride, or arrogance, failed to examine its evidence. The third group shall be saved and includes those who received an erroneous or flawed religious message, but were able to think and contemplate. Al-Ghazali quotes Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in his *Fayṣal al-Tafriqah* in which he makes mention of a group of people in the saved category (*nājūn*), who heard about Prophet Muhammad yet ignored his qualities and characteristics, and only knew that a liar or deceiver called Muhammad claimed prophethood.¹⁷⁶

Following this introduction, al-Ghazali moves on to draw on the position of a prominent Azharite scholar, Shaykh Mahmud Abd al-Halim, in regards to the religious responsibility of Muslims towards *Ahl al-Fatrah*. Shaykh Abd al-Halim argues that Muslims' failure to convey the message causes the whole Muslim nation to be held accountable. He does not hesitate to blame Muslims for being negligent in their *daʿwah*.¹⁷⁷ Shaykh Mahmud divides *Ahl al-Fatrah* into two categories. The first includes those who knew about the Prophet Muhammad, and that he was sent with the Islamic faith and the Qur'an, yet knew nothing about his teachings. Those should learn the teachings of Islam, because their failure to do so causes divine accountability. If they find no way to learn about Islam, then they shall not be held accountable. In contrast, Muslims who fail to discharge their duty of *daʿwah* shall be held accountable.¹⁷⁸ The second group includes those who knew literally nothing about Islam nor about the Prophet Muhammad. They shall not be held accountable, and their destiny lies with God alone, whether He forgives or punishes them.¹⁷⁹ In his discussion on the responsibility of

people who received a distorted image of *daʿwah*, Shaykh Abd al-Halim blames the distortion on external factors.¹⁸⁰ Al-Ghazali however, makes a division. For him, the ignorant (*jāhil*) include those not exposed to a genuine message, or who lived according to ideas available to them, or inherited traditions. Upon examination however, this category of the ignorant divides into many sub-groups, including the People of the Book, polytheists, intelligent, ordinary people, and those who wished to know about the genuine Islamic revelation. Upon understanding revelation however they should not be asked to believe, but rather assured safety and security of their persons and honor. Only then, in a climate of freedom and peace, will they possibly believe.¹⁸¹

Al-Ghazali also draws on the arguments of the Ashʿarites concerning the exemption of *Ahl al-Fatrah* based on Surah *al-Isrāʾ* (The Journey by Night: verse 15).¹⁸² Prophets are described to have had supported the understanding of the intellect and to have had elaborated issues beyond its realm, including questions of the Day of Judgment and methods of worship. According to al-Ghazali, the majority of scholars are of the opinion that the prophets' transmission of belief is by itself sufficient and sets a pretext of accountability for those exposed to faith, even when prophets were not sent to them specifically.¹⁸³ By comparison, the Muʿtazilites argue that God endows humans with the intellect, by means of which, in the absence of a prophet, they should avoid atheism and polytheism, as well as aggression and corruption, even when they are not requested to practice religious rituals. They are, however, required to believe in the foundations of the truth, that is, certainty about One God, and to act well to the best of their abilities.¹⁸⁴

Unlike Muslim theologians who address this problem with a major preoccupation over salvation (*najāt*) or accountability (*muʾākhadhah*), al-Ghazali instead reverses the problem and shifts attention to the ruling concerning those who fail to deliver *daʿwah*.¹⁸⁵ Through focusing on the caller (*dāʿiyah*) rather than

the called upon (*mad‘ū*) he underscores a number of reasons leading to a state of dysfunctional *da‘wah* among Muslims rather than being preoccupied with theological questions beyond the realm of human imagination. As a result, he was concerned with those exposed to a distorted message and so accordingly unable to turn their hearts to Islam. He states:

We should ask ourselves about the ruling of Islam concerning those who were misguided or misled from the true religion, those who did not receive the message of Prophet Muhammad, or those who have instead received a distorted message unable to attract them to the faith or open their hearts to Islam.¹⁸⁶

In his attempt to resolve the controversy of *Ahl al-Fatrah*, al-Ghazali argues that a large number of people should be viewed beyond the reach of *da‘wah* either because of their complete ignorance of the Qur’an, the Prophet, and the teachings of Islam, or because of their misconceptions about Islam.¹⁸⁷ Disbelief, according to al-Ghazali, only applies when a person is exposed to the truth, understands it and is able to adhere to it, yet rejects it for certain purposes.¹⁸⁸ Hence, people not exposed to the teachings of Islam from its original holders shall be exempted from divine accountability.¹⁸⁹ Still, al-Ghazali finds it difficult to issue a general judgment including all of *Ahl al-Fatrah* together in one common destiny. Some sincerely acted upon the little divine knowledge to which they were exposed. In addition, there were those with sound character, who respected and preserved the rights of others and abstained from moral vice. There are also those who mock religion and reject belief in the unseen, and still others who, despite their ability to discover the truth, choose otherwise.¹⁹⁰ Al-Ghazali writes:

What can those little children do when they have been taught since childhood that there is no God, or that existence is simply physical, or that gods live as partners on Mount Olympus, on an Island, or on top of a cloud? Those children simply grow in misguidance.¹⁹¹

Al-Ghazali's treatment of communities beyond religious outreach clearly shows his accommodating approach and his interest not to discuss their status with God; whether they shall be held accountable or subject to divine salvation, and whether they can discover God on their own. His major interest, instead, was what impaired or handicapped *da'wah*, or what caused it to be conveyed in distorted and distorting ways. In this regard, al-Ghazali discusses serious issues concerning Muslims' interaction with people of other faith groups, and urges Muslims to view other faith groups who reject the prophecy of Muhammad with justice and objectivity.¹⁹² Those who fail to properly embrace Islam because of repulsive religious practices should then be excused.¹⁹³ People who have not been emotionally or intellectually awakened by the religious message should not be viewed as disbelievers because they have not been properly exposed to the speech (*al-qawl*) described in the Qur'an.¹⁹⁴ Thus, for al-Ghazali Islamic outreach to polytheists is incomplete because it lacks elements that would attract them to a proper understanding of the religion. For example, Muslims' poor implementation of the Qur'an and dire internal conditions and external policies can drive people away from God's path.¹⁹⁵ For al-Ghazali Muslims only shall be held accountable for their disregard of the message and for holding back the light of guidance.¹⁹⁶ To reach a more objective answer to the many questions regarding religious outreach and human accountability, al-Ghazali hypothetically asks whether he himself would have embraced Islam, known God, or believed in the Qur'an, had he been born and raised in the West. The answer is an affirmative negative! This according to him is due to distorted and negative images of Islam reaching modern western societies.¹⁹⁷ Al-Ghazali writes:

I suppose when God asks people on the Day of Judgment the reasons for their neglect of His worship, failure to do good or prepare for their meeting with Him; their answer would probably be the Arabs who inherited the religion yet blur/constrain its light.¹⁹⁸

Al-Ghazali's approach to the issue of *Ahl al-Fatrah* appears to be largely affected by the prevailing poor conditions of Muslims, and to a large degree illustrates the deep level to which contemporary conditions affected his reasoning, even on an issue that is supposedly theological. It also shows that Al-Ghazali chose not to focus on metaphysical questions having no practical implications for *da'wah*, preferring rather to preoccupy Muslim minds with questions that are useful and practical. His approach makes no exception to his general critical pattern in the discussion of the affairs of the Muslims and *da'wah* outreach. Thus, instead of being satisfied with their current *da'wah* contributions, *du'āt* are required to reflect on their approaches, methods and conditions, to engage in self-criticism, and meet their *da'wah* responsibilities toward people of *Ahl al-Fatrah* to the best of their abilities. Al-Ghazali's approach however, appears to be non-judgmental, and endorses al-Ghazali's character as a *dā'iyyah* and not of a theologian or a jurist. While there is criticism, nevertheless al-Ghazali's contribution to the discussion on *da'wah* and *Ahl al-Fatrah* is characterized by tolerance and understanding, by an apology for *Ahl al-Fatrah* for not being properly educated or exposed to religious teaching, and by a belief that a role model is as influential as the religious transmission of *da'wah*. In fact, a role model is seen to be even more influential than theoretical teaching; this is an original contribution to the theological discussion of *Ahl al-Fatrah*.

[IV] The Universality of *Da'wah*

The universality of Islam's message (*ʿālamīyyat al-risālah*) is another distinctive component of al-Ghazali's model of *da'wah*. It is a universality which has run across time, uniting all of God's prophets around the one common theme of showing mankind the path to God. According to al-Ghazali, Prophet Muhammad's message develops this concept of universality based on the belief that across time religion has only been one, and that prophets are

but brothers who introduced the Creator and guided people to Him.¹⁹⁹ Further, the seal of prophethood (*khatm al-nubuwwah*, a title to indicate that prophethood came to an end with Prophet Muhammad and that no other prophet is to follow) accorded to the Prophet is an affirmation of the universality of Islam since no further divine message will proceed after the Qur'an.²⁰⁰ Al-Ghazali supports Islam's universality with Qur'anic verses,²⁰¹ mostly Makkan²⁰² implying that the universality was determined at a very early stage of revelation, during times when *da'wah* was suffering the most.²⁰³ In considering one single Madinan verse that addresses this universality, al-Ghazali argues that²⁰⁴ the Qur'an declared itself as a message for humanity even when the Makkans did not even accept Muhammad as a Prophet for the tribe of Quraysh.²⁰⁵

Al-Ghazali approached the universality of *da'wah* not just in terms of the large geographical area within which it operates, but particularly in light of the guidance and the formulation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah which address all humanity everywhere, irrespective of time or space considerations.²⁰⁶ This however, should neither inhibit human thought nor overlook humanity's changing conditions or circumstances.²⁰⁷ Thus, this universality should by no means lead to a homogenization or negligence of the features of religious and national existence. Al-Ghazali exhorts Muslims to be clear in their understanding of Islamic universality's relationship with nationalism. For example, they should not invite the Africans or Indians to Arabism for Muslims should not forget their origin or ethnicity.²⁰⁸ This led al-Ghazali to discuss the position of language with regards to Islamic universality, which for him calls for a combination of both a mastery of Arabic and foreign languages, as well as exploration of other nations, and strengthening of relationships with them.²⁰⁹ Al-Ghazali felt that the Arabs should master foreign languages and develop a synopsis of Islamic teachings (or guide) in areas of beliefs, morals, worship, and other key aspects.²¹⁰ They should also transmit revelation to humanity using all possible mediums

of communication.²¹¹ Arabic as a language nevertheless was paid special attention in the context of Islamic universality.²¹² Similar to the point made earlier, al-Ghazali was clear that the primacy of the Arabic language should not lead one to leave her/his ethnic origin. Arabic serves the cause of Islamic universality but does not censure racial or ethnic attachment. Thus it would be absurd to arabize humanity in order to gain its complete understanding of Islam.²¹³

In addition to these important points on *daʿwah* universality, al-Ghazali also underscored the importance of global reform and humanitarian endeavor. Such a perspective seeks to break emotional and cultural barriers surrounding this universality, and to forge bridges connecting cultures, communities, and societies. For al-Ghazali, dissemination of goodness, protection of piety, and resistance against evil are universal obligations. This implies that the spread, as well as safeguarding, of goodness or struggle against evil are not so much local duties incumbent upon Muslims in their mother societies, but rather represent universal obligations.²¹⁴ This universality connecting *fiṭrah* to an ongoing dialogue with the intellect also implies that the Muslim nation is set for humanity as a whole,²¹⁵ and that the message of Islam is meant to be communicated to people in all of their conditions irrespective of time or space.²¹⁶

Universality in relation to *daʿwah* requires exploration of the world around us, including diverse religious communities.²¹⁷ *Duʿāt* preoccupied with intellectual and emotional reforms need to examine and acquaint themselves with universal human thinking and to understand people's conditions with a view to improving them. Thus, Muslim scholars should examine strategies of universal *daʿwah* whether in terms of the presentation of Islam to the external world or in their response to doubts.²¹⁸ Muslim administrations and ministries are equally responsible in terms of understanding foreign languages, familiarizing themselves with the conditions of close and distant nations, exploring far off lands, and strengthening mutual relationships.²¹⁹ For al-

Ghazali, in order for Islamic universality to be effective, Muslims need to relate positively with others. This requires they exude extraordinary levels of morality in the personal and public sphere so as to motivate others to become interested in and learn about Islam,²²⁰ and in the same vein, to intermingle with others and frequent their public and official gatherings.²²¹ In the process, Muslims need to call upon humanity to accept Islam, a call that assimilates all races and colors, and strengthens the fellowship of humanity in the knowledge of God and spiritual purification.²²² At the macro-level however, the universality of *da'wah* relates to improved moral and economic conditions for Muslim society²²³ just as the followers of Prophet Muhammad relied on their noble character and persuasive language to communicate the religion with other nations.²²⁴

Al-Ghazali examines the current state of Islamic universality through prevailing understanding of it, the degree to which bridges have been built with the external world, and Muslim contributions to humanity to date. The universality of Islam, for al-Ghazali, is regrettably an expression which Muslims reiterate excessively yet are not considerate of when it comes to its implications. Contemporary Muslims are not qualified to implement this universality because of their confusion, contaminated cultures, and tyrannical political systems.²²⁵ Current conditions of Muslim societies even raise doubts as to the value of Islam, and the extent to which people would benefit from it.²²⁶ For al-Ghazali, despite the fact that the Qur'an was sent to all mankind with Muslims therefore having a duty to convey the Prophet's message to all people, they nevertheless still retain a level of separateness, ignoring much of other nations, modern thinking or philosophies, only claiming the message to be universal without making the least effort to reach out to the wider world.²²⁷ Al-Ghazali continues to question whether Arab-speaking Muslims grasp the essence of this universality or even fathom Muhammad was a universal Messenger sent to humanity.²²⁸ Al-Ghazali asks: "Do the Arabs realize that Muhammad is a Messenger to

humanity, and that this universality requires them to know him, and to introduce and illustrate his message instead of accentuating his physical traits?”²²⁹ In the same vein al-Ghazali writes:

Unfortunately, the Arabs today neither appreciate Muhammad greatly nor adhere to his teaching. On the contrary, they provide a defamatory source of the Islamic religion and of the Prophet; both in knowledge and action, and have further provided examples causing detrimental judgment.²³⁰

Along similar lines of discussion, al-Ghazali wonders what *daʿwah* contributions Muslims have thus far made, given that they are supposed to carry out a universal *daʿwah*, both on local and international fronts, and whether the universal mercy of Prophet Muhammad has had any impact on contemporary thought, philosophies, or ideologies.²³¹ Al-Ghazali’s evaluation of Muslims’ current state led him to ask why they had served *daʿwah* universality so poorly. And he reasons, that this was due partially to the early Muslims’ preoccupation with Greek philosophy when in fact they should have been emphasizing and demonstrating Islamic monotheism and Qur’anic philosophy in diverse academic disciplines, ethics and business.²³²

Political stagnancy also deprived official Islamic policy of any sense of universality or global *daʿwah*, primarily due maintains al-Ghazali, to rulers who instead of adhering to programs of teaching and guidance, became overwhelmed by desire for control and power. Whereas in previous times Muslim caliphs had understood that at the core of their duty lay an obligation to convey the Islamic message, subsequent rulers failed to establish a clear and realistic strategy to do so, and were not concerned with educating *duʿāt* (giving them adequate training i.e. in the time-space factor) to spread the message to other nations.²³³

[v] *Daʿwah*, Society and Culture

Al-Ghazali’s discussion of *daʿwah* and *duʿāt* clearly shows his

deep concern with the effects society, culture and tradition have on religious, moral and human development. This latter perspective effectively integrated social reality into the formulation of *daʿwah* methods and strategies, demonstrating how this reality proportionally affects and shapes the idealism of *duʿāt*.

We next discuss the reasons leading al-Ghazali to view the impact of economic conditions together with societal reform as fundamental elements in the implementation of *daʿwah*. For al-Ghazali the social and cultural environment's impact on religion as well as personal and moral conduct is undeniable.²³⁴ Hence, substantial influence over the moral and social environment was for him a prerequisite for the successful delivery of the religious message.²³⁵ Similarly religious worship requires safeguarding of the *fiṭrah* and constant struggle against distorting conditions.²³⁶ To substantiate this understanding, al-Ghazali drew on the real-life example of a twenty-six year-old youth offender sentenced to death. We are told he began stealing at the age of five, became a street robber at age eleven, and murderer at age twenty-six. The offender's memoir reads as follows:

I hereby introduce the story of my life. Had I been properly educated and brought up, I would have chosen the right course which good people normally choose. I was, nonetheless, more unfortunate than being of a wicked nature. I only met those who misunderstood and misguided me, and gradually led me from theft to murder to execution.²³⁷

Prior to discussing the effects of society on human development, we need to first define what we mean by "society." Society according to al-Ghazali is all that surrounds people from birth to death, including the house and city in which we live, the schools in which we are educated, the friends we choose, and the books we read. It even includes the radio channels we listen to, the natural scenes we watch, the political system under which we live, the geographical and economic conditions in which we reside, and local and international circumstances. All these factors

affect people's thoughts and feelings, shaping their work and state of affairs.²³⁸ This implies that the process of developing human character involves various elements including inherited characteristics of human emotion, home conditions, one's school, friends, conditions of health and sickness, wealth and poverty, peace and anxiety, weather, and even the news and information one reads or hears about.²³⁹

This environment however, is deeply affected by economic need. For al-Ghazali, moral crimes and vice are often born and flourish in societies affected by economic need.²⁴⁰ This, he argues, is because corrupt environments distort the nature of *fiṭrah*, and infect it with disease.²⁴¹ People are originally born in a state of faith and are prepared to connect with religion and its teachings as soon as they have acquired understanding, and the effects of negative practices have been removed.²⁴² In other words, in natural conditions, people are inclined to piety instead of immorality, and to righteousness instead of corruption.²⁴³ This also implies that due attention is to be given to surroundings and their influence instead of human character or belief per se,²⁴⁴ and that prior to any *da‘wah* activity, *du‘āt* must first improve those surrounding conditions.²⁴⁵ Interestingly, the divine commands and prohibitions address both human beings and their living societies together,²⁴⁶ Islamic rulings being geared to support healthy environments.²⁴⁷ This explains why Islam strictly forbids a life of seclusion even when a person's faith is at its peak,²⁴⁸ and looks for an atmosphere of justice.²⁴⁹

Note, even in societies boasting good living conditions and provision of adequate levels of physical and emotional health care, atheism nevertheless is still able to prevail, if religiosity is extremist, corrupt and ignores or undermines mundane life.²⁵⁰ In environments steeped in scepticism, belief is susceptible to distortion; worshippers and worship in atheist societies slowly dwindle, and atheism eventually becomes triumphant,²⁵¹ with people also inclined to polytheism instead of monotheism.²⁵² Moreover, the spread of atheism is not due to any intrinsic merit

on its part, but rather a result of the failure of religious people to solve people's problems making the reciprocal relationship between people and their socio-cultural environments difficult and even more problematic.²⁵³

Al-Ghazali proceeds to tackle a more specific issue, namely the relationship of *da'wah* to poverty. He explains how Islam seeks to purify human talents and coordinate human endeavors, yet in any of these conditions of poverty this is hardly achieved.²⁵⁴ Basic human needs should be secured first, only then are people expected to hold onto faith.²⁵⁵ To substantiate his argument, al-Ghazali explains how suffering social classes provide poor soil to sow the seeds of sound belief, righteous deeds and morals.²⁵⁶ The context of *da'wah* for al-Ghazali largely involves poverty and, as seen below, much of his critique of *du'āt* involves how *da'wah* is to be effective in conditions of poverty. Al-Ghazali describes how, despite several attempts, *da'wah* had not yet found the proper environment in which to implant beliefs, morality, or good deeds in poor social classes.²⁵⁷ He shares his experience of *da'wah* to show the serious effect economic conditions can have. For instance, he voices perplexity over preaching to people living in conditions of poverty, disease, and ignorance. Puzzled and not knowing what to tell his audiences he ponders over certain questions. Should he discourage worldly life in accordance with what religious scholars were expected to teach? And then what worldly life was there for the wretched people he faced, their need to learn about life being more crucial than their need to learn about religion. He writes:

Most of them – poor people – are unaware of the proper skills of agriculture, manufacturing, or business. I am supposed to teach them about God! Yet their knowledge about God is not possible without knowing oneself. He who knows himself knows His Lord. Those people are lost and are unconscious about their own selves. Feelings of need (deprivation) and humiliation have affected their thinking. How would they then know their Lord or feel devotion for Him?²⁵⁸

This state of affairs according to al-Ghazali requires *du‘āt* to provide solutions to moral and economic problems.²⁵⁹ Prior to guiding people to the Creator, large-scale economic reforms are required, for these are unavoidable if crime and moral vice are to be fought in the name of Islam.²⁶⁰ Al-Ghazali considers improvement of economic conditions as crucial to *da‘wah* and believes in a type of proportional relationship to exist between economic development of Muslim societies and *da‘wah*.²⁶¹ Thus, it would be absurd to allow conditions for crime to grow yet be satisfied with purely religious admonitions,²⁶² for preaching of faith alone is not successful,²⁶³ it being extremely difficult to inspire guidance in the hearts of people whilst their stomachs lie empty, or dress them in the garment of piety (*libās al-taqwā*) whilst they are physically naked.²⁶⁴ Al-Ghazali’s attention to economic and social conditions provides *da‘wah* thought with a degree of objectivity and realism, and points to the notion that the ideals of *da‘wah* are impaired when the surrounding conditions are poor. Whilst on the one hand, this consideration shows that *du‘āt*’s attention to the context of *da‘wah* is no less significant than the values which they intend to convey, on the other, the need for economic reforms prior to *da‘wah* would appear to surpass the efforts of individual *du‘āt*, to involve states and institutions. Of course aware of this, al-Ghazali educates *du‘āt* to integrate the socio-economic context into their *da‘wah* understanding and practices, and simultaneously calls upon institutions to proceed with reform programs as a key means to religious education and a prerequisite to discharge *da‘wah* and Islamic reform in general.

Society’s impact on *da‘wah*’s progression also draws attention to the effects of culture and custom. According to al-Ghazali, regrettably horrendous traditions, marginal to Islam, continue to control Muslim life in the name of religion.²⁶⁵ Al-Ghazali’s many travels led him to conclude that customs have become more authoritative than the Shari‘ah, that people have an amazing power to dress their personal and material inclinations in the garb of religion, and that they know well how to advance their

personal agendas in the name of God.²⁶⁶ For him, the teachings of Islam have withdrawn from political, economic, and social life, with religious worship left without spirit, and turned into meaningless rituals. Morals have been degraded, people interact according to personal and material desires, and the prevailing conflict is not so much between Islam and lower material desires but, rather, between the poor practices of Muslims and awakened human nature.²⁶⁷

To elaborate further on the problem of culture and traditions and their effects on *daʿwah*, al-Ghazali argues that *daʿwah* is jeopardizing its message and compounding problems by transmitting Islamic principles that have been erroneously jumbled with elements from medieval and modern times.²⁶⁸ Al-Ghazali asks: “Has the call to *tawhīd* turned into one inviting [people] to the attitudes of the early Arabs during their era of ignorance? These primitive attitudes drive people away from the path of God.”²⁶⁹ In his review of *daʿwah*, al-Ghazali exhorts readers not to confuse proper Islamic religious teachings with current customary practices.²⁷⁰ Such confusion is the result of adhering to customs under the pretext of their being originally Islamic.²⁷¹ Al-Ghazali firmly opposed the imposition of desert customs in the name of Islam,²⁷² or inviting people to adopt these traditions on the basis of their supposed islamicity. He was clear in exposing the fact of certain people dressing non-Islamic traditions in Islamic garb, in the service of private interest and gain, and certainly not in the service of God.²⁷³

Al-Ghazali thus exhorts Muslims to discard customs rooted in the first period of ignorance (*al-jāhiliyyah al-ūlā*). These for example include the suppression of women, in the form of amongst other things, disregarding their education, barring their attendance at mosques, discouraging them from enjoining the good and forbidding evil, and increasing their punishment for any sin committed.²⁷⁴ For him lack of a proper understanding of Islam has led certain nomadic traditions to infiltrate Muslim jurisprudence. Furthermore, it was interestingly his belief that

many of the customs which disgraced women and denied them moral status and economic rights, wrongly evolved under the requirements of the Islamic dress code.²⁷⁵ One of al-Ghazali's many disappointments on the issue of Muslim women was the embarrassing verdict which forbade women from driving cars! Al-Ghazali comments:

An intelligent journalist once told me how modern civilization had enabled women to conquer space, whereas Islam still forbade women from driving cars, remarking are not the people right to think wrongly of Islam and to discard religion from their life? I replied: "Islam neither forbids women from riding donkeys nor driving cars, but unfortunately some local customs have paved the way for this verdict."²⁷⁶

The various ills prevailing across Muslim societies caused al-Ghazali to feel that Muslims were living and breathing in an atmosphere of intellectual stagnancy, or sterility, and that their psychological, social, intellectual, and emotional nourishment was deeply poor.²⁷⁷ Al-Ghazali considered many prevailing customs to be un-Islamic, affecting the future of the religion, and wondered why *du‘āt* were failing to straightforwardly confront the sources of these problems.²⁷⁸ Nothing for al-Ghazali justifies neglect in reforming prevailing negative customs and attitudes. This renders the enthusiasm of Muslims in *da‘wah* questionable so long as these negative qualities continue to persist. These customs only burden Muslim societies with hardship and difficulty breeding insincerity and encouraging people to show-off.²⁷⁹ Some of these customs for al-Ghazali pertain to marriage and divorce, social gatherings, occasions of joy and sadness, and the treatment of friends and neighbors. The spread of these customs has engendered chaos throughout Muslim societies.²⁸⁰ Attitudes of boredom, laziness, apathy, and impassivity vis-à-vis creativity and exploration of the universe, have surfaced, only serving to pull Muslims backward.²⁸¹ This is in addition to customs related to marriage, dowries or gifts, which neither relate to religious

piety nor support chastity. They further provide no confirmation of spiritual or social purity, and only develop attitudes of pride and arrogance and the need to show off.²⁸² With such a dismal state of affairs, al-Ghazali criticizes *du‘āt* who understand the religious message as having its own customs and protocols – its own isolated streets as it were – yet are disapproving of any connection with the external world. Meaning that what mostly mattered in their view was those streets remaining isolated and filled only with indigenous people.²⁸³

To purify customs of doubt and suspicion and draw them closer to revelation would require enormous intellectual effort and vigilance.²⁸⁴ Thus, Muslim culture should be thoroughly reviewed,²⁸⁵ with periodic reviews of customs made mandatory, to assess their proximity to belief and virtues,²⁸⁶ until such a time as only those related to the Shari‘ah are left surviving.²⁸⁷ This appraisal furthermore is to be wide-ranging, meaning that a comprehensive review of culture is to be undertaken by Muslims subjecting prevailing customs and traditions, including Islamic legal judgments, to principles contained in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.²⁸⁸

As discussed, al-Ghazali’s *da‘wah* is strongly anchored to conditions prevailing in present-day Muslim life – conditions which take account of scientifically advanced western nations, “backward” Muslim societies, and the ever complex problems of culture and custom. And note, this incorporation of reality into *da‘wah* is not simply a consideration or understanding of the social context alone (known as *murā‘āt al-wāqī‘*). But, al-Ghazali points to a dire need to undertake economic and cultural reforms prior to undertaking *da‘wah* as his main preoccupation was to see a positive social environment flourish, that smoothly facilitates the interaction of *fiṭrah* with the values of Islam. This environment is crucial to the success of *da‘wah*, and is one that *du‘āt* are required to seek and realize. Visualizing al-Ghazali’s notion in practice, one easily sees, hypothetically at least, that modern prosperous and civilized societies have gone far in terms

of preparing fertile ground for a proper interaction of *fiṭrah* with religious ideals. That is, in a sense they have already provided an ideal ground for *daʿwah* based on having al-Ghazali's requisite indicators in place.

[VI] *Daʿwah* and Freedom

In analysing the connection of religion to freedom, and the impact of freedom on religious practice, al-Ghazali's major concern was to establish a solid and intimate relationship between freedom and religious prosperity.²⁸⁹ Al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* perspective is strongly entrenched in freedom, to the extent of even showing *daʿwah* and freedom to be at times synonymous. This section examines the relationship between *daʿwah* and freedom and to explain the crucial role that *daʿwah* plays in supporting freedom. It also addresses religious freedom in light of Muslim belief in the everlasting obligation of *daʿwah*.

We begin by introducing al-Ghazali's perspective and how he defined freedom. He viewed freedom of the intellect and conscience as fundamental foundations of religiosity,²⁹⁰ and a key environment enabling religion to emerge, grow, and prosper.²⁹¹ Free persuasion is the only means to faith,²⁹² whilst a climate of freedom is the most conducive for belief and religious adherence to develop.²⁹³ Since the early beginnings of religious monotheism, *daʿwah* has been closely attached to freedom of worship.²⁹⁴ Freedom is also viewed as an echo of innate human nature, secret of life,²⁹⁵ and other face of worshipping God.²⁹⁶ What it really signifies is an atmosphere which allows for exploration and determination of truth, and a guidance of people away from compulsion.²⁹⁷ Humans are created to be dignified, not humiliated, to be honored and not debased. They should exercise their freedom through intellect, love with their hearts, walk with their feet, and work with their hands.²⁹⁸

According to al-Ghazali, intellectual freedom forms the foundation of *daʿwah*, and is a crucial criterion for divine reward and

punishment.²⁹⁹ It represents the only path leading to God, to discovery of His glory, affirmation of His rights, and attainment of His guidance.³⁰⁰ Religious freedom is a paramount feature of Islam,³⁰¹ with freedom from fear of persecution a basic foundation of the faith.³⁰²

Freedom of expression involves constructive criticism, contesting intellectual positions through cogent debate not offense or threat.³⁰³ Al-Ghazali writes: "I greatly esteem freedom of expression. I, nonetheless, dislike idiocy, falsehood, or the support of opinions through forceful suppression of the intellect to block all avenues leading to the truth."³⁰⁴ According to al-Ghazali, religious messages have accorded the intellect necessary freedom to engage in enhanced dialogue demonstrating no compulsion against people's faith.³⁰⁵ Islam for instance, seeks to establish an atmosphere of tolerance, free of any despotism and oppression,³⁰⁶ aiming to gently persuade in an environment of peace. Faith is thus seen as something rooted in, as well as an outcome of, absolute intellectual freedom, without resort to the use of miracles (suppressing intellectual capacity), or any pressure exerted on the human intellect or will.³⁰⁷ The basic foundation for *da'wah*, as mentioned in the Qur'an, is God's statement: "Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! Your Lord is Best Aware of him who strayeth from His way, and He is Best Aware of those who go aright."³⁰⁸

In contrast, tyranny is an enemy of God, His messengers, and all people; and no rights shall be fully established on earth until all forms of tyranny are completely removed.³⁰⁹ Since the genesis of human creation tyrannical, authoritarian rulers have caused most harm to religion, with prophets suffering the most in societies lacking freedom.³¹⁰ This led al-Ghazali to thus discuss the proportional relationship between disbelief and abusive environments, that is, disbelief grows and develops in conditions lacking freedom of expression.³¹¹ Islam, in contrast, establishes social relationships based on personal and intellectual freedom,

and utterly rejects compulsion of the intellect and conscience.³¹² The Qur’an shows that the only way to faith consists of acquiring knowledge through freedom and persuasion.³¹³ Al-Ghazali enumerates approximately one hundred verses from the Qur’an in order to prove that faith is the ultimate outcome of free thinking, will,³¹⁴ and conscience,³¹⁵ the end result of intellect and persuasion which requires removal of coercion from *da‘wah*.³¹⁶ Al-Ghazali further enumerates various types of freedom, such as freedom of speech, religious freedom, the freedom to satisfy basic needs, and freedom from persecution.³¹⁷ The freedom Muslims long for relates to the development of a peaceful, honorable, and just life, where rights are protected and people are treated equally.³¹⁸

Da‘wah is essentially free from compulsion, assuring freedom of human conscience to accept or reject faith.³¹⁹ It involves illustration and guidance, both through written and spoken words, and not coercion,³²⁰ and helps people identify Muslims’ interest in conveying religion through legitimate means with no compulsion in establishing or supporting arguments.³²¹ For al-Ghazali, persuasion and debate are powerful, whilst fear and force have no place.³²² Logic alone dictates that when it comes to religion, any form of compulsion will drive people away and instead of instilling faith will foster religious misconceptions.³²³ People forced to adhere to religion are not considered religious even when subjected to strict religious observances.³²⁴ Compulsion in religion is viewed as an intellectual offense, finding no support in the life of Prophet Muhammad or the rightly guided caliphs.³²⁵ Islam seeks only to remind people to uphold the truth and to reject hunger for material desires, and to further understand that religion cannot be dropped from human life.³²⁶ For freedom to flourish however, Muslims are required to eliminate artificial obstacles preventing innate human nature from expressing itself, blocking humanity’s struggle for safety, justice, and dignity.³²⁷

In light of the congruent relationship between *da‘wah* and freedom, al-Ghazali exhorts *du‘āt* to be concerned with guiding

people, and not make accumulation of profit the *raison d'être* of life, the latter making of them little more than robbers not *du'āt*.³²⁸ Muslims should simply introduce Islam³²⁹ with what is essentially the ideal way, the communication of goodness and truth through decent means and persuasive argument.³³⁰ This signifies that Muslims should not coerce people against their personal beliefs, nor compel them to abandon their own religion,³³¹ and should avoid inciting division and ill-feeling vis-à-vis intellectual and religious differences.³³² Muslims are to illustrate the beauty of Islam, so that hearts and intellects are attracted to it through appealing persuasion,³³³ and are to recite and illustrate the Qur'an, and invite others to its message whilst assuring freedom, irrespective of people's acceptance or refusal.³³⁴ Besides this, they are to provide opportunities for peace and reconciliation, appreciate human error, and act nobly even when forced to fight.³³⁵ And even in this latter scenario, Muslims are to rely on continuous wisdom, calm debate and persuasion.³³⁶ Al-Ghazali supports peace and condemns bloodshed, permits engagement in war for defense and to promote freedom hindered by corrupt authority.³³⁷ He always advocates a strategy of peaceful transmission rather than damaging civil war.³³⁸ Fighting is justified only in establishing intellectual freedom which involves the removal of corrupt authorities.³³⁹

Muslims should encourage legitimate competition, allow for diverse religious groups to draw their life and spirituality from their own principles, and recruit religious followers far removed from pressure or force.³⁴⁰ In discussing the role of religious freedom in *da'wah* and critiquing *du'āt*'s inclination to compulsion, al-Ghazali encourages *du'āt* to emulate the Prophet Muhammad, who was commanded to act within the boundaries of religious transmission.³⁴¹ This understanding led al-Ghazali to criticize those who perceived their relationship with non-Muslims as one concerning issues of conversion, payment of *jizyah*, or conflict.³⁴² Using Qur'anic evidence³⁴³ al-Ghazali also criticizes *du'āt* who neglect the role of intellectual and political freedom, overlook

the need to nourish a prosperous, free environment, or even fail to understand that lack of freedom only leads to a decline in religious practice until this vanishes altogether and people fall into disbelief or atheism.³⁴⁴

The question of freedom also led al-Ghazali to address *daʿwah* in relation to religious difference, that is whether *daʿwah*'s universal ambitions are compromised by its intrinsic character of freedom. This is a theoretical issue involving discussion of basic concepts of Islam and the nature of *daʿwah* itself. According to al-Ghazali, prophets are brothers whose spiritual intimacy unites people awakening within them feelings of cooperation and sympathy instead of leaving them fragmented and scattered. God has sent innumerable prophets to mankind yet their message contains a common religious theme, such that the truths God reveals in areas of emotional education and social interaction are close if not identical across all faith groups.³⁴⁵ Interestingly, out of the ten principles al-Ghazali enunciated, four are devoted entirely to *daʿwah* and religious cooperation, while principle eight addresses religious differences and how they should prevent enmity or adversity.³⁴⁶

According to al-Ghazali, humanity is one single family originating from one common source, with no preference whatsoever of one over the other with regards to creation or life.³⁴⁷ God has created mankind to know not to deny one another. Such knowledge, however, requires Muslims to share good tidings and to follow ease instead of hardship.³⁴⁸ Differences in language or color are irrelevant,³⁴⁹ and have no effect on human equality versus original human existence.³⁵⁰ Religions share a common background because of their common beliefs and appreciation of the prophethoods of Moses and Jesus, they honor their birth, exalt their lineage, and agree that any defamation of their status causes disbelief.³⁵¹ Other religious commonalities include belief in the unity of God, affirmation of His divine glory, knowledge, and might; belief in the Day of Reckoning where the righteous shall be rewarded and sinners disgraced; belief in emotional and

social virtues, the need for cooperation and abstention from moral vice; adherence to human rights; and the establishment of universal brotherhood.³⁵² Jesus for instance was one of God's resolute prophets who guided people to the worship of God. Al-Ghazali shows respect for the life, peace, and security of followers of Jesus who believe he died for their salvation.³⁵³

To further elaborate on the nature of religious difference, al-Ghazali maintains Islam to be the synopsis of preceding religious teachings, conveyed through subsequent messages, and endorsed through the finality of the Qur'an.³⁵⁴ In other words, Islam is a new title for an older truth which Prophet Muhammad built on but did not abolish. Rather he affirmed and confirmed earlier messages instead of waging combat or igniting conflict.³⁵⁵ This establishes Islam's relationship with other faith groups in terms of preserving truth and justice.³⁵⁶ Irrespective of religious or ideological differences, Muslims, along with other nations, should work together towards the betterment of global economic and moral conditions.³⁵⁷ Muslims should also welcome any call for unity, which directs religious followers to build instead of deconstruct, while adhering to the Qur'an which says: "And say: 'The truth [has now come] from your Sustainer: let, then, him who wills, believe in it, and let him who wills, reject it'..."³⁵⁸ Islam rejects any compulsion of faith or hatred towards non-Muslims caused by intellectual or religious differences.³⁵⁹

Muslims appreciate the spiritual bonds they share with the People of the Book,³⁶⁰ viewing Jews and Christians as brothers, whilst also viewing other faith groups with justice, kindness, and loyalty.³⁶¹ Religious groups according to al-Ghazali should cooperate around common issues. These serve to bring them closer together instead of disuniting them.³⁶² They should also apply their energies collectively in the face of atheism and corruption,³⁶³ in a manner that is kind, just, and cooperative.³⁶⁴ Muslims should simultaneously develop a positive international policy,³⁶⁵ and accept all invitations for religious brotherhood³⁶⁶ and any call that unites religions and removes conflict.³⁶⁷

However religious unity should not eliminate the distinguishing characteristics of each individual faith.³⁶⁸ Al-Ghazali regretted the conflict between Christians and Muslims and hoped that it would end with the fuel igniting the dissension extinguished.³⁶⁹ He aspired for a sincere friendship to develop between believers in the oneness of God and Christians. Religious peace, nonetheless, requires several supporting factors including the mutual recognition of an honorable life, in addition to the need to express oneself, and defend and safeguard human rights, honor, and life.³⁷⁰ A better future between Islam and Christianity whilst feasible, would yet require mutual forbearance, understanding of difference, and cooperation.³⁷¹ Al-Ghazali writes: “We like to see a unity between the crescent and the cross, and cooperation among the believers in Jesus and Muhammad.”³⁷²

The above discussion illustrates how al-Ghazali’s works distance *daʿwah* from all forms of abuse, tyranny, and exploitation. Both the caller (*dāʿiyah*) and the called upon (*madʿū*) enjoy equal freedom. This not only relates to the interpretation of religion, but also invokes complex social and cultural ramifications associated with religious understanding. This also renders *daʿwah* as an intelligible presentation of Islam, a courteous and intelligent argument against doubt, and an opportunity for reflection.³⁷³ In religious fields however, *daʿwah* does not race to win supporters or gain new territories, but rather develops positive religious models in an atmosphere of intellectual and political freedom, while maintaining independence from material and emotional incentives.

Note, however, that this represents a logical sequence of al-Ghazali’s own beliefs. In practical terms this freedom raises more challenges. First, there is the challenging task of keeping *duʿāt* passive in the face of abusive and oppressive forces; second, there is the challenge of realizing needed cultural and economic reforms resulting in freedom in the same way that economic reforms are required prior to the undertaking of *daʿwah*. Reinforcing freedom leads to religious tolerance and is acquired

through education and criticism of *du'āt's* practices. To develop new environments of freedom, major political reforms are unavoidable. This shows that *da'wah* and reform rotate on the same plane and cannot be separated.

Al-Ghazali's discussion of freedom and religious pluralism appears to be positive, especially given his own history of imprisonment and persecution. The perspective on freedom in al-Ghazali's works transcends his own socio-political experience, and largely depends on persuasion and choice. This perspective is shown to be original, humanistic, realistic, and of course religious. It effectively integrates religion with reality, and transposes *da'wah*, human emotions and existence, making *da'wah* transparent and accommodating, and causing no jeopardy to either religious or mundane life, while further ensuring no distortion of the basic notions of *da'wah*.

In al-Ghazali's works, *da'wah* is shown to be an open and tolerant process of change, paying considerable attention to human emotion and intellect. It rationally translates the values of what he terms the natural religion (*al-dīn al-ṭabī'ī*) without confronting the universal values. The harmonious interaction between religion, intellect, and human nature was at the core of his *da'wah* thought, and helped him appreciate or criticize *du'āt's* contributions accordingly.

In view of the fact that favorable human conditions enhance and sustain *da'wah*, al-Ghazali's goals were clear, simply pave the way before *da'wah*, as shown in much of his critique of *du'āt's* attitudes and approaches.

Evaluating the feasibility of al-Ghazali's *da'wah* framework however, involves complex factors. Firstly, there is the attitude of Muslims to their socio-cultural problems, western lifestyles, religious interpretation, traditional learning, and, above all, the very definitions and objectives of *da'wah*. Secondly, *da'wah* requires political stability, economic prosperity, and cultural health. And thirdly, al-Ghazali's approach seeks to differentiate between the sacred and the secular, and subjects the work of *du'āt* to rational and objective measures of assessment.

Chapter 3

Du‘āt (Callers to Islam)

INTRODUCTION

IN HIS DISCUSSION ON the current and future status of *da‘wah*, al-Ghazali was predominantly concerned with *du‘āt*’s duties and responsibilities, their religious understanding and approaches, strategies for facilitating religious progress, and more importantly, failures to meet his high *da‘wah* expectations. This chapter examines al-Ghazali’s perspective on *du‘āt*’s responsibilities, their spiritual, moral, and educational qualifications, as well as the problems and challenges facing them in relation to *da‘wah*. It also examines al-Ghazali’s critique of their views. This helps us to better understand the nature and implications of *da‘wah* work, and the importance al-Ghazali’s model of *da‘wah* placed on spiritual and moral character. It also allows us to identify the reasons which led him to regard these qualifications as mandatory for *da‘wah* practice and without which he was clear *du‘āt* would not succeed. Discussion of these qualifications also highlights al-Ghazali’s position with regard to current notions of *du‘āt*’s educational standards, and other prerequisites required for *da‘wah* practice. In fact al-Ghazali’s discussion of the failures and shortcomings of *du‘āt* furnished him with an ideal platform to address the various spiritual, intellectual and socio-cultural problems and challenges facing contemporary *da‘wah*. The harsh and frank tone he adopted in relation to this

however, partly obscured real arguments concerning the issues he raised. In other words al-Ghazali's rigorous discourse on requirements and obligations clearly translated into an ambitious search for some sort of ideal *dā'iyyah*, ones who in the words of Malek Abisaab, would resemble "mini-Messengers" reflecting ideal moral and spiritual personalities.

[I] Responsibilities of *Du'āt*

Al-Ghazali's view on the responsibilities of *du'āt* primarily reflects an understanding of the fundamental objectives of the Islamic message (*al-risālah al-islāmiyyah*) vis-à-vis personal and human development. This is understandable given that *du'āt*'s efforts should be geared towards actualization of the objectives, which note affect society at both the sacred and mundane levels. As there are a multitude of objectives, however, this therefore requires *du'āt* to handle a wide range of responsibilities. This in turn requires multi-talented individuals with diverse academic, religious and intellectual credentials.

According to al-Ghazali, Islam is in essence quintessentially geared to *da'wah*. It exhorts Muslims to learn and teach, become persuaded and persuade others.¹ Islam imparts detailed knowledge of the Creator, provides certainty for those who doubt and prescribes piety for all people.² It also seeks to change the human self and society, confronts corruption and injustice, disposes of negative customs and rules, and endorses virtuous traditions and practices instead.³ Such is the religious message. The goal of *da'wah* then is effective human development and the mobilization of Muslims through enthusiastic faith, devout prayers, sincerity and love of God and His Messenger, and excellence in worldly life.⁴

These general requirements demand that Muslims uphold the message, convey it to other nations,⁵ and share its guidance with people living in confusion.⁶ This duty of religious outreach made al-Ghazali concerned over Muslims' accountability in front of

God, that is in relation to the many nations/people unaware of Him, and not introduced to Him, His books, or to the true path leading to Him. According to the Qur’an, *du‘āt* are to recite its verses, acquire spiritual purification, and educate people.⁷ These duties, as advocated by the prophets, represent essential components of *da‘wah*. Furthermore, recitation of the Qur’an implies several key elements such as the illustration of Islamic doctrine, Islamic education through development of good potential and the control of lower physical desires, and the establishment of a legal system for the individual, society, and state.⁸

More immediately, however, *du‘āt*’s primary field of work is their own selves and groups.⁹ That is, they should acquire proper understanding of the fundamentals of Islam,¹⁰ and practice religion devoutly.¹¹ Through setting a good example they instantly act as role models, inspiring others to faith in God, as well as educating both Muslims and non-Muslims with regards to religion¹² and revelation, testing their connection with the Qur’an.¹³ *Du‘āt* illustrate the truth and do not conceal it,¹⁴ conveying the faith’s message intact, free of the effects of material life.¹⁵ At the social level, and following several Qur’anic reports, the *dā‘iyah* frees *da‘wah* of desire and greed, communicating the Islamic message without thought of material gain. In this, and also, the *dā‘iyah* secures public safety proving that *da‘wah* is not a means to access or control public wealth or property.¹⁶ Al-Ghazali writes:

The state of the religion improves when its followers commit themselves to social and political integrity, and preserve life, honor, and public property. Acting differently causes people to adopt materialistic philosophies which reject divine revelation to believe solely in matter.¹⁷

Given that Islam calls for dialogue and persuasion and unequivocally rejects all means of damage and destruction, *du‘āt* should forge bridges of trust with the larger society to be able to present *da‘wah* and overcome its challenges.¹⁸ They are to app-

reciate the impact of environment on the development of beliefs, emotions, and judgments, and to acknowledge that they themselves could have been, under similar conditions, in a state of denial with regards to Islamic beliefs.¹⁹ Such an understanding requires *duʿāt* to improve their environment emotionally and intellectually – this improvement serving as a ground for subsequent reforms.²⁰ Internally, *duʿāt* are to cure society from within and end the harmful and negative impact of alien intellectual influences. Ideally, for al-Ghazali, *duʿāt* rescue society by closing intellectual and spiritual gaps among Muslims, reviving religious brotherhood and inspiring love.²¹ Externally, they explore communities living outside Muslim societies, and familiarize themselves with their socio-cultural conditions.²² *Duʿāt* need to understand their own as well as others' thought,²³ and should be aware of arguments made by atheists or adversaries.²⁴

A *dāʿiyah*'s responsibilities also involve his/her personal and social development and ability to address the religious and mundane worlds together. These responsibilities do not simply reflect the traditional duties of religious teachers, preachers, or scholars but, rather, fit a new *daʿwah* perspective, whereby *duʿāt* contribute to Islamic reform and act as agents of change. This shows how al-Ghazali's broad understanding of *daʿwah* affected his understanding of *duʿāt*'s responsibilities. Such a wide-ranging spectrum of responsibilities, nonetheless makes the *dāʿiyah*'s task multifaceted, complex, and challenging, and renders assessment of their progress and contribution a little difficult. These responsibilities also show a subtle shift to a versatile and dynamic style of *daʿwah* responsibilities. This broadens *duʿāt*'s attention, makes *daʿwah* a crucial tool in general Islamic reform, and also de-emphasises the distinctions between Islamic reform and *daʿwah*.

Al-Ghazali laid out *daʿwah* responsibilities for individuals and groups participating in Islamic reform and the improvement of local and global life. These involved preachers, theologians, and members of Islamic reform movements. Most of his critique, however, is directed at *duʿāt* considered to be religious preachers

and scholars. Al-Ghazali keeps both categories in mind, yet does not separate the responsibilities of each. This makes the attempt to identify the *da‘wah* responsibilities of each category of *du‘āt* challenging. Al-Ghazali’s discussion of *da‘wah* responsibilities in several contexts also shows how each time they carry the implications of the topic under discussion. As a result, they do not provide any sequence of order or priority in the analysis of *da‘wah*.

[II] Spiritual and Moral Qualifications of *Du‘āt*

Al-Ghazali’s discussion of the need for spiritual and moral qualifications of *du‘āt* reflects the nature of *da‘wah* composition and drafts a moral pattern of the lives of *du‘āt*. Such a discussion also brings to light al-Ghazali’s perspective on spiritual and moral education in modern times. What is crucial, however, is al-Ghazali’s definition of spirituality and morality in the undertaking of *da‘wah*, whether those concepts are static or dynamic reflecting the constant needs of society, and what framework al-Ghazali employed to assess progress and failure in terms of those requirements. Al-Ghazali believed that *du‘āt* were most in need of self-discipline²⁵ and needed to implement within themselves a greater level of religious and moral virtue than the general public. For example *du‘āt* should attain a higher degree of faith and certainty, enthusiasm and virtue.²⁶ This required *du‘āt* to be attentive to their own moral and spiritual state, self diagnosing themselves to cure any shortcomings or spiritual disease. They were also not to assume their lectures applied to their audiences only and not to themselves.²⁷ In discussing the critical role of self-discipline in the development of effective *da‘wah*, al-Ghazali suggests that those who fail to explore their own selves or discover their weaknesses cannot be *du‘āt*, and that those who are keen to accuse people of disbelief or downplay their good deeds are simply sick at heart.²⁸ They should even be dismissed from the field of *da‘wah* because of their inability to appreciate the spirit

of goodness contained in the religious message, and because of their wrong exploitation of religious knowledge to mislead people or to reduce the benefits to them of religion.²⁹

For al-Ghazali, greed and materialism are inconsistent with *daʿwah*. *Duʿāt* do not seek material reward in return for their work.³⁰ They give but do not receive in return, sacrifice themselves without the least personal advantage,³¹ and are independent of material ends or temptations.³² *Duʿāt* adopt an honorable path to God,³³ are free from falsehood,³⁴ and distance themselves from people who indulge heavily in material life or have corrupt intents.³⁵ To support his argument, al-Ghazali draws on numerous Qurʾanic narratives concerning prophets Hūd, Ṣāliḥ, Shuʿayb, and Mūsā, including the reaction of their respective communities to them.³⁶ For al-Ghazali, this selfless sacrifice found in the work of *duʿāt* is not accidental because the central foundation of a *dāʿiyah*’s moral character lies in his/her spiritual association with God; this association is free of material expectations, boosts life and provides light and warmth.³⁷ In contrast, spiritual disassociation from God or lack of sincerity only leads to ineffective *daʿwah*, for pretence in *daʿwah* makes it worthless.³⁸ Al-Ghazali asks: “What is a famous scholar who memorizes chapters of the Qurʾan, hadith, and literature, or even grasps the profound meanings of all of these, worth when inwardly he is corrupt?”³⁹

Crucially, and at the core of *duʿāt*’s spiritual development, lies purity of intention. That is, *daʿwah* should relentlessly be undertaken for God only and be approached with pure intention.⁴⁰ In undertaking *daʿwah*, *duʿāt* should be seeking divine satisfaction, not their own self-satisfaction, and their intention should be constantly focused on the fact that what they are doing, they are doing for God, and this cannot be done without a sincere heart and a positive connection to the Divine.⁴¹ This requires *duʿāt* not to give up undertaking *daʿwah*, so long as their ultimate goal is divine pleasure, with little care for people’s criticism.⁴² Such spiritual aptitude, however, can only be attained

through understanding the meanings of the Qur’an.⁴³ This requires *du‘āt* to exalt the Qur’an through recitation, to reflect upon its meanings, and to contrast Qur’anic ideals with deteriorating human conditions.⁴⁴ This spiritual exercise equally requires *du‘āt* to avoid hunting for mistakes in others and/or be overly preoccupied in criticizing them, rather, they are to engage themselves in rebuilding society.⁴⁵ Al-Ghazali expresses his dissatisfaction with *du‘āt* who instead of offering guidance on salvation and obedience, divulge people’s faults or develop them into hurdles. He even questions the sincerity of some *du‘āt*’s approach to human failure asking: “Are those *du‘āt* more concerned about the religion than the Lord of the religion, and are they more compassionate towards people than their Creator?”⁴⁶

Al-Ghazali also cautions against so-called “*du‘āt*” who know nothing but shouting or who show anger in support of the truth yet house corruption inside.⁴⁷ Al-Ghazali writes: “Some people claim to be religious yet their inner [being] is corrupted. Be assured that these people are as far as their corrupted hearts and minds are from the religion.”⁴⁸ Some pretended to be *du‘āt*, yet for al-Ghazali their approach to *da‘wah* associated them with al-Ḥuṭay’ah.⁴⁹ And then there were others, he complained, who enjoyed divulging people’s mistakes just to satisfy their own egos. This censoriousness, in al-Ghazali’s view, was worse than the ills they blamed people for, making even the sinner with a broken heart, in his eyes, more honorable than an arrogant preacher. To illustrate the point, he recounts the incident of a young Muslim man who blamed al-Ghazali for sitting with clean-shaven students and immodestly dressed girls, and for smiling instead of sternly commanding facets of the faith. Al-Ghazali’s response was to explain that displaying anger was not the etiquette of a *dā‘iyah*, who should only explain Islamic principles with regards to belief and morals.⁵⁰ For him, pretence and anger in a *dā‘iyah* do not point towards the Islamic message. Likewise a calm and unpretentious verbal illustration of the message also does not suffice to establish or reinforce the message’s reli-

gious foundations. Real success, rather, lies in practical example which translates morals, commands, and prohibitions from the world of the imaginary to that of reality.⁵¹ Thus, the rights of God and people, for example, should not just be abstract ideas instilled into the intellect, but should be familiar examples and part of growing traditions.⁵² Values such as belief, excellence, and equality, will remain lost in the imagination until translated through proper and motivating practices.⁵³ This is substantiated by the examples set by the prophets who acted as role models and ideal examples in speaking on behalf of God.⁵⁴

Al-Ghazali argues that the Qur'anic description of Muslims as being the best nation raised for mankind, is not based on any ethnic or geographic considerations but, rather, on their moral and intellectual qualities and their beneficial contribution to humanity.⁵⁵ Successful *du'āt* are those who guide people through example, acting as role models,⁵⁶ displaying prophetic character in their worship, conduct, and struggle.⁵⁷ Overall, *du'āt* are to adhere to the teachings of Islam in their approach to, and style of *da'wah*, and to abstain from deception, while reaching out to human hearts.⁵⁸ This is because twisted approaches violate the nobility of *da'wah*.⁵⁹

In addition, *du'āt* should improve themselves morally and academically,⁶⁰ because advanced societies are not realistically going to pay attention to inferior *du'āt* who fail in areas of intellectual, scientific, and moral leadership.⁶¹ Indeed al-Ghazali suggests: "I only recommend to *da'wah* those who integrate intelligence with sincerity. Idiots are adverse to their own selves, and the speech of hypocrites ends up being rejected."⁶²

To develop a moral archetype for modern *du'āt*, al-Ghazali draws on Prophet Muhammad's deep quality of mercy, which connected him to the world in a spirit of kindness, hope, and peace.⁶³ The centrality of mercy implies for al-Ghazali that its opposites – harshness, cold heartedness, emotional indifference to human suffering – are the root cause of religious defeat in con-

temporary societies.⁶⁴ Those who leave in their wake social enmities destroy themselves and their mission together.⁶⁵

For al-Ghazali, Islam sympathizes with human weakness and helps wrongdoers⁶⁶ repent and acquire guidance. *Du‘āt* should share the sadness of people in distress, wish them health and recovery, assist them during failure, care for their sorrow, defend them against injustice, and join the crowds of ill-treated and abused people.⁶⁷ This sympathy is an active but not a reflective practice which can be understood in terms of returning people to their Creator. Such a return is crucial. *Du‘āt* are to help and facilitate people’s return to their Creator,⁶⁸ and gradually guide wrongdoers through righteousness.⁶⁹ Gradual guidance is only possible through constant interaction with people. *Du‘āt* are to connect with people and not segregate themselves from them, and to share good tidings, instead of driving people away.⁷⁰ In all of this, *du‘āt* are to rise above personal disputes and not condemn people.⁷¹ *Da‘wah* is an expression of active sympathy for people, within the work of returning people to their Creator. As such, *da‘wah* requires patience.⁷² Rather than being driven by zealous emotions, *du‘āt* are to examine issues profoundly,⁷³ and instead of letting emotions drive them to suspicion or rudeness should equip themselves with patience. In so doing, *du‘āt* emulate the example of the Prophet Muhammad,⁷⁴ who gently sowed seeds and provided ample time for their growth and development. During this time the sleeping awoke, the wrongdoer repented, and complex problems inherited from the past were resolved.⁷⁵ Al-Ghazali draws on many Qur’anic verses which show patience and forbearance vis-à-vis ignorant and misguided people until such a time that obstacles hindering their intellectual freedom are removed.⁷⁶

In sum, the major concern of *du‘āt* is to teach, remind and guide people,⁷⁷ and provide opportunities of hope until they return to their Creator.⁷⁸ *Du‘āt* motivate others and hope for their good, are satisfied if the goals of *da‘wah* are achieved,⁷⁹ and avoid despair, particularly if the surrounding conditions do not

support *daʿwah*.⁸⁰ This major work is not advanced, however, if *duʿāt* act ignorantly, cruelly, or rudely, or if they fail to advocate the truth with respect, calmness and decency.⁸¹ In this regard, al-Ghazali argues that discourse on truth does not require recourse to abusive language since it is possible to reach out to others positively, politely, and kindly.⁸²

Given this major concern, for al-Ghazali the ideal qualities of a *dāʿiyah* represent essential spiritual and moral components as engrained in his *daʿwah* model – qualities reflecting al-Ghazali’s view of *daʿwah* as multifaceted and all-inclusive in nature, and requiring a religious, respectful and caring approach. Al-Ghazali does not deny that *duʿāt* endeavors always have a large degree of spirituality. What his model does is to balance religious spirituality with the needs of ordinary life and distance *daʿwah* from purely spiritual reflection or philosophical meditation. In his model, the spiritual and moral aptitudes of *duʿāt* play an instrumental role in the process of *daʿwah* and change, and ensure that *duʿāt* endeavors remain religious in nature. And this assurance is important since, in al-Ghazali’s model, *daʿwah* involves a variety of objectives, requires contributions from diverse disciplines, and necessitates ongoing interpretations.

These spiritual and moral requirements, nonetheless, reflect al-Ghazali’s ideal position, which informs his view on the actual education of *duʿāt*. They either struggle and acquire religious qualities such as these, or are dismissed from the field of *daʿwah* altogether. In other words, al-Ghazali leaves the impression that *daʿwah* activities are difficult and challenging by nature. It is arguable, however, that al-Ghazali’s model only draws a general pattern for the life of *duʿāt*, and makes their success vary proportionally with the degree of the spirituality they acquire. The long set of spiritual qualities also raises a two-part question: whether all *duʿāt* involved in the process of change or preaching require similar levels of spiritual and moral education, and whether religious preachers and scholars require a much higher level than ordinary Muslim activists. This question is legitimate, given the

demanding job of Muslim educators who are directly connected with the moral development of the Muslim public, in contrast to *du‘āt* who are required to excel in their respective areas of expertise. Again, al-Ghazali is constantly aware of these differences, yet he generalizes those requirements among *da‘wah* workers while extending the scope of *da‘wah* beyond the traditional perspective.

[III] Educational Qualifications of *Du‘āt*

In his preoccupation with *da‘wah*, al-Ghazali would constantly critique the religious education that *du‘āt* received. He regarded preachers and religious scholars’ failure at *da‘wah* as a reflection of their educational background. However, his approach to the educational requirements of *du‘āt* appears to be drawn from a context other than Islamic studies, a context that urges Muslims to excel in all branches of modern academic scholarship to carry out Islamic reform with success. Al-Ghazali directly applies this view of excellence to the field of Islamic preaching and religious education, yet without discussing the feasibility of integrating religious with modern education, and without providing any specific guidance as to the process of implementation. Nonetheless, we can examine his perspective on education and *da‘wah*.

As mentioned, al-Ghazali believed that, in light of the Qur’an, the divine selection of nations depended on their intellectual and moral merit beneficial to humanity, and not on any ethnic or geographic terms.⁸³ This implied that religious representation is not granted to any group other than those with educational, intellectual, and spiritual aptitudes.⁸⁴ For al-Ghazali God selects His messengers from among the best of His creation, and grants them high intellectual and spiritual qualities. This thus, for him disqualifies narrow-minded *du‘āt* with poor skills from succeeding where the prophets left off.⁸⁵ For al-Ghazali, *du‘āt*’s success depends on their commitment to wide and deep study;⁸⁶ that is, *da‘wah* requires the mind of a philosopher, the emotion of a man

of letters, the precision of a lawmaker, the courage of a knight, and the kindness of a parent.⁸⁷ Without all of these qualities, *duʿāt* would not understand the true meaning of the religion they are responsible for conveying,⁸⁸ and so would not have the ability to convey the Islamic message in an all-encompassing manner.⁸⁹

The issue of education in *daʿwah* also calls to attention the role of reading. For al-Ghazali, this forms the backbone of *duʿāt* thinking.⁹⁰ *Duʿāt* are to be obsessed with reading and books, to be booklovers constantly in search of new titles.⁹¹ They are to read about all types of literature and trends in human thought to understand life and its surrounding influences; they are to read about faith, atheism, philosophy, and Sunnah,⁹² and to avoid reading materials from periods of decline.⁹³ According to al-Ghazali, *daʿwah* also requires knowledge of the Qurʾan and the Sunnah.⁹⁴ This is because *duʿāt*'s intellectual and emotional connections with the Qurʾan and the Sunnah provide them with a proper understanding.⁹⁵ It is equally important for *duʿāt* to understand the history of Muslim caliphs and their extensive examination of contemporary conditions.⁹⁶ *Duʿāt* should also be familiar with the occasions and history of revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*), and the conditions in which hadith traditions were stated (*munāsabat al-ḥadīth*).⁹⁷

Duʿāt are to learn about life and universal history. They are to critically explore Islamic history, examine jurisprudential, literary, educational and intellectual movements,⁹⁸ and to become familiar with Islamic law and civilization.⁹⁹

To make these demands possible, al-Ghazali argues that *duʿāt* should not necessarily be well versed in the studies of the Sunnah or acquire a level of Islamic knowledge similar to that of scholars like Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik or ibn Ḥanbal. What is crucial is that they acquire a minimum degree of intellectual capability, and a basic knowledge of the Qurʾan and the Sunnah, with an understanding of the priorities of Islamic law (*awlawayyāt al-fiqh*

al-islāmī). Specific questions are to be referred to experts in their respective fields.¹⁰⁰

And in connection with an understanding of Islam, al-Ghazali underscores the role of Arabic language and literature as a pre-requisite for effective *da‘wah*.¹⁰¹ Learning Arabic helps people learn about Muslims,¹⁰² motivates them to understand revelation, and supports the transmission of beliefs.¹⁰³ Al-Ghazali thus proposes setting up schools for Arabic language and sending delegations overseas to disseminate the Arabic language dissociated from the religion; this supports the cultural foundations of the Qur’anic language and provides a way to Islam.¹⁰⁴ Al-Ghazali’s attention to Arabic language is a distinct characteristic of his *da‘wah* model and shows his eagerness to preserve the traditional character of *da‘wah*. This, nonetheless, may pose a challenge to the issue of Islamic universality which demands all linguistic and cultural differences to fade away in favor of higher religious objectives. It is not just the cultural traits that seem contrary to Islamic universality, there is also al-Ghazali’s strict requirement of Arabic in the education of *du‘āt*. Proficiency in Arabic, however, is a challenge for non-Arabic speaking *du‘āt* who whilst unable to understand religious texts in Arabic may nevertheless effectively contribute to broad *da‘wah* through excellence in their respective areas of specialization. In other words, the strict requirement of Arabic in *da‘wah* could place its universal character in jeopardy. One can only presume that al-Ghazali gives to the Arabic language a crucial role to play in *da‘wah* in order to preserve some of its basic characteristics, and also to encourage *du‘āt* in all areas of life to acquire educational qualifications to the best of their abilities.

For al-Ghazali, the above form only part of a *dā‘iyah*’s intellectual formation. Muslims currently face an onslaught of universal modes of thought as a result of their interaction with diverse civilizations, each reflecting various movements and philosophies.¹⁰⁵ These modern developments require *du‘āt* to acquire a solid knowledge base in both Islamic and non-Islamic cultures,

and to study human history, including both intellectual history and the history of modern philosophies.¹⁰⁶ The intellectual formation of *du'āt* is also to include the study of the human sciences,¹⁰⁷ including ethics, and social and political philosophy. They are also to have a grasp of modern trends in thought.¹⁰⁸ And the intellectual formation of *du'āt* requires even more than this. That is, effective *da'wah* also demands a knowledge of sociology, economics, education, and psychology.¹⁰⁹

This wide-ranging intellectual development is important because it forms part of a *dā'iyah*'s relationship with those they are engaging with in terms of *da'wah*. *Du'āt*, for al-Ghazali, are to give due attention to human beings and their psychological makeup and how to utilise revelation to correct confused human thinking and misunderstanding.¹¹⁰ Accordingly *du'āt* are to approach the human sciences from an Islamic perspective.¹¹¹ They are also to examine religious sects¹¹² and attain a fair understanding of world religions and religious disciplines. With an understanding of comparative religions and thereby an understanding of their doctrines and practices, *du'āt* become aware of the shortcomings of each, as well as points of similarity and prospects, and how these affect societies, aiding them in not only their *da'wah* efforts but an understanding of their own and other societies.¹¹³ This understanding is very important for al-Ghazali. In the great scope of his broader vision, *du'āt* succeed only when they acquire an understanding of history, and develop an insight into modern schools.¹¹⁴ As noted above the intellectual development of a *dā'iyah* depends in part on his/her relationship with those to whom *da'wah* is given. For this relationship goes beyond that of mere preaching. Rather it is one based on real communication and the benefits to be gained from this. That is, *du'āt* are to study the arts and identify artists who can communicate better on issues of *da'wah*.¹¹⁵

Finally, the intellectual formation of *du'āt* is to include a study of the natural sciences. *Du'āt* are to understand physical sciences including chemistry, biology and astronomy, and are to be also

acquainted with geography, botany, and animal sciences.¹¹⁶ Al-Ghazali underscores the position of universal laws in both the human and physical worlds, and the need to understand and apply those laws to maintain a social equilibrium crucial to *da‘wah*. For al-Ghazali, many *du‘āt* fail to develop a constructive approach towards morally troubled societies, due either to lack of a proper understanding of universal laws or lack of a proper study of *da‘wah*.¹¹⁷ The sciences outlined are for al-Ghazali crucial to *da‘wah* because they help *du‘āt* to correct their concepts, coordinate their relationship with the physical world, and provide them with in-depth guidance.¹¹⁸

It is clear that al-Ghazali’s call for educating oneself in various academic disciplines is not to accumulate knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself, but rather to utilise it as a tool to aid *da‘wah* work, for through this knowledge base *du‘āt* are able to engage with and understand comprehensively the world in which they live and the people who make it up. That is to understand human and societal problems, drives, social ills, how to mend the watch that is broken by learning how it ticks, then applying the tools of Islam to repair it. Once again, this will amongst other subjects, entail studying politics and economics, and the views of educationists and psychologists.¹¹⁹ This knowledge is also required to understand Muslim societies and culture.

So, in al-Ghazali’s view because of their need to understand the traditional and modern aspects of Islamic culture,¹²⁰ *du‘āt* should acquire broad education and understanding.¹²¹ A selective approach towards the various areas of scholarship and a broad culture are to assure sound logic and effective *da‘wah*.¹²² These also imply that *du‘āt* are not to confine themselves to a particular legal or theological school. They are to remain independent of these constraints, and equip themselves with an objective understanding of their living conditions.¹²³ In fact, *du‘āt* must be careful to understand social conditions, the nature of the intellect they deal with, and the differing types of ills and good qualities prevalent in innate human nature.¹²⁴ They are

to comprehend the nature of the time and space they live in, and the universal movements dominating it.¹²⁵ They should also understand characteristics of human societies and the human race, studying respective leaders, beliefs, and movements.¹²⁶

In sum, al-Ghazali attempts to articulate an ambitious *daʿwah* model in which *duʿāt* are to be remarkably learned personalities mastering various areas of academic scholarship. His model, however, demands socially skilled *duʿāt* with encyclopaedic minds, who are able to exercise a multidisciplinary approach to areas of research – rational or traditional, physical or moral.¹²⁷ The problem is that experts in their own respective field, they may either fail to meet those requirements or fail in their own area of expertise, defeating the purpose of broadening the scope of *daʿwah* or religious responsibility. Al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* model involves a set of ideal requirements which although aiming at enhancing *duʿāt*'s intellectual level to the best possible standard is probably beyond the reach of most *duʿāt*. Having said that, the requirements do however reflect a need to enrich *daʿwah* with diverse modern academic disciplines and professional expertise, and more importantly to develop an intimate relationship between *daʿwah*, science, and modernity. The requirements also reflect al-Ghazali's belief in the inability of traditional learning to develop an effective *daʿwah* methodology, which according to him requires a different educational background.

Overall, however, al-Ghazali's work on the intellectual development of *duʿāt* for effective *daʿwah* gives scope for hope. That is, their intellectual formation has potential with regards to Islamic reform and a modern representation of Islam. On the one hand, al-Ghazali's discussion reveals his interest in forging a solid association between *daʿwah* and research and exploration, an approach applicable not only to *daʿwah* but to Islamic reform in general. On the other hand, his model seeks to overcome the dichotomies existing between religion and modern education, or religion and science. The implementation of his views not only yields a positive relationship between *daʿwah*, science and

modernity, but also eventually equips preachers and religious scholars with the tools necessary to digest modern changes and developments, and the ability to present Islam through a modern perspective.

[IV] Problems of *Du'āt*

Without a solid intellectual foundation, in al-Ghazali's view the prospects for *da'wah* do not appear positive. Al-Ghazali's critical appraisal of *da'wah* continually reveals a negative view with regards to the overall progress of Islam.¹²⁸ These problems and shortcomings relate to Islamic reform, and make of both *da'wah* and reform, two sides of the same coin. Not all of the problems, however, relate to *du'āt*'s intellectual development. Some concern their own incompetence and failure, while others go beyond this to deal with questions of Islamic reform in general. Indeed, any improvement in *da'wah* will entail, according to al-Ghazali, analysis of the conditions of Muslims influencing *da'wah*. Thus, an examination of al-Ghazali's analysis of Muslims' current conditions is needed to understand the problems of *du'āt* and *da'wah*, as he presents them.

So, the same problems affecting Muslims are also detrimental to *da'wah*, which is geared to alleviating these difficulties. Al-Ghazali points to the numerous problems and challenges etc. affecting *da'wah*. These include questions of culture and customs, *du'āt* being poor role models with poor religious practice, women's low rank status, a weak education system, inadequate institutions of *da'wah*, *du'āt* performance, Muslim misconceptions about mundane life, legal differences, abrogation in the Qur'an (*al-naskh fī al-Qur'ān*), failure in worldly life, and influential foreign cultures. For al-Ghazali, all these form critical challenges, especially when *da'wah* requires an intelligent and broad treatment, and the state of affairs facing Muslims is one of terrible economic and scientific backwardness.¹²⁹ In his *Sirr Ta'akhkhub al-ʿArab wa al-Muslimīn* (The Causes of Arab and

Muslim Backwardness), al-Ghazali enumerates the following as major problems: (a) religious misunderstanding, (b) flaws in Muslim culture, (c) ignorance concerning mundane life, (d) the doctrine of fatalism (*al-jabriyyah*), (e) ostentation, (f) women's low status, (g) the poor standard of Arabic literature, (h) financial mismanagement, and (i) political despotism.¹³⁰ Al-Ghazali points to an additional four highly detrimental factors: (a) a spoiled religious passion enhanced through the teachings of Sufis and their negative view of life; (b) a deteriorated value of human beings due to long periods of tyrannical political rule; (c) a loss of intellectual potential and the influence of fiction and myth over Muslim public life; and (d) deviance from the texts and rulings of Islam.¹³¹

For al-Ghazali, intellectual and sectarian differences have caused deep fissures among Muslims, engendering a disregard for social responsibilities both locally and internationally.¹³² Such disregard is, in turn, caused by Muslims' preoccupation with outward religious forms rather than their innate being.¹³³ There are the ensuing causes of decline, whether intellectual, social, or political, and the cultural influences exploiting Muslim personality.¹³⁴ The long-lasting state of ignorance has also caused a lack of research and follow up on *da'wah*, and allowed corrupted cultures and confused political movements to develop putting into jeopardy *du'āt*.¹³⁵ As a result, the universal message of Islam has gradually declined.¹³⁶

According to al-Ghazali, *du'āt* encounter a now centuries old legacy of defeat,¹³⁷ and are caught and lost between the weaknesses of the public and those of the government.¹³⁸ Moreover, efforts are made to drive *du'āt* away so that they ultimately quit their positions leaving them open for ignorant and uneducated people to take up.¹³⁹ And whilst *da'wah* encounters greatly intelligent and powerful forces,¹⁴⁰ it faces them dependent on pathetic skill, disintegrated enthusiasm, the spare time of volunteers and the dead spirit of negligent professionals.¹⁴¹ Not surprisingly, al-Ghazali doubted if *da'wah* would prosper given the prevailing

problems of general educational failure, moral incompetence, unsubstantiated claims, self-satisfaction, and general accusation of others.¹⁴² Al-Ghazali’s critical approach to the Muslims’ conditions, nonetheless, appears to have dismissed the contributions made by individual or collective *da‘wah* efforts in Muslim history. Of course, al-Ghazali is undoubtedly aware of Muslim contributions to *da‘wah* both locally and internationally, and whether by individuals, organizations, or states. One can only suspect that these efforts did not meet his broad expectations. His negative approach also indicates his ideal position vis-à-vis *da‘wah* contributions, and a somewhat less appreciative and acknowledging attitude. Al-Ghazali maintained a generally negative approach, probably to keep everyone on their toes, that is to generate a distress signal and have it course around circles of *da‘wah*, rather than cause a positive impression that might lead to self-satisfaction.¹⁴³

In his *da‘wah* example al-Ghazali devotes serious attention to the question of a Muslim role model (*al-quḍwah al-islāmiyyah*). Without a role model, any talk on *da‘wah* progress becomes idle. Muslim role models are the key to *da‘wah*’s success.¹⁴⁴ For al-Ghazali, when it comes to the written word, people can hardly distinguish between what is true and what is myth. In contrast they can quickly grasp truth and become attached to it when exemplified in a role model, who can embody the hopes of the entire nation.¹⁴⁵ Morals in fact represent a universal language through which nations, despite differences of laws and customs, communicate and adhere to.¹⁴⁶ This notion implies that the theoretical illustration of the truth alone is insufficient to assure implementation of its principles, and that implementation requires real life examples which translate morals and religious values from abstract planes to reality.¹⁴⁷ To gain western admiration, Muslims residing in the West should, for al-Ghazali, be inspiring role models in education and culture.¹⁴⁸ Al-Ghazali goes on to state that the future of the Muslim nation depends

entirely on its religious, economic, and social conditions whether at the individual or social levels.¹⁴⁹

Da'wah has its own set of requirements when it comes to role models. Muslims should set ideal examples reflecting Islam's message, and act as genuine recipients of the divine teachings and values revealed. This means that their healthy internal condition constitutes a pre-requisite for a positive *da'wah* to be exercised in the external world and that,¹⁵⁰ prior to understanding or advancing the cause of Islam, Muslims are first required to improve their economic as well as moral standards. Without that step, all preceding efforts will be in vain, with no real impact.¹⁵¹ Note, these improvements are geared to producing positive role models and not eloquent speeches¹⁵² and are affected by *da'wah*'s broad and all-inclusive nature, which includes farmers, crafts men, and business people.¹⁵³ They, as well as religious scholars, can be role models suitable for *da'wah*. The mastery of life skills and its beneficial use in support of the truth are all facets of the religious endeavor, yielding enormous progress towards the truth.¹⁵⁴ In point of fact any scientific progress irrespective of its origin¹⁵⁵ supports the religious message and the mastery of life, while acquisition of expertise supports Islamic principles.¹⁵⁶

Before continuing, it is worthwhile highlighting some aspects of the Muslim role model and what constitutes it. For al-Ghazali, goodness means integration of both inward and outward purity of character through which the Muslim people can progress and at the same time attract others to the faith.¹⁵⁷ This integration of the internal and external confirms the true nature of the Islamic message and motivates religious adherence.¹⁵⁸ The Muslim role model will also safeguard the honor of all those who are abused or maltreated, providing local and international support for them, acting with compassion, showing generosity, and rising above petty, trivial issues.¹⁵⁹ That is, Muslims are to observe social and political integrity, and safeguard people's lives, wealth, property and honor.¹⁶⁰ Only then, according to al-Ghazali, will they be able to head civilization.¹⁶¹

Muslim society, described by al-Ghazali as being balanced and wise, has sufficient institutions to facilitate marriage, collect for charity in the face of poverty, establish prayers, and transmit knowledge through setting up of schools and printing houses.¹⁶² Given his strong emphasis on developing role models for and by nations, al-Ghazali argues that a nation with a message should establish its life system accordingly. In so doing, the goodness of Muslims will eventually become visible across their borders and reach out to the whole world.¹⁶³ Muslims should meet and maintain expectations of the religion, and communicate effectively with other nations. They should be well established holding leading positions in various areas of life,¹⁶⁴ reflect their mandate, and introduce it to close and far nations.¹⁶⁵

A Muslim role model can also come in the shape of Muslim governments who through various institutions, should take care of their citizens, uphold justice,¹⁶⁶ advocate peace, and stand against material desires. They should impart goodness and invite to it, teach truth and disseminate evidence for this, enjoin good, and forbid evil, both locally and internationally.¹⁶⁷ Confusion about state and *da‘wah* related activity can raise confusion as to what *da‘wah* is. Al-Ghazali tries to avoid confusion concerning *da‘wah* viewing it as excellence in governmental affairs and much more. For example, he argues that guidance from God through communication with the intellect is a fundamental component in *da‘wah*. *Da‘wah* and state related verses should not, however, be confused. *Da‘wah* related verses address the intellect through discovery of God, leading to adherence of a certain lifestyle.¹⁶⁸ States track down criminals,¹⁶⁹ fight crime, and safeguard life, property, and honor.¹⁷⁰ Al-Ghazali writes:

Neglecting *da‘wah* implies that Muslim governments neglect the acts of goodness, teaching the truth, enjoining the good and forbidding evil, advocating peace against aggression, justice against violence, or supporting of humanity in the face of material desires and temptations.¹⁷¹

Excellence as a role model also includes more than excellence in governmental affairs. In view of his attention to the need for excellence in worldly life, al-Ghazali argues that excellence does not evolve from itself, for it requires several factors, including interest in learning, a longing to discover the unknown, and a determination to overcome difficulties. These in al-Ghazali's view, depend on the strength of faith capable to develop these emotions.¹⁷² The question of education is also crucial to the improvement process. Al-Ghazali anticipates that if Islam is to work well as a role model, a high percentage of Muslims require education.¹⁷³

Al-Ghazali's attention to the need for internal improvement reflects the crucial role this plays in advancing *da'wah*.¹⁷⁴ For al-Ghazali, *da'wah* does not flourish if Muslims fail in key areas of economics and social development, or lack understanding of life and its sciences.¹⁷⁵ One implication is that the living conditions of Muslims are fundamentally vital to the success of *du'āt*, and the development of Islamic values and teachings.¹⁷⁶ Another implication is that Muslims are incapable of effectively advancing the Islamic faith so long as their general conditions are not equal to universally acceptable or higher standards.¹⁷⁷ That is to say the Islamic message can only be disseminated successfully when Muslim nations change fundamentally, such that their moral and economic characteristics become effective and persuasive to the outside world.¹⁷⁸ Hence, faith will not prosper so long as the intellectual and economic situation of Muslims remains poor.¹⁷⁹

Al-Ghazali's notion of a Muslim role model did not, however, draw much on the revelation in contrast to the case with *du'āt*'s spiritual and moral etiquettes. In fact, *da'wah* related verses in the Qur'an do not explicitly allude to this component, and in many instances show followers of *da'wah* to have made their way to salvation and prosperity after states of subjugation. The process of *da'wah* development, as given in the Qur'an, appears to present belief, patience, and trust in God as the means for suc-

cess in *da‘wah*. Al-Ghazali rather supports the notion of a role model in *da‘wah* through general verses calling for change, such as the following: “Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts...”¹⁸⁰ Al-Ghazali does not contradict the importance of belief, patience and trust for *da‘wah*. Rather, a key point of his is that Muslims’ internal conditions have jeopardized *da‘wah*. In his reading of Muslim history, it is the poor conditions or state of civilization that have affected *da‘wah*.¹⁸¹ Specifically, in a world that struggles for freedom and embedded to science and experimentation, al-Ghazali is concerned that Islam is being portrayed as a tyrannical, mythical, and fictional religion, a mere set of meaningless rituals irrelevant to the mundane world.¹⁸² For al-Ghazali, statements and actions by Muslims have regrettably led to terrible confusion to arise about and within *da‘wah*, and this coupled with acute scientific backwardness and moral decline have stalled people’s progress to God.¹⁸³

For al-Ghazali, the social condition of present day Muslims not only affects *da‘wah*’s progress,¹⁸⁴ but also raises doubts as to Islam’s value and the extent to which humanity would benefit from it.¹⁸⁵ For him, Muslim attitudes and social disintegration can easily deter people from the faith.¹⁸⁶ Presently, Muslims cannot guide others and neither can their religious leaders. Being far too preoccupied with their internal affairs the latter are incapable of carrying out this responsibility.¹⁸⁷ As such not only have they have failed to introduce Islam to the wider world but have not provided positive role models whose example would have invited and won people to the faith.¹⁸⁸ Al-Ghazali criticizes Muslims for the injustice, and damage, they have done to Islam through their own behavior and malpractice falsely giving out the impression that Islam conflicts with human nature, freedom, and reason.¹⁸⁹

Al-Ghazali further rebukes Muslims for failing to properly implement Islamic teachings arguing that it is because of this that Muslims have earned for themselves the reputation of being

thieves, people given to hedonism, or concerned with power as a means to advance ethnicity or regional agendas.¹⁹⁰ *Du‘āt* should not overburden Islam’s message nor cause distraction over it. Harming *dhimmīs*, for instance, is oppression, and gives out the false impression that it is religiously motivated.¹⁹¹ Generally, according to al-Ghazali, Muslims fail to provide positive examples of religious monotheism or moral values, and are unable to offer role models of peace, or rise above materialistic ends, or safeguard the lives, property and honor of others, or enjoin good and forbid wrongdoing.¹⁹² Al-Ghazali writes:

What make residents of Damascus, Baghdad, or Istanbul spend the night insecure and fearful while they would sleep safely and comfortably in London, Paris, or Washington? Who shall God grant to lead humanity?¹⁹³

According to al-Ghazali, Muslims have failed to embody the values and teachings of Islam, whether in formulating *da‘wah* strategies or developing methods of religious presentation.¹⁹⁴ And Muslim society will continue to encumber the religion so long as Muslims fail to invite others to Islam through setting a persuasive and attractive example and thus offering an effective role model.¹⁹⁵ Al-Ghazali asserts: “The shadow of religious failure has affected economic and administrative life. Work that is perfectly done by others emerges from Muslim hands like an aborted fetus with no features and no hope of surviving.”¹⁹⁶ And this incapability of producing effective role models is caused by either misunderstanding of the implications of the message,¹⁹⁷ or by cultural and political corruption.¹⁹⁸

Al-Ghazali believed that nations concerned with scientific excellence, political dignity, and social and economic prosperity, entertain no hope of Muslims leading any of these areas.¹⁹⁹ And even if some sliver of hope did exist this would soon vanish given the backward state of the Muslim world in these fields.²⁰⁰ This state of affairs has caused nations to pay little attention to the Muslim world and they will continue to do so, just as long

as Muslims remain economically backward, ignorant of their heritage, or solicit aid from abroad.²⁰¹ Needless to say economic backwardness and the need for humanitarian relief on the part of Muslims does not impress nor attract others to Islam.²⁰² Poverty stricken nations seeking humanitarian relief from the developed world become impeded by this very act and inevitably become mired in a state of inferiority.²⁰³ And then backwardness has forms other than simply economics. For instance, there is the issue of widespread rates of illiteracy amongst Muslims, unfortunately interpreted by developed nations in religious terms,²⁰⁴ reasoning perhaps that if the teachings of Islam were good, then the conditions of Muslims would be good, and as the reverse is the case, the conclusions drawn thereby are obvious. This seeming contradiction consequently causes doubt and jeopardizes adherence to Islam.²⁰⁵

Al-Ghazali saw a proportionate relationship to exist between the Muslim role model and *da‘wah*. His discussion of this relationship demonstrates clear concern over the Muslims’ current conditions, and also shows his conviction that comprehensive improvement is a basic requirement for effective *da‘wah*. Al-Ghazali’s hopes relate largely to the objectives and scope of Islamic reform, echoing his hopes for *da‘wah* and the reactions of outreached communities. His attention to the question of a role model also reflects a deep understanding of the diverse implications involved in the process of *da‘wah*, which requires correspondence between propagated ideals and the context of *da‘wah*, and to match the development of Islamic theory and practice. He was unimpressed by verbal manifestations when the causes of decline were still functioning, because unless these problems were remedied, *da‘wah* would remain a nonsense.

For al-Ghazali the Muslim role model comprised something far greater in scope than simply a set of personal, behavioral and moral codes attached to *du‘āt*. Rather, it represented the collective movement and growing examples of an entire nation in most or all spheres of life, geared to proving that Islam leads to pros-

perity and human welfare and, hence, is worth serious thought, consideration and ultimately acceptance. The Muslim role model also transcends regional, religious, and cultural boundaries, to contribute to global improvement. It thereby has the potential to earn global credibility leading to trust in Islamic religious ideals.

Alongside the issue of a role model, and at the core of *daʿwah* improvement, lies the problem of culture. Rather than developing a base for religious knowledge and moral contribution, to thereby shape a people capable of carrying out the message,²⁰⁶ Muslim culture (*thaqāfah*), according to al-Ghazali, has led intellects to seclusion and isolation.²⁰⁷ For him, today's Muslim culture today does not facilitate the truth about Islam²⁰⁸ and presents Muslim societies as being flawed, and suffering from intellectual and emotional problems.²⁰⁹ The culture al-Ghazali dreams about sympathizes with people without disparaging them and is preoccupied with fundamental issues instead of resorting to conspiracy theory to explain or interpret its own failure.²¹⁰ Al-Ghazali's criticism seeks for a positive image of Muslims and calls for a purification of the culture from elements not consistent with Islamic revelation as a vital step in order to construct a positive role model impacting positively the progress of *daʿwah*.

Of importance, and along similar lines of cultural reform, al-Ghazali discusses the effects of customs on *daʿwah*. For him, most customs are baseless and have their origins in periods of backwardness. What is worse is the fact that Muslims have impeded Islam by equating adherence to these customs (whether in politics, economics, social or family life) with adherence to Islam by interested parties.²¹¹ To illustrate the damaging effects of custom, in this case in relation to a western stance, al-Ghazali draws on the stories of a few Muslim converts. The first was a European named Leonard (renamed Shaykh Ali) who dressed oddly. Shaykh Ali, according to al-Ghazali, should have dressed in an ordinary manner, and shown his distinct moral character and physical purity. Another convert, Rosy (later named Taqiyyah) al-Ghazali wishes had continued to be known among

her colleagues and students as an experienced and competent playschool teacher, whilst maintaining her beauty and modest appearance.²¹² This comment is perhaps made in light of Rosy’s decision to quit her job instead of continuing to work and remain a noble example to her colleagues. Last is a British Muslim who by joining the Naqshbandi Sufi order, and despite his good religious character, al-Ghazali feels was not likely to benefit much in relation to Islamic development.²¹³ This because al-Ghazali’s overall perspective of Sufism viewed them as having little or no significant affect on people’s contribution to life or society. These examples illustrate al-Ghazali’s approach to the problem of culture and *da‘wah*. On the one hand they show al-Ghazali’s attention to the essence and not the forms of deeds or actions. On the other, they demonstrate his attempt to create an atmosphere of integration where less or insignificant consideration is given to external appearances, especially when these affect *da‘wah*. Arguably, his approach is geared to creating a rather neutral environment in which secondary religious or cultural changes or adoptions, including dress codes or minor acts of piety, do not affect fundamental transformations in the process of Islamic progress.

To a certain degree, al-Ghazali’s critique provides a contrasting position to religio-cultural manifestations in which outer form often appears to legitimize inner being, and where external manifestations carry out a profound authority over substantial issues. Al-Ghazali’s message seeks to re-establish the position of cultural accommodation within a broader yet essential perspective of change and *da‘wah*. It does not, however, provide us with a clear understanding of the priorities involved in the process of distinguishing fundamentals from secondary aspects, religious from cultural elements, nor about the *da‘wah* implementation process, particularly amongst non-Muslim countries.

Al-Ghazali also discusses a number of problems that together amount to a substantial setback for *da‘wah*. First, he surveys Muslim history and contends that poor religious practices have

significantly impeded *daʿwah*'s progress.²¹⁴ Arabs, for example, have not only abandoned their leadership position in universal *daʿwah*, but have also detached themselves from the virtues and commands of Islam.²¹⁵ Al-Ghazali's attention to religious practice is geared to a coordinated *daʿwah*, whereby the introduction of Islamic values, beliefs, and actions is harmonious. To develop a harmonious correspondence between *daʿwah* and Muslim practices, al-Ghazali re-interprets religious manifestations which inflict damage to Islam, affect negatively the way it is presented, and damage the proportionate relationship existing between positive religious practice and effective *daʿwah*. For al-Ghazali *daʿwah* is either dormant or obsolete when religious practices are negligent or artificial. His works, nonetheless, fall short of a structure and methodology to deal with prevailing practices in uniformity and consistency. In most parts al-Ghazali's interpretations project his own personal views on what he believed to be a proper and healthy culture or customs supporting *daʿwah*. All that concerns al-Ghazali, and what he in fact cares for, is a genuine manifestation of *daʿwah*, yielding satisfactory results, or at least positive interest.

Second, the conflict between this worldly life and the hereafter has caused *daʿwah* fatal losses,²¹⁶ and entailed two major injustices: failure to understand or support people's attachment to life and failure to understand divine guidance or observe religious commands.²¹⁷ *Duʿāt* confusion vis-à-vis worldly life and the hereafter has led to the impression that the religious and mundane worlds are hostile domains, and that people shall not truly acquire piety, unless they indulge in poverty or discard the reality of life and the divine laws of the universe.²¹⁸

Third is *duʿāt* misunderstanding of abrogation (*al-naskh*). Al-Ghazali viewed abrogation negatively seeing it as undermining *daʿwah* and damaging the beauty of its nature.²¹⁹ The misinterpretation by certain jurists of, for instance, the verse of the sword (*āyat al-sayf*) as supposedly abrogating the many Qur'anic verses calling for peaceful invitation to Islam, is criticised keeping in

mind additionally the traditions of the Prophet i.e. preserving the peaceful methodology of *da'wah*.²²⁰ Another related example is the claim that *da'wah* had been legislated in early Islam but then abrogated following the conquest of the tribe of Banū al-Muṣṭalaq.²²¹

Fourth is *du'āt*'s preoccupation, even obsession, with trivial conflicts. That is, extreme focus on legal differences has led to disregard of both the political and economic systems and the development of relationships with other nations.²²² Al-Ghazali does not name specific nations or time periods but makes of this a general observation. The excessive stress on legal differences, according to al-Ghazali, has even revived the age-old conflict which existed between early and later generations of Muslims (*al-salaf wa al-khalaf*),²²³ a conflict which drove them to a course other than the pursuit of *da'wah* and caused Muslims to be preoccupied with various problems.²²⁴

Last, there is the absence of institutions of *da'wah* that should motivate goodness,²²⁵ explore new intellectual fields,²²⁶ and follow up on internal and external *da'wah* progress, achievements, or defeats.²²⁷ For al-Ghazali, Muslim negligence has caused weaknesses and deficiencies in *da'wah* institutions.²²⁸ For example, institutions of Islamic learning have failed to cultivate a discipline of *da'wah* or foster positive *da'wah* institutions.²²⁹ This failure has harmed existing official and public *da'wah* institutions;²³⁰ they remain ignorant, incompetent, or corrupt.²³¹ The issue of absent or defective *da'wah* institutions brings to attention the role and responsibilities of Muslim governments towards *da'wah*. Ideally, for al-Ghazali, those governments should support the undertaking and safeguarding of *da'wah*.²³² Al-Ghazali questions the contribution of Muslim governments, past and present, towards the transmission of Islam and argues that *da'wah* was dissociated from the state early in Muslim history.²³³ Towards the end of the era of the rightly guided caliphs (10 AH/632 CE–40 AH/661 CE), for instance, Muslim rulers generally abandoned their *da'wah* responsibilities, and

failed to develop or support *daʿwah* institutions with adequate resources. In reality, according to al-Ghazali, they left most or all *daʿwah* responsibilities to the public.²³⁴ Al-Ghazali does not refer specifically to Islamic establishments such as Dār al-Iftāʾ or Al-Awqāf – rather, he makes the point that governments in general have left *daʿwah* responsibilities to the public. As a result, *daʿwah* has not received adequate attention or care from Muslim rulers.²³⁵ Such was the state in which *duʿāt* contributed to the transmission of Islam, with minimal effect.²³⁶

Al-Ghazali also maintained that *daʿwah*'s poor progress was a reflection of the poor standards of *duʿāt*. As noted above, he was particularly concerned with *duʿāt*'s intellectual makeup and development. Current procedures for selecting *duʿāt* were also problematic with the poor qualities of those selected ever detrimental to the purity of the faith and its present and future status.²³⁷ Al-Ghazali also believed that most people aspiring to become *duʿāt* were incompetent.²³⁸ For him it is *duʿāt*'s incompetence which has caused them loss of influence, poor recognition (despite efforts and contributions), and failure in supporting the faith.²³⁹ *Daʿwah* is also affected by extremists or naïve individuals. Thus, the current state of *daʿwah* witnesses ignorant *duʿāt* threatening scholars, emotionally troubled *duʿāt* posing a menace to those with sound *fiṭrah*, *duʿāt* wielding wooden swords to frighten men of science, and illiterate *duʿāt* intimidating highly educated women.²⁴⁰ It is this dire state of affairs, which al-Ghazali maintains, explains the need for intelligence, or as has been alluded to by early scholars, the requirements of a broad understanding and pure intention, on the part of Muslims and of course *duʿāt*.²⁴¹ Undoubtedly *daʿwah* needs thinkers, researchers, and speakers of high calibre.²⁴² It also needs motivated *duʿāt* who can convey Islam's message and follow up on current developments in religion.²⁴³ These type of *duʿāt* are both residents and travelers, and fluent in foreign languages.²⁴⁴

As the stress on intellectual development suggests, al-Ghazali places discussion on improving *daʿwah* within the framework of

Islamic education. For al-Ghazali, Islamic learning is primarily responsible for the quality of *du‘āt* and *da‘wah*. Current Islamic education, however, is not able to integrate reason with emotion and has either produced naïve dervishes or rude jurists.²⁴⁵ Their poor understanding of science has also caused confusion for students of religious studies.²⁴⁶ More specifically, the decline in religious education has produced a narrow-minded generation of *du‘āt*, who are unable to advance the cause of Islam.²⁴⁷ In addition, because Muslim jurists have overburdened Islamic disciplines with trivial issues, what is now required is a thorough filtering to restore them closer to their original condition in order to serve people better.²⁴⁸ Al-Ghazali connects *du‘āt*’s educational incompetence, already noted above, with contemporary limitations in Islamic learning. Graduates of major Islamic institutions represent a disturbed tradition and intellectual decay, and have emotional problems; all these hold back rather than advance *da‘wah*.²⁴⁹ *Du‘āt* are selected according to a criteria that disturbs the purity of the present as well as future state of the religion.²⁵⁰ Some *du‘āt* fail to strike a balance between the various aspects of religious education, either because of personal shortcomings causing disequilibrium and misunderstanding, or because of a lack of guidance and a poor educational background.²⁵¹

Al-Ghazali seeks to remedy *da‘wah*’s deteriorated state, and to advance the dissemination of Islamic culture in such a way that it enhances *da‘wah* concepts, blending *da‘wah* with the time-space factor components of reality. In seeking these goals, he examines diverse related problems and options for improvement.²⁵² For al-Ghazali, one positive step towards improvement would be to include more *du‘āt* who are intelligent, able to understand the implications of religious progress and the needs of the people.²⁵³ Another step would be to understand other nations to enable *du‘āt* to know whom they are communicating with and what religious material they should be communicating. This requires understanding of the contemporary achievements of civilization, examination of political trends and the overall

achievements and potentials of other nations, as well as the better selection of *du‘āt* and reform of institutions of *da‘wah*. Al-Ghazali in fact calls for struggle against culturally-based illusions or deceptions and intellectual delinquencies; this would, in his view, reconstruct the Muslim nation on the basis of revelation, and lead it to exploration of the universe and the effective exploitation of resources.²⁵⁴

At this point, most of the problems concerning *du‘āt* discussed thus far, could be viewed as problems affecting Muslim society as a whole. Therefore, any solution to the problems of *du‘āt* would represent, in al-Ghazali’s view, a contribution to improving the general conditions of society as a whole. In other words, the solutions proposed for *du‘āt* and *da‘wah* fall within the realm of broad-based social reform. Nevertheless, al-Ghazali also sees problems that are more specific and appear to fall within the purview of religious preachers and scholars. Examples include poor *da‘wah* performance, negative views on women, legal differences etc. Therefore, discussion turns next to al-Ghazali’s specific critique of *du‘āt*. Al-Ghazali maintained a constantly critical approach, because through critiquing *du‘āt* he was attempting to reveal the real problems facing contemporary *da‘wah*. He did not list these problems in order, but presented them as part of his critique. Accordingly, it is important to examine his critique to determine the nature of these problems and his criteria for *da‘wah*’s improvement.

[v] Critique of *Du‘āt*

Al-Ghazali criticizes preachers, muftis, scholars, and sometimes even students of religious learning, more often than he criticizes *du‘āt*. Nonetheless, the latter are extensively criticized for their understanding and performance. Al-Ghazali’s style is scornful and provocative often causing confusion, misunderstanding, and negative reaction. This would seem to be due to his frustration at the contributions of *du‘āt* not meeting his expectations

and his understanding of *da‘wah* for contemporary societies not being translated. This would also explain his persistence in critiquing *du‘āt* and *da‘wah*, his harsh remarks with regard to *du‘āt* contributions reflecting a generally negative evaluation of their diverse attempts at *da‘wah*. Given the discussion of *du‘āt*’s education above, it is no surprise that al-Ghazali develops an intensely critical attitude to *du‘āt*’s intellectual or educational failures. For him, *du‘āt*’s weakness is primarily the outcome of their taking as authoritative their own poor knowledge.²⁵⁵ His own experience based on diverse religious settings, taught him that poor intellects should be dismissed from *da‘wah*,²⁵⁶ in the same way that the religious message does not prosper when human characteristics and emotions are defective.²⁵⁷

Al-Ghazali criticises *du‘āt* who speak for a religion they themselves misunderstand and whose standards they fail to rise to, their example reflecting poorly on the faith.²⁵⁸ Islam, according to al-Ghazali, should not be learnt from nomadic jurists or dervish Sufis,²⁵⁹ or from emotionally troubled people who should seek a field of work other than *da‘wah*.²⁶⁰ Some *du‘āt* educate people about God yet are themselves unaware of Him, are ignorant of the universe and human history, null in religious matters and lack knowledge of the mundane world.²⁶¹ For al-Ghazali, God’s religion is honorable and is not to be taken from the mouths of idiots;²⁶² embracing Islam is easier without the hurdles of ineffective *du‘āt*;²⁶³ some *du‘āt* would do better to sell sheep; and when butchers act as juristcounsults they only look for a sacrifice.²⁶⁴ The stress on effective levels of education carries over into his discussion of Islamic culture, including the economy. Al-Ghazali regretted that *du‘āt*’s educational levels did not qualify them to even set up a small shop, yet they would be adamant in competing with large oil companies and giant financial institutions.²⁶⁵ Al-Ghazali writes:

While walking in Cairo, I noticed a building for an Italian delegation, which trained Egyptians on how to manufacture shoes. At that time, I

asked myself whether we need training in this particular field, and I also remembered *du‘āt*.... I responded: “Go and fight your barefootedness first, and be humble before God.”²⁶⁶

Al-Ghazali criticized *du‘āt* who failed to reflect upon their mistakes, correct their assumptions, or realize that social and political lapses have caused global decline.²⁶⁷ For him, many *du‘āt* have lost sense of the value of political and intellectual freedom, and of the need for freedom to sustain and nourish *da‘wah*. They have also forgotten that faith only fades away in the absence of freedom, and even shrinks until it disappears or changes to disbelief.²⁶⁸ On this occasion, al-Ghazali criticizes those jurists who argue that a Qurayshite man may marry an Arab or a non-Arab woman, whereas a non-Qurayshite is required to fulfill the requirement of marriage compatibility as far as their genealogy (*nasab*) is concerned.²⁶⁹ For al-Ghazali, some *du‘āt* are less connected with Islamic principles than with current practices, whether right or wrong, and approach *da‘wah* in terms of their current traditions and customs, rather than in light of the divine revelation.²⁷⁰ Some even perceive Islam to be a message for a small neighborhood, inaccessible to the external world, with its own traditions and protocols. Those *du‘āt* according to al-Ghazali, may well serve as doorkeepers in a deserted area but cannot be callers to a universal religion.²⁷¹

Certain *du‘āt*, we are told, introduce Islam through customs or historical weaknesses as if these are norms, or part and parcel of divine guidance.²⁷² Al-Ghazali points to the example of an American convert persuaded by a Muslim to dress in traditional white garments. He wonders why, when his identity as a Muslim should be confirmed through his conduct and manners rather than his attire.²⁷³ Al-Ghazali dismisses *du‘āt* of Bedouin understanding, as well as those who, in capital cities, clothe Islam in Bedouin garb.²⁷⁴ Some i.e. look forward to reviving the tradition of eating with hands whilst sitting on the floor, refusing to use utensils or tables. Al-Ghazali questions:

Du‘āt (Callers to Islam)

Who has ruled out that eating on tables or using spoons is against the Sunnah? The religious understanding of these people is strange. The discussion of these questions is an intellectual disease or insanity. Why are some people preoccupied with these traditions and neglectful of their obligations and major problems?²⁷⁵

Al-Ghazali is even surprised at *du‘āt* who, despite lacking educational qualifications, enjoy talking ignorantly about God and Islam.²⁷⁶ In his *Al-Tharthārūn bi al-Islām min Ghayr ‘Amal Muthmir* (Chattering about Islam without Productive Action) al-Ghazali voices disappointment with those who continue to raise religious and legal problems despite a clear inability to be productive, their alleged scholarship only being, he argues, a deception, or pretext, to mask their failures.²⁷⁷ The problem, according to al-Ghazali, arises when *du‘āt* love talking about Islam, yet ignore its reality and history, remain unaware of contemporary issues, and are inattentive to the difficult conditions surrounding the faith, both in the present-day and future.²⁷⁸ He criticizes *du‘āt* who increasingly bicker over legal questions rather than developing insights into current problems:²⁷⁹

My dear friend, western democracy only grew in the vacuum you have yourself made, and only found lovers because of your extremely distorted presentation of religious and worldly reality, and your insignificant attention to the human characters and history of nations searching for mercy and justice. You know well how to bring about death yet are unaware how to boost life. You prohibit in the name of God yet fail to provide lawful alternatives to satisfy people’s needs or obstruct the course of disobedience.²⁸⁰

Al-Ghazali wishes such *du‘āt* to keep quiet, given their terrible weakness in the field of the Qur’an and Sunnah, their poor understanding of the little they have memorized, their insignificant appreciation of the traditions of Muslim scholars, and their poor comprehension of humanity.²⁸¹ They are unable, he argues

to help Muslim societies, let alone third parties interested in Islam. *Du'āt* inability to rescue their people from poor conditions is due to their attention to the outer instead of the inner.²⁸² According to al-Ghazali, it is not only impoverished environments that affect the progress of *da'wah*, but also moody and pessimistic *du'āt* keen to issue verdicts of prohibition causing people distress,²⁸³ or talkative *du'āt* who preoccupy people with useless knowledge.²⁸⁴ Clearly some *du'āt* lack the essential characteristics which qualify them to transmit the message, or attract people to the religion. For al-Ghazali, had *da'wah* been dependent on present-day *du'āt*, and had Islam not been easy and in harmony with innate human nature, it would have halted where it first started, dwindled, and even vanished. It cannot be overemphasized that methods of religious presentation require effective skills, wisdom, sincerity, and dedication – aspects al-Ghazali saw as regrettably scarce amongst *du'āt* in his time.²⁸⁵

Al-Ghazali also criticizes *du'āt* who present Islam as being in conflict with human nature, who constantly look for restraints, hardship and complexity when people long for freedom and ease,²⁸⁶ or introduce defective and unattractive commodities, despite their citation of legal rulings.²⁸⁷ Where they are supposed to call for ease instead of hardship and to share good tidings instead of driving people away,²⁸⁸ some *du'āt* are keen to issue verdicts that forbid almost everything around one.²⁸⁹ In doing so they affect the progress of *da'wah* terribly.²⁹⁰ Given the choice these people would have even prohibited the air we breath even if causing their own suffocation.²⁹¹

Some *du'āt* escape political or economic issues, underestimate the effects of customs on divine guidance,²⁹² or issue prohibitions without providing alternatives for the public.²⁹³ Some others concentrate on the supererogatory, rather than the obligatory acts of worship, on secondary rather than fundamental legal rulings, and on areas of disagreement rather than those of consensus.²⁹⁴ Some *du'āt* live in the past, and introduce Islam as a historical phenomenon neither suitable for the present nor the

future. They preoccupy themselves over battles with the Mu‘tazilites or the Jahmites,²⁹⁵ losing sight of contemporary problems.²⁹⁶ They fight with theological sects in Muslim history, not knowing they only fight ghosts, or may win in areas having no real enemies.²⁹⁷ Some others summon features of decayed societies and culture²⁹⁸ and take their knowledge from the period of the Abbasids (750-1517 CE), Mamluks (1250-1517 CE), or the petty kings of Muslim Spain (*Mulūk al-Tawā’if*) (1031-1086 CE).²⁹⁹ Al-Ghazali’s following comment at a Friday sermon illustrates the point: “Had this sermon been delivered as of the fifth or sixth century hijrah (12th/13th century CE), nobody would have then objected. The sermon exhibits weakness and fear of rulers, causing *du‘āt* to escape real problems.”³⁰⁰

Al-Ghazali has additional criticisms for *du‘āt* working in the West. In discussing the presentation of Islam to western societies, al-Ghazali mocks vulgar *du‘āt* who advocate authoritative political systems, and associate public consultation (*shūrā*) with the personal opinion of the ruler.³⁰¹ In addition, al-Ghazali regrets that some *du‘āt* in the West still address westerners through literature and cultural traditions developed specifically for the problems of Muslim societies, instead of a discourse that meets the challenges and concerns of the West.³⁰² There is also the problem of local customs. *Du‘āt* who transmit Islam to western societies should respect the established customs of those societies, so long as these do not conflict with Islamic principles,³⁰³ and should not try to enforce the customs of Arab tribes.³⁰⁴ Such problems, within Muslim societies and in the West, led al-Ghazali to conclude that the dilemma facing *du‘āt* was their neglect or overlooking of current issues of public welfare and their trust in notions such as: reason is presumed guilty until proven innocent; analogy (*qiyās*)³⁰⁵ is inferior to a weak report; and nomadic dress is a symbol of piety.³⁰⁶ The problem, according to al-Ghazali, lay in half educated *du‘āt* who failed to master the art of fatwa, were not objective and had not acquired the picture in full. Unaware of the precise dose required

for Islamic treatment and unable to detect the ills of Muslim or non-Muslim societies,³⁰⁷ their ignorance caused more harm than benefit.³⁰⁸

Al-Ghazali's criticism informed his own model for *da'wah*. Overall, that model is ambitious. It involves ramifications of responsibilities, requirements, problems, and concerns. It projects both the concerns and the dreams of a typical Muslim thinker in modern times. Furthermore the problems and challenges identified by al-Ghazali are real, understandable, and still present. Al-Ghazali's model however, ignored the religious monopoly in *da'wah*, and succeeded in scrutinizing the ailments accompanying modern *da'wah* and *du'āt* with the tools used by jurists (*fuqahā'*) and traditionists (*Ahl al-Ḥadīth*). Predictably, the immediate reaction of some scholars and *du'āt* was to discredit al-Ghazali by denying he had any legal or hadith credentials.

The question now addressed is the value of al-Ghazali's method, including his tone, intellectual legacy, and critique. Al-Ghazali counters his opponents' opinions or accuses them of extremism which, in his view, hinders *da'wah*'s progress or damages the image of Islam in the West.³⁰⁹

In sum, al-Ghazali's critique of *du'āt* focuses on specific individuals or groups, and he was able to develop a critique of common problems. However, had his approach and tone been less provocative and more constructive, then his critiques could have been probably more helpful. But, his provocative style only led to angry reactions and self-protective responses at the time, a point discussed in the following chapter.

Al-Ghazali's open criticism, however, reveals his independence, and his strong belief in the model of *da'wah* he developed for modern times and particularly in the West. In short his legacy leaves an example of independent and open critique of *da'wah*, and includes not only an open criticism of religious undertakings, but also an undermining of what is usually perceived as the distinction between the sacred and the secular.

In the end, al-Ghazali’s criticism was successful to a degree because it created or opened up the current discourse on *da‘wah*, the various legal problems attached to it, and the principles of *da‘wah* and how they are understood or translated in society. Neither his model nor the criticism informing it are the end of that discourse. Al-Ghazali’s critique raises problems it does not solve, does not lead to any systematic methodology reflecting unity, objectivity, or consistency, and demonstrates the need for a systematic yet extensive remedying effort in modern *da‘wah*.

As the above has shown, al-Ghazali’s work rests on an ideal portrayal of *du‘āt* with regard to their qualifications and achievements and provides one of the most rigorous critiques of modern *da‘wah* and *du‘āt* that has been made. One can only presume that al-Ghazali’s quest for a comprehensive Muslim society in contrast to the poor state of Muslims underlay his whole discussion, and ignited most of his critiques of *du‘āt*. This conclusion, however, is not completely satisfactory. A careful examination of the *du‘āt* portrayed by al-Ghazali reveals the need to create a large class of charismatic *du‘āt*, well versed in most academic disciplines integrating them into the Islamic perspective. This, on the one hand, is a problem in view of al-Ghazali’s own assumptions that both society and government share the responsibilities of *da‘wah*, and on the other, because it does not clarify as to the requirements of each category as the boundaries for *du‘āt*, from either the fields of religion and ordinary life.

At the practical level however, we are faced with the problem of feasibility. Al-Ghazali’s ideal image of *du‘āt* raises a series of critical questions. First, those “*du‘āt*” appear to integrate tradition with modernity, and use their skills in light of their understanding of the socio-economic and cultural context of *da‘wah*. If that is the case then any further discussion should have focused on the process of integration of disciplines, and also what methodology to adopt in approaching both Islamic and modern knowledge from the perspective of *da‘wah*. Perhaps al-Ghazali should not be blamed because he only raised concerns pointing

to the problems of *daʿwah* with the hope that others would continue his work.

Second, al-Ghazali's emphasis on *duʿāt*'s educational standards raises the question as to what type of Islamic education institutions could help *duʿāt* acquire the various skills stipulated. This again leads to the question of perspective, curriculum, and staff. With his criticism of Islamic tradition and secular education, and keen interest to see good, comprehensive, all-round education in place, al-Ghazali does not advocate a new Islamic institution but, rather, seeks to modernize contemporary Islamic institutions including Al-Azhar University. We should, however, not lose sight of the fact that his discussion of *duʿāt*'s multifaceted education is nothing but a reflection of the implications of modern Islamic reform, which sought to respond to the various problems of Muslim individuals and society.

Al-Ghazali discusses the need to involve society and government in *daʿwah* so as to avoid the dichotomy between religion and mundane life, and also to escape the problem of religious elites as opposed to professional classes. He urged *duʿāt* in their respective professions to acquire a minimum degree of Islamic education yet without specifying how this was to happen, given his many critiques of traditional Islamic learning. Al-Ghazali proposed Islamic education would not happen in a vacuum and not before the problems associated with contemporary religious institutions had been remedied.

Clearly, al-Ghazali's inattention to this problem reinforces the fact that he was simply concerned with raising the question of *daʿwah* and *duʿāt* at a general level without developing a detailed *daʿwah* program for implementation.

Chapter 4

Al-Ghazali's Perspective on the Methodology of *Da'wah*

INTRODUCTION

AL-GHAZALI'S *da'wah* methodology is the central theme of this chapter, which examines both his own works and those of his critics, to identify the methodology underlying his analysis. This is particularly important, partly because al-Ghazali's works do not provide a cohesive or uniform statement on *da'wah* methodology, thus making the discussion significant in its attempt to reveal the methodological criteria he identified for successful *da'wah*. One important finding is how consistently al-Ghazali used *da'wah* as a lens through which to view law. In this regard, research reveals how through the vehicle of *da'wah* he re-interpreted traditions, relations between Islam and the West, and the socio-political and religious roles of women.

The chapter contains three main sections. The first dealing with al-Ghazali's approach to *da'wah* and his understanding of *da'wah* priorities, and the relationship of *du'āt* to the receptive intellect and religious preaching. The second addressing the relationship of *da'wah* to Islamic law. This has caused intense criticism of al-Ghazali by scholars and *du'āt* and the accusation that he passed over religious authorities to accommodate secular humanist ways of life. The third and last section concerns *da'wah* and women. Al-Ghazali here re-interprets many legal questions with regards to women to develop a framework that legitimizes

women's participation in social and political life and supports his position that women, not just men, can make a positive contribution to *daʿwah* and Islamic reform.

[1] The Approach to *Daʿwah*

The approach to *daʿwah* is what translates *duʿāt*'s knowledge and experience into an undertaking of religious transmission. It also reflects the priorities of *daʿwah*, areas of *duʿāt*'s attention and the implications of *daʿwah* for society. These involve the educational, spiritual, and moral qualities but, more importantly, the skills necessary to integrate the goals of *daʿwah* with the needs and challenges of society. For al-Ghazali the difficult work of *daʿwah* must be done well, since *duʿāt*'s failure to properly present Islam entails negative consequences, i.e. assumptions such as adhering to Islam means a return to tribal life, a denial of science, and/or a neglect of women's right to education.¹

According to al-Ghazali, *duʿāt* should present their beliefs in conformity to the methodology of the Qur'an,² which adheres to a specific style in introducing the Creator and the divine attributes.³ The Qur'an for instance draws human intellect and emotions towards the signs of creation in the universe, and illustrates evidence⁴ and solid proofs for the Creator.⁵ Also, the teachings of the Qur'an are open and protect the freedom of the people to either accept or reject them.⁶

For al-Ghazali, *daʿwah* is an honest translation of religious truths, and a genuine interpretation of Islamic beliefs and laws.⁷ *Duʿāt* are to avoid twisted approaches leading to compromises or to consent to falsehood.⁸ They are to adopt the use of Islamic approaches and means in the transmission of religion.⁹ Al-Ghazali's emphasis on Islamic means for *daʿwah* builds *daʿwah* on a proper and undistorted understanding of revelation; this repeats an established notion in Islamic law and also shows the traditional character of his *daʿwah* model.¹⁰ Implementation of this requirement in *daʿwah*, nonetheless, requires the skill of

being able to distinguish Islamic from un-Islamic means, an area needing advanced training in Islamic law and jurisprudence.

According to al-Ghazali, *da'wah* is fundamentally preoccupied with elucidation of the oneness of God, instead of secondary legal opinions, this leads to goodness, and unites people around obligatory religious acts.¹¹ Away from legal debates, *da'wah* is a guide to the fundamental tenets of Islam, and a focus on issues that are certain rather than doubtful, drawing upon the Qur'an and the Sunnah and not upon opinions or strange legal views.¹² *Da'wah* is designed for established and certain principles instead of differences or doubtful opinions, and adheres to famous hadiths (*sunan mashhūrah*) rather than strange opinions (*ārā' gharibah*).¹³ With this understanding *du'āt* are to call to fundamental and decisive religious texts,¹⁴ discard questions of dispute,¹⁵ and appropriately select legal rulings especially in non-Muslim societies.¹⁶ *Da'wah* defends the principles of Islam in education, ethics, and constitutional and international law.¹⁷

Nevertheless, al-Ghazali seems overly preoccupied with the impact of legal differences on the approach to *da'wah*. To free *da'wah* from the grip of legal differences, he suggests what he terms "an amnesty in Islamic law." Such attention reinforces his concern about the proper understanding and application of the law in *da'wah*. According to al-Ghazali, *du'āt* weaken or mislead Muslim society¹⁸ when they present Islam as a review of secondary legal rulings or theological discussion.¹⁹ According to him, the approach to *da'wah* should accommodate differences. *Du'āt* should consider the differences among people, whether in education or learning, both for the public or the elite. *Du'āt* should anticipate each individual, and allow them to understand the message, regardless of their varying intellectual capabilities or needs.²⁰ The approach to *da'wah* also requires *du'āt* to share their perspectives on various issues including Muslims' viewpoints, identity, and goals, and to leave the final judgment to the intellect.²¹ The transformation of belief into mere argument, however, weakens its emotional and moral credibility.²²

Al-Ghazali examines the relationship between the caller (*al-dā'iyyah*) and the called upon (*al-mad'ū*), giving more attention to the called upon, or what he terms "the receptive intellect." For al-Ghazali, *da'wah* is undertaken with success when the intellect is sound,²³ for poor intellects only provide unfavorable conditions for *da'wah*.²⁴ The receptive intellect, however, implies that *du'āt* assist people to understand and respond to the Islamic message.²⁵ The overall clarity of the *dā'iyyah*'s transmission should be consistent until they transfer the message to the recipient, making both the transmitter and the recipient equal in the appreciation of the religion.²⁶ Such being the case, the two interactive parties then share the process of religious education. Such an understanding, however, places *da'wah* at an objective level where neither the callers to Islam nor the called upon are imperious to scrutiny and criticism. Al-Ghazali's concern was to have people acquire proper understanding, avoid ignorance, and overcome doubts, which all necessitate time.²⁷ Hence, the approach to *da'wah* also requires patience and persuasion,²⁸ with *du'āt* needing to develop wisdom, devotion and sacrifice,²⁹ preach faith with wisdom and kind admonition,³⁰ show forbearance and gentleness, and confirm established religious truths, regardless of public vilification.³¹

As seen above, there are several means to *da'wah*, besides preaching (*al-wa'z wa al-irshād*). Religious preaching, however, caught al-Ghazali's attention despite his belief that it was the duty least required in modern times.³² For al-Ghazali, religious sermons are easy to implement so long they are simple and straightforward. So for him, the more accommodating religious preaching is, the more conducive it is to God's creation and the easier it is to follow God's path.³³ To develop a fresh perspective on Islamic preaching in the context of modern times, al-Ghazali pointed to the example of Prophet Muhammad who rarely, he informed people spoke at length, and whose sermons were short, concise, and wise. Contrary to the teachings of Islam, and the example set by the Prophet, however, Muslim preachers today

were prolonging their speeches, with the content of some being hollow, repetitive, extremist, unfocused, and unrealistic.³⁴

Even worse was the Muslim public's addiction to lengthy, repetitive, and ineffective preaching, this reflecting the chaotic nature of religious preaching and teaching.³⁵ Worse, speakers' incompetence was making it less likely that *du'āt* would inspire their audiences.³⁶ Specifically, religious speeches known in Sufi circles as sermons of the divine drunkenness (*khutab al-sukr al-ilāhī*) or sermons of the divine wine (*khutab al-khamr al-'ilāhiyah*) only prompt ambiguous religious feelings, having no connection whatsoever with Islamic reality nor the currently distressing conditions of Muslims.³⁷ The overall situation was further being worsened by storytelling undertaken at the expense of religion. According to al-Ghazali, throughout Muslim history, storytellers have gratified the public and satiated their wishes, and it was deplorable that preachers had revived this type of religious storytelling (*al-qaṣaṣ al-dīnī*), and were applying it to their lectures and seminars.³⁸ Al-Ghazali suggests that even if the public was satisfied with obsolete stories and disliked investigation and precision, *du'āt* still have a responsibility to raise the level of public understanding, instead of joining in their decline.³⁹

At the core of religious preaching, however, lies the question of the state of the Friday sermons (*khutab al-jumu'ah*).⁴⁰ Friday sermons, in al-Ghazali's view, should address both mundane and eternal life, peace and conflict, wealth and poverty, the individual and the group, and body and spirit. In addition, Friday sermons should tackle aspects of the human condition, including loneliness, work, family, and law.⁴¹ More specifically, Friday sermons should include the following elements: brevity and cohesiveness, logical sequence, attention to current events, contemporary conditions, and respective audience. Friday sermons should dispose of weak and fabricated reports and avoid controversial questions or traditions that give immense reward for minor deeds. Instead they should focus on illustrating the moral and social aspects of Islam, as well as the cultural and

political contributions made by early Muslims. They should also explore and illustrate the meanings attached to goodness and evil, examine the diverse trends associated with atheism, deal with the psychological effects of alien philosophies, and ensure they have safe emotional and social effects upon the listeners.⁴²

In contrast to such excellence, however, are preachers who deliver memorized sermons without paying attention to the conditions of their respective audiences, and who mix up several topics without any thematic unity.⁴³ For al-Ghazali, most religious speakers, particularly in mosques, fail to convey the truth of Islam or properly address their audiences.⁴⁴ This happens when religious speakers are preoccupied with the delivery of memorized sermons.⁴⁵ Dead statements devoid of any spirit are not Islamic sermons; in effect, people listen to these non-sermons, then leave the mosque not knowing the subject of the speakers' lecture.⁴⁶

Friday sermons, however, play a vital role within the broad spectrum of *da'wah*. Al-Ghazali's discussion raises the need for effective styles of religious communication, and reflects an ambition to improve the delivery of *da'wah* through competent *du'āt*. His theoretical model, however, is probably difficult to achieve, given the many problems of society, culture and education which surround *da'wah*. According to al-Ghazali, the problems affecting preaching mean that traditional methods of religious transmission are inadequate in modern times, and that intelligent dialogue and the demonstration of life in the form of stories, jokes, or cartoons have become effective tools in religious transmission.⁴⁷ For example, a broadcast about the oneness of God could be aided by a magnificent image of the universe and a brief demonstration of how science leads to faith.⁴⁸

Alongside the traditional form of religious preaching, al-Ghazali alludes to what he termed *al-I'lām al-da'awī* (*da'wah* information). This is an honest transmission of the message, committed to the spread of the truth and support for the welfare of humanity.⁴⁹ For him, the media that advocates truth and

peace, inadvertently conveys the teachings of Islam in many ways.⁵⁰

This discussion brings al-Ghazali back to the question of *du'at*'s competency. A few of them are proficient at *da'wah*.⁵¹ Good preachers are good *du'at*, that is, well versed in divine revelation and the problems of life and its tribulations,⁵² and do not simply act as instruments of transmission – their duty is not fulfilled once they convey religious texts to their audience.⁵³ A competent preacher according to al-Ghazali epitomizes a successful *dā'iyyah*. Had al-Ghazali provided us with a concrete example of successful religious preachers, we would probably have acquired a better idea of preaching in modern times. In fact he only describes al-Banna's preaching style as unique and influential yet does not provide any details other than an apparent emotional attachment.

Al-Ghazali seems to be more concerned with the effect of modern preaching on the approach to *da'wah*. In his writing, the differences between *da'wah*, preaching, and professional careers has caused some Muslims to perceive *da'wah* as limited to religious preaching, dressing in a particular way, or making day visits to a neighboring village. And this perception has led to a disassociation from society, schooling, and academic pursuit. According to al-Ghazali, there are Muslims who use the pretext of *da'wah* to quit academic careers, regarding *da'wah* as more important, under the impression that their specialties are entirely different to the field of *da'wah*. But, for al-Ghazali, *da'wah* is present in all careers and specialties, or as he states: "Just like *da'wah* opposes their current situations, these Muslims could not translate *da'wah* through their academic specialties and expertise, or set up effective social pulpits."⁵⁴

On another note, al-Ghazali believed that the Friday *khuṭbah* was analogous to the establishment of a hospital for a physician, the building of a road or a bridge for the engineer, and excellence in governmental affairs for the minister.⁵⁵ Al-Ghazali's understanding of the relationship between work and *da'wah* including

the Friday sermon is based on the all inclusive nature of *daʿwah*. *Daʿwah* involves all the disciplines people require to discover their *raison d'être* and the sign posts of guidance.⁵⁶ Hence, *duʿāt* should undertake a comprehensive movement of reform, one that connects Muslims' past to their present, and helps them understand their position, mission, and the surrounding hostility to them.⁵⁷ This he supports through divine ordinances that commanded Prophet Muhammad to undertake *daʿwah* comprehensively and in an all-encompassing way.⁵⁸

Whether giving attention to the Qur'an as a framework for *daʿwah* or looking at the compliance of *daʿwah* with the requirements of the law, al-Ghazali demonstrates a genuine interest in understanding and applying an effective Islamic approach to *daʿwah*. His approach to *daʿwah* involves the requirements and implications of revelation, yet is not simply a set of theoretical assumptions; rather, it involves reinforcement of the moral characters of *duʿāt*. Lacking those moral competences simply defeats *daʿwah*, and causes suspicion among outreached communities. For al-Ghazali, the approach to *daʿwah* is interwoven with the personal make up of *duʿāt*, and is geared to producing proper and effective religious understanding. It is attentive to the fundamentals of Islam, not to trivial questions, is realistic because it deals with social problems, and is open for improvement. Al-Ghazali's discussion also shows a serious preoccupation with an effective delivery method and style for *daʿwah*. He gives attention to the context of *daʿwah* and the position of the receptive intellect. He also points to the need for *duʿāt* to intelligently hone their skills as a necessary step for an effective and comprehensive transmission of the religious message.

[II] *Daʿwah* Legal Methodology (*Fiqh al-Daʿwah*)

Whether understood as broad-based reform, the individual or collective transmission of Islam, developing positive role models, or religious preaching, the development of *daʿwah* continually

searches for Islamic legitimacy. This search constantly solicits legal rulings through interpretations of religious texts so as to justify, support, or enrich *da'wah* progress. For al-Ghazali, this begins as a proactive approach, forcing the law to serve the needs and challenges of *da'wah*. It's an approach which appears to be both challenging and complex, given the diverse interpretations of the law, the various Muslim schools and philosophies underlying the strategies of Islamic change, and more importantly, the constantly changing environment surrounding *da'wah*.

In his own case, al-Ghazali exercised independent reasoning concerning both *da'wah* and law, first delving into the problem of *da'wah* and how it should be understood, approached and undertaken, and secondly, addressing the question of the law and how it should be interpreted and applied to serve the best interest of *da'wah*.⁵⁹ Al-Ghazali underscores the need to comply with and sustain the goals of *da'wah*. For this he had to wear the twin hats of both jurist and theoretician in relation to *da'wah* – a challenging and unsafe position, vulnerable to misinterpretation and manipulation. To assess his stance we need to evaluate first al-Ghazali's scholarly credentials, and whether he was a jurist-consult, a thinker, or a *dā'iyyah*. This will help locate his competence in integrating *da'wah* with law, and reveal the nature of the *da'wah* lens he used when discussing legal problems. So, in sum how did al-Ghazali approach Islamic jurisprudence through the problems and challenges of *da'wah*?⁶⁰ What scholarly credentials are required in the integration of law and *da'wah*? And do al-Ghazali's legal interpretations reflect any original understanding of the law or are they simply arbitrary, speculative and superficial renderings?

Muslim scholars and thinkers have viewed al-Ghazali's overall contribution to the field of Islamic thought differently. Uways, for example, regards al-Ghazali as a leading modern *dā'iyyah*, rather than a jurist or a hadith expert. He mentions that some hoped al-Ghazali would have devoted his intellectual and literary talents to *da'wah* without delving into the problems of

jurisprudence or hadith; this resulting from the belief that al-Ghazali's strengths lay more in the field of Islamic reform and *da'wah* in particular.⁶¹ Why the focus on Islamic reform and *da'wah*? Because this is manifest in al-Ghazali's works which address contemporary issues in Islamic thought, culture, society, *da'wah* and reform. His work *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Hadith*, however, formed his most extensive thesis on legal discussions.⁶² Malkawi views al-Ghazali as a man of *da'wah* per se,⁶³ who despite his fine qualities in writing, rhetoric, research, and independent thought, adopted *da'wah* as a favorite topic.⁶⁴ For Huwayni, although al-Ghazali is a distinguished *da'iyyah* of modern times, and probably the best to have presented Islamic issues with enthusiasm,⁶⁵ his discussion of questions of law nevertheless is extremely poor.⁶⁶ Sultan whilst appreciating al-Ghazali's contributions to *da'wah* and thought, disqualifies him from being a jurist or a hadith expert, because Islamic jurisprudence and hadith are sophisticated academic disciplines requiring specific, not a broad type of thought.⁶⁷

Indeed, al-Ghazali's own personal accounts reveal the study of Islamic jurisprudence to be neither his subject of interest nor area of specialization. Mostly inclined towards interdisciplinary studies and a broader perspective to learning, he writes: "I do not enjoy Islamic jurisprudence much and am uncomfortable with it. I had to revisit its study because of the many problems I encountered concerning *da'wah*, and the legal opinions about to destroy it."⁶⁸ In revisiting Islamic jurisprudence then al-Ghazali sought to solve pressing problems which, in his view, impeded *da'wah* and negatively affected his model of it. This demonstrates that his study of law in regards to *da'wah* was simply a practical strategy with little attention paid to the formulation of a systematic methodology of *da'wah* thought. This is apparent in many of his juristic preferences, which fail to supply a consistent application of the law or a systematic methodology on the question of its integration with *da'wah*.

Al-Ghazali's legal qualifications should not, however, be

underestimated, for his broad legal perspective gave him a good insight into the many inter-related problems surrounding law in modern societies. For example, in al-Qaradawi's opinion, al-Ghazali understood well the objectives of the Shari'ah, and was capable of connecting secondary legal rulings to their principles and deducing essential questions from their texts.⁶⁹ Even if al-Ghazali were not a jurist (*faqīh*) or a transmitter of traditions (*muḥaddith*), per se, his discussions of legal questions shows a good understanding of the development of Islamic law, and how Islamic disciplines should be approached and applied. Al-Ghazali determined his position towards Muslim schools of law. He only advocated the Qur'an and the Sunnah,⁷⁰ and gave no preference whatsoever for a particular juristic opinion over another. This implies that *da'wah* should be undertaken for Islam and not for schools of law.⁷¹ On the other hand, he condemns the emulation (*taqlīd*) of schools by Muslim scholars.⁷² In particular, scholars should meet certain educational requirements, attain the stage of inquiry and the weighing of evidence (*al-nazar wa al-tarjīh*), exert independent reasoning, and select legal opinions appropriate for their time and condition.⁷³

Al-Ghazali also discusses the effects of legal differences on *da'wah*. For him legal disagreements should not hinder *da'wah*.⁷⁴ Al-Ghazali's concern was that Islamic jurisprudence should serve *da'wah* and that legal verdicts should not drive non-Muslims away from Islam, nor repel wrongdoers from guidance.⁷⁵ By contrast he rejects any independent reasoning that jeopardizes *da'wah*.⁷⁶ Instead of adhering to Islamic fundamental tenets, Muslims have adopted legal opinions that cause people to turn away from the religion.⁷⁷ Part of the problem lies with the legal verdicts (fatwas) that are issued for certain regions and are transmitted worldwide even when they could be detrimental to *da'wah*.⁷⁸ To solve this problem, *du'āt* should adopt the legal opinions of the majority.⁷⁹ This requires *du'āt* to understand the laws and strategies supporting legal preferences, which correspond to the particular questions under discussion.⁸⁰ Al-Ghazali

for example questions the reasons which lead Muslims to lay stress on trivialities, which either drive people away from the path of God or portray Islam as hideous.⁸¹ As a result, he had to re-examine certain legal questions with regards to their support of, or damage to *daʿwah*, and sought a practical selection of juristic preferences to maintain a rational and intelligible presentation of the law in the process of *daʿwah*.

Al-Ghazali lays out a broad framework for the relationship between law and *daʿwah*, yet always with serious attention given to *daʿwah*'s best interests. For example, he discusses the legal ruling on the prohibition of music, believing this should not impede faith. He felt this to be particularly true of western societies in relation to which questions of music/song,⁸² or the covering of women's faces should not be raised in the course of *daʿwah*.⁸³ Al-Ghazali even doubts whether Islam will ever prosper given some legal verdicts which prohibit western forms of attire, the uncovering of women's faces, music, or women's attendance at mosques.⁸⁴ His juristic preferences in the propagation of Islam were those held hitherto within the territories of Sunni Schools of law, including the legal opinions of Ibn Ḥazm.

Al-Ghazali felt that in relation to western societies, *daʿwah* should intelligently take into consideration context and not fall victim to naïve speech. Only legal rulings closer to the cultural context of people should be selected.⁸⁵ Islam's image was often of great concern to al-Ghazali particularly when Muslims traveling to the West raised legal issues such as women's invalidation of the Muslim prayer (see note for explanation of the latter),⁸⁶ not taking into account the fact that in western societies women enjoy independence and personal freedom. For instance, in western societies women can undertake their own marriage contracts. Taking this into consideration thus, al-Ghazali requires *duʿāt* not to force Mālik or Ibn Ḥanbal's legal opinion on the matter when Abū Ḥanīfah's would accommodate the culture.⁸⁷ Muslims should not for example exhort European women to have a guardian when their own social customs in relation to

marriage do not require the presence of one. And, in similar vein, where societies do require a guardian Muslims should abide by this. Islamic law is in favor of each preference.⁸⁸ Such an application of the law does not appear to be any of al-Ghazali's concern, and was not at all addressed in his discussion. His major concern was simply to select juristic preferences harmonious with the socio-cultural practices of the West so as to assure a correct, positive, bright and encouraging perception of Islam.

Al-Ghazali's preoccupation with the question of *da'wah* and law did not preclude him from critically reviewing those Muslim attitudes causing suspicion. This state of affairs does not draw people to Islam or motivate them towards it.⁸⁹ Examples include certain *du'āt* in the UK raising questions over appointing women to public office instead of occupying themselves with questions of belief, the emotional and social implications of religious monotheism, the divine perfection, human weakness, and the hereafter.⁹⁰ He points to *du'āt* travelling to other, and perhaps also troubled regions, to then raise issues of immodest clothing, Islamic law versus the divine reality (*al-sharī'ah wa al-ḥaqīqah*), the weaknesses of Muslim schools of law, unlawful external appearance,⁹¹ or people's attachment to graves.⁹² For example, *du'āt* should not jeopardize Islamic progress through discussions on the prohibition of consuming certain foods which are culturally accepted in certain countries.⁹³

Other examples include adherence to the Sunnah by way of sitting down while drinking, dressing in traditional attire, or eating with hands instead of using utensils.⁹⁴ Al-Ghazali felt that certain practices of Tablighī Jamā'at *du'āt* such as eating together from a single plate, could cause westerners to view these acts as being Islamic, or lead them to lose interest in Islam.⁹⁵ Al-Ghazali does not explain why such practices could possibly cause a negative impression on western people, nor on what grounds he basis his frustrations on. As we are given no objective criteria to assess the impact of such actions on *da'wah*'s progress could it be, and as it appears, acts which al-Ghazali believes westerners would

find off putting are simply those which he himself has taken a personal dislike to, including dressing in traditional attire, and eating communally?

To support his selective approach, al-Ghazali hypothetically contends that if westerners were to embrace Islam, provided the women are allowed to testify concerning cases of human life and honor (*al-shahādah fī al-dimā' wa al-'a'rāḍ*) or are permitted to occupy public office, then based on the principle of legal flexibility and the broad scope of *ijtihād*, and in view of the public need for security,⁹⁶ they should choose the opinion of Ibn Ḥazm.⁹⁷ Al-Ghazali describes his approach to juristic differences, how he explores legal evidences with objectivity to select only those which reflect the strongest evidence (*yaqā'u fī nafsīhi anna dalīlahu aqwā*). His selection, however, revolves around two essential questions: what is easy for people, and what serves the best interests of *da'wah* in various societies and times.⁹⁸ When legal evidences are conflicting, and the opinions of legal experts are many, al-Ghazali gives himself the right to choose a fatwa, select one evidence over another, and choose what is more convenient for people and so solve their problems more easily.⁹⁹ Al-Ghazali asks:

Why should we jeopardize the Islamic faith through strict adherence to Muslim schools of law? We should rather expand the scope of Islamic jurisprudence without necessarily abandoning the texts of the religion. In their approach to controversial questions, *du'āt* should select legal rulings that best suit the needs of *da'wah*.¹⁰⁰

Al-Ghazali adopts a selective approach to the law,¹⁰¹ and selects legal rulings that sustain the infusion of Islam into the hearts of people. He exhorts *du'āt* to apply legal ease (*al-tawsi'ah al-fiqhiyyah*) in the selection of legal opinions to support *da'wah* instead of jeopardizing the progress of Islam through rigid juristic preferences.¹⁰² Muslim converts in particular, should not be invited to adopt a particular school of law, rather, they should be

free to choose legal rulings.¹⁰³ The problem, however, is not so much about the principle of legal selection than an understanding of the best interests of *da'wah* and the very process of selection. Without knowing first what those interests are, and what criteria we should adopt to infer those interests, any process of legal selection becomes hopeless. More important are the academic requirements involved in both the process of determining those interests and the process of juristic selections.

Al-Ghazali's approach to Islamic law did not escape scholarly critique. Sultan, for example, questions al-Ghazali's application of subjective deduction and argues that when revelation is taken as the ultimate source of law, the traditions of the prophets are not strange, and cause no bypassing of religious precepts.¹⁰⁴ For Sultan, adopting legal opinions for their correspondence with western customs, and disregarding their authentic application, is detrimental to the legal rulings of Islam. Westerners, according to him, should rather be invited to learn about Islamic rulings which reflect the guidance of the Prophet.¹⁰⁵ One way to understand al-Ghazali's legal selections, according to al-Sawwa, is to understand his various legal preferences in light of his legal methodology. Al-Ghazali's preferences include an alignment with the public interest (*al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah*),¹⁰⁶ advocacy of democracy when tyranny is the norm, and his consent to aspects of socialism when economic exploitation is prevailing.¹⁰⁷ Sultan describes al-Ghazali's methodology as rational, one which discounts the methodology of *Ahl al-Sunnah*, and as a mis-interpretation of religious and legal rulings pertaining to the relationship of Muslims with non-Muslims.¹⁰⁸

For Kashk however, al-Ghazali's approach to Hadith is arbitrary, and is primarily concerned with a presentation of Islam which yields a positive reaction in the West. This, according to Kashk, caused al-Ghazali to pay little attention to authentic reports, and to rely on personal judgments and preferences, and to also reject solitary reports (*āḥād*), and subject the traditions (hadith) to the satisfaction of those in the West.¹⁰⁹ Kashk's

criticism, however, is hardly sustainable, especially when al-Ghazali repeatedly appeals for faithfulness to God and preservation of Muslim values, and is critical of the western lifestyle and its cultural invasion (*al-ghazw al-thaqāfī*).¹¹⁰ For Huwayni, when al-Ghazali encounters two legal opinions, he chooses that which is closer to the desires of people. This is based on the notion that every *Mujtahid* is correct, and that it is permissible to search for dispensations (*rukhaṣ*)¹¹¹ in Muslim schools of law.¹¹² Al-Ghazali for instance argues that a certain tradition of ‘Ā’ishah’s is weak in terms of its chain of transmission (*sanad*), and is not strong evidence for the covering of women’s faces.¹¹³ Huwayni states: “Ghazali should have shown the weakness in the hadith, and whether it can acquire further strength.”¹¹⁴ For al-Ghazali, ‘Ā’ishah’s tradition is also irregular (*shādh*) in terms of the text (*matn*). Huwayni responds: “This is a false allegation. Based on al-Ghazali’s definition of irregularity (*shudhūdh*) as being the disagreement of a credible with a more credible narrator, I then request al-Ghazali to substantiate the irregularity in the hadith. Al-Ghazali will eventually find no way to it except through usual allegation.”¹¹⁵

For Huwayni, al-Ghazali’s argument was that when the meaning of a hadith was found to be in total concordance with the Qur’an or a tradition, he then narrated and wrote it down.¹¹⁶ Following this understanding, al-Ghazali views many hadiths as defective, including those which were not determined as defective by hadith experts or jurists. Huwayni argues that al-Ghazali uses the term *muḥaqqiqīn* (established scholars) to persuade his readers. Yet his understanding of defectiveness (‘*illah*) is poor. For Huwayni, al-Ghazali should, however, be excused because he was not an expert in the field of Hadith.¹¹⁷ For ‘Abd al-Maṣṣud, what led al-Ghazali to reject authentic hadiths or allege their weakness was the pretext that they did not fit with the general context (*al-siyāq al-‘āmm*), his understanding of the religion or the strategies of *da‘wah*.¹¹⁸ For ‘Abd al-Maṣṣud, al-Ghazali’s rejection of hadith is also based on the following notions: (a)

jurists and not *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* are able to discover defects in hadith, (b) defects in hadith occur when a hadith goes against the obvious meaning of the Qur'an (*ẓāhir*), and c) Muslim belief cannot be sustained through single tradition (*al-khabar al-wāḥid*).¹¹⁹ ʿAbd al-Maqsud also believes that the following factors affected al-Ghazali's method of hadith scrutiny: (a) al-Ghazali's state of religious doubt in his early life, which caused him to lose trust in Muslim traditions and heritage, (b) the influence of modern rational schools on his thought, (c) the influence of orientalist, and (d) western influences, which led him to search for dispensations (*rukhaṣ*) in order to endorse their customs even when they were opposite to Islam.¹²⁰

Al-Ghazali's legal methodology for *da'wah*, nonetheless, shows a profound preoccupation with the reactions of western societies vis-à-vis Muslim practices, as shown in his worry over western impressions of political refugees escaping the Muslim world.¹²¹ Al-Ghazali's concern regarding the interest of *da'wah* and his dream for a positive reaction from outreached people caused him to adopt considerable numbers of weak reports (*aḥādīth ḍa'īfah*).¹²² Al-Ghazali preferred weaker legal opinions to established opinions on issues of women's dress code, their testimony, and appointment to public office.¹²³ As noted above, al-Ghazali was concerned with how interpretations of the law should not jeopardize the progress of *da'wah*. For example, he discusses Maryam Jamilah's description of the great esteem Europe has for musicians and dramatists, in terms of Islamic progress stating: "What alternative should I provide to these societies? Should I, based on weak or fabricated hadith, request westerners to ignore the arts altogether? And should I request them to leave out their beliefs while raising hurdles [to Islam] like music and songs?"¹²⁴ This, however, is a *da'wah*-oriented argument, not a systematic approach to Islamic law or the adoption of a particular legal opinion. Sultan criticizes al-Ghazali's view regarding western arts:

This is a strange discussion of *daʿwah* methods... The worldviews, principles, message, and values of Islam and the West are different. Islam transforms new Muslims and re-models their ways of learning, guidance, and laws.¹²⁵ In modern times, western stars who convert to Islam leave behind their western view of arts as was the case with Yusuf Islam.¹²⁶

In his book, *Ḥiwār Ḥādī' maʿa Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* (A Calm Discussion with M. al-Ghazali), ʿAwdah argues that the problem with al-Ghazali lies in the question of whether his preference for specific legal opinions over others was the result of a compromising approach to western conventions and ways of life. According to him, al-Ghazali let the influences of law affect his legal selections.¹²⁷ Al-Ghazali's juristic preferences are not supported by evidence from the Qur'an or hadith, nor are his legal inferences supported by established principles.¹²⁸ His preoccupation with presenting a bright and cheerful image of Islam affected all of his later works, and could be considered a slippery slope leading to a disregard concerning established legal and religious questions.¹²⁹ They represent the upshot of a preoccupation not to weaken the religion in the face of conventional laws or social customs.¹³⁰ For some, al-Ghazali's compromises in order to accommodate western intellectual and social aspects almost afflicted harm to the authority of the Shari'ah.¹³¹ His approach to the law was even viewed by some as detrimental to the education of Muslim youth, and his works were regarded as no less harmful than Abu Rayyah's.¹³² Al-Ghazali was also blamed for not clearly and straightforwardly addressing social problems, or giving insightful attention to the emotional and religious formation of Muslim youth, the claim being that he was rather interested in satisfying deviant concessions.¹³³

In spite of these criticisms, we should, however, acknowledge al-Ghazali's full and complete adherence to the authority of the religious text, without by-passing the fundamentals of the religion. Most of al-Ghazali's legal interpretations revolved around issues of Sunnah practices, legal permissibility (*al-ibāḥah*) or

desirability (*al-nadb*), which in the usual exercise of *ijtihād* should not have caused such intense and over-reacting criticism. The bitter disparagement of some scholars and *du'āt*, however, demonstrates an increasing degree of irritation with al-Ghazali, particularly by *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*, who were mostly concerned with the potential harm al-Ghazali's perspective on *da'wah* could cause, in terms of the damage the interpretations could bring to Islam. The best way al-Ghazali's opponents could undermine his popularity was to cast doubt on his scholarly credibility, and one way they did so was to describe him as a "*dā'iyyah*" or a thinker, stripping him of any juristic title.

Criticism of al-Ghazali's methodology, however, was not so much concerned with his application of the principle of interest in *da'wah*, as it was more with his speculation as to what might be detrimental or supportive. The act of enjoining good and forbidding evil¹³⁴ for example involves the principle of considering the public interest (*maṣlahah*), and requires due consideration of surrounding factors. Such consideration however varies according to one's personality as well as social and cultural upbringing. Al-Ghazali's principle of best-interest-of-*da'wah* (*maṣlahah al-da'wah*) aims to enhance effective religious progress, this required him to re-interpret related religious texts in a way that would serve the purpose of *da'wah*.

Notwithstanding, al-Ghazali's approach to the interest of *da'wah* raises many crucial problems since it does not adhere to a coherently built approach. His juristic preferences do not follow a systematic legal methodology. They rather show the influence of certain opinions, such as the need to comply with international laws or avoid conflict with people's lifestyles. Those juristic preferences reflect certain pressures, as they appear to be affected by personal feelings, and by an anticipation of others' reactions to Muslim religious or customary practices. What appears to have deeply affected al-Ghazali's approach is an engrained sense of needing to satisfy the recipients of *da'wah*, giving them a breezily light and cheerful presentation of Islam in the hope they would

eventually accept the faith. Yet al-Ghazali only speculates as to what western taste and what western reaction would actually be on interaction with Muslim practices and attitudes.

Al-Ghazali's work nonetheless provides a courageous exploration of the contemporary problems afflicting *da'wah* both internally and externally. One can only surmise that al-Ghazali's efforts, although in a stage of infancy, nevertheless broke the tense silence which had hitherto surrounded the association of *da'wah* with the law, and initiated the foundations of modern discourse on *da'wah*, law, and Islamic progress. He also charted a new way of analysis, which exhorted Muslims to give due attention to the cultural and religious manifestations associated with the phenomena of *da'wah*, especially in western societies, and to the reality of the relationship of Muslim societies with humanity in general.

[III] Women and *Da'wah*

The issue of women often arises in discussions of Islamic reform. Al-Ghazali's examination of the role of women in *da'wah* cannot be separated from the general question of their contribution to Muslim social and political life. Al-Ghazali re-examines some theoretical assumptions concerning women, because detrimental cultural perceptions and customs in relation to women have negatively affected women's position and contribution, all in the name of Islam. Al-Ghazali repeatedly discussed the issue of cultural infiltration creeping into religious interpretation, the failure of *du'āt* in their approach to the question of women, and the need to re-visit legal perspectives concerning various questions involving women. For al-Ghazali, a genuine understanding of the issue of women assures a proper approach with regard to their contribution to modern societies.

Al-Ghazali defended the position of women as early as the 1950s in a book entitled *Min Hunā Na'lam* (From Here we Know), and continued this defence through his writing and

lectures.¹³⁵ However, he appears to have shifted attention to a religious context when, concerning women, he advocates a change and a return to the fundamental tenets of Islam. In his book *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* (The Sunnah of the Prophet), al-Ghazali discusses several legal problems, including Muslim women's dress (*ḥijāb*), covering of face (*niqāb*), family responsibilities, spirituality, and social role. This section examines al-Ghazali's perspectives on women's role in social and political life, impediments to their participation in the latter, as well as al-Ghazali's contribution to the question of women and *da'wah*.

It must be borne in mind that al-Ghazali echoed prevailing debate regarding the emancipation of woman (*tahrīr al-mar'ah*) in the Arab and Muslim world at the time. As noted earlier, al-Ghazali was born into a conservative family in a rural setting. He remembered, for instance, women frequenting markets, helping with planting, irrigation, and harvests etc. Women could not attend prayers in local mosques because certain traditions had forbidden their attendance. They were moreover not allowed to attend school because of a false tradition (*riwāyah maghlūṭah*) which required them to stay illiterate.¹³⁶ Thus locked in their homes,¹³⁷ the four walls of their houses became the limit of their thought and activity.¹³⁸

In addition, women did not exercise any cultural or political role, held no positions, played no part in the development of the educational curriculum or social system, and had no place in mosques or in any field of struggle. To mention a woman's name was a disgrace, to see her face was prohibited, to hear her voice was considered taboo – in fact her only real roles involved the kitchen and bedroom.¹³⁹ Al-Ghazali argued that the Qur'an's teachings regarding women were being totally ignored. Women rarely received their shares of inheritance, were seldom consulted with regards to their marriage,¹⁴⁰ and were humiliated and left in ignorance by uneducated religious people.¹⁴¹ As a result, they had forgot their religious duties and responsibilities in life¹⁴² and ignored special or public affairs – even the effective education of

children.¹⁴³ Sadly, they were imitating also western style of attire and appearance and were oblivious to questions of science and exploration.¹⁴⁴

According to al-Ghazali, social and cultural customs such as these have contributed significantly to women's lowered status, for instance denying women their economic rights¹⁴⁵ due to the Muslim obsession with associating cultural custom and opinion with the body of Islamic belief and law.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, these man-made customs and perceptions have impeded the contribution of women to society, making them insignificant in both life and religion,¹⁴⁷ and in doing so preserving the darkness of ignorance, violating the teachings of Islam, and leading to a decline in the education of women and thereby the whole nation.¹⁴⁸

For al-Ghazali, these customs by weakening the position of women have raised the status of men, constraining women to the realm of physical pleasure. Women's moral position is viewed through the lens of honor, such that i.e. a son's wrongdoing is considered youthful fun, whereas a woman's erroneous action is considered an embarrassment whose implications are serious.

Throughout his work, al-Ghazali was clear on the issue of women. Unjust customs have fundamentally caused women physical and educational poverty as well as incompetence in worldly and religious life. They have also generated further customs subjugating women.¹⁴⁹ And he saw these customs as the by-product of regions highly attached to local traditions, and only familiar with abandoned or rejected religious narrations (*riwāyāt matrūkah aw munkarah*).¹⁵⁰ For example, one particular fabricated report prohibited women from learning to write whilst another disallowed them from seeing men, and vice versa. Narrations which, according to al-Ghazali, deprived women of an education.¹⁵¹ Specifically, it was men who caused women's decline. This conclusion forms part of al-Ghazali's criticism of Muslim jurists and preachers who, through their religious interpretations, endorsed women's subjugation. Moreover, it was men's misunderstanding and misapplication of Islam which

caused the backwardness of the entire Muslim community including women.¹⁵² Some men cloaked their personal desires in the name of religion, and alleged false traditions prohibiting women from seeing men and men from seeing women.¹⁵³ Some religious people drove women from worldly and religious life. For al-Ghazali, these attitudes survived and rested on fabricated or weakly-supported traditions, odd interpretations (*ta'wīlāt shādhdhah*) of the Qur'an, and a state of ignorance, worse, in al-Ghazali's view, than the first pre-Islamic era of ignorance (*al-jāhiliyyah al-'ulā*).¹⁵⁴

To illustrate some of these negative manifestations in modern times, including their far-reaching consequences, al-Ghazali draws on the example of *du'āt* in Algeria who caused protests by feminists against Muslim family laws in 1984. These *du'āt* depicted women as primarily responsible for giving birth to men, maintaining that elementary education far exceeded women's educational needs and that they were to remain illiterate or at most allowed to learn basic mathematical notions.¹⁵⁵ Other *du'āt* elsewhere encouraged women to stay indoors and not leave their homes, save on their marriage. On this occasion, al-Ghazali refers to the position of a well-known but unnamed *dā'iyyah*, who astonishingly held the view that women were only to leave their homes for their husbands or their graves. His point of reference being a report stating that a woman during the time of the Prophet Muhammed had sought her husband's permission to visit her father on his death-bed. Her husband had refused. Soon after her father's death, she again asked her husband's permission to attend the funeral procession and be with her family. Her husband again refused. Upon hearing her story, the Prophet Muhammad is supposedly to have said: "God forgave your father because of your obedience to your husband."¹⁵⁶ Al-Ghazali argues that this report is not authentic and contrary to Islam because it undermines God's commands to maintain the bonds of family and the rights of parents.

Similar examples have led to Islam being perceived as a set of

draconian laws causing and perpetuating women's detention, ignorance, and humiliation, with women's contribution to knowledge, worship, and social life as something not worth consideration.¹⁵⁷ Al-Ghazali objects that men ignorant of Islam have played false with its true message, violating women's right to worship,¹⁵⁸ denying them a right to education, and rejecting any contribution they might have made to support the good, or struggle against falsehood and evil.¹⁵⁹ Al-Ghazali questioned the increasingly artificial impediments facing women, which placed believing women in discomfort, and resulted in jeopardy for *da'wah*.¹⁶⁰ And all this he complained despite the clear and universal teachings of the Prophet, which encouraged women to acquire education,¹⁶¹ secure positions in mosques to elevate their spirituality, and develop an understanding of society with a view to effecting its moral betterment.¹⁶²

As stated, the spread of these false customs was harming people's understanding of Islam which was being viewed as a source of women's humiliation and oppression. Al-Ghazali asks: "Do the Qur'an and Sunnah support this allegation?"¹⁶³ And in answer argues that Islam views both men and women as equal with regards to their rights, responsibilities,¹⁶⁴ and freedoms.¹⁶⁵ This is drawn from the following two Qur'anic verses "And their Lord hath accepted of them, and answered them: Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he male or female: You are members, one of another,"¹⁶⁶ and "They are your garments and you are their garments." For al-Ghazali, the blending of the existence of men and women makes of them both one single being.¹⁶⁷

Al-Ghazali declares that humanity flies with two wings, and the disruption of one wing is enough to cause global interruption and decline. The solution in his view lies in discarding weak and fabricated reports.¹⁶⁸ Women represent half of the nation, so when they are physically and intellectually handicapped, the second half becomes dysfunctional. This means, for al-Ghazali, that the religious and worldly well-being of women strengthens

their positive status and contribution.¹⁶⁹ Women are partners of men. Seeking knowledge is an obligation on both, and so is their contribution to enjoining good and forbidding evil.¹⁷⁰ Neither does toughness endow men with piety nor does softness reduce women's opportunities for goodness.¹⁷¹ Depriving women of knowledge, education, and worship, or blocking their contribution to society and politics is not a religious act.¹⁷² In many areas, the result has been that the teaching of Islam has shrunk, and so has the relationship between men and women.¹⁷³ Such being the case, al-Ghazali draws on early Muslim history to establish a legitimate gender relationship, to demonstrate how negative practices are contradictory to Islam. Through examination of gender relationships in early Islam he reveals that both Muslim men and women met in the mosque courtyard, during the day and at night, and that they also fought together.¹⁷⁴ According to al-Ghazali, traditions such as these confirm that both men and women performed obligatory prayers in rows at the mosque whilst visible to each other. Women struggled and fought, and provided men with help and support.¹⁷⁵

To criticize current and social cultural practices, al-Ghazali selects the story of Moses in the Qur'an as his counter-example. The Qur'an informs us that Moses leaves Egypt and at some point comes upon a small watering place at which men were watering their animals:

And as he turned his face towards Madyan, he said [to himself]: "It may well be that my Sustainer will [thus] guide me onto the right path." Now when he arrived at the wells of Madyan, he found there a large group of men who were watering [their herds and flocks]; and at some distance from them he came upon two women who were keeping back their flock. He asked [them]: "What is the matter with you?" They answered: "We cannot water [our animals] until the herdsmen drive [theirs] home – for [we are weak and] our father is a very old man." So he watered [their flock] for them; and then he withdrew into the shade and prayed: "O my Sustainer! Verily, in dire need am I of any good which Thou mayest bestow upon me!" (Qur'an 28:22-24)

When the daughters returned home they informed their father of the incident. He was a pious man and sent one of his daughters after Moses as soon as she described his character. The father ultimately expresses his wish to Moses that he marry one of his daughters. Al-Ghazali's comment was that had the father been from one of Egypt's villages, he would not have proposed the marriage but might instead have killed the girl for having described a strange man to him. Al-Ghazali states: "Had her father been one of today's Muslims, he would not have sent his daughter to invite a strange man."¹⁷⁶

Al-Ghazali is clear about what he believed to be the Islamic perspective on women's contribution to religion and society. Women are allowed to acquire public responsibilities (e.g., in government or the judiciary), benefit Islam and the nation, and carry out their duties, together with men. Together, both sexes should serve the broad area of education and knowledge, family, and social relationships.¹⁷⁷ Competent female preachers should teach in mosques because there is a dire need for their instruction.¹⁷⁸ Muslim women are also entitled to carry out *da'wah*, enjoin good and forbid evil, and share the guidance of Islam with others.¹⁷⁹ They should participate in public life.¹⁸⁰ *Da'wah*, for al-Ghazali, needs doctors, engineers, chemists. Both men and women stand equal in this.¹⁸¹

Women are allowed to attend mosques and schools, and to go to other places so long as they are properly dressed.¹⁸² At one point, however, al-Ghazali considered unemployed mothers and wives at home to be better, more devout women, and more honourable spouses, than women employed outside the home.¹⁸³ Al-Ghazali's consistent defence of women's domestic role is due to his conviction that mothers inspire tranquility and love, and help develop decent and good people.¹⁸⁴ Women's domestic role should not be underestimated or considered embarrassing.¹⁸⁵ Later, al-Ghazali realized the need to place women's contribution in a broader context, and to develop relevant ideas in this regard. This led him to better understand the status and role of

women vis-à-vis society. In so doing, he realized the need for a criterion instead of a focus on occupations, and an attention to the fundamentals to which secondary goals are associated.¹⁸⁶

Al-Ghazali's strategy was to provide fresh legal interpretations surrounding the condition of women. He argues, for example, that there is no indisputably authoritative Islamic text requiring women to cover their faces. In contrast, the tradition implies the opposite, the problem being that some jurists issued this fatwa to obstruct immorality.¹⁸⁷ In fact, throughout Islamic history, Muslim women have contributed both their time and wealth and have made significant contributions to religion and society. In illustration al-Ghazali points to Khaznadar, an Egyptian woman who established the faculty of theology in the University of Al-Azhar, and a mosque, an orphanage, and a hospital. She advanced the cause of knowledge, protected worship and orphans, and cared for the sick.¹⁸⁸ Al-Ghazali also witnessed many Muslim women in modern times as successful school principals and talented physicians, who honored their families and their occupations.¹⁸⁹ The condition of women, according to al-Ghazali, will improve even more and to higher levels, especially if intelligent minds and pure hearts draw their understanding from Islam (not customs) and apply that understanding in both social and governmental affairs.¹⁹⁰ Al-Ghazali proposed to deal with women's issues in terms of their knowledge and capabilities and not through reference to their supposed problems of emotionalism, negative moods, jealousy and ignorance of the truth.¹⁹¹

To re-establish the position of women, al-Ghazali considered various interpretations that he believed would produce a fresh understanding, and which would unleash women's potential and capabilities. There is first the issue of men's guardianship (*al-qiwāmah*) mentioned in the Qur'an. "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women."¹⁹² Al-Ghazali saw men's guardianship as a responsibility not an honor and a sacrifice not a dignity. Moreover, the problem of ignorance has engulfed people to

make the relationship of male and female simply physical.¹⁹³ Gender does not make men superior¹⁹⁴ and is irrelevant to questions of advancing or impeding, rewarding or punishing.¹⁹⁵ Despite the principal duty of women to be skilled in home management and care for the family,¹⁹⁶ guardianship does not allow men to be arrogant. A woman might be better than her husband in areas of scholarship, morality and piety.¹⁹⁷ Guardianship (*al-qiwāmah*) should not undermine a woman's freedom, and nor should it lead to men's interference in women's business or property management.¹⁹⁸

Al-Ghazali also considers the tradition making the testimony of two women equaling that of one man. For him, this is simply with regards to gender, women can be forgetful (inundated with familial care for instance) and emotional (especially perhaps during pregnancy and childbirth, and during menstruation). Specifically, anger causes women to easily forget the good deeds of their husbands.¹⁹⁹ In contrast to al-Ghazali, however, some preachers have interpreted *nāqīṣāt* 'aql as women's deficiency of intellect, their sinful nature, and as connoting humiliation for their gender. For al-Ghazali, both styles of interpreting *nāqīṣāt* 'aql are a continuation from the first period of ignorance²⁰⁰ and are unjustifiable in terms of both reason and tradition. For al-Ghazali, women have always been perfect, both in the past and present times, and have greatly contributed to the service of religion and society. For him, such misunderstanding of *nāqīṣāt* 'aql contradicts the Qur'an, which affirms that men and women are created for each other, and also contradicts the tradition of Prophet Muhammad about the partnership of men and women.

Al-Ghazali discusses a number of secondary issues, which highlight his attention to what he viewed as abusive interpretations of scripture in relation to men and women. Thus for instance he discusses hadith commentators' interpretation of the tradition of greeting between men and women, pointing out that they tried their best to ban this form. Over time, their commentaries become authoritative to a point of undermining the very

principle of greeting, replacing it with distorted interpretations. For instance, such commentaries al-Ghazali points out, assert that men can greet women only when a *mahram* is present or if the women are old.²⁰¹ Yet, according to a tradition in al-Bukhārī, Prophet Muhammad allowed men to greet women; and it is reported that he conveyed the greeting of Angel Gabriel to ʿĀ'ishah, saying: "Gabriel greets you with peace."²⁰²

Al-Ghazali dealt with a few other specific legal issues pertaining to the perception of women's status and role in society. In this area, his re-interpretations seek to free women and break down cultural and social barriers affecting their position, movement and role in society. The first of these issues was travel. Al-Ghazali advocates permissibility of women to travel so long as they are safe. He asks: "does the ruling on women's travel change when safety prevails?" Some jurists advocate permissibility with a safe companionship (*rufqah ma'mūnah*) which eliminates worry and suspicion.²⁰³ The second issue was women's voices. Al-Ghazali held that the notion of women's voices being a taboo (*ʿawrah*) led to a false legal verdict against their voices. For him, there is no solid legal ground to this verdict, yet it has acquired authority.²⁰⁴ During the period of Prophet Muhammad women narrated hadith, enjoined good and forbade evil, yet nobody claimed their voices to be taboo. The real taboo, in al-Ghazali's view, is in the voices of both men and women when they speak ill, evil, or in vain.²⁰⁵ The third legal issue concerns hiding women's names. Men were not allowed to mention women's names, whether mothers or wives. For al-Ghazali, Islam should not be held responsible for men's feelings towards women. The Prophet Muhammad publicly called upon Ṣafiyyah and his daughter Faṭimah to believe in God alone.²⁰⁶

In contrast to the illegitimate practices around these three legal issues, the Muslim dress code is central to the discussion of women and their position in society. The Qur'an ordains women to cover themselves and not to show their beauty in public. Al-

Ghazali, however, alluded to a new aspect to the dress code, namely the dress of virtue, which confirms innate human nature. For him, the dress code of Christian nuns is closer to the teachings of Islam, as is the dress code of female farmers in Manufiyyah or Sharqiyyah in Egypt.²⁰⁷ As a result, al-Ghazali calls for adherence to modest forms of dress (*malābis al-faḍīlah*), that are familiar to westerners because they bring justice to Islam and attract lovers of virtue to embrace Islam.²⁰⁸ Al-Ghazali does not advocate a particular style of dress, as much as he advocates modesty and virtue. Modesty and virtue do not isolate women socially, or present them as strange creatures, particularly in western societies. Such an understanding illustrates his interest in satisfying western perceptions and to bridge the cultural, and more importantly, emotional gap. Al-Ghazali's ultimate goal, however, is to support modesty and virtue, while freeing women from excessive juristic probabilities of immorality, separating cultural influences from genuine Islamic practices, and avoiding any drawback or negative impression (especially in western societies) that could impede *da'wah*.

Al-Ghazali exhorts Muslims in the West not to require school girls to veil their faces because this requirement would destroy *da'wah*, and drive people away from the religion.²⁰⁹ He also views the ruling of face veiling as being not a means to obstruct immorality, but only adopted in periods of the Muslims' intellectual weakness and general civilizational decline. To deal with this problem, al-Ghazali proposes a complete and all-encompassing education on the virtues required of both men and women. This should be based on traditions originating from obvious, not from ambiguous or controversial texts (*nuṣūṣ mutashābihah aw mukhtalaf fihā*).²¹⁰ Besides, some Muslim scholars regard the ruling of veiling the face as a weak or alternative opinion (*ḍa'īf aw marjūh*).²¹¹

The contribution of women also includes their testimonies. Although the tradition in question considers the testimony of a woman as half that of a man,²¹² al-Ghazali argues that the safety

of the public requires consideration of their testimonies.²¹³ The appointment of women to public office is also relevant. Al-Ghazali draws on the example of the UK, which under the leadership of women has achieved economic prosperity and political stability. Al-Ghazali wonders: "Where then is the loss in appointing a woman as a governor?"²¹⁴ And what does gender have to do with this?" For al-Ghazali, western societies are free to elect or appoint women as governors, judges, ministers, or ambassadors, and should not be told that such elections or appointments are prohibited, especially when juristic opinions allow for the election and appointment of women.²¹⁵

In sum, for al-Ghazali, religion will not progress in the West or elsewhere so long as *du'āt* continue to depict Islam as neglecting or dismissing women's testimony, even in cases of public safety, that women cannot contribute to public office, or that their election or appointment is prohibited.

The issue of women's education, knowledge, worship, and social and political roles, is crucial to *da'wah*.²¹⁶ Al-Ghazali discussed women's religious discourse in a much broader context examining generally relevant traditions and addressing the religious foundations (*al-uṣūl*) required to separate them from personal opinion, or opinions resulting from foreign influence, as well as from local or regional customs (*a'rāf*).

In an essay entitled "Ma'rakah al-Ḥijāb" (The Battle of the *Hijāb*), al-Ghazali exhorts contemporary Muslim movements to avoid the mistakes and factors leading to the Muslim world's decline and insignificant global influence today, and to produce once again a positive image of Islam, faithful to the original which had eliminated doubt, brought justice to the revelation, and attracted those who witnessed it.²¹⁷

Throughout his extensive discussion of women's position and role, al-Ghazali recognized the problem of finding a conceptual framework, arguing that it is an open question because implementing parts of the religion whilst the whole is absent does not lead to the development of an Islamic society. Issuing legal ver-

dicts (fatwas) for instant pressing cases, whilst ignoring their surrounding circumstances, affects both the religion and society – not always positively.²¹⁸ Accordingly, for al-Ghazali, rulings concerning the social role of women form only a part of a contemporary inoperative Islamic whole.²¹⁹ Hence, obstructing immorality should be carried out through a positive approach without necessarily causing hardship or constraint. Education in its broadest sense remedies such backwardness and decline.²²⁰

Several factors appear to have underscored al-Ghazali's discussion of women's contribution to the intellectual-educational and socio-political arenas. These first include the character of modern civilization which adopts humanism as a motto and human rights as the basis of international relations, and supports social justice. This requires Muslims not to introduce Islam as a rival to human nature and human longings or a discourse on secondary issues, while ignoring major ones.²²¹ Female scientific achievements in the West caused al-Ghazali to carefully review the social movement of Muslim women. He, for example, asserts that while modern western women have made inroads into space, Muslim women are still kept in the home and away from attention.²²²

As noted elsewhere, al-Ghazali considered the effects of economic conditions on the way people understand their cultural needs. Thus, keeping this in mind he was careful about spreading minor fatwas in the absence of the broader Islamic context. For him, what is required is not only adherence to the decisive religious texts, but also an Islamic socio-economic and cultural environment supporting the application of religious texts.²²³

Al-Ghazali believed that contemporary Muslim women do the work of *da'wah*. In comparing the conditions of Christian women missionaries with their Muslim counterparts however he makes some telling observations. In North Africa for example, nuns served their religion with enthusiasm and devotion.²²⁴ Mother Teresa supervised hundreds of women and ran many charitable projects in India and elsewhere.²²⁵ According to al-

Ghazali, the spiritual energy of Muslim women is no less than that of Mother Teresa. Ignorant *du'āt*, however, have denied women's social contribution.²²⁶ In his work, al-Ghazali brought the contribution of Mother Teresa to the attention of Muslim preachers. They, however, continued to be embarrassed concerning women's education and their attendance in mosques. As a result, preachers have looked into themselves, not religion, to develop or maintain obstacles that exclude women from enjoining good, forbidding evil, or guiding the public.²²⁷ Some Muslim *du'āt* and jurists are eager to lock women up in the home, and keep them away from worship, learning, or intellectual contribution. Those *du'āt* and jurists, according to al-Ghazali, should not be allowed to speak in the name of God.²²⁸ As a reaction to the failures of religious elites to properly address the question of women, and their traditional approach, al-Ghazali calls for the formation of a guided women's movement (*nahḍah nisā'iyyah rashīdah*). Rational and pious women should support this movement, defend the precepts of Islam, and enjoin good and forbid evil.²²⁹ Just how and by whom this women's movement is to be guided is not discussed by al-Ghazali.

The discussion of women in *da'wah* shows al-Ghazali's keen interest in issues of Islamic reform in general. Because *da'wah* and reform are parallel, the issue of women immediately floats to the surface. Al-Ghazali seeks to ameliorate *da'wah* discourse on women, improve their position in the socio-political arena, and secure their role in *da'wah*. He believed these objectives to be achievable through purifying Muslim culture from practices detrimental to women's progress, and re-evaluating *du'āt's* treatment of women's issues. Al-Ghazali's endeavor was to develop an approach to replace the stagnant status of women in religion and in society with a new understanding that allows them to contribute to and share in *da'wah* and Islamic reform. Despite his broad perspective, al-Ghazali invested much of his attention, however, to a review of specific interpretations of Islamic rulings, impeding the progress of Muslim women, and even pulling them backward.

CONCLUSION

As shown above, al-Ghazali was very careful that *daʿwah* should result in a positive impression of Islam for westerners. In fact, his critique of the actions of some Muslims is highly affected by an accommodationist approach to probable western reactions. As also shown, he did search for juristic bases to support his views and critiques. One can presume that in writing for a Muslim audience al-Ghazali recognized the importance of establishing credible views which required him to seek support from Islamic law. Yet al-Ghazali's choosing from various legal opinions does not by itself challenge his approach to a number of questions in relation to *daʿwah*. What remains problematic is why he firmly believed in accommodating western reaction as a pre-condition for *daʿwah*'s progress, and why he employed the pretext of his best-interest-of-*daʿwah* principle to discredit or disqualify what he believed to be *duʿāt*'s poor undertaking of *daʿwah*.

As for his constant preoccupation with attaining a favorable western impression, al-Ghazali firmly believed in presenting a positive and convivial image of Islam. A reality during the early generations of Muslims but which had become poor by his own period and was still deteriorating. In his works, he stipulates that to project a positive contemporary presentation of Islam requires not only positive Muslim role models, but also a rational understanding of Islamic traditions which necessitates the constant reinterpretation of Islamic traditions in light of modern science. In fact, al-Ghazali's works addressed not only issues pertaining to religion and science, reason and revelation, but also those of cultural lifestyles, i.e., eating without utensils, or drinking while sitting. Even here, religious traditions are re-interpreted.

At the base of al-Ghazali's frustration with contemporary *duʿāt* and *daʿwah*, however, lay a determination to avoid any religious or cultural practices that those in the West would find odd or strange. Thus, in matters of religious practice, al-Ghazali explored different interpretations that westerners could accept.

In matters of culture or custom, however, he only used his broad criteria of the interest of *da'wah* to criticize or unveil the damaging effects that these culture or custom elements could have on *da'wah*'s progress.

The best-interest-of-*da'wah* criteria al-Ghazali relied on in his works, was nothing more than a personal assessment of what could enhance or impede *da'wah* in non-Muslim countries. This reliance usually involves reference to religious principles but also reflects his own anxieties over Islam's future in general. Given his negative evaluation of Islam's current and future progress, al-Ghazali was not ready to accept any more damage being inflicted on either *da'wah* or Islam. Through his writings, he worked to alleviate this harm and help people become aware of the obstacles they themselves were putting in the way of *da'wah*. In the attempt to create that awareness, his works do not focus on the development of a methodology to assure *da'wah*'s success. Despite the ambiguity around his criteria, the principle of *da'wah* interest does not appear to be abused in his work. Indeed throughout his works, al-Ghazali constantly endeavored to show that his conclusions were based on genuine interest in *da'wah*, and the proper understanding of the fundamentals of Islam (*al-uṣūl al-kullīyah li al-Islām*). In general terms, the best interest of *da'wah* more or less subsumes the issues and concerns of each school of Islamic reform. Hence, the best interest of *da'wah* criteria could allow the concerns of al-Ghazali's school of reform to be translated for a western audience in a manner that is sensitive to their reactions to the representation of Islam. Therefore, in this instance at least, the best-interest-of-*da'wah* principle is committed to the rational and positive introduction of Islam to the west and the non-Muslim world.

Conclusion

AL-GHAZALI SOUGHT TO DEVELOP a modern *daʿwah* model within a broad spectrum of Islamic change. In his model, *duʿāt* are not just conveyers of abstract religious teachings or morality but also agents of positive change. Furthermore, *daʿwah* is viewed as no longer the duty of a particular religious group of *duʿāt* but rather a social and collective responsibility that seeks not only to enhance religious life but also the economic standards of Muslim society. What's more *daʿwah* is to enrol in its service not only preachers, muftis, and religious scholars, but additionally all those contributing to social and global change, transcending the traditional space of groups such as Tabligh Jamāʿah, the Sufis and Salafis.

In developing his model, al-Ghazali was not seeking to reproduce the experiences of either al-Banna or Al-Azhar University – in fact he criticizes both, as well as many *duʿāt* – rather he aimed to establish a new vision for *daʿwah* in modern societies. Despite sharp criticism of contemporary *daʿwah* practices, and a vision to re-establish *daʿwah* on religious fundamentals, al-Ghazali did not escape the effects of contemporary notions of *daʿwah* or Islamic reform. Such being the case, al-Ghazali did not demolish existing frameworks but, rather, assessed both their proximity to what he believed to be the original understanding of religion and, more importantly, their potential to transform Muslim societies and chart a way for them to lead and be influential in the modern world.

Al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* model exhibits originality and independence as far as religious interpretations are concerned, yet shifts the focus of *daʿwah* literature onto a broader arena.

Daʿwah does not simply connote the responsibility of religious preaching but also reflects a process of intellectual change and moral transformation. Such a process is open and holistic, embraces diversity, and involves points of contact between religion and society. Al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* is peaceful and accommodating, transparent and open, caring and supportive, human and rational, all-inclusive and educative, not only for Muslim communities, but for humanity as a whole. *Daʿwah* connects the concerns of *duʿāt* to global challenges facing humanity, requiring local and international attention. It necessitates an extensive and profound review of cultures and customary practices, on both local and international levels, improving *duʿāt*'s contributions on universal levels leading to advocacy of international justice and peace.

Given this multifaceted nature of *daʿwah*, al-Ghazali looks for a new operating context, one which transcends cultural and geographical boundaries, adheres to a fresh and rational understanding of the religious traditions, and is dissociated from contemporary contributions of Muslim *daʿwah* movements and groups. His model of *daʿwah*, however, applies well to a context of civilization characterized by economic prosperity and assured political freedom and civil liberties, as well as effective dialogue among nations, sincere religious interaction, advocacy of human rights, and international law.

Al-Ghazali's model of *daʿwah* is far from being a purely hypothetical and religious or spiritual exercise. It constantly involves questions of Islamic change, to produce an atmosphere that is conducive for *daʿwah*. It further takes the implications of life, of both Muslims and non-Muslims, to the level of religious interpretation in order to preserve the rationality and humanity of *daʿwah*. Thus, *daʿwah* in al-Ghazali's model, is ineffective unless the conditions of Muslims significantly improve, and until such time Muslim models of excellence in all areas of life are developed. In fact, al-Ghazali's *daʿwah* requires Muslims to lead the world in morality and justice, in worldly life, and in the support

of deprived nations. This priority of development in his model evolves neither in a vacuum nor is built upon confusion and negativity. This reinforces the fact that this vision rather requires a new vision of reform, and involves extensive intellectual exercise not only to properly position the sacred vis-à-vis the mundane, but also to bring al-Ghazali's own questions to a level of understanding, clarity, and feasibility, to say the least.

In view of the universal character of *daʿwah* requiring the introduction of Islam to different individuals and nations, al-Ghazali's model seeks to forge bridges of communication, understanding and interaction, particularly with the West, as well as enhancing universal channels of communication in Muslim societies themselves. These bridges do not impede *daʿwah* but, rather, enrich *duʿāt* with positive insights leading to better prospects for *daʿwah*. This only requires open and sincere dialogue and freedom, not only to support *daʿwah* but to match all improvements in Muslim societies with the local needs of *daʿwah*. Integrating and enhancing communication for *daʿwah* entrenches peace and tolerance, and rejects all types of violence or conflict because these simply defeat the purpose of *daʿwah*. *Daʿwah* in al-Ghazali's model has no notion of a clash of civilizations and is predicated on the possibility, or rather the need for a serious interaction among nations, which is made possible through freedom, religious pluralism, dialogue, and advocacy of human rights – all of which al-Ghazali addresses in his works.

Given this model of *daʿwah*, the efforts of *duʿāt* can be characterized as focused, clear, and straightforward. *Duʿāt* adhere to peaceful means to convey their teaching with effectiveness. They exercise freedom because losing freedom entails losing their *raison d'être*.

A question worth reflecting on is the degree to which al-Ghazali's model of *daʿwah* can meet the current needs of *daʿwah* movements and institutions (in the years after his death). First, the *daʿwah* model not only applies well to the agenda of modern Muslim reform, but also strengthens *daʿwah* institutions and

du'āt's contributions. This is possible in part because al-Ghazali raised critical questions concerning the progress of Islam and attempted to develop an objective and rigorous approach to *da'wah* and *du'āt*. Let us recall that both his conceptual analysis of *da'wah* and his extensive discussions of the many problems hindering current progress are worth examining. They help *du'āt* re-shape their understanding, re-position their movements in a broader context of debate, and clarify their views on religion and modernity. What might limit interest in al-Ghazali's ideas on *da'wah*, however, relates mainly to his legal interpretations, which have caused debate, with criticism aimed at his scholarly credibility, particularly by *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* and the *Salafiyyah*.

Al-Ghazali's autonomy and also independence from any affiliation with Muslim movements, especially given his early association with the Muslim Brotherhood, seem to have worked in favor of his ideas on *da'wah* and his general intellectual contribution to society. His style of critique, however, does not work in his favor. For instance a statement as blunt as a pious woman is better than an arrogant bearded man can hurt Muslim feelings and give rise to negative reaction i.e. from religious scholars, bearded men, and members of societies in which having a beard could either be a religious or cultural practice. This negative style caused some Muslim youth to lose respect for al-Ghazali and even accuse him of being hostile to the Sunnah, especially when he undermines scholarly interpretations of sound hadith. For Huwayni, al-Ghazali should have avoided making adversaries and let them, instead, benefit from his knowledge.¹

Al-Ghazali's model of *da'wah* supports a middle position. It calls for global reforms, and addresses traditional questions of *da'wah*, including the Friday sermons and religious preaching. Furthermore, the model not only addresses conventional *da'wah* but also looks to improve Muslim life and prepare the ground for a lasting *da'wah* that has far-reaching results. The actualization of this model would have many ramifications and implications for society as a whole, such as the improvement of religious

Conclusion

education, social culture, and political and economic life. It may be that, as was the case with Algerian thinker Malik Bennabi, more time is needed before Muslim movements and groups fully realize the instrumental contribution of al-Ghazali's *da'wah* in modern times, and the need to transform his theoretical model into social action.

Far from dismissing al-Ghazali for not being able to develop *da'wah* methodologies or elaborate on perspectives and strategies for its proper implementation, we should give him great credit for the number of issues or questions he raised concerning *da'wah* throughout his works. The full import of this is nothing short of remarkable and a tremendous gain for the fields of *da'wah* and Islamic studies in general.

And although the al-Ghazalian model of *da'wah* still requires further analysis and development, for example, around issues regarding use of sound legal authority and his accommodationist attitude vis-à-vis western perceptions, we should never forget that al-Ghazali's commitment to issues of *da'wah* produced a wealth of writings and ideas which if exploited well could lead to outstanding developments in any future *da'wah* programs. In other words, al-Ghazali succeeded in creating an Islamic awareness within the climate of contemporary Muslim and Western developments, while raising appropriate questions and strongly critiquing attitudes and practices that defeat the purpose of *da'wah*. Furthermore, al-Ghazali did his best to deal with the problem of *da'wah* from many angles, probably hoping some of his sincere readers or disciples would continue the task he had set in motion.

Indeed, it is hard to conceive where the state of discourse on *da'wah* and Islamic reform would be without al-Ghazali's outstanding, constructive, and comprehensive contributions. His legacy, which continues to thrive to this day, is founded on a lifetime of service and contribution to the positions, critiques and theories he engineered, and it is an undeniable fact that very few, if any, of his critics – whether scholars or *du'āt* – would have

added to the discourse on *daʿwah* had he not identified and engaged with the issues first. More critically, it is questionable whether his contemporaries would have contributed meaningfully to the field of *daʿwah* on numerous multifaceted subjects without his cutting edge, trailblazing insights and extraordinary contributions. This remains his distinction and a hallmark of his undisputed position as one of the most eminent modern fathers of the discipline in both his and our own times.

The values and principles al-Ghazali espoused, the grander and greater vision he sought to realize, the eminently practical and common sense approach he took to the Muslim predicament, all are testament to the caliber of the man and the depth of his scholarship. It is little wonder that he transcended the group-think strictures and limitations his peers allowed themselves to be confined by, enduring consistent scorn in doing so. Ever forward-looking, al-Ghazali was ahead of his time and his thoughts remain as compatible and critical to societies today as when they were first written. The powerful stand he took on the importance of education, the significant weight he gave to a free society, his promotion of a decent standard of living for the poor, the quality of personal excellence he appealed for, and his compassionate, impassioned role as an educator and public critical intellectual, all these preserve al-Ghazali's reputation both in his own lifetime and for many generations to come as one of the century's most important intellectual Muslim thinkers and reformers.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. The term *daʿwah* appears in such passages of the Qurʾan: “Call unto the way of your Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! Your Lord is best aware of him who strays from His way, and He is best aware of those who go aright.” *The Meaning of the Glorious Qurʾan, Explanatory Translation*, Chapter 16:125, (ed.), Arafat K. el-Ashi (Maryland, USA: Amana Publications, 2002), p.249. *Daʿwah* is to exhort people to an internal and external adherence to the beliefs, statements, and actions of Islam. See Abd al-Rahman Maydani, *Fiqh al-Daʿwah ilā Allāh wa-Fiqh al-Nuṣṣ wa al-Irshād wa al-ʿAmr bi al-Maʿrūf wa al-Nahy ʿan al-Munkar* (The Understanding of *Daʿwah*, Guidance, and Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil), 2nd edn., (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2004), 1:16.
2. Fathi Yakan criticizes Muslim movements for using the same old methods, and considers their attitudes in *daʿwah* a kind of suicide. He exhorts Muslim workers to re-examine their *daʿwah* experience of the past forty years, as well as the positive and negative aspects of their intellectual contributions. See Fathi Yakan, *Mushkilāt al-Daʿwah wa al-Dāʿiyah* (Problems of *Daʿwah* and *Duʿāt*) (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1981), pp.7-11. Yakan also wrote *Kayfa Nadʿū al-Nāsa ilā al-Islām?* (How to Invite People to Islam?) (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1981).
3. Muhammad H. Fadlallah believes that the question of *daʿwah* methodology is serious in the progress of Islamic work, both at the individual and collective levels. This is because of the political, intellectual, and social changes affecting Islamic work. These have led Muslim *duʿāt* to realize the need to exploit all of their intellectual and material resources, understand how to deal with current reality through new methods so as to meet the intellectual standards, and encounter the movement of change. See Muhammad H. Fadlallah, *Uslūb al-Daʿwah fī al-Qurʾān* (The Approach of *Daʿwah* in the Qurʾan) (Beirut: Dār al-Zahrāʾ li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ), p.9.
4. Mustafa Mashhur was born in September 1921 in the town of Sadiyyin,

- Mina, in the Province of al-Sharqiyyah. He graduated from the Faculty of Sciences in 1942. He joined the Organization of Muslim Brotherhood in 1936. Because of his membership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mashhur was fired from work in 1954, and sentenced to ten years in the military prison. In 1965, he was again imprisoned until the president Anwar Sadat released him. In 1996, and after the death of the fourth guide of the Muslim Brothers Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, he was appointed as a leader for the Muslim Brotherhood. Mashhur wrote several works on *daʿwah* and Islamic movements. He died in October 2002. See Special Dossiers 2002: Muslim Brothers...Where to?, "The Fifth Guide of the Muslim Brothers"; available from <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/7A531648-5092-4EDE-9D28C-174298AoDFC.htm>; accessed 28th April 2008.
5. *Fiqh al-Daʿwah ilā Allāh* by Abd al-Rahman Maydani is a comprehensive treatise on the foundations, methods, means, and manners of *daʿwah* in light of the sources of the Shariʿah. Maydani's major interest, however, was to develop an understanding of *daʿwah* through deduction (*istīnbāt*) of the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. See Maydani, *Fiqh al-Daʿwah ilā Allāh wa Fiqh al-Nuṣṣ wa al-Irshād wa al-Amr bi al-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahy ʿan al-Munkar* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2004), vol. 1, p.9.
 6. Fathi H Malkawi, "Kalimat al-Maʿhad," in *Al-ʿAtā' al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Ḥalqah Dirāsiyyah* (A Symposium on the Intellectual Contribution of Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali) (Amman, Jordan: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996), p.16. Al-Qaradawi describes al-Ghazali as a person who unreservedly devoted his life to *daʿwah*. See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftuh, Riḥlat Niṣf Qarn* (Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali as I Knew Him, A Journey of Half of a Century) (Al-Manṣūrah, Egypt: Dār al-Wafā' li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 1995), p.55.
 7. Al-Ghazali's translated works include, *Our Beginning in Wisdom*, a translation of *Min Hunā Naʿlam* by Ismāʿīl R. al-Farūqī (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953); *Remembrance and Prayer: The Way of Prophet Muhammad*, trans. Yusuf Talal De Lorenzo, (USA: Amana Publications, 1996); *Understanding the Life of Prophet Muhammad* (International Islamic Pub. House; Rev. 2nd edn., 1999); *A Thematic Commentary of the Qur'an*, trans. A. A. Shamis, (UK: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2000); *Muslim Character* by Mufti A.H. Usmani (Kazi Pubns Inc.), *La Foi du Musulman* (ʿAqīdat al-Muslim) by Moussa Chami.

8. In 1995, al-Ghazali received The International Islamic University President's Conferment Award for Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali. See Ramadan Gharib, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī: Ḥayātuhu, wa-ʿAṣrūhu, wa-Abrāz man Ta'aththara bihim* (Al-Ghazali: Life, Age, and Influential People) (Cairo: Dār al-Haram li al-Turāth, 2003), pp.83-84. Al-Ghazali also received various awards of appreciation from several governments, including Egypt, Mauritania, Qatar, Algeria, Sudan, and Pakistan. See Ala M. Al-Ghazali, "Al-Sīrah al-Shakhṣiyyah li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī," in *Al-ʿAṭāʾ al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Ḥalqah Dirāsiyyah* (A Seminar on the Intellectual Contribution of Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali), (ed.), Fathi Malkawi, (Amman, Jordan: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996), p.185.
9. Gharib's *Maḥāwir al-Mashrūʿ al-Fikrī ladā al-Shaykh* (Themes of al-Ghazali's Intellectual Project) is a Master thesis submitted to the Faculty of Theology in the University of Al-Azhar, under the supervision of Dr. Abd al-Munim Ali Qassas. It was published by Dār al-Haram li al-Turāth, Cairo, in 2003.
10. Al-Ghazali's works entitled *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* and *Turāthunā al-Fikrī* caused many critical responses from some Muslim preachers and *duʿāt*. They include *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī: Naqd Kitāb al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* by Jamal Sultan; *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī bayna al-Naqd al-ʿĀtib wa al-Madhʿ al-Shāmit* by Kishk Jalal; *Fī Ḥiwār Hādīʾ maʿa Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* by Salman al-Awdah; *Jināyat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī ʿalā al-Ḥadīth wa Ahlihi* by Ashraf ibn Abd al-Rahim; *Ṣamt al-Laālīʾ fī al-Radd ʿalā Shaykh Muḥammad Ghazālī* by Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni; *Al-Miʿyār li ʿIlm al-Ghazālī fī Kitābihi al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* by Abd al-Aziz M. Al al-Shaykh; *Al-Ghazālī wa al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Ḥadīth Naẓarāt wa Mulāḥazāt* by Mundhir Abu Shar; *Kashf Mawqīʿ al-Ghazālī min al-Sunnah wa Ahlihā wa Naqd baʿḍ Ārāʾihī* by Rabi Madkhali; and *Fī Ḥiwār Hādīʾ maʿa al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ghazālī* by Salman al-Awadah.
11. Abd al-Halim Uways, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī: Tārīkhuh, wa Juhūdubuh, wa Ārāʾuh* (Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali: History, Contributions, and Opinions) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), p.139. According to Uways, those thinkers advocate a comprehensive reform of Islam, characterized by a positive representation, presenting role models, and cooperation. For Abd al-Quddus, al-Ghazali is a leader of a school of *daʿwah* following

- wisdom and kind speech. Muhammad Abd al-Quddus, *Fī al-Daʿwah wa al-Duʿāt* (About *Daʿwah* and *Duʿāt*) (Giza: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawziʿ, 2000), p.20. According to al-Qaradawi, al-Ghazali's lectures contributed to the development of an Islamic school characterized by originality, purity from additions, distortions, or alterations, and an uncompromising stance about the truth. Al-Ghazali's sermons do not cite individuals by name, nor ignite fire or raise sensitive issues. Al-Ghazali approaches issues with wisdom and kindness. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftuh*, p.60.
12. Ishaq Farhan, "Kalimah Jamʿiyyat al-Dirāsāt wa al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyyah," in *Al-ʿAṭāʾ al-Fikrī*, p.20.
 13. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post 1967 Arab Intellectual History* (London: Pluto Press), p.242.
 14. Malkawi, "Kalimat al-Maʿhad," p.16. The emotional inclination is noticeable in works like *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī, Ghuṣn Bāsiq fī Shajarat al-Khulūd* by Fallussi Masud, *Al-Daʿwah wa al-Dāʿiyyah* (*Daʿwah* and *Dāʿiyyah*) by Abd al-Rahman al-Adawi, or The Conference of *Al-ʿAṭāʾ al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*.
 15. *Baṣīrah* (clear evidence) is made in reference to the Qurʾan: "Say [O Prophet]: 'This is my way: Resting upon conscious insight accessible to reason, I am calling [you all] unto God – I and they who follow me.' And [say:] 'Limitless is God in His glory; and I am not one of those who ascribe divinity to aught beside Him!'" (12:108).
 16. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftuh*, p.7. This is made in reference to the tradition of the Prophet: "If water becomes two jars (*qullatayn*), it is not contaminated by filth." ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar relates that the Prophet said: "If water reaches two *qullahs* in volume, it will not become impure due to impurities." This hadith was related by al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, al-Nasāʾī, and Ibn Mājah, al-Bayhaqī and others. [Editor: See in relation to this hadith <http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-377-3268.htm>].
 17. Adawi, *Lamsat Wafāʾ ilā al-Imām Muḥammad al-Ghazālī: Al-Daʿwah wa al-Dāʿiyyah* (Giza: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawziʿ, 1997), pp.34-35. Al-Qaradawi argues that al-Ghazali does not belong to any particular group, movement or a country, but rather belongs to the entire Muslim nation. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftuh*, p.281. Shalabi for example writes: "To the great Muslim thinker, the devoted *mujāhid*, the exemplary *dāʿiyyah*, the eloquent speaker for whom

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three public protests were held, to the student of the martyr Hasan al-Banna, to the al-Ghazali of *Iḥyā'* (work by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī) and *Aḥyā'* (living people), on the occasion of his seventieth anniversary." Muhammad Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma'rakat al-Muṣṣḥaf* (Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali and the Battles of the Qur'an) (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣaḥwah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1987), p.13.

18. Abd al-Halim Uways, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.49.
19. Muhammad Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mawqī' al-Fikrī wa al-Ma'arik al-Fikriyyah* (The Intellectual Position of Muhammad al-Ghazali and the Intellectual Debates) (Egypt: Al-Hay'ah al-Miṣriyyah al-'Āmmah li al-Kitāb, 1992), p.5.
20. Muhammad Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī 'alā Mashārif Qarn Jadīd: Qirā'ah fī Tajrubat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* (Revival of Islamic Thought) (Dār al-Qalam li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1999), pp.112-113.
21. Ibrahim M. Abu al-Rabi, "Muslim Self-Criticism in Contemporary Arab Thought: The Case of Muhammad al-Ghazali," in *Contemporary Arab Thought, Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History* (London: Pluto, 2004), p.224.
22. *Ibid.*, p.246.

I: THE LIFE, EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI

1. Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim al-Ḥaqq fī Kifāḥinā al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīth* (Signposts from our Present Islamic Struggle) (Giza, Egypt: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2003), p.203.
2. Nikla al-Inab is located in the province of al-Buhayrah, in the North-Eastern part of Egypt.
3. Al-Ghazali spent one year in the prison of Tur and less than a year in Turrah prison in 1965. Muhammad Shalabi, *al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa-Ma'rakat al-Muṣṣḥaf* (Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali and the Battle of the Qur'an) (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣaḥwah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1987), pp.24-25.
4. Muhammad al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt al-Shaykh," (Excerpts from the Memories of al-Ghazali: A Life Story) *Islāmiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, 7 (1997), p.156.
5. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim al-Ḥaqq*, p.203.
6. Al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt fī al-Dīn wa al-Ḥayāt* (Reflections about Religion

- and Life) (Giza: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2005), pp.108-109. Al-Ghazali is referring to the following verse in the Qur'an: "Recite what is sent of the Book by inspiration to thee, and establish regular Prayer: for Prayer restrains from shameful and unjust deeds; and remembrance of Allah is the greatest (thing in life) without doubt. And Allah knows the (deeds) that ye do" (29:45).
7. Al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Da'wah* (In the Crowd of *Da'wah*), 3rd edn., (Egypt: Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1965), p.267.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p.19.
 10. Muhammad Imarah, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī wa al-Mawqī' al-Fikrī wa al-Ma'ārik al-Fikriyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Salām li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2009), p.29.
 11. Muhammad Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf* (Al-Ghazali and the Battle of the Qur'an) (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣaḥwah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1987), p.24.
 12. Gharib, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī: Ḥayātuh*, p.13.
 13. Ibn Rushd, Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd, al-Ḥafīd (the grandson), the "Commentator of Aristotle," famous in the Medieval West under the name of Averroes, scholar of the Qur'anic sciences and the natural sciences (physics, medicine, biology, astronomy), theologian and philosopher. He was born in Cordoba in 520/1126 and died in Marrakesh in 595 AH/1198 CE. Biographers stress the excellent juridical education of the future Commentator. The science of law and of the principles (*uṣūl*), *dirāyah*, interested him more than the science of traditions, *riwāyah*. He also worked also on Ash'arite *kalām*, which he was later to criticize. In medicine, he was the pupil of Abū Ja'far Hārūn al-Tadjālī (of Trujillo), who was in addition a teacher of Hadith. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'ah limits himself to reporting, following al-Bājī, that Averroes studied "philosophical sciences" (*al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyyah*) with the physician Abū Ja'far. 1174 to 1180 CE was the period in which his original works were produced: "Treatises on the Intellect," *De substantia orbis*, *Faṣl al-maqāl*, *Kashf al-manāḥij*, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*. As a jurist, Ibn Rushd was interested in the *Uṣūl*. Ibn al-Abbār mentions the important *Kitāb Bidāyat al-muḥtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid fī al-fiqh*. Ibn Rushd had few disciples in Islam. His great fame among western scholars is well known. If one considers the whole

corpus of Ibn Rushd's works and the unity of his wide thought, it becomes apparent that the "Commentator" was a true philosopher. See Arnaldez, R. "Ibn Rushd, Abu al-Walid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd, al-Ḥafīd." *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. 25 April 2008.

14. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī* (Essays by Shaykh al-Ghazali) (Giza: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2002), vol. 3, p. 164.
15. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā'iz al-Īmān bayna al-ʿAql wa al-Qalb* (Foundations of Faith between the Intellect and Heart), p. 105.
16. Gharib, *Maḥāwir al-Mashrūʿ al-Fikrī*, p. 67.
17. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jānib al-ʿĀtifī min al-Islām* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p. 11. In Qatar, a Sufi disciple once encouraged al-Ghazali to give allegiance to his Sufi master. Al-Ghazali replied: "Is there any better allegiance than that which we gave to al-Banna? We have taken from al-Banna the religion of Islam in its comprehensiveness, depth, and moderation." See al-Qaradawi, "Al-Ghazālī Rajul Daʿwah," in *Al-ʿAṭā al-Fikrī*, p. 216.
18. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā'iz al-Īmān*, p. 105. Al-Ghazali calls *Taṣṣawuf* the discipline of perfection (*iḥsān*), discipline of the inner (*al-Qulūb*), and also the emotional side of Islam. See his *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 2, p. 154.
19. Al-Ghazali, "Muqtaṭafāt min Mudhakirāt al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī," pp. 155-156.
20. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah min al-Ḥaqq al-Murr* (New Doses of the Bitter Truth) (Giza, Egypt: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2004), vol. 6, p. 144.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
22. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p. 155.
23. Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad (1263-1328 CE) was a Ḥanbalī in many, though not all, juridical and theological matters, and a Salafi on a wider plane. He has had a strong influence on conservative Sunni circles and, in the modern period, on both liberals and conservatives. His life was a mix of intellectual activity, preaching, and periodic persecutions and imprisonments. He was persecuted and imprisoned in Syria and Egypt for his *tashbīh* (anthropomorphism), *ijtihād* (independent reason) and his idiosyncratic legal judgments (e.g., on *ṭalāq*—divorce). Ibn Taymiyyah was also active in anti-Mongol propaganda. See Ronald L. Nettler, "Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad," *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 165.

24. Al-Ghazali, “Qışsat Hayāt,” p.156.
25. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ‘Araftuh Riḥlat Nişf Qarn*, 1st edn., (Beirut: Resalah Publishers, 2001), p.186.
26. Gharib, *Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, Hayātuh*, p.228.
27. Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma‘rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.23.
28. Al-Ghazali, *Jur‘āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.44.
29. Muhammad Majdhub, *Muḥāḍarāt al-Ghazālī fī Iṣlāḥ al-Fard wa al-Mujtama‘* (Al-Ghazali’s Lectures on Reform of the Individual and Society), (ed.), Qutb Abd al-Hamid Qutb, (Cairo: Al-Bashīr li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘), p.18.
30. Al-Ghazali, “Qışsat Hayāt,” p.155.
31. Fallusi Masud, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī Ghuṣn Bāsiq fī Shajarat al-Khulūd* (Al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, A Lofty Branch in a Tree of Eternity) (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2003), p.17, 18, 21.
32. Ahmad Assal, “Al-Jawānib al-Nafsiyyah wa al-Khuluqiyyah,” in *Al-‘Aṭā’ al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, p.28.
33. In his *Ta’amullāt*, al-Ghazali shares some scenes of the conditions of the countryside in Egypt (pp.44-46). He states that while walking in the evening, he heard children singing. “Oh night! Oh night! Oh night! I am a stranger! Where Shall I spend the night?” Their singing tone, however, was mixed with sadness, and invaded the listener’s emotions with a complex of regret and grief. The singers were hundreds of poor children who migrated to the village, ate poorly and drank from impure water. At night, they slept in animal habitats. Al-Ghazali whispers: “My children, you are not strangers! This is the country of your fathers and your grandfathers! It is your right to sleep in comfort. While children of other nations live in peace, you continue to live in destitution as children and as men.” Al-Ghazali then asks his friend: “How do those children go back home – their original homes?” His friend responded: “Do you recall the diseases affecting animals? Poor food, work from sunrise until after sunset, the strikes hitting the backs of those who fall from their work, and above all petty salaries most of which go to their brokers. When they remember their past, they begin to sing as you have heard. Such is the case; those children can only complain about their problems to the dark (night). Finally, they either make it to their graves or their homes.”
“ Oh night! Oh night! Oh night!
I am a stranger! Where shall I spend the night?
How cheap is the human being!

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He is humiliated because of two piasters
 Oh night! Oh night! Oh night!
 I am a stranger! Where shall I spend the night?
 My mother and father both cry with tears of the eye.”

34. Assal, “Al-Jawānib al-Nafsiyyah wa al-Khuluqiyyah,” p.28.
35. Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981* (London: George Allen & Unwin), pp.17-18.
36. Al-Ghazali, *al-Islām wa Awdā‘unā al-Iqtisādiyyah* (Islam and our Economic Conditions) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), p.62.
37. Al-Ghazali, *Ta’ammulāt*, p.52.
38. Fallussi, *Ghuṣṣn Bāsiq*, p.24.
39. See J. M. Landau, “Kuttāb,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, (ed.), C. E. Bosworth. E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, and Ch. Pellat, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), p.568.
40. Fallussi, *Ghuṣṣn Bāsiq*, p.24.
41. Al-Ghazali, “Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.158.
42. Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt* (Berkeley & Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1998), p.37.
43. J. M. Landau, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p.568.
44. Al-Ghazali, *Ta’ammulāt*, pp.226-227.
45. Al-Ghazali, “Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.157.
46. Al-Ghazali, *Jur‘āt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.218. Al-Ghazali remembered, for example, how he understood the following Qur’anic verse to mean a pigeon or crow attached to one’s neck. The verse states: “And every human being’s destiny have We tied to his neck; and on the Day of Resurrection We shall bring forth for him a record which he will find wide open” (17:13), p.252.
47. Fallussi, *Ghuṣṣn Bāsiq*, p.28.
48. Al-Ghazali, “Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.160. Al-Ghazali wrote: “My father was a pious person who guided me to memorize the Qur’an. When I was ten, he sold all of his business to help me relocate to Alexandria and to enrol me in Al-Azhar.” See al-Ghazali, “al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī,” in *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 3, p.164.
49. Al-Ghazali, *Jur‘āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.44.
50. Al-Ghazali, “Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.160. Interestingly, the curriculum was developed by Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi, a follower of Muhammad Abduh. See al-Ghazali, “Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.160.

51. *Nūr al-Īdāh Matn al-Qaddūrī* is a Ḥanafī legal manual written by Hasan Shurunbulali (Delhi: Kutubkhānah’i Rashīdiyyah). *Majma‘ al-Anhur ‘alā Multaqā al-Abḥur* was written by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Shaykhzadah, 2 vols., (S.I.: Maṭba‘ah al-‘Uthmāniyyah).
52. The *Majma‘ al-Anhur* is an illustration of *Multaqā al-Abḥur* and a concise legal manual written by the Ḥanafī scholar Abd Rahman Muhammad bin Sulayman.
53. Fallussi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p.30. *Madārik al-Tanzīl wa-Haqā’iq al-Ta’wīl* or *Tafsīr al-Nasafī* by Nasafī ‘Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad (701/d. 1301) (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1995).
54. Al-Ghazali’s father purchased a bookstore on Karmūz Street in Alexandria, where he sold stationery and books including foreign novels and religious books. See al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.158.
55. Al-Qalamawī, *Alf Laylah wa-Laylah* (One Thousand and One Nights), 1969.
56. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.159.
57. *Daqā’iq al-Akhbār fī Dhikr al-Jannah wa al-Nār* was written by Abd al-Rahim ibn Ahmad al-Qadi (Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1984). This work discusses spiritual preaching and guidance, discussion on paradise, hellfire, death, and the questioning by the Angels in the grave.
58. This work consists of 56 chapters (*majlis*) and is by the Sufi Shu‘ayb ibn Sa‘ad al-Ḥarīfīsh. It discusses spiritual sermons, hadiths, poems, stories of Sufi masters (*awliyās*), and merits of pious people.
59. Nasr Ibrahim Samarqandi, *Tanbīh al-Ghāfilīn* (Egypt: Abd al-Hamid al-Hanafī, 1953-1954).
60. Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī (1165-1240 CE), *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah*, (ed.), Ibrahim Madkur, (Cairo: Al-Ha’yah al-Miṣriyyah al-‘Āmmah li al-Kitāb, 1072).
61. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.159.
62. Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh, Tāj al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl (and Abū al-‘Abbās, see Ibn Farḥūn, *al-Dīwān*, Cairo 1351, p.70)... ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh al-Iskandarī al-Shādhilī, Arab mystic, follower of the doctrines of the mystic al-Shādhilī (d. 656/1258) as a disciple of the mystic Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Anṣārī al-Mursī (d. 686/1287). See Makdisi, G. “Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online accessed 25 April 2008. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ibn-ata-allah-SIM_3092.

Notes

63. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 2, p.154.
64. Ibid., p.154.
65. Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.24.
66. Muhammad Majdhub, “al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī al-Saqqā,” *Muḥāḍarāt*, p.18.
67. Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa-Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.24.
68. Ala M. al-Ghazali, “Al-Sīrah al-Shakhṣiyyah li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī,” in *Al-ʿAṭāʾ al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Ḥalqah Dirāsiyyah*, pp.186-187.
69. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” pp.167-168.
70. Majdhub, “Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī al-Saqqā,” p.19.
71. Fallussi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, pp.39-40. Diraz’s book *Al-Nabaʾ al-ʿAẓīm* (The Great Tidings) influenced al-Ghazali’s style of thematic commentary of the Qur’an. See al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.228.
72. Ibid., p.41.
73. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī Kamā ʿAraṭuh*, p.35. Shaykh Shaltut (1893-1963) was a scholar, and a reformist rector of Al-Azhar under Abd al-Nasir. He sought to combine the modern sciences with the traditional Islamic studies and called for the opening of the gate of ijtihad. He served as rector of Al-Azhar from 1958 until his passing. He authored twenty-six works and spear-headed Al-Azhar’s modernization, but failed however to ensure its independence from the Egyptian government’s influence. Among his many contributions is, *Mujammaʿ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyyah* (The Islamic Research Assembly). See “Shaltut, Shaykh Mahmud,” *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, (ed.), Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000), p.188.
74. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.168.
75. Taha Husayn (1889-1973) was a writer, educational administrator, and minister, often called the Dean of Arabic Letters and *Qāhir al-Zalām* (Conqueror of Darkness). In Al-Azhar, he came under the influence of Muhammad Abduh and his circle of modernists. He went to France in 1915 and earned a doctorat d’état at the Sorbonne in 1919. He published *Fī al-Adab al-Jāhilī* (On Pre-Islamic Literature), *Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfah fī Miṣr* (The Future of Culture in Egypt). See “Husayn Dr. Taha,” *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, p.81.
76. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.168.
77. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* (Understanding Islam) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), p.214.

78. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīnunā* (This is our Religion) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1999), p.6.
79. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akbkhur al-ʿArab wa al-Muslimīn* (The Causes of Backwardness of Arabs and Muslims) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), p.51.
80. Al-Ghazali, "Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt," pp.168-169.
81. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī* (Islamic Daʿwah in the Present Century) (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2000), p.62.
82. Al-Ghazali, *Kifāh Dīn* (A Struggle of a Religion), p.193.
83. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh: Dirāsah fī al-Daʿwah wa al-Duʿāt* (In the Company of God: A Study of Daʿwah and Duʿāt) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p.9.
84. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim al-Ḥaqq*, pp.196-197.
85. Donald Malcolm Reid, "Azhar," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 1, p.170.
86. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah* (Diseases and Cures) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p.196.
87. Al-Ghazali, "Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.157.
88. Al-Ghazali, *Taʿammulāt*, p.113.
89. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu Maʿa al-Qurʾān?* (How to Approach the Qurʾan?) (Giza, Egypt: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 2005), p.31.
90. Al-Ghazali, *Taʿammulāt*, p.113.
91. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu maʿa al-Qurʾān?* p.31.
92. Ibid.
93. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān bayna Taʿālim al-Islām wa-Iʿlān Hayʾat al-Umam* (Human Rights between the Teachings of Islam and the Declaration of the United Nation) (Giza, Egypt: Nahḍat Miṣr li Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 2004), p.5.
94. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu maʿa al-Qurʾān?* pp.31-34.
95. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.28.
96. Ibid., p.30.
97. Ibid., p.32.
98. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa-Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (The Sunnah of the Prophet between the Jurists and the Muhaddiths) (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2001), p.15. Al-Ghazali draws on legal rulings touching on the use of water, which Muslims learn as if they still lived in the desert. For

- Al-Ghazali, there are major changes which need to be taken into account when teaching those legal rulings, not only in the area of purity, but also with respect to many other transactions. See Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.164.
99. See Daniel Neil Crecelius, “The ‘Ulama and the State in Modern Egypt” (Ph.D. diss., University of Princeton: Department of Politics and Oriental Studies, 1967), p.2.
 100. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Manābij al-Ishtirākīyyah* (Islam and the Socialists’ Systems) (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1960), p.215.
 101. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jānib al-‘Āṭifi min al-Islām*, p.15.
 102. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.198.
 103. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt,” pp.175-176.
 104. Ibid., p.175.
 105. Mustafa al-Maraghi (1881-1945) was an Islamic scholar, reformer, and rector of Al-Azhar. He was educated at Al-Azhar and became a disciple of Abduh. He played a pivotal role in the 1926 Cairo Caliphate Congress, in which the delegates discussed restoring the caliphal office that had just been abolished by Atatürk. He was the rector of Al-Azhar from 1928-1929 and from 1935 until his death. His reforms included the introduction of modern sciences and foreign languages into the curriculum of Al-Azhar. An opponent of *taqlīd* (blindly following ancient Muslim customs), he called for the renewed exercise of *ijtihād* and for reconciliation among the various madhabs and sects of Islam. Al-Maraghi wrote several books about Qur’anic interpretation. See “Al-Maraghi, Shaykh [Muhammad] Mustafa,” *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, (ed.), Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000), p.123.
 106. Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Zawahiri was the rector of Al-Azhar. He studied with Muhammad Abduh and others. He took over the leadership of the Ahmadi Mosque in Tanta from his father, then moved to Asyut to be the Shaykh of its Institute for a while. As he strengthened his ties with King Fuad, he replaced al-Maraghi as rector of Al-Azhar in 1929. He served until 1935, when he resigned due to ill health. While he was a rector, the magazine *Nūr al-Islām* was launched and Al-Azhar adopted some of the organizations of a modern university. An orator, al-Zawahiri had leanings toward the Shādhilī Sufi order. His books include one on how to organize instruction and a memoir. See “Al-Zawahiri, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmad,” *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, p.237.
 107. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.40.

108. For example, See al-Assal, "Al-Jawānib al-Nafsiyyah wa al-Khuluqiyyah," p.27.
109. Al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt*, p.3.
110. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, p.19.
111. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, vol. 2, p.110.
112. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.42.
113. Al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt*, p.3.
114. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, pp.44-45.
115. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.4.
116. Al-Ghazali, "Qīṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.159.
117. Al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt*, pp.3-4.
118. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 50, p.130.
119. Al-Ghazali, *Ṣayḥat Taḥdhīr min Du'āt al-Tanṣīr* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), 1st edn. , p.33.
120. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.213.
121. Al-Ghazali, *Ṣayḥat Taḥdhīr*, p.29.
122. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akhhur*, p.14.
123. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* pp.14-15.
124. Ibid., p.214.
125. Ibid., p.213.
126. Ibid., pp.14-15.
127. Ibid., p.214.
128. The *Munqidh* is al-Ghazali's narrative of himself, a description of freeing himself from *taqlīd*, the domination of doubt, and his healing through Sufism. The *Munqidh* does not contain any of al-Ghazali's philosophy. His philosophical treatises are rather found in his *Tahāfut*, *Maqāṣid*, *Iḥyā'*, and *Mīzān al-ʿAmal*. Al-Ghazali wrote the *Munqidh* after seclusion (*ʿuzlah*) over a period of ten years in which he adopted the ways of the Sufis. The starting point of his doubt was freeing himself from *taqlīd* in faith in search for certain knowledge (*ʿilm yaqīnī*). The *Munqidh* raised the crucial role of intuitive knowledge (*maʿrifah ḥadsīyyah*), which is the key to knowledge, and without which, certainty (*yaqīn*) will not be able to draw on the intellect. The process of inquiry according to al-Ghazali must trust the intellectual necessity (*ḍarūrah ʿaqliyyah*). See Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa al-Mūṣil ilā dhī al-ʿIzzah wa al-Jalāl*, (eds.), Jamal Saliba and Kamil Ayyad, (Damascus: Maṭbaʿat Jāmiʿat Dimashq, 1960), pp.20-24.
129. Gharib, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, pp.222-226. Gharib draws an

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analogy between the two al-Ghazalis, the thinker and the philosopher, around issues of doubt and certainty, position of the intellect, and seclusion. Ibid., pp.222-226.

130. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.214.
131. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, vol. 3, p.164.
132. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, pp.124-125. The tendency to give attention to the dark sides of things more than their bright aspects is present in many of al-Ghazali's statements. See al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt fī al-Dīn wa al-Ḥayāt*, p.132. Al-Ghazali for instance tells us how he completely leaves out a given matter when he is unable to address it as a whole, and how he largely focuses on deficiencies in any matter rather than its good side. See al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt fī al-Dīn wa al-Ḥayāt*, pp.132-133.
133. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 2, p.109.
134. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p.207.
135. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 2, p.110.
136. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.156.
137. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr* (The Harvest of Pride) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p.202.
138. Al-Ghazali, *al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, vol. 6, p.181.
139. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā'iz al-Imān*, p.31. This is an exaggeration, but al-Ghazali is concerned that contemporary institutions are insufficient to support the maintenance or progress of religion.
140. Al-Ghazali, *al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, vol. 3, p.209.
141. Al-Ghazali, *Ḍalām min al-Gharb* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1999), p.117.
142. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.207.
143. Al-Ghazali, *al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, vol. 3, p.133.
144. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, pp.124-125.
145. Al-Ghazālī, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.48.
146. Al-Ghazālī, *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 3, p.133.
147. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p.124.
148. Al-Ghazālī, *Ḥaqīqat al-Qawmiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah* (The Reality of Arab Nationalism) (Giza: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 2005), p.237.
149. Ibid., p.237.
150. Al-Qaradawi, "Al-Ghazālī Rajul Daʿwah," p.220.

151. Jamal Sultan, *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī: Naqd Kitāb al-Sunnah al-Nabawīyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (The Crisis of Religious Dialogue: A Critique of Sunnah of the Prophet between Jurists and Hadith Experts) (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣafā, 1990), p.23.
152. Ibid., p.28.
153. Ibid., p.65. *Zāhir* of the Qur'an applies to those verses, the meaning of which is obvious or clear, without seeking any additional assistance from the context of the verse (*qarīnah*).
154. Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom*, trans. Ismā'īl R. al-Farūqī (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953), pp.69-70.
155. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Contemporary Arab Thought*, p.231.
156. Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and author of *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il* (Letters) and *Mudhakkirāt al-Da'wah wa al-Dā'iyyah* (Memories of the Message and the Messenger). In Ismailiyyah in March 1928, al-Banna and six friends founded a "religious association devoted to the promotion of goods and the rooting out of evil," a branch of the Ḥaṣafiyyah. By 1929, the Organization was already being referred to as the "Muslim Brotherhood." Two main themes dominate al-Banna's doctrine, aside from his traditional beliefs concerning faith in a single God and in His Book as revealed to the Prophet. Four terms dominated his discourse – nation, state, social justice, and society. If we add the term 'Islamic' to these four terms, we will have characterized al-Banna's 'idea', the key to which is the view of Islam as a comprehensive system of life. Al-Banna was assassinated by Egyptian secret services in February 1949. See "Hasan al-Banna," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, (ed.), John L. Esposito, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp.195-198.
157. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.188.
158. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhā'if al-Ḥaqq* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2002), p.81; *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.9.
159. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.183.
160. Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.31.
161. Ibid., p.31.
162. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, p.11.
163. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p.24.
164. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.4.
165. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.9.

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166. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.4.
167. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftuh*, p.31.
168. Al-Qaradawi, “Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt,” p.173.
169. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftu*, pp.30-31.
170. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/39-1897) was a writer and Pan-Islamist activist. In 1869, he went briefly to Cairo, and then to the Ottoman capital Istanbul. From 1871 to 1879, al-Afghani lived in Cairo. He spent most of his time teaching, introducing an interpretation of Islamic philosophy that included restricting rational inquiry to the elite while encouraging orthodoxy among the masses. He was then expelled from Egypt for his continued fiery anti-British speeches. Al-Afghani returned to India, going to the Muslim state of Hyderabad, where he did much of his writing. At the time of the Urabi revolt in Egypt (1881-1882), al-Afghani took steps to leave India. Muhammad Abduh joined him in Paris where they edited an Arab newspaper, *Al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqā*. Its main themes were Pan-Islamist and anti-British, and it also included theoretical articles. His political thought was impelled to occupiers’ rule in foreign, especially Muslim, lands. He is strongly associated with two movements that he did not originate, but that he expressed lucidly and propagated widely. One is nationalism, supported in Egypt with references to the glories of ancient Egypt and in India with praise of the ancient Hindus. The other is Pan-Islamism, which started with the nineteenth-century Ottoman sultans and was then voiced in more progressive, anti-imperialist forms of the Young Ottomans. See Audrey L. Altstadt, “Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,” *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, (ed.), John L. Esposito, vol. 2, pp.23-26.
171. Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) was an Egyptian scholar and reformer regarded as the architect of Islamic modernism. The initial factors in his career were his traditional studies at Al-Azhar University and an early commitment to Sufism with the Shadhili order of mystical discipline. The crucial influence in his development was the impact of al-Afghani, a strenuous advocate of a unitary Islam who emphasized the concept of ummah (community) against regionalism. Pan-Islam was al-Afghani’s response to the British rule in Egypt and to European domination in general. Abduh was drawn into the cause and became editor of the journal *Al-ʿUrwaḥ Al-Wuthqā* (Firm Handhold). Abduh was exiled from Egypt between 1882 and 1888, when he made wide contacts with kindred minds in Syria and North Africa, with a short sojourn also in France. After his return to Cairo, his

- thought and efforts were drawn increasingly towards education and a renewal of Islamic Theology. See Kenneth Cragg, "Muhammad Abduh," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 2, p.111.
172. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'at Jadidah*, vol. 5, p.4. Rashid Rida (1865-1935) was a writer, editor and Muslim reformer. He was the chief disciple of Muhammad Abduh, continuing and developing his reformist teachings. They founded an influential Arabic monthly, *Al-Manār*, which disseminated their ideas throughout the Muslim world. He also wrote a commentary of the Qur'an and a three-column biography of Abduh. His ideas were influenced by Wahhabi puritanism, calling for a return to the pristine Islam of Muhammad and his associates, hence its name, *Salafiyyah* (way of the righteous ancestors). During World War I Rida aided the Arab nationalists in Cairo who worked for future independence. Hoping to revive the caliphate, he took part in the Islamic congress in Makkah in 1926 and Jerusalem in 1931. After his death, his movement and magazine vanished. "Rida, Sayyid Muhammad Rashid," *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, p.166.
173. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftu*, pp.30-31.
174. *Ibid.*, pp.31-35.
175. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wihdah*, p.6.
176. *Ibid.*, pp.10-11. According to al-Ghazali, al-Banna developed a set of principles to gather disunited groups together, illustrate the objectives of Islam, draw Muslims nearer to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and to further address the root causes of decline and indolence Muslims have encountered in the past. *Ibid.*, p.5.
177. Successor to Hasan al-Banna as supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. He attended the Khedivial Secondary School and graduated from the government Law School in 1915. He practiced law in Cairo and Suhaj, became judge in 1924, and joined the Brothers in 1943. Following the assassination of al-Banna, Hudaybi was named his successor in 1951, partly because he was not associated with terrorism or the secret branch within the society, and he accordingly resigned from the bench. He was arrested in 1954 for two months, and from 1965 to 1971. His *Sab'at As'ilah fi al-'Aqidah wa al-Radd 'Alayhā: Takhaṭṭī al-Ṣu'ūbāt wa al-'Aqabāt* (Seven Questions and Answers about Doctrine: Surmounting Difficulties and Obstacles) was published five years after his death. Cautious and conservative, he could not moderate the society's emotionalism and violence. See "al-Hudaybi Hasan," *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, pp.78-79.

178. Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.33. Al-Ghazali's expulsion however, helped him avoid imprisonment in 1954 and in 1965, except for a period of ten days in the prison of Turrah. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, pp.44-45. The reason for his imprisonment in Turrah was because he refused to carry out the directives of the Egyptian authorities concerning warning the public against the Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, or addressing their mistakes on a radio broadcasting program. See al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.216. Al-Ghazali's career as a public servant, and his cooperation with official scholars, also helped him avoid subjecting his *da'wah* efforts into political jeopardy.
179. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.197.
180. See Midhat Basyuni, *Al-Ḥaḳīqah al-Ghā'ibah bayna Khālīd Muḥammad Khālīd wa Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* (The Missing Truth between Khalid Muhammad Khalid and Muhammad Ghazali) (Cairo: n.p., 1997), p.76.
181. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Ḥayātaka* (Damsacus: Dār al-Qalam, 2004), p.124.
182. Al-Assal, "Al-Jawānib al-Fikriyyah," in *Al-'Aṭā' al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, p.54. Al-Ghazali strongly pushed the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to take action against King Faruq, but they were incapable of committing to such a stand. Al-Ghazali criticised them for missing the opportunity, and for not letting anyone in their organization act, as it was the duty of their followers to listen and obey! See al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Da'wah*, p.17.
183. Nazih N. Ayubi, "Ghazali Muhammad," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 2, pp.63-64.
184. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, pp.55-56. Al-Ghazali addresses these issues in *Kifāḥ Dīn*, *Qadhā'if al-Ḥaqq*, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, and *al-Islām wa al-Zahf al-Aḥmar*.
185. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.188.
186. Ibid., p.197.
187. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, p.47. For al-Ghazali's critique of the Muslim Brotherhood in the stage of al-Banna's post-assassination. See *Fī Mawḳib al-Da'wah*, pp.80-81.
188. Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.62. Al-Ghazali argues that while the allegations making the Muslim brothers out to be anarchists are false, yet the claims of their impeccability are mere pride. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhā'if al-Ḥaqq*, p.81.
189. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, p.51.

190. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p. 56; See also al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p. 196.
191. Al-Ghazali views the differences between the Sunnites and Shi'ites as more political than religious. See *Zālām min al-Gharb*, p. 278.
192. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Contemporary Arab Thought*, p. 223.
193. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, p. 33.
194. Al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Da'wah*, p. 14. Al-Ghazali says: "I used to accept things from him and leave others, followed him and argued with him. Al-Banna used to see both satisfaction and criticism from me." Ibid.
195. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhā'if al-Haqq*, pp. 81-82.
196. Al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Da'wah*, p. 13.
197. The following are al-Banna's Twenty Principles: 1) Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life; 2) The glorious Qur'an and the purified tradition (Sunnah) of the Prophet are the reference points for every Muslim to acquaint himself with the rules of Islam; 3) True belief, proper worship, and struggle in the Way of Allah have light and warmth; 4) Talismans, incantations, placing of shells around the neck, fortune telling whether by drawing lines on sand or astrology, sorcery and claiming to have knowledge of the unseen and similar practices are all evils that must be fought, except what is mentioned in the Qur'an or transmitted to us as authentic narrations of the Prophet; 5) The opinion of an Imam or his deputy is acceptable in matters which are of proven benefit to the public, provided that his opinion does not conflict with any established principle of Islam; 6) Everyone's opinion except that of the unfailing Prophet is liable to changes and modifications; 7) Any Muslim who has not reached the level of understanding the different branches of Islamic jurisprudence may follow one of the four great Imams of this religion; 8) Differences regarding the branches of Islamic Jurisprudence should not be allowed to cause division, contention, or hatred within the ranks of the Muslims; 9) This category includes debating minute aspects of rulings in cases which have never occurred, investigating the meaning of the Qur'anic verses which are still beyond the scope of human knowledge (the *mutashābihāt* verses), and differentiating between the Companions of the Prophet or investigating the instances of disagreements among them. Every *ṣaḥābī* (may Allah be pleased with them all) has the honor and distinction of being a Companion of the Messenger of Allah, and to each is the recompense of his motives; 10) Recognising Allah's existence, believing in His oneness, and glorifying Him are the most sublime beliefs of Islam; 11) Every innovation introduced by people into the Religion

of Allah on the grounds of their whims and without authentic foundation, whether by adding to the principles of Islam or taking away from them, is a serious deviation which must be fought and abolished by the best means as long as it does not lead to a greater evil; 12) There is a difference of opinion regarding innovations which do not contradict established Islamic principles; 13) Love of pious people, respecting them, and honoring their righteous achievements brings one closer to Allah; 14) Visiting grave sites and tombs is an authentic Sunnah if done in the manner prescribed by the Prophet, but seeking the help of the dead, whomever they may be, appealing to them, asking them to fulfil certain requests, vowing to them, and swearing with their names instead of the name of Allah, building high tombs, covering them with curtains, and illuminating them are all evil innovations that are equally prohibited. We do not need to interpret such actions giving excuses for them; 15) Supplication to Allah via an intermediary is a minor difference of opinion; 16) Erroneous practices of people should not change the realities of legal terms. When something in essence contradicts an Islamic principle, it should then be opposed irrespective of what people call it; 17) Belief is the basis of action; 18) Islam liberates the mind, urges contemplation of the universe, honors science and scientists, and welcomes all that is good and beneficial to mankind; 19) Islamic principles may be evident or uncertain, as are pure scientific principles; 20) Never label as an unbeliever (*kāfir*) any Muslim who has confessed the two declarations (*shahādah*) of faith, acts accordingly and performs the obligatory (*farḍ*) duties of Islam unless he clearly professes the word of unbelief, refuses to acknowledge a fundamental principle of Islam, denies the purity of the Qur'an, or commits an evident act of unbelief. See Said Hawwa, *Fī Āfāq al-Ta'ālīm* (In the Horizon of Teaching Banna) (Beirut, Lebanon: The Holy Qur'an Publishing House, 1980), pp.168-173.

198. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.5. It appears that al-Banna profoundly inspired al-Ghazali's book *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah al-Thaqāfiyyah*.
199. This collective responsibility implies support for *da'wah* and does not negate individual efforts of *du'āt*.
200. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, pp.236-237.
201. Al-Ghazali states: "I believe that Muslim societies need these additions, referring to his new principles." Ibid., p.236.
202. Alalwani, "Shaykhunā Muḥammad al-Ghazālī wa-Ṣafahāt min Ḥayātih," *Islāmiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, 7 (1997), pp.9-10.
203. See for example, al-Ghazālī, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, pp.78-85.

204. Ibid., p.86.
205. Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.36.
206. Al-Ghazali acknowledged that as a student of Hasan al-Banna, he benefited from his example, gained piety through his guidance and also learned from his comments. See al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Daʿwah*, p.14.
207. Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.96.
208. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 3, p.166.
209. Muhammad Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p.21.
210. Uways, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, pp.140-141.
211. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī fī Mīzān al-Sharʿ wa al-ʿAql* (Our Intellectual Heritage in the Perspective of Reason and Revelation) (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2003), p.83.
212. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, pp.50-51.
213. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ʿAraftuh*, p.37.
214. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, pp.50-51.
215. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil Qarnahā al-Khāmis ʿAshar* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2001), pp.68-92.
216. Al-Ghazali describes his position on leadership as follows: “I dislike leading anyone because I prefer the other party as a colleague instead of a follower. I would like however, to meet the person whose heart and mind are great in order for me to deal without artificiality. I dislike having a boss, not out of arrogance, but because most of those leaders, keen to lead, are just slaves (ʿabīd) who hide their disgrace through artificial pride. You may argue that life requires leaders who instruct and lead people towards action. I would not have objected had the order of life been similar to the universe, where small planets rotate around bigger ones. In the natural order, great planets do not revolve around pebbles. People are naturally attracted to great leaders. When the order is mixed and small people are required to grow when the big should shrink, then you expect nothing but chaos and failure.” See al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Daʿwah*, pp.15-16.
217. Fathi Malkawi, *Al-ʿAtāʾ al-Fikrī*, pp.229-260. See also Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, pp.47-90.
218. *Maʿa Allāh* is addressed to *duʿāt* only and provides a series of seminars on *daʿwah* delivered in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Al-Azhar. The administration of Al-Azhar requested al-Ghazali to lecture on *daʿwah* according to a certain methodology (*minhāj*). This book discusses definitions and methods of *daʿwah*, in addition to the general rules extracted from the *daʿwah* of the prophets.

Notes

219. Al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt*, p.209.
220. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, vol. 3, p.3.
221. Ibid.
222. Uways, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī: Tārīkhuh*, pp.10-11.
223. Al-Ghazali, *Ta'ammulāt*, p.209.
224. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, vol. 2, pp.111-112.
225. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.6.
226. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p.43. In 1943, al-Ghazali was appointed as Imam and preacher in the Mosque of al-ʿAtabah al-Khaḍra' in Cairo. See Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.24.
227. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.178.
228. Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.24. Al-Ghazali was assigned to the preaching administration in Al-Azhar, and was later appointed as the Director of mosques and religious training. In July 1971, he became the Director of *Da'wah* and Guidance, and was promoted to the position of undersecretary in the Ministry of Endowment, charged with Islamic *da'wah* in March 1981. See Imarah, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.30.
229. Shalabi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.25.
230. Adawi, *Lamsat Wafā' ilā al-Imām Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.27.
231. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.226. In Egypt, al-Ghazali carried out his *da'wah* through the Ministry of Endowment, and worked in higher education for nearly twenty years. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.140. See also *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, vol. 3, p.36.
232. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.226; Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, pp.56-57.
233. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.226.
234. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.67.
235. Ala M. al-Ghazali, "Al-Sīrah al-Shakhṣiyyah," p.186.
236. Alalwani, "Shaykhunā Muḥammad al-Ghazālī Raḥimahu Allāh," pp.13-14.
237. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, p.62.
238. Ishaq al-Farhan, "Kalimah Jam'iyyah al-Dirāsāt wa al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyyah" in *Al-ʿAṭā' al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Ḥalqah Dirāsiyyah*, p.21.
239. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, p.62.
240. Uways, *Shaykh Muḥammad Ghazālī*, p.8.
241. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p.77.

242. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Haqq al-Murr*, vol. 3, p.36; Talbi Ammar, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī Kamā 'Araftuh fī al-Jazā'ir," *Islāmiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, pp.50-51.
243. Talbi, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī," *Islāmiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, p.50. It would seem that his stay in Algeria brought him across cases and examples of poor religious understanding and *da'wah* practices, which he addressed in his work *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*. Such examples include the misinterpretation of Moses poking the angel of death's eye, and human suffering at the hand of evil spirits. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.92-93. See also Talbi, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī," pp.52-53.
244. Alalwani, "Shaykhunā Muḥammad al-Ghazālī," *Islāmiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, 7.
245. According to Uways, al-Ghazali might be the only person for whom two public protests were held. The first was during Abd al-Nassir's term, during the preparation of the constitution, which led al-Ghazali to object to the influence of secular and socialist groups on its drafting. The second occurred during Sadat's era when an attempt was made to amend the family laws. Shaykh al-Ghazali urged the public to protest. See Nasr al-Din Larabah, *Hayāt wa Āthār, Shahādāt wa Mawāqif*, 1st edn., (Algeria: Sharikat al-Ummah li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1998), p.23.
246. Alalwani, "Shaykhunā Muḥammad al-Ghazālī", pp.7-8. According to al-Ghazali, the defeat in the War of 1973 was a shame brought about by an absent-minded leadership. The failure of the leadership to observe a minimum degree of consultation and democracy was for him, the primary reason leading to the defeat. See Alalwani, "Shaykhunā Muḥammad al-Ghazālī," p.14.
247. Ibid., p.9. In the prison of Tur, the Muslim Brotherhood unanimously agreed to appoint al-Ghazali as their leader despite the presence of other older inmates. See al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, p.17.
248. Fathi H. Malkawi, "Kalimat al-Ma'had," in *Al-'Aṭā' al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Ḥalqah Dirāsiyyah*, p.16.
249. Fallusi, *Ghuṣn Bāsiq*, p.95.
250. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.6.
251. Alalwani, "Shaykhunā Muḥammad al-Ghazālī," p.11.
252. Uways, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.8.
253. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, p.74.
254. Ala M. al-Ghazali, "Al-Sīrah al-Shakhṣiyyah," p.195.
255. Larabah, *Hayāt wa Āthār*, p.26.
256. Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p.5.

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257. Ibrahim M. Abu al-Rabi, "Muslim Self-Criticism in Contemporary Arab Thought," p.224.
258. Gharib, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī: Ḥayātuh*, pp.83-85.

2: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DA‘WAH

1. The following example shows al-Ghazali's concern over the intelligent representation of Islam in the West: "What does Islam gain from Muslim youth who in their travels to Europe or America wear white garments and sit on the floor to eat food using their fingers under the assumption that they are practicing the etiquette of the Prophet Muhammad in regards to food, and by doing so have introduced the Sunnah. What do westerners think when a person who is standing holding a glass then sits down to drink in order to follow the Sunnah? Is this what will attract people to Islam? See al-Ghazali, *al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī*, p.59.
2. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.77.
3. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt al-Qur’ān*, p.95.
4. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, p.18.
5. Ibid., pp.16-17. The Qur'an states: "Because of this, then, summon [all mankind], and pursue the right course, as thou hast been bidden [by God]; and do not follow their likes and dislikes, but say: "I believe in whatever revelation God has bestowed from on high; and I am bidden to bring about equity in your mutual views. God is our Sustainer as well as your Sustainer. To us shall be accounted our deeds, and to you, your deeds. Let there be no contention between us and you: God will bring us all together – for with Him is all journeys' end" (42:15); "But although they entered [Joseph's city] in the way their father had bidden them, this proved of no avail whatever to them against [the plan of] God. [His request] had served only to satisfy Jacob's heartfelt desire [to protect them]: for, behold, thanks to what We had imparted unto him, he was indeed endowed with the knowledge [that God's will must always prevail]; but most people know it not." (12:68); "To every People have We appointed rites and ceremonies which they must follow: let them not then dispute with thee on the matter, but do thou invite (them) to thy Lord: for thou art assuredly on the Right Way" (22:67); "Call unto the way of your Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! your Lord is Best Aware of him who strays from His way, and He is Best Aware of those who go aright" (16:125); "And who

could be better of speech than he who calls [his fellow-men] unto God, and does what is just and right, and says, ‘Verily, I am of those who have surrendered themselves to God?’” (41:33); “And We ordained for him in the tablets [of the Law] all manner of admonition, clearly spelling out everything. And [We said:] ‘Hold fast unto them with [all thy] strength, and bid thy people to hold fast to their most goodly rules.’ I will show you the way the iniquitous shall go” (7:145); “And Allah summons to the abode of peace, and leads whom He will to a straight path” (10:25).

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p.18. The Qur’an refers to this aspect in the following: “Say [O Prophet]: ‘This is my way: Resting upon conscious insight accessible to reason, I am calling [you all] unto God – I and they who follow me.’ And [say:] ‘Limitless is God in His glory; and I am not one of those who ascribe divinity to aught beside Him!’” (12:108).
8. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.197.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p.16. This is made in reference to the Qur’an: “[We sent all these] apostles as heralds of glad tidings and as warners, so that men might have no excuse before God after [the coming of] these apostles; and God is indeed Almighty, Wise” (4:165).
11. Ibid., p.17.
12. Ibid.
13. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma‘ālim al-Ḥaqq*, p.164.
14. Ibid., p.17.
15. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.218.
16. Al-Ghazali, *Ta‘ammulāt*, p.76.
17. Al-Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālat*, 2, p.55.
18. Al-Ghazali, *‘Aqīdat al-Muslim* (The Muslim Creed) (Dār al-Qalam. 1999), p.188.
19. Al-Ghazali, *‘Ilal wa Adwiyah* (Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p.31.
20. Al-Ghazali, *‘Aqīdat al-Muslim*, p.202.
21. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, p.91.
22. Al-Ghazali, *Nazarāt*, p.95.
23. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.135.
24. The Qur’an illustrates this question in the following verses: “And no reward whatever do I ask of you for it: my reward rests with none but the Sustainer of all the worlds” (26:109). “Those were the (prophets) who received Allah’s

guidance: Copy the guidance they received; Say: ‘No reward for this do I ask of you: This is no less than a message for the nations’” (6:90). “O my people! I ask of you no reward for this (Message). My reward is from none but Him who created me: Will ye not then understand?” (11:51); “Say: ‘No reward do I ask of you for it but this: that each one who will may take a (straight) Path to his Lord’” (25:57); “...Say [O Prophet]: ‘No reward do I ask of you for this [message] other than [that you should] love your fellow-men’...” (42:23); “But if you turn away [from the message which I bear, remember that] I have asked no reward whatever of you: my reward rests with none but God, for I have been bidden to be among those who have surrendered themselves unto Him” (10:72).

25. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Tarīq min Hunā*, p.76. The Qur’an says: “And We made them leaders, guiding (men) by Our Command, and We sent them inspiration to do good deeds, to establish regular prayers, and to practise regular charity; and they constantly served Us (and Us only)” (21:73).
26. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na‘lam* (From Here we Know) (Giza, Egypt: Dār Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Naṣhr wa al-Tawzī‘, 2005), p.95.
27. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, p.92.
28. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.81. The Qur’an states: “And We gave them the clear Scripture, And showed them the right path” (37: 117-118).
29. Ibid., 3, p.81.
30. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, pp.18-19.
31. The Qur’an states: “But the sincere (and devoted) Servants of Allah” (37:40).
32. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, pp.171-172.
33. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā‘iz al-Īmān*, p.24. Al-Ghazali argues that religion embraces both the message (*al-risālah*) and the Muslim nation (Ummah). The former being the divine guidance leading to the straight path and calling upon others to follow; the latter is the group that translates the divine guidance from theory into practice, (i.e.) the nation’s understanding and practice of revelation and invitation to it. See al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Aduwiyah*, p.236.
34. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.181. According to al-Ghazali, those who can conceive belief yet their hearts are emotionless with no feeling whatsoever except for their own selves, and with no care except for their personal needs; those people have deficient belief and cloudy direction. Ibid., 3, p.181.
35. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.72.

36. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.181.
37. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhāʾif al-Ḥaqq*, p.223.
38. Al-Ghazali, *Rakāʾiz al-Īmān*, p.23.
39. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.17.
40. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīmunā*, p.12. The Qurʾan says: “And so, set thy face steadfastly towards the [one ever-true] faith, turning away from all that is false, in accordance with the natural disposition which God has instilled into man: [for,] not to allow any change to corrupt what God has thus created this is the [purpose of the one] ever-true faith; but most people know it not” (30:30), 3, p.82.
41. Al-Ghazali, *Nazarāt*, p.51.
42. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.31.
43. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.75.
44. Ibid., pp.171-172.
45. Ibid., p.35.
46. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.49.
47. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim al-Ḥaqq*, p.148.
48. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.72.
49. Ibid., p.35.
50. Al-Ghazali, *Miʾat Sūʾāl* (One Hundred Questions) (Cairo: Dār al-Muqattam li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 2004), p.283.
51. Al-Ghazali, *Khuluq al-Muslim* (Muslim Character) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2004), p.218.
52. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.7.
53. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.52.
54. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.40.
55. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.55.
56. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.172.
57. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.40.
58. Ibid., p.19.
59. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.52.
60. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.250.
61. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.10.
62. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.172.
63. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.218.
64. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.92.
65. Ibid., p.171.

66. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.250. According to al-Ghazali, corruption often creeps into religious circles through emotional excessiveness and intellectual ambiguity. See al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.238.
67. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakkkhur*, p.40.
68. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.250.
69. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.171.
70. Ibid.
71. Al-Ghazali, *Huqūq al-Insān*, p.218.
72. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.162.
73. Al-Ghazali, *Rakāʿiz al-ʾImān*, p.215.
74. Al-Ghazali, *Maqālāt al-Ghazālī*, 1, p.74.
75. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.10.
76. Ibid., 11. See also al-Ghazali, *Qadhāʾif al-Ḥaqq*, p.165.
77. Ibid., p.76.
78. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.256.
79. *Mushtarak*, the active or passive participles of the form VIII verb *ishtaraka* “to be associated with, common to.” Al-Jurjānī defines the term as qualifying a noun “which has come into use for its multiple meanings, like the word *ʿayn*, because of its association with several meanings.” See Troupeau, G. “Mushtarik or Mushtarak.” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. McGill University Library. 21 April 2008.
80. Ahmad Ghalwash, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah* (Islamic *Daʿwah*) (Lebanon: Al-Sharikah al-ʿĀlamiyyah li al-Kitāb, 1987), p.12.
81. Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr*, p.107.
82. Al-Ghazali is not alone in this. In a chapter entitled “*Faṣl fi Anna Dīna al-Anbiyāʾ Wāḥid*” (The Religion of the Prophets is One), Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the religion of prophets is one, namely the religion of Islam. Laws, however, change for a wisdom as was the example of changing the direction of prayer to Jerusalem, which was later changed to the Kaʿbah. Laws changed but religion remains the same. Ibn Taymiyyah draws on the tradition of the Prophet: “We, prophets, our religion is but one (*innā maʿāshir al-anbiyāʾ dimunā wāḥid*).” See Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyyah, *Jāmiʿ al-Rasāʾil al-Majmūʿah al-ʾUlā*, (ed.), Muhammad Rashad Salim, (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanī, 1969), p.274.
83. Ibid., p.237. Al-Ghazali draws on the following verse as a point of reference: “To the righteous (when) it is said, ‘What is it that your Lord has revealed?’

- they say, ‘All that is good.’ To those who do good, there is good in this world, and the Home of the Hereafter is even better and excellent indeed is the Home of the righteous” (16:30).
84. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.76. To support the wide scope of *da‘wah*, al-Ghazali argues that just like prayer or fasting, technical and administrative expertise are considered righteous deeds. See al-Ghazali, *Al-Haqq al-Murr*, 3, p.133.
 85. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3:90.
 86. Qur’an, 30:30: “And so, set thy face steadfastly towards the [one ever-true] faith, turning away from all that is false, in accordance with the natural disposition which God has instilled into man: [for,] not to allow any change to corrupt what God has thus created this is the [purpose of the one] ever-true faith; but most people know it not.”
 87. Al-Ghazali, *Jur‘āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.130; See also al-Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma‘ālim al-Haqq*, p.94.
 88. Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar’ Ta‘ārūḍ al-‘Aql wa al-Naql* (Repulsion of Conflict between Reason and Transmitted Texts (of [Shari‘ah])), (ed.), Muhammad Rashad Salim (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia, Jāmi‘ah al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Sa‘ūd al-Islāmiyyah, 1979-1981), 4, p.284.
 89. Qur’an, 30:30.
 90. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar’ Ta‘ārūḍ*, 4, p.284.
 91. Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi‘ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān* (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1987), 21, p.26.
 92. Ibid., p.27.
 93. Majority (*bulūgh*) in Islamic law is, generally speaking, determined by physical maturity in either sex (the Shāfi‘is explicitly lay down a minimum limit of nine years); should physical maturity not manifest itself, majority is presumed at a certain age: fifteen years according to the Ḥanafīs, Shāfi‘is and Ḥanbalīs, eighteen years according to the Mālikīs (various other opinions are ascribed to the old authorities). Within these limits, the declaration of the person concerned that he or she has reached puberty is accepted. Majority is one of the conditions of full legal capacity; the minor is subject to a legal disability (*ḥajr*) and to the guardianship of his father or other legal guardian. See (eds). “Baligh.” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. McGill University Library. 21 April 2008.

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94. Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Anṣārī al-Qurṭubī, *MukhtaṣarTafsīr al-Qurṭubī*, (ed.), ShaykhMuhammad Karim Rajih, (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1987), 4, p.88.
95. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar’ Ta‘āruḍ*, p.279.
96. Al-Qurṭubī, *MukhtaṣarTafsīr al-Qurṭubī*, 4, p.88.
97. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar’ Ta‘āruḍ*, p.279.
98. This contradicts the Qur’anic description: “And Allah brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers knowing nothing, and gave you hearing and sight and hearts that haply ye might give thanks” (16:78).
99. Ibid., p.289.
100. Ibid., p.287.
101. Ibid., p.279.
102. Qur’an, 7: 172-173.
103. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, p.56.
104. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar’ Ta‘āruḍ*, 4, p.302.
105. *Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr* (Abridged), (ed.), Safiur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, (Saudi Arabia: Maktabat Dār al-Salām, 2003), vol.4, p.47.
106. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar’ Ta‘āruḍ*, 4, p.280. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, *ḥanīf* in the language of the Arabs connotes purity and righteousness. There is no better righteousness than the religion of Islam. Ibid., p.283. *Ḥanīf* (pl. *ḥunafā’*), a believer who is not a polytheist (*mushrik*). The Arabic root *ḥ-n-f* initially means “to incline,” so that *ḥanīf* is most probably understood in the Qur’an as one who has abandoned the prevailing religions and has inclined to a religion of his own. It occurs once as a synonym of Muslim and also in juxtaposition with the verb *aslama*. The Qur’anic prototype of the ideal *ḥanīf* is Abraham, and being a *ḥanīf* signifies belonging to the “religion” (*millah*) of Abraham. In Qur’anic terminology, his *ḥanīf* monotheism consists of inclining his face towards God. A *ḥanīfī* monotheism is therefore part of the natural constitution (*fiṭrah*) with which one has been created. The Qur’anic Prophet, too, is requested to become a *ḥanīf* by setting his face upright towards the true religion, and the same demand is also imposed on the rest of the people. See Rubin, Uri. “Hanif.” *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an*. General Editor, Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. McGill University Library. 25 April 2008.
107. This age is reached when the child can take care of himself/herself and no longer needs an adult to help him eat, get dressed, and clean himself/herself.

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108. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar' Ta'ārud*, 4, p.318.
109. Ibid., pp.286-287.
110. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.63.
111. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'al*, p.283.
112. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Ḥayāt," p.200.
113. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.53.
114. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.122.
115. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Ḥayātaka*, p.9.
116. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.61.
117. Ibid., p.6.
118. Ibid., p.53.
119. Ibid., p.8.
120. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Ḥayātaka*, p.59.
121. Ibid., p.9.
122. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.51. The Qur'an states: "When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam – from their loins – their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): 'Am I not your Lord (who cherishes and sustains you)?' – They said: 'Yea! We do.' (This), lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: 'Of this we were never mindful': Or lest ye should say: 'Our fathers before us may have taken false gods, but we are (their) descendants after them: wilt Thou then destroy us because of the deeds of men who were futile?'" (7:172-173).
123. Ibid., p.148.
124. The Qur'an states: "We have, without doubt, sent down the Message; and We will assuredly guard it (from corruption)" (15:9).
125. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, p.148.
126. Ibid.
127. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Da'wah* (The Future of *Da'wah*) (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1997), p.15.
128. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.51.
129. Al-Ṣan'ānī, *Kitāb Iqāz al-Fikrah li Murāja'āt al-Fiṭrah*, p.204.
130. Ibid., pp.203-204.
131. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.50.
132. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.204.
133. Al-Ghazali suggested integrating the criteria of determining the actions as good or vile in the process of public education. See al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.142. For al-Ghazali the insight through which good or

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- evil are distinguished is among God's greatest gifts upon people. See al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.142.
134. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.50.
135. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.142.
136. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.51. This is the example of the Islamic religion which introduces teachings that preserve *fiṭrah* from anomalistic and adverse germs. See al-Ghazali, *Hādhā Dīmunā*, p.12.
137. Ibid.
138. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.63.
139. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.59.
140. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Hayātaka*, p.8.
141. Ibid., p.62.
142. *Min Ma'ālim al-Ḥaqq*, p.148. According to al-Ghazali, the example of the unity of human nature in its search for goodness and the implications of revelation is similar to the unity of two different individuals offering similar responses to a common question. See al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Hayātaka*, p.5.
143. Al-Ghazali, *Hādhā Dīmunā*, p.260.
144. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar' Ta'āruḍ*, 4, p.319.
145. Ibid., p.320.
146. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.51.
147. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, p.94.
148. Ibid., p.62.
149. See al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.64; See also al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'āl*, p.139.
150. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'āl*, p.139.
151. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.51.
152. Al-Ghazali, *Hādhā Dīmunā*, p.12.
153. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, pp.59-60.
154. Al-Ghazali, "Qiṣṣat Hayāt," p.200.
155. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, pp.68-69.
156. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā'iyyah*, p.74.
157. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.59.
158. Al-Ghazali, *Ḍalām min al-Gharb*, p.39.
159. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā'iz al-Īmān*, p.82.
160. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.120. For al-Ghazali, respect for democracy and human rights is consistent with *fiṭrah*. Islam is the highest expression of *fiṭrah*. Accordingly, for al-Ghazali, western politics and human rights are often closer to the values of Islam than are some Arab governments. Ibid.

161. Al-Ghazali, *Zalām min al-Gharb*, p.39.
162. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Hayātak*, p.12.
163. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā‘iyah*, p.74.
164. Al-Ghazali, *al-Ghazw al-Thaqāfi*, p.18. The common terms are referred to in the Qur’an: “Say: ‘O followers of earlier revelation! Come unto that tenet which we and you hold in common: that we shall worship none but God, and that we shall not ascribe divinity to aught beside Him, and that we shall not take human beings for our lords beside God.’ And if they turn away, then say: ‘Bear witness that it is we who have surrendered ourselves unto Him’” (3: 64).
165. Ibid., p.17.
166. Al-Ghazali, “Qīṣṣat Hayāt,” p.201.
167. *Ahl al-Fatrah* (those who received no message or messenger).
168. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, p.63.
169. The Qur’an states: “Who receiveth guidance, receiveth it for his own benefit: who goeth astray doth so to his own loss: No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another: nor would We visit with Our Wrath until We had sent an apostle (to give warning)” (17:15).
170. Qur’an, 2:62.
171. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, pp.53-54.
172. Ibid.
173. Qur’an, 2: 62.
174. Muhammad Abduh, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Karīm al-Musammā Tafsīr al-Manār* (The Interpretation of the Glorious Qur’an, called *Tafsīr of al-Manār*), (ed.), Muhammad Rashid Rida, (Al-Ha’yah al-Miṣriyyah al-‘Āmmah li al-Kitāb, 1972), 1, p.279.
175. Ibid., 1, p.580. Al-Ṭabarī argues that Qur’an commentators disagree over the religious group Sabians. Some argue that the Sabians include all those who leave their religion for another. Some others believe that they are those who had no religion. Al-Ṭabarī quotes Mujaḥid’s statement: “The Sabians have no religion. They are neither Christians nor Jews,” and Ibn Zayd’s statement: “The Sabians believed in a religion that existed in the Arabian Peninsula. They believed in the oneness of God, but did not believe in any prophet. They had no rituals (‘amal), book, or a messenger.” See Abū Ja‘far ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi‘ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān* (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah li al-Ṭibā‘ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1987), 21, p.253.
176. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, pp.64-65.

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177. Abd al-Halim Mahmud, *Ālamiyyat al-Risālah al-Islāmiyyah* (The Universality of the Islamic Message) (Al-Manṣūrah: Dār al-Wafā' li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Naṣh wa al-Tawzī', 1992), pp.571-572.
178. Ibid., pp.576-577.
179. Ibid., p.575.
180. Ibid., pp.577-585.
181. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.69.
182. The Qur'an states: "Who receiveth guidance, receiveth it for his own benefit: who goeth astray doth so to his own loss: No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another: nor would We visit with Our Wrath until We had sent an apostle (to give warning)" (17:15). The Ash'ariyyah is a theological school, the followers of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī. During the last two decades of his life al-Ash'arī attracted a number of disciples, and thus a school was founded. Despite opposition the Ash'ariyyah apparently became the dominant school in the Arabic-speaking parts of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate (and perhaps also in Khurāsān). In general, they were in alliance with the legal school of al-Shāfi'ī, while their rivals, the Māturīdiyyah, were almost invariably Ḥanafīs. Towards the middle of the 5th AH/11th CE century, the Ash'ariyyah were persecuted by the Buwayhid sultans, who favored a combination of the views of the Mu'tazilah and Shi'ah. But with the coming of the Saldjūqs the tables were turned, and the Ash'ariyyah received official support, especially from the great *wazīr* Nizām al-Mulk. In return, they gave intellectual support to the caliphate against the Fātimids of Cairo. From this time on, until perhaps the beginning of the 8th/14th century, the teaching of the Ash'ariyyah was almost identical with orthodoxy, and in a sense it has remained so until the present time. Watt, W. Montgomery, "Ash'ariyyah." *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. McGill University Library. 5 April 2008.
183. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.64.
184. Ibid., p.54.
185. Ibid., p.52.
186. Ibid., p.54.
187. Ibid. Shaykh Abd al-Halim Mahmud doubts these groups still exist today given the advance in modern communication. See Abd al-Halim Mahmud, *Ālamiyyat al-Risālah al-Islāmiyyah*, 575. In his discussion of "The position of those who were not exposed to *da'wah* or have instead received a distorted

- image of *daʿwah*,” Shaykh Mahmud argues that if *Ahl al-Fatrah*, do still exist, then like the primitive tribes living in jungles, should then be very few in number. Ibid.
188. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.56.
189. Ibid., p.55. This group, according to al-Ghazali resembles *Ahl al-Fatrah* among the Arabs preceding the advent of Islam, whom the Qurʾan states about them: “Who receiveth guidance, receiveth it for his own benefit: who goeth astray doth so to his own loss: No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another: nor would We visit with Our Wrath until We had sent an apostle (to give warning)” (17:15). Ibid.
190. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.56.
191. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.64.
192. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.56. The Qurʾan states: “And now verily We have caused the Word to reach them, that they may give heed” (28: 51).
193. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Hayātak*, p.8.
194. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.70.
195. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah li al-Qurʾān al-Karīm* (The Five Themes of the Glorious Qurʾan) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), p.24.
196. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.70.
197. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.14.
198. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.32.
199. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.168.
200. Ibid., p.166.
201. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.31. “And We have not sent thee (O Muhammad) save as a bringer of good tidings and a warner unto all mankind; but most of mankind know not” (34:28); “Say [O Muhammad]: ‘O mankind! Verily, I am an apostle of God to all of you, [sent by Him] unto whom the dominion over the heavens and the earth belongs! There is no deity save Him; He [alone] grants life and deals death!’ Believe, then, in God and His Apostle – the unlettered Prophet who believes in God and His words – and follow him, so that you might find guidance!” (7:158); “And who seeks as religion other than Islam it will not be accepted from him, and he will be one of the losers in the Hereafter” (3:85); “Lo! It is nothing else than a reminder for all mankind. And you will come in time to know the truth thereof” (38:87-88); “Thus, have We made of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves; and We appointed the *Qiblah* to which thou wast used, only to

test those who followed the Messenger from those who would turn on their heels (From the Faith). Indeed it was (A change) momentous, except to those guided by Allah. And never would Allah make your faith of no effect. For Allah is to all people Most surely full of kindness, Most Merciful” (2:143); and “Blessed is He Who has revealed unto His servant the Criterion (of right and wrong), that he may be a warner to mankind” (25:1).

202. “This is nothing else than a reminder unto the worlds” (81:27); “For [even] before thy time, [O Muhammad,] We never sent [as Our apostles] any but [mortal] men, whom We inspired – hence, [tell the deniers of the truth,] ‘If you do not know this, ask the followers of earlier revelation’” (21:7); “And though you try much, most men will not believe. You ask them no fee for it. It is nothing else than a reminder unto the worlds” (12:103-104); “Say: ‘What could most weightily bear witness to the truth?’ Say: ‘God is witness between me and you; and this Qur’an has been revealed unto me so that on the strength thereof I might warn you and all whom it may reach.’ Could you in truth bear witness that there are other deities side by side with God? Say: ‘I bear no [such] witness!’ Say: ‘He is the One God; and, behold, far be it from me to ascribe divinity, as, you do, to aught beside Him!’” (6:19); “Those were the (prophets) who received Allah’s guidance: Copy the guidance they received; Say: ‘No reward for this do I ask of you: This is no less than a message for the nations’” (6:90). See al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, pp.165-166.
203. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.166; Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt al-Ghazālī*, 2, p.175.
204. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.166; Al-Ghazali argues that he enumerated twelve verses in the Qur’an about the universality of *Da‘wah*, and found out that they were all revealed in Makkah, and this means they were revealed during days where (the religion of) Islam was trying to free itself from idolatry. The Qur’an states: “Muḥammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he is) the Messenger of Allah, and the Seal of the Prophets: and Allah has full knowledge of all things” (33:40).
205. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, 166; Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.175.
206. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta’akbkhur*, p.148.
207. Al-Ghazali, *Ta’ammulāt*, p.73.
208. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaḡīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.234.
209. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.172.

210. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.179.
211. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, pp.145-147.
212. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.179.
213. Al-Ghazali, *Ẓālām min al-Gharb*, p.43. On this occasion, al-Ghazali disapprovingly quotes a *muftī* to the effect that learning different languages is permissible under extreme necessity only. The *muftī* uses Ibn Taymiyyah as an authority in his case; Al-Ghazali writes: “Ibn Taymiyyah was not an ignorant person to say such a thing, and how could that have had happened when the Prophet Muhammad is sent to people speaking different languages.” See al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wihdah al-Thaqāfiyyah*, p.16.
214. Al-Ghazali, *‘Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.237.
215. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.164.
216. Ibid., p.15.
217. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā‘iyah*, p.53.
218. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta’akhhur*, pp.94-95.
219. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.62.
220. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.181.
221. Al-Ghazali, *‘Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.121.
222. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.234.
223. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah*, pp.145-147.
224. Ibid., p.174.
225. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta’akhhur*, p.94.
226. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā‘iyah*, p.3.
227. Al-Ghazali, *‘Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.199.
228. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.184.
229. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhā’if al-Ḥaqq*, p.238.
230. Ibid., p.184. Al-Ghazali describes Muslims today as being ignorant of their universal mission. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.178.
231. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā‘iyah*, p.3.
232. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.57.
233. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.62.
234. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.15. Abū Hurayrah reported Allah’s Messenger as saying: “No child is born but upon *fiṭrah*. He then said. Recite: The nature made by Allah in which He created man, there is no altering of Allah’s nature; that is the right religion.” *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* 4:2047. The following tradition is also similar. “Every child is born upon the *fiṭrah*, it is only his parents who turn him into... a Zoroastrian.” See *Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr*,

Notes

- (Abridged), (ed.), Safiur-Rahman al-Mubarkfuri, (Saudi Arabia: Maktabat Dār al-Salām), vol. 4, p.46. Al-Ghazali however, disagrees that attention to economic factors vis-à-vis morals and virtues, is an inclination to communism or materialism, or a neglect of the effects of spiritual potentials which protect humans from sin or disobedience. Al-Ghazali, *ibid.*, pp.91-92. For al-Ghazali, every economic progress irrespective of its origin enhances the Islamic message. See *Sirr Ta'akhhur*, p.5.
235. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.54. Al-Ghazali argues that the Qur'an contains teachings about personal and public relationships. See al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.54.
236. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr* (The Bitter Truth) (Giza, Egypt: Nahḍat Miṣr, 2005), 1, p.111.
237. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, pp.95-96.
238. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.54.
239. Al-Ghazali, *Ẓalām min al-Gharb*, p.211.
240. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa-Awḍā'unā*, pp.91-92.
241. Al-Ghazali, *ʿAqīdat al-Muslim*, p.13.
242. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.63.
243. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyya fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī*, p.5.
244. True worship according to al-Ghazali, not only safeguards human thought, but constantly struggles against distortive environments. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.111. Religious teachings consider the living reality through examination, contemplation, and comprehension (*tafahhum*, *tadabbur*, and *istī'āb*). The deviated living reality should be dismissed altogether and be replaced with the truth. It should be subjected to examination and analysis in order to understand its nature, reason, and causes. Abd al-Majid al-Najjar, "Al-Fikr al-Wāqī'ī fī al-Nahḍah al-Islāmiyyah" in *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah, al-Wasā'il, al-Khuṭaṭ, al-Madākhil* (Riyadh: WAMY, 1982), p.210.
245. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.63.
246. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣṣaḥaf*, p.14.
247. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.55.
248. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.177. Al-Ghazali wrote about "Fann al-Ikhtilāṭ wa al-'Uzlah," *Min Ma'ālim*, p.72.
249. *Ibid.*, p.5.
250. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.69.
251. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, p.177.

252. Al-Ghazali, *ʿAqīdat al-Muslim*, p.13.
253. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.202.
254. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.68.
255. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.147. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī argues that the religious order cannot be fulfilled without the order of the mundane life. Religious order that is accomplished through knowledge and worship can only be achieved with a healthy body and living, and with minimum requirement of clothing, shelter, food, and security. He who wakes up safe in his household, with a healthy body and food sufficing his day, is just like he who owns the whole world. Religion shall not be in order unless basic necessities are secured. He who constantly struggles for safety against aggressors or seeks his livelihood from the unjust will not be free to work or seek knowledge; both are means to the Hereafter. The order of life, that is basic necessities, is a requirement for religious order. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Al-Iqtisād fī al-ʿitiqād* (The Middle Path in Belief), p.258.
256. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.147.
257. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa-Awḍāʿunā*, p.61.
258. Ibid., p.62.
259. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah* (Concerns of a Dāʿiyah) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), p.129.
260. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.147.
261. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakbkhur*, p.89.
262. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.147.
263. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa-Awḍāʿunā*, p.69.
264. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.147. The Qurʾan states: “O ye Children of Adam! We have bestowed raiment upon you to cover your shame, as well as to be an adornment to you. But the raiment of righteousness, - that is the best. Such are among the Signs of Allah, that they may receive admonition!” (7:26).
265. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.120.
266. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq Min Hunā*, p.44.
267. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakbkhur*, p.5.
268. Ibid., p.33.
269. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.105.
270. Ibid., p.129.
271. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa min al-Islām* (Not from Islam) (Beirut: Al-Dār al-Shāmiyyah, 1999), p.231.

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272. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.169.
273. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyyah*, p.129.
274. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhkhur*, p.32.
275. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.169.
276. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhkhur*, p.31.
277. Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islam?*, p.6.
278. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.13.
279. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 5, pp.12-13.
280. Ibid.
281. Ibid., 5, p.13.
282. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.155.
283. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.39.
284. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jānib al-ʿĀtifī*, p.10.
285. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.183.
286. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.204.
287. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhkhur*, p.32.
288. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islam wa al-Ṭāqāt al-Muʿaṭṭalah* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2001), p.60.
289. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīmunā*, p.67.
290. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.92.
291. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāʾif al-Ḥaqq*, p.235.
292. Ibid., p.55.
293. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, pp.219-220; Al-Ghazali, *Kifāh Dīn* (Struggle of a Religion) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), p.108.
294. Al-Ghazali, *Muḥāḍarāt*, p.194.
295. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.73.
296. Al-Ghazali, *Miʿat Sūʾāl*, p.205.
297. Al-Ghazali, *Rakāʾiz al-Īmān*, p.37.
298. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.73.
299. Ibid., p.90.
300. Al-Ghazali, *Miʿat Sūʾāl*, p.205.
301. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah bayna ʿAjz al-Dākhil wa Kayd al-Khārij* (The Struggle of Daʿwah between Internal Deficiencies and External Adversity) (Beirut: Al-Dār al-Shāmiyyah, 1999), p.73. Muslims' appreciation of intellectual persuasion in religious matters led them to discuss the question of whether the belief of the imitator (*muqallid*) is of any worth, and whether it will be of any value in the Hereafter. See al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīmunā*, p.67.

302. Ibid., pp.66-67.
303. Ibid., p.52.
304. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.104.
305. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.87.
306. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Da'wah*, p.15.
307. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīnunā*, p.67.
308. Qur'an, 16:125.
309. Ibid., p.77.
310. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.239.
311. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhā'if al-Haqq*, p.235.
312. Al-Ghazali, *Muḥāḍarāt al-Ghazālī*, p.194.
313. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīnunā*, p.55.
314. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.13.
315. Al-Ghazali, *Zalām min al-Gharb*, p.89.
316. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.128.
317. Ibid., pp.74-75.
318. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.173.
319. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Da'wah*, p.34.
320. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, 107. The Qur'an states: "Say: 'pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the Apostle.' And if you turn away [from the Apostle, know that] he will have to answer only for whatever he has been charged with, and you, for what you have been charged with; but if you pay heed unto him, you will be on the right way. Withal, the Apostle is not bound to do more than clearly deliver the message [entrusted to him]" (24:54).
321. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, p.165.
322. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'al*, p.296.
323. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.91.
324. Al-Ghazali, *Zalām min al-Gharb*, p.89.
325. The Qur'an states: "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things" (2:256).
326. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'al*, p.89.
327. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.173.
328. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'al*, p.296. Al-Ghazali states: "Life is not created for us nor does it function through us only." See al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Da'wah*, p.37.

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329. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.121.
330. Ibid., 1, p.4.
331. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.35.
332. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.65. Based on Qurʾanic verse seventy-five and seventy-six of Surah *Āl-ʿImrān*, al-Ghazali concludes that religious differences should not cause aggression or distress, or create hostility among each other. See al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.30. Using aggression against others exposes Muslims to the wrath of God. See al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.98. Al-Ghazali says; “I believe it is horrible to kill somebody to acquire paradise on the account of his bloodshed. It is horrible to request others to believe in my statements otherwise they will perish.” See al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 2, p.44. Al-Ghazali dislikes those who hold on to their inherited ideas, reject dialogue, or refuse to look at different opinions. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.103.
333. Ibid., p.163.
334. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīmunā*, p.55. Al-Ghazali even suggests punishing those who back up their opinions through terror, or force people to embrace their ways, since such conduct contradicts the practice of presenting opinions kindly and with evidence. See al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.10.
335. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.133-134.
336. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim al-Ḥaqq*, p.164.
337. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.53.
338. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.66.
339. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibdād al-Siyāsī*, p.104. Ibid., p.98.
340. Al-Ghazali, *Kifāh Dīn*, p.20.
341. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.141.
342. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, pp.78-79.
343. Ibid., p.157. The Qurʾan states: “God does not like any evil to be mentioned openly, unless it be by him who has been wronged [thereby]. And God is indeed All-Hearing, All-Knowing” (Chapter 4:148).
344. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Akhīrah*, 6, p.7.
345. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.204.
346. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.237.
347. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.14.
348. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.30.
349. Al-Ghazali makes no reference to class or gender in this context. However his line of thinking is general and can easily be extended to cover class and gender.

350. Al-Ghazali, *Huqūq al-Insān*, p.14.
351. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥalām min al-Gharb*, p.72.
352. Ibid., p.286.
353. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣṣḥaf*, p.141. The Qurʾan states: “And Lo! We did accept a solemn pledge from all the prophets – from thee, [O Muhammad,] as well as from Noah, and Abraham, and Moses, and Jesus the son of Mary:– for We accepted a most weighty, solemn pledge from [all of] them” (33:7). Al-Ghazali writes; “I believe I am correct and that others have been misled, and I sincerely hope for their guidance. Yet I do not cross the boundaries of this emotional desire nor do I convert it to any compulsion or coercion.” Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣṣḥaf*, p.141.
354. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa Awḍāʿunā*, p.20.
355. Al-Ghazali, *Hādā Dīnunā*, p.13.
356. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥalām min al-Gharb*, p.54.
357. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wihdah*, p.237. Al-Ghazali criticizes those who assume that the foundations of divine religions are detached or conflicting, for there are many areas of cooperation between religious groups which help address issues endangering humanity. Al-Ghazali is not only concerned with the preservation of the Islamic teachings but with those of other religions. He underscores the need to develop a defence line for the followers of Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad to protect their places of worship. See Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Istibḍāʿ al-Siyāsī*, p.96. The Qurʾan states: “(They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, – (for no cause) except that they say, ‘our Lord is Allah.’ Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure. Allah will certainly aid those who aid his (cause);– for verily Allah is full of Strength, Exalted in Might, (able to enforce His Will)” (22:40).
358. Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr*, 140. See Qurʾan, 18: 29.
359. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.65.
360. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Naʿlam*, 120. The Qurʾan says: “[And as for thee, O Prophet,] nothing is being said to thee but what was said to all [of God’s] apostles before thy time. Behold, thy Sustainer is indeed full of forgiveness – but He has also the power to requite most grievously!” (41:43).
361. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.129.
362. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.210.

Notes

363. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.122.
364. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā'iyah*, p.95.
365. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, p.163.
366. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.122.
367. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.122.
368. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.122.
369. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.124.
370. Al-Ghazali, *Kifāh Dīn*, pp.18-19.
371. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.213.
372. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.124.
373. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Da'wah*, p.34.

3 : D U ' Ā T (CALLERS TO ISLAM)

1. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.129-130.
2. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqqīqat al-Qawmiyah*, p.49.
3. Ibid., p.200.
4. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.107.
5. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.49.
6. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akkhur*, p.39.
7. Al-Ghazali, *Muḥāḍarāt*, pp.113-114. The Qur'an states: "He it is who has sent unto the unlettered people an apostle from among themselves, to convey unto them His messages, and to cause them to grow in purity, and to impart unto them the divine writ as well as wisdom – whereas before that they were indeed, most obviously, lost in error" (62:2).
8. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.129-130.
9. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.228.
10. Ibid., p.146.
11. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.72.
12. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.121.
13. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī*, p.41.
14. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.81.
15. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.72.
16. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'alam*, p.95.
17. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.105.
18. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.113.
19. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.15.

20. Al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt fī Ṭarīq al-Ḥayāt al-Islāmiyyah* (Problems on the Way to the Islamic Life) (Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2003), p.137.
21. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā'iyyah*, p.16.
22. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah li al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, p.131.
23. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.157. Al-Ghazali made an exception when he closely examined the conditions of western societies, intellectual, moral, and religious schools affecting their lives, standards of their civilization and economic export percentages; such an examination greatly supporting the undertaking of *da'wah*. See Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.135.
24. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, p.148.
25. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.186. Al-Ghazali argues that the guidance, which is not translated from the realm of self-discipline into social reform, is like a baby being born aborted before acquiring complete growth. See Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.200.
26. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.181.
27. Ibid., pp.187-188. According to Al-Ghazali, the living conditions of many *du'āt* are at odds with their statements, and people who listen to their lectures about righteousness and piety find their actions and their teachings at odd. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.35.
28. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.229.
29. Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.34.
30. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'alam*, p.95. The Qur'an states: "Behold, I am an apostle [sent by Him] to you, [and therefore] worthy of your trust: be, then, conscious of God, and pay heed unto me! And no reward whatever do I ask of you for it: my reward rests with none but the Sustainer of all the worlds" (26:107-109).
31. Ibid., p.95.
32. Al-Ghazali, *Min Ma'ālim*, 161; *Ma'a Allāh*, p.212.
33. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.200.
34. Ibid., p.285.
35. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.29.
36. Ibid., p.95.
37. Ibid., p.182.
38. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.169.
39. Al-Ghazali, *Ḍalām min al-Gharb*, p.205.
40. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.129.

41. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.144.
42. Al-Ghazali, *Haṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.163. Al-Ghazali argues that preserving *daʿwah* from a “business-like” attitude reflects the true meaning of asceticism (*zuhd*) practiced by earlier religious masters. See Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim al-Haqq*, p.161.
43. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.30.
44. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.185.
45. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.135; See also al-Ghazali, *Al-Haqq al-Murr*, 3:19. For al-Ghazali, such spiritual and emotional aptitudes are also accessible within the Muslim cultural heritage, and are illustrated by early scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. See Abd al-Halim Uways, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Tārīkhuhu wa Juhūduhu wa Ārāʾuhu*, p.58. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmūʿ Fatāwā ibn Taymiyyah, Iqtidāʾ al-Ṣirāt al-Mustaqīm, Rafʿ al-Malām ʿan al-Aʿimmah al-Aʿlām, al-Tuhfah al-ʿIrāqīyyah fī al-Aʿmāl al-Qalbiyyah, al-ʿAqīdah al-Tadmuriyyah* and *al-ʿUbūdiyyah*. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *Madārij al-Sālikīn bayna Manāzil Iyyāka Naʿbud wa Iyyāka Nastaʿīn, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn wa Bāb al-Saʿadatayn*, and *ʿIlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn ʿan Rabb al-ʿĀlāmīn*.
46. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, 4, pp.16-17.
47. *Ibid.*, 3, p.19.
48. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīnunā*, p.12.
49. Al-Ghazali, *Taʿammulāt*, p.152. Under the title “When al-Ḥuṭayʿah is Engaged in *Daʿwah*,” al-Ghazali wrote: “Al-Ḥuṭayʿah was an Arab a poet who criticized others. Al-Ḥuṭayʿah’s passion for insult constantly caused him to criticize others. When there was nobody to insult, al-Ḥuṭayʿah would turn to his wife and tell her: ‘I walked for long then I return to a house whose lady is dull.’ But when his wife ran away from him, and he did not find anybody to insult, he turned against his reflected image in the mirror and said: ‘I see my face that God made ugly. What an ugly face and what an ugly person!’” See al-Ghazali, *Taʿammulāt*, p.152. Al-Ḥuṭayʿah’s name is Jarwal ibn Aws ibn Makhzūm ibn Mālik, known as Abū Mulaḳkah. He was imprisoned during the time of the Caliph ʿUmar for his negative criticisms of the Muslim public. Later, ʿUmar released him but warned him not to do so again. Al-Ḥuṭayʿah replied: “Then my children would die. That is my livelihood.” It is, however, narrated that ʿUmar paid him three thousand *dirham* provided he stop criticizing the public. Al-Ḥuṭayʿah fulfilled the promise. But once ʿUmar died, he returned back. See *Dīwān al-Ḥuṭayʿah*, (ed.), Numan Muhammad Amin Taha, (Cairo: Al-Ḥalabī, 1958), p.41, 47.

50. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.240.
51. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.23.
52. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.134.
53. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.134.
54. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.76.
55. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.57. The Qur'an states: "Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only the People of the Book had faith, it were best for them: among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors" (3: 110).
56. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.285.
57. Ibid., p.212.
58. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.40.
59. Al-Ghazali, *Taʾammulat*, p.76.
60. Al-Ghazali, *Muḥāḍarāt*, pp.256-257.
61. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.165.
62. Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr*, p.128.
63. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 2, p.245.
64. Ibid., 4, p.77.
65. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim*, p.163. Al-Ghazali states: "Those who do not show mercy or are unmindful of others should quit *daʿwah*." See al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.20.
66. "Wrongdoer" best translates the Arabic *mufsid*.
67. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, pp.16-17.
68. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.62.
69. Ibid., 61. Al-Ghazali distinguishes between identifying legal judgments and implementing them. Alcoholic consumption is unlawful, yet in their approach to alcoholics, *duʿāt* should act kindly and gently. See al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʾamal Maʿa al-Qurʾān*, p.101.
70. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.24.
71. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.64.
72. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.19.
73. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.28.
74. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.19.
75. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.16.
76. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.17.
77. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.66.

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78. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.16.
79. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Da'wah*, p.61.
80. Al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt*, p.137.
81. Al-Ghazali, *Nazarāt*, p.219. The Qur'an states: "So patiently persevere: for verily the promise of Allah is true: nor let those shake thy firmness, who have (themselves) no certainty of faith" (30:60); "We created not the heavens, the earth, and all between them, but for just ends. And the Hour is surely coming (when this will be manifest). So overlook (any human faults) with gracious forgiveness" (15:85); "And so, [O Prophet,] exhort them; thy task is only to exhort: thou canst not compel them [to believe]" (88:21-22). Al-Ghazali writes: "They do not act like business people who offer a commodity, and take no interest in the buyer once the sale is over – rather, they present the religion in such a way that unites people in brotherhood." See al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī*, p.41.
82. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.176. According to al-Ghazali, belief does not develop in a debate where arguments are recalled to defeat one's opponent, or where parties manipulate Aristotle logic to trick their opponents in public. See al-Ghazali, *ʿAqīdat al-Muslim*, p.6.
83. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.21; See also *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 2, p.57.
84. Al-Ghazali, *Jaddid Ḥayātak*, p.9.
85. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.165. Al-Ghazali states: "Training of *du'āt* for al-Ghazali implies the training of the Muslim nation. This is because great nations are nothing save the good education of talented people." Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.9.
86. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.21.
87. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣhaf*, p.119.
88. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.165.
89. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.175. Al-Ghazali exhorts *du'āt* not versed in *da'wah* to quit the field. Al-Ghazali, *al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.56.
90. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.164.
91. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.212.
92. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.165.
93. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.245.
94. Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.193.
95. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, pp.42-43.
96. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.193.
97. *Ibid.*, p.190.

98. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.143. According to al-Ghazali, *duʿāt* should stay away from the study of historical archaic.” Al-Ghazali, *Humūm*, p.129.
99. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, pp.166-167.
100. Ibid., p.159.
101. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.218; *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Taṣṭaqbil*, p.88.
102. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Taṣṭaqbil*, p.157.
103. Ibid., p.47.
104. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.181. Al-Ghazali exhorts *duʿāt* ignorant of Arabic literature to quit *daʿwah*. See Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.218.
105. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.273.
106. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, pp.166-167.
107. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣṣḥaf*, p.171. Al-Ghazali disqualifies *duʿāt* who poorly understand the political and legal history of Islam, Islamic thought, contemporary world, or modern philosophies. Al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt*, p.59.
108. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, pp.216-217. Al-Ghazali believes that poor understanding of human sciences causes the confusion of students of religious studies in view of the fact that the foundations of Islam only prosper in intellectually flourishing atmospheres. See al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.202.
109. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.214. According to al-Ghazali, psychology is closer in the description and analysis of human emotions and intellectual activity than ancient philosophies. Ibid., p.215.
110. Ibid., p.40.
111. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.203.
112. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.44.
113. Ibid., 3, pp.269-270.
114. Abd al-Halim Uways, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.52.
115. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu Maʿa al-Qurʾān?*, p.222.
116. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.215.
117. Al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt*, p.117.
118. Ibid., p.215. Al-Ghazali writes: “Those who do not learn about the universe fail to appreciate the greatness of the Qurʾan.” Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, pp. 202-203. For al-Ghazali, the ignorance of the universe and the human creation just devastate *daʿwah*. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Naḥḥam al-Islām?*, p.32.
119. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa min al-Islām*, p.226.
120. Al-Ghazali, *Maqālāt*, 3, pp.42-43.

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121. Ibid., p.169.
122. Ibid., p.159.
123. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.273.
124. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu Maʿa al-Qurʾān*, p.222.
125. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.217.
126. Ibid., p.218. For al-Ghazali, some *duʿāt* are well versed in religious sciences, yet are ignorant of the living conditions, mundane life, and the universe around them; such ignorance only leads them to issue damaging legal verdicts. See al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakbkhur*, p.50.
127. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakbkhur*, p.95.
128. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim*, p.3. For al-Ghazali, all what had affected Islam in the past and modern times was caused by Muslims themselves. Ibid. Note, however, their argument may perhaps work in favor of al-Ghazali in view of the fact that the British singer and Muslim convert Yusuf Islam, known previously as Cat Stevens, having left music in 1977 when he converted to Islam, eventually returned to it after a period of thirty-six years.
129. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.28. Al-Ghazali writes: “When other nations travel to space and to explore the universe, Muslims are still dependent on foreign products such as bread.” Ibid.
130. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, pp.65-92.
131. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.23.
132. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, pp.39-40.
133. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.100. Al-Ghazali writes: “Islam implies nothing save a lively heart, awakened consciousness, a pure inner being, and loses its worth once it turns to rituals and ceremonial services.” Ibid.
134. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.252. Abu Rayyah (1889-1970) is a Muslim thinker and author who studied in Al-Azhar and is famous for his critique of the Sunnah. Among his most famous work is *Aḍwaʿ ʿalā al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* (Lights on the Sunnah of the Prophet).
135. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.75.
136. Ibid., pp.163-164.
137. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.122.
138. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.172.
139. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Fasād al-Siyāsī fī al-Mujtamaʿāt al-ʿArabiyyah wa al-Islāmiyyah (Azmat al-Shūrā)* (Political Corruption in Arab and Muslim Societies) (Giza, Egypt: Nahḍat Miṣr li al-Ṭibāʿah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 2003), p.23.

140. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.10.
141. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa mina al-Islām*, p.228.
142. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.77.
143. Given al-Ghazali's critical approach to modern nation of Islam, it is likely he wanted to keep his readers from self-congratulation.
144. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.289.
145. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥalām min al-Gharb*, p.266.
146. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.50.
147. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.23
148. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.17.
149. Ibid., 3, p.105.
150. Ibid., p.237.
151. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa Awdā'unā*, p.191.
152. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā'iz al-Īmān*, p.216.
153. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'al*, p.115.
154. Al-Ghazali, *Hādihā Dīmunā*, pp.87-88. According to al-Ghazali, just like prayer or fasting, technical and administrative expertises are considered righteous deeds without which, a nation or a religious mission is unable to rise or prosper. See, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Mur*, 3, p.133. Al-Ghazali also draws on the example of *Dhul-Qarnayn* who bridged between the two steep mountain-sides, and who melted iron and copper into a series of castles to protect the weak against tyrants in order to show how *Dhu al-Qarnayn*, instead of relying on speeches, carries out his responsibility and refuted falsehood through usage of earth resources. See al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.26.
155. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.34.
156. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah*, p.137.
157. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?* p.79.
158. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Yahūd al-Mu'tadūn*, p.29.
159. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.76.
160. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Mur*, 3, p.105.
161. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nata'āmal Ma'a al-Qur'ān?* p.222.
162. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akhhur*, p.86.
163. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, pp.79-80.
164. Ibid., p.89.
165. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.24.
166. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.287.
167. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akhhur*, p.39.

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168. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.38.
169. Ibid., 4, p.215.
170. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.36.
171. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʿakkkhur*, p.38.
172. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.107.
173. Al-Ghazali, *Khuluq al-Muslim*, p.218.
174. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.23.
175. Al-Ghazali, *Rakāʿiz al-Īmān*, p.159.
176. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.237.
177. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.131.
178. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.40.
179. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.64.
180. Qurʿan 13:11.
181. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.79.
182. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.4.
183. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, pp.37-38.
184. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.79.
185. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.3.
186. Ibid., 36-37; See al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.89.
187. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, pp.80-81.
188. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.134.
189. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.63. The Prophet is reported to have said, “He who unfairly treats a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with Muslims, or undermines his rights, or burdens him beyond his capacity, or takes something from him without his consent; then I am his opponent on the Day of Judgment.” Reported in Abū Dāwūd and Al-Bayhaqī. The Prophet is also reported to have said, “He who harms a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with Muslims has harmed me, and he who harms me has harmed Allah.”
190. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.77.
191. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, pp.36-37.
192. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.34.
193. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.14.
194. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.25.
195. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maʿālim*, p.167.
196. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʿakkkhur*, p.44. Al-Ghazali writes: “I am worried if every object return to its place of origin, Muslims would then be left without food,

- electricity, clothing, transportation, and might even walk barefooted.” See al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt*, p.12.
197. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.119.
198. Al-Ghazali, *Mi’at Sū’āl*, p.16.
199. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, pp.37-38.
200. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Yahūd al-Mu’tadūn*, p.30.
201. Al-Ghazali, *Mi’at Sū’āl*, p.141.
202. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.77.
203. Ibid., p.115. Al-Ghazali calls on Muslim not to be inferior to other nations, or depend on working and intelligent nations. See *Ma’rakat al-Muḥḥaf*, p.133. He also argues that the poverty of Muslims lies essentially in the severe impairment of human talents and skills. See Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.104.
204. Ibid., Al-Ghazali excuses nations that turned down the call of Islam, especially when they are introduced to Islam through corrupted political and economic systems. See al-Ghazali, *Al-Da’wah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī*, p.124.
205. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Yahūd al-Mu’tadūn*, p.30.
206. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.90.
207. Ibid., 2, p.1.
208. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.183.
209. Al-Ghazali, *Rakā’iz al-Īmān*, p.5.
210. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dā’iyah*, p.15.
211. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, pp.75-76.
212. Ibid., pp.27-28.
213. Al-Ghazali, *Mi’at Sū’āl*, p.112.
214. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta’akhhur*, p.44.
215. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, p.57. Al-Ghazali argues that the West has received a distorted image of Islam in both its theoretical and practical aspect, and that westerners know more about the Arab world’s oil than the Qur’an. See al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.14.
216. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Maḥāwir al-Khamsah*, p.150.
217. Al-Ghazali, *Ma’a Allāh*, p.86.
218. Al-Ghazali, *‘Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.267.
219. Ibid., p.46.
220. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da’wah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.22.
221. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Da’wah*, p.28.

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222. Al-Ghazali, *Jur'āt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, pp.8-9.
223. Abrogation in the Qur'an is a controversial issue. For a detailed and comprehensive understanding of abrogation in the Qur'an, please see: Khan, Israr Ahmad, *Theory of Abrogation: A Critical Evaluation* (Research Management Centre, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 2006.) Also see, Taha J. Alalwani, *Nahwa Mawqif Qur'ānī min al-Naskh* (Towards a Qur'anic Position on Abrogation) (Egypt: Maktabat al-Shurūq al-Dawliyyah, 2007), in which he rejects the concept of abrogation entirely. Editor's note.
224. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Mahāwir al-Khamsah*, 8. For al-Ghazali, "true" Salafis do not overlook or neglect the fundamentals of moral, social, and political reform. See his *Humūm Dā'iyyah*, p.11. Al-Ghazali describes how young Muslims are encouraged not to look into legal the opinions of scholars or *Madhāhib*, and to directly deal with the Qur'an and the Sunnah. See *Al-ʿAṭā' al-Fikrī*, 77; and *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.10.
225. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 1, p.34.
226. Ibid., 3, p.165.
227. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah*, p.90.
228. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, pp.39-40.
229. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Fasād al-Siyāsī*, 2003), p.21.
230. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām Khārij Arḍih*, p.31.
231. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nata'āmal Ma'a al-Qur'ān*, p.223.
232. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.187.
233. Al-Ghazali, *Huqūq al-Insān*, p.190.
234. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akbkhur*, p.39.
235. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.170.
236. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Fasād al-Siyāsī*, p.21.
237. Ibid., p.23. Al-Ghazali criticizes the orientation of intelligent students to study arts, and others to religious studies and *da'wah*. He draws on the example of Al-Azhar which enrolls successful students in business administration and others into Shari'ah or *da'wah*, and only recruits students who fail in other universities. These attitudes do not support the education of leaders in areas of Islamic disciplines including *da'wah*. See al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.119.
238. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Qarn al-Ḥālī*, p.124.
239. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Mahāwir al-Khamsah*, p.124.
240. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.64.

241. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.163.
242. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.10.
243. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.176.
244. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.10.
245. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Akbīrah*, 6, p.97.
246. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, pp.202-203. To substantiate his view concerning the poor status of education, al-Ghazali argues that many notions have infiltrated Islamic education. Ignorance is called knowledge, innovation has become a Sunnah, misguidance is viewed as righteousness, and lower desires have turned to religion. Wrong titles and distorted concepts have turned evil into good deeds and goodness into wrongdoing. On the other hand, many wrong notions have infiltrated the Muslim world through secular humanist influences. Chaos has become freedom, illegitimate sexual relationships represent love, a return to religion is viewed as fundamentalism. See al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.143.
247. Al-Ghazali, *Rakāʿiz al-Īmān*, p.153. Al-Ghazali writes: "In the same way old telescopes cannot capture images of distant planets, narrow-minded *duʿāt* are also unable to understand major issues." Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, pp.146-147.
248. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaqīqat al-Qawmiyyah*, p.182. Al-Ghazali says: "I sadly observe religious guidance delivered to the Muslim public. Both the content of traditional literature and the cultural conquest require revision and new approaches." Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Akbīrah*, 6, p.145.
249. Al-Ghazali, *Rakāʿiz al-Īmān*, 10. For al-Ghazali, disturbed or "unbalanced" studies also lead to a disturbed reasoning, just as the in-depth study of a discipline without an interdisciplinary perspective does not produce a proper education. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.51.
250. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.149.
251. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.193.
252. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.46.
253. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.129.
254. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.37.
255. Ibid., p.157.
256. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.34.
257. Ibid., p.68.
258. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 2, p.114; *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.47.
259. Al-Ghazali, *Mīʾat Sūʾāl*, p.112. It was al-Ghazali's belief that "Nomadic-

jurisprudence” (*al-fiqh al-badawī*) has narrowed prospect, and only drives people away especially when associated with the religion. See al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.91. Al-Ghazali does not clearly define the concept of Nomadic-jurisprudence nor sets its terms and position with relation to classical Islamic jurisprudence. He only illustrates its manifestations and “negative” impacts on modern *daʿwah*. The Nomadic-jurisprudence, however, as understood from al-Ghazali, reflects many meanings. On the one hand, it involves strict traditional jurists who give no attention to various developments in contemporary societies. It also connotes jurists who advocate their cultural and traditional lifestyles as genuine Islamic practices to be reinforced in *daʿwah* and adopted by the general Muslim public. On the other hand, Nomadic-jurisprudence also designates religious and cultural practices, which for al-Ghazali, cause detriments to *daʿwah* in non-Muslim societies, and go against the very practical objectives of *daʿwah*.

260. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.61.
261. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.92.
262. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.24.
263. Al-Ghazali, *Mīʾat Sūʾāl*, p.20.
264. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.13. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.148.
265. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.212.
266. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.13. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.148.
267. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.15.
268. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Akhīrah*, 6, p.7.
269. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.124.
270. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.133.
271. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.39.
272. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ghazw al-Thaqāfī*, p.28.
273. Al-Ghazali, *Mīʾat Sūʾāl*, p.112.
274. Al-Ghazali, *Ilal wa Adwiyah*, p.243.
275. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.152. Al-Ghazali mentions a Muslim preacher advocating the opinion that zakat should be given as dates, barley, or other food items, and who rejects the option of currency. Al-Ghazali states: “this person thinks as a Bedouin who requests London and Paris, if they are Islamic, to import tons of barley and dates for charities. What is wrong in giving zakat in cash?”, al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.169.

276. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.92.
277. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.133.
278. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Akhīrah*, 6, p.25.
279. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.43. Al-Ghazali blames *duʿāt* for raising the issue of photography's permissibility when not knowing that satellites can locate their sites. See al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Akhīrah*, 6, p.21.
280. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.110.
281. Al-Ghazali, *Ḍalām min al-Gharb*, p.151.
282. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.61.
283. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām?*, p.41.
284. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.170.
285. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.21.
286. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.124.
287. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, p.133.
288. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.41.
289. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.39.
290. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.41.
291. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.39.
292. Al-Ghazali, *Sir Ta'akhhur*, p.51.
293. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.167.
294. Al-Ghazali, *Jihād al-Daʿwah*, p.17.
295. In general terms, the Jahmites or those qualified as such denied a distinct existence of any of God's attributes. According to Ibn Ḥanbal, Jahm gave the following answer to a question about Qur'an 42:11 (that is "...there is nothing like unto Him..."): "He cannot be qualified (*lā yūṣaf*), neither is He known by any attribute or act; He has no limit or end; mind cannot apprehend Him; He is..., all knowledge, all hearing, all sight, all light, all power, without being two separate things. Whenever you think that He is something you know, He is other than that." See Gilliot, C., "Attributes of God," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3, (eds.), Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas and Everett Rowson, (Brill, 2008). Brill Online. McGill University Library. 25 April 2008.
296. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.167.
297. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.129.
298. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta'akhhur*, p.51.
299. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, p.4.
300. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.147.

301. Al-Ghazali, *ʿIlal wa Adwiyah*, p.241.
302. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu Maʿa al-Qurʾān?*, p.222.
303. Al-Ghazali, *Miʿat Sūʾāl*, p.89.
304. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.59.
305. *Qiyās*, reasoning by analogy, the fourth source of Muslim law. In a broad sense, *Qiyās* can indicate inductive reasoning (*istidlāl*), and even deduction (*istinbāt*, *istikhrāj al-ḥaqq*). It is thus that in *kalām*, *Qiyās al-Ghāʾib ʿala al-Shāhid* indicates the syllogistic procedure which consists in induction from the known to the unknown. In the terminology of fiqh, *qiyās* is “judicial reasoning by analogy.” It is the method adopted by the Muslim jurisconsults to define a rule which has not been the object of an explicit formulation: a verse of the Qurʾan, a hadith of the Prophet or *Ijmāʿ*. This specific structure results from the particular nature of the mode of reasoning by analogy; the absence of a middle term in the primitive form of *qiyās*, then definition of an explanatory principle (*ʿillah*) which is not a logical norm, but the prescription of a rule (*ḥukm*) established by God or His Prophet, this is the judicio-religious norm. See Bernand, M.; Troupeau, G. “Qiyas.” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. McGill University Library. 27 April 2008.
306. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.125.
307. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, pp.130-131.
308. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr*, 3, pp.26-27. According to al-Ghazali, some *duʿāt* regard the pulpit, niche, or the clock as purely religious innovations; yet when they speak they do not awaken the sleepy nor educate people. Ibid.
309. Sultan, *Azmat al-Hiwār al-Dīnī*, p.56.

4: AL-GHAZALI'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE METHODOLOGY OF DAʿWAH

1. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jurʿāt al-Jadīdah*, 6, p.26.
2. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm*, p.129; *Min Maqālāt*, 1, p.123.
3. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.109.
4. Ibid.
5. Al-Ghazali, *Zalām min al-Gharb*, p.87. The Qurʾan states: “As for them – God knows all that is in their hearts; so leave them alone, and admonish them, and speak unto them about themselves in a gravely searching manner”

- (4:63); “Call thou (all mankind] unto thy Sustainer’s path with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with them in the most kindly manner: for, behold, thy Sustainer knows best as to who strays from His path, and best knows He as to who are the right-guided” (16:125).
6. Al-Ghazali, *Qadhāʾif al-Haqq*, p.161.
 7. Ibid., p.168. For example, the tolerance of the Qurʾan vis-à-vis ignorant people is about removing all obstacles before the intellectual freedom and healthy perception of the truth. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nafham al-Islām?*, p.16.
 8. Ibid., p.82. The Qurʾan states: “Hence, defer not to [the likes and dislikes of] those who give the lie to the truth: they would like thee to be soft [with them], so that they might be soft [with thee]” (68: 8-9).
 9. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.168.
 10. That commitment reflects the legal maxim stating “The best means to the best ends” (*afḍal al-wasāʾil ilā afḍal al-maqāṣid*). This implies a conjunction between goals and the ways to achieve them. The legal maxim on the Islamic nature of both the means and ends requires *duʿāt* to abstain from ways deemed contradictory to the teachings of Islam.
 11. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.175.
 12. Al-Ghazali, *al-Ṭarīq min Hunā*, p.68.
 13. Ibid., p.76.
 14. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.75.
 15. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.70.
 16. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nataʿāmalu Maʿa al-Qurʾān?*, p.98.
 17. Al-Ghazali, *Jurʿāt Jadīdah*, vol. 4, p.9.
 18. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.44.
 19. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.147.
 20. Al-Ghazali, *Naẓarāt*, p.128.
 21. Ibid., p.178.
 22. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt al-Muʿaṭallah*, p.83. Undoubtedly, debate and discussion in ordinary conditions enrich understanding and cooperation. Al-Ghazali, however, is concerned with a type of negative debate and argumentation, when arguing parties are predominantly concerned with winning over the game. For him, *duʿāt* should abstain from these sorts of debates and rather adopt a straightforward style of presenting Islam.
 23. Ibid., p.20. The Qurʾan states: “Thus do we explain the signs by various (symbols): that they may say, ‘Thou hast taught (us) diligently,’ and that We may make the matter clear to those who know” (6:105).

24. Ibid. For al-Ghazali, the work of *daʿwah* can be difficult. *Duʿāt*, however, are supported with two essential factors in their representation of Islam: first, the covenant of the sound and healthy *fiṭrah*, and second, an appreciation of the intellect and absolute adherence to its judgment. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.32.
25. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.20.
26. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.195; al-Ghazali *Sirr Taʾakhhur*, p.39. The Qurʾan says: “But if they turn away, say: ‘I have proclaimed this in equity unto all of you alike; but I do not know whether that [judgment] which you are promised [by God] is near or far [in time]’” (21:109).
27. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālat* p.29.
28. Ibid., p.15.
29. Ibid., p.21.
30. Al-Ghazali, *Miʿat Sūʾāl*, p.283.
31. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Jānib al-ʿĀtifī*, p.103.
32. Al-Ghazali, *Humūm Dāʿiyah*, p.17.
33. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿrakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.169.
34. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa min al-Islām*, pp.227-228.
35. Ibid.
36. Al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawkib al-Daʿwah*, p.247.
37. Ibid., p.234.
38. Al-Ghazali, *Maʿa Allāh*, p.320.
39. Ibid., p.324.
40. *Khuṭbah* (sermon) is addressed by the *khaṭīb*. The *khuṭbah* has a fixed place in Islamic ritual, viz. in the Friday-service, in the celebration of the two festivals, in services held at particular occasions such as an eclipse or excessive drought. On the Friday it precedes the Salah in all the other services the salah comes first. It is customary to pronounce the *khuṭbah* in Arabic; nevertheless, this rule is not infrequently broken in non-Arabic speaking lands. The history of the *khuṭbah* in Islam remains to be written, and the study of oratory from the *minbar* or pulpit likewise remains to be undertaken. On the latter point, the enquirer might utilise with profit the texts (of varying degrees of authenticity) of those sermons of the Prophet given in the *Sīrah*, in the Hadith collections and in historical texts, as well as in those *adab* (literature) works which have preserved specimens of famous *khuṭbahs*. See Wensinck, A. J. “Khutba.” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online.

41. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.297.
42. Ibid., p.89.
43. Ibid., p.190.
44. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa min al-Islām*, p.228.
45. Ibid., p.190.
46. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.296.
47. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.178.
48. Ibid., p.181.
49. Ibid., p.179.
50. Ibid., p.178. According to Muhammad Yunus, comparing al-Ghazali's *da'wah* experience to modern mass communication, shows that al-Ghazali employs most recent scientific theories discovered by modern scholars. See Yunus, *Tajdīd al-Fikr*, p.106. Al-Ghazali argues that the current condition of Muslim media is poor. See Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī*, vol. 3, p.83. For him, modern Muslim media is also defeated and unable to lead to *da'wah* reforms. See al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.157.
51. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.228.
52. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'a Allāh*, p.297.
53. Ibid., p.247.
54. Al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt*, pp.138-139.
55. Al-Ghazali, *Fī Mawḳib al-Da'wah*, p.233.
56. Ibid., p.17.
57. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, pp.30-31.
58. Ibid., p.82. The Qur'an states: "Is it, then, conceivable [O Prophet] that thou couldst omit any part of what is being revealed unto thee [because the deniers of the truth dislike it, – and] because thy heart is distressed at their saying, 'Why has not a treasure been bestowed upon him from on high?' – or, '[Why has not] an angel come [visibly] with him?' [They fail to understand that] thou art only a warner, whereas God has everything in His care" (11:12).
59. "Literalists" were provoked with regards to questions of women, music, beards, dress codes, and international relations. See Ali al-Sawwa, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Minhajuhu fī al-Fiqh," in *Al-Aṭā' al-Fikrī li al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.151.
60. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuh*, p.151. For al-Qaradawi, the various problems and challenges of *da'wah* led him to underscore the glory and justice of law and legislation. Ibid.

Notes

61. Uways, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.49.
62. Abd al-Maqsud believes that Al-Ghazali's *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* contains false allegations and many accusations of the Sunnah and its followers. See Abd al-Maqsud Ashraf, *Jināyat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī 'alā al-Ḥadīth wa Ahlih* (Al-Ismā'īliyyah, Egypt: Maktabat al-Imām al-Bukhārī, 1989), p.12.
63. Al-Qaradawi, "Al-Ghazālī Rajul Da'wah," in *Al-‘Aṭā’ al-Fikrī*, p.210.
64. Ibid., p.16.
65. Al-Huwayni, Abu Ishaq, *Talī‘at Samṭ al-La’ālī fī al-Radd ‘ala al-Saykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* (Giza, Egypt: Maktabat al-Taw‘iyah al-Islāmiyyah, 1989), p.3.
66. Ibid., p.6.
67. Jamal Sultan, *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī*, p.23.
68. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.202.
69. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ‘Araftuh*, p.151.
70. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3, p.211.
71. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, pp.75-76.
72. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘a Allāh*, p.177.
73. Ibid., p.177.
74. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.134.
75. Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī kamā ‘Araftuh*, p.177.
76. Al-Ghazali, *Kayfa Nata‘āmal Ma‘a al-Qur’ān?*, p.98.
77. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.134.
78. Al-Ghazali, *Mushkilāt*, p.137.
79. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.156-157.
80. Ibid., p.99.
81. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.70.
82. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.92-93.
83. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.70.
84. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 2, p.15.
85. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.61.
86. Ibid., pp.156-157. This is made in reference to the following tradition of the Prophet Muhammad in which he says: "When one of you stands in prayer, what definitely constitutes a barrier for him is an object placed in front of him of the same height as the back of a camel-saddle. If it is not in front of him and of the same height as the back of a camel-saddle, then some... woman passing...will cut off his prayer." Al-Ghazali was aware that this was

- meant in the sense of a woman being a source of distraction affecting prayer and not in the sense of her as being something lesser than a man. Al-Ghazali's general plan of *da'wah* sought to promote the image of Islam in a way that was rational, humanistic, and universal, while presenting itself appealingly and persuasively. He understood that taken out of context as well as out of relation to other hadith on a similar subject western minds would interpret it incorrectly in terms of a feminist perspective and female rights.
87. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.61. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: "A woman may not be married without the presence of her guardian. If she is, then her marriage is invalid, invalid, invalid." Another hadith states: "No marriage may be made without the presence of a guardian."
 88. Huwayni, *Talī'at Samt al-La'ālī'*, p.17. Huwayni mentions that marriage cannot be held without a guardian. The Ḥanafī argument is weak. Ibid.
 89. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.70.
 90. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.175.
 91. Al-Ghazali, *Ṣayḥat Taḥdhīr*, p.136.
 92. Ibid., p.225.
 93. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, p.41. Certain countries cook using dog meat for instance.
 94. Ibid., p.70.
 95. Ibid., p.41.
 96. Ibid., p.69.
 97. Al-Ghazali, *Mi'at Sū'āl*, p.89.
 98. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.134.
 99. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah bayna al-Taqālīd al-Rākidah wa al-Wāfidah* (Women's Issues between Static and Foreign traditions) (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1994), p.23.
 100. Al-Ghazali, *Min Maqālāt*, 3:210-211; See also Abd al-Halim Uways, *Al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.52.
 101. Ibid., 3, p.160.
 102. Ibid., 3, pp.210-211.
 103. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, pp.75-76.
 104. Ibid., p.41.
 105. Abd al-Maqsud, *Jināyat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.83.
 106. *Maṣlahah* (pl. *maṣālīḥ*) is the abstract noun of the verb *ṣalaḥa* (or *ṣaluḥa*), "to repair or improve." Generally speaking, *maṣlahah* denotes "welfare" and

is used by jurists to mean “general good” or “public interest.” Anything which helps to avert *mafsadah* or *ḍarar* and furthers human welfare is equated with *maṣlahah*. As a legal concept, *maṣlahah* must be distinguished from *istiṣlāḥ*, a method of legal reasoning through which *maṣlahah* is considered a basis for legal decisions. In the modern age, however, under the impact of western legal thought, the concept of *maṣlahah* has become the subject of an increasing interest among jurists who have sought legal reforms in order to meet the needs of the modern conditions of Islamic society. See Khadduri, M. “Maslaha,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008.

107. Ali al-Sawwa, “Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Minhajuhu fī al-Fiqh”, p.164.
108. Sultan, *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī*, p.29.
109. Mohammad Kashk, *Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī bayna al-Naqd al-‘Ātib wa al-Madh al-Shāmit* (al-Shaykh al-Ghazali between Caring Praise and Negative Blame) (Maktabat al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1990), p.28.
110. Ali al-Sawwa, “Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa-Minhajuhu fī al-Fiqh,” p.161.
111. *Rukhṣah*, literally “permission,” “dispensation” is a legal ruling relaxing or suspending by way of exception under certain circumstances an injunction of a primary and general nature (‘*azīmah*). The general obligation to fast during Ramadan is, by way of *rukḥṣah*, suspended during the days of an illness or a journey, under condition that these days are made up after Ramadan. Similarly, the general prohibition to eat meat that has not been ritually slaughtered is suspended if a Muslim can only survive by violating it. As a rule, one has the choice whether or not to make use of the *rukḥṣah*. The circumstances permitting a dispensation of the strict rule are either the necessity to preserve one’s life or the removal of hardship. See Peters, R.; Haar, J. G. J. “Rukhsa.” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online. 6 April 2008.
112. Huwayni, *Ṭalīf at Samt al-La’ālī*, p.16. Huwayni reports that scholars discourage a person looking for dispensations across schools of law. He quotes Ibn Ḥanbal saying: “Following the dispensation – *rukḥṣah* – of every scholar makes thee person turn into a recipient of all evil.” Ibid., p.17.
113. Ibid., p.43.
114. Ibid. The tradition of ‘Ā’ishah quotes as follow: “Men on camels used to pass by us while we were with the Prophet and we were in a state of *iḥrām*. We would cover our faces with our gowns when they passed by us, and then uncover them again.”

115. Ibid., pp.45-46.
116. Ibid., pp.43-44.
117. Ibid., p.107. Huwayni describes al-Ghazali as a nightly wood collector (*ḥaṭṭāb al-layl*). Ibid., p.45.
118. Abd al-Halim Abd al-Maqsud, *Jināyat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.34.
119. Ibid., p.46. *Khabar al-wāḥid* is a tradition or a report going back to one single authority. According to the generally accepted definition, *khabar al-wāḥid* is a report, which falls short of the predicate *mutawātir* (or, as certain scholars assert, *mashhūr*) in that it has only one or a few (from two to five) transmitters in every *ṭabaqah* of its *isnād*. *Khabar al-wāḥid* can only be invalidated by one or more other reports which present an opposing view and which, at the same time, meet the requirements of reliability more adequately. See Juynboll, G. H. A. "Khabar al-Wahid." *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online.
120. Ibid., p.53.
121. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr* (Harvest of Pride) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2003), pp.39-40.
122. *Daʿīf* (weak) is a hadith which falls short of *ḥasan* (good) due to defects in its chain of transmission (*sanad*) or, integrity of reporter or text. The greater the number of defects, the more the severity, the lower the rank of *daʿīf* hadith i.e. closer to being *mawḍūʿ* (fabricated). *Shādhḍh* (irregular) is a hadith which is reported by a trustworthy person but goes against a narration by an even more reliable authority.
123. Al-Sawwa, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Minhajuhu fī al-Fiqh," p.160.
124. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, pp.92-93.
125. Sultan, *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī*, pp.56-57.
126. Ibid., p.57.
127. Ibid., p.160.
128. Al-Sawwa, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Minhajuhu fī al-Fiqh," p.161.
129. Sultan, *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī*, p.51. Al-Ghazali rejects many traditions, including those concerning black magic, flies, the battle of Muṣṭalaq, and a black dog. See Abd al-Maqsud, *Jināyat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, pp.35-36. Al-Ghazali for example claims that the story of Moses and the Angel of death as narrated in al-Bukhārī and Muslim is defective (*maʿlūl*). Al-Ghazali could not imagine pious people, especially prophets, disliking death. See Huwayni, *Ṭalīf at Samt al-Laʿālī*, p.8.

Notes

130. Al-Sawwa, "Al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Minhajuhu fī al-Fiqh," p.161.
131. Ibid., p.29.
132. Abd al-Maqsud, *Jināyat al-Shaykh al-Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, p.20. Abū Rayyah's work is entitled *Aḍawā' alā al-Sunnah* (Highlights on the Sunnah).
133. Sultan, *Azmat al-Ḥiwār al-Dīnī*, p.74.
134. *Al-Amr bi all-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahy 'an al-Munkar*, "commanding right and forbidding wrong" refers to the exercise of legitimate authority, either by holders of public office or by individual Muslims who are legally competent (*mukallaf*), with the purpose of encouraging or enforcing adherence to the requirements of the Shari'ah. This article deals mainly with the duty of individual Muslims in this regard; technically, this is usually considered to be a collective obligation (*fard kifāyah*). See Cook, M. "Al-Nahy 'an al-Munkar," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online.
135. Suhaylah al-Husayni, *Al-Mar'ah fī Manhaj al-Imām al-Ghazālī* (Women in the Methodology of al-Ghazali) (Cairo: Dār al-Rashād, 1998), p.15.
136. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.162.
137. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.103; al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, p.99.
138. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.103.
139. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, p.33.
140. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.54.
141. Ibid., p.169.
142. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.96.
143. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.166. The same applies to men. Ibid.
144. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, p.99.
145. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥda al-Thaqāfiyyah*, p.169.
146. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.67.
147. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.245.
148. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, p.16.
149. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.142.
150. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.64.
151. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.83.
152. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.96.
153. Ibid., p.103.
154. Ibid., pp.258-259. The tradition of preventing women from learning writing

- (Do not teach women writing – *Lā tu‘alimmū al-nisā’ al-kitābah*) led schools for girls to be closed. See Shalabi, p.144. According to al-Ghazali, women of the first era of ignorance (*al-jāhiliyyah*) did not face the same obstacles placed before Muslim women in periods of decline. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.99.
155. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.48.
156. Ibid., p.51. Kashk wonders how al-Ghazali discovered that women never left the home. For Kashk, this very hadith proves that this woman, without any trouble, left home at least twice to complain to the Prophet. For some unknown reason, however, her husband objected to her visit, particularly to see her father. See Kashk, *Shaykh al-Muḥammad al-Ghazālī bayna Naqd al-‘Ātib wa al-Madh Shāmit*, p.82. The question, for Kashk, should rather be whether a Muslim woman should obey her husband in regards to what goes against her emotions, especially when the husband’s decision goes against the most honorable emotions. These questions are open for discussion. Ibid., pp.82-83.
157. Al-Ghazali, *Mī‘at Sū‘āl*, p.20.
158. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥaṣād al-Ghurūr*, pp.257-258.
159. Ibid., p.258.
160. Al-Ghazali, *Jur‘āt Jadīdah*, vol. 5, p.40.
161. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.63. The tradition goes that a woman requested her husband’s permission to visit her father during his sickness, yet he refused. When her father died, she again requested her husband to let her join the family and attend the funeral procession, but her husband refused again. Al-Khatib states: “When this lady told her story to the Messenger of Allah, he told her: God has forgiven your father because of your obedience to your husband.” Al-Ghazali commented: “Is this how the religion of Islam should be presented?”
162. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.63.
163. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.6.
164. Ibid., pp.15-16. The Qur’an states: “And thus does their Sustainer answer their prayer: ‘I shall not lose sight of the labour of any of you who labours [in My way], be it man or woman: each of you is an issue of the other...’” (3:195).
165. Al-Ghazali, *Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, p.103.
166. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, pp.15-16.
167. Ibid., p.154. The Qur’an says: “It is lawful for you to go in unto your wives

during the night preceding the [day's] fast: they are as a garment for you, and you are as a garment for them" (2:187).

168. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, p.6.
169. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.144.
170. Al-Ghazali, *Dustūr al-Wiḥdah*, p.236.
171. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, p.99.
172. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.245.
173. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.103.
174. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa min al-Islām*, p.232. It is reported that the mother of Sharīk used to receive guests in her home. Some women attended the allegiance of the 'Aqabah before the migration of Muslims, and many other women pledged the allegiance of Prophet Muhammad after that. See al-Ghazali, *Ṣayḥat Taḥdhīr*, p.156.
175. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.103.
176. Al-Ghazali, *Laysa min al-Islām*, p.250. The Qur'an states: "And as he turned his face towards Madyan, he said [to himself]: 'It may well be that my Sustainer will [thus] guide me onto the right path.' Now when he arrived at the wells of Madyan, he found there a large group of men who were watering [their herds and flocks]; and at some distance from them he came upon two women who were keeping back their flock. He asked [them]: 'What is the matter with you?' They answered: 'We cannot water [our animals] until the herdsmen drive [theirs] home – for [we are weak and] our father is a very old man.' So he watered [their flock] for them: and when he withdrew into the shade and prayed: 'O my Sustainer! Verily, in dire need am I of any good which Thou mayest bestow upon me!' [Shortly] afterwards, one of the two [maidens] approached him, walking shyly, and said: 'Behold, my father invites thee, so that he might duly reward thee for thy having watered [our flock] for us.' And as soon as [Moses] came unto him and told him the story [of his life], he said: 'Have no fear! Thou art now safe from those evildoing folk!' Said one of the two [daughters]: 'O my father! Hire him: for, behold, the best [man] that thou couldst hire is one who is [as] strong and worthy of trust [as he]!' [After some time, the father] said: 'Behold, I am willing to let thee wed one of these two daughters of mine on the understanding that thou wilt remain eight years in my service; and if thou shouldst complete ten [years], that would be [an act of grace] from thee, for I do not want to impose any hardship on thee: [on the contrary,] thou wilt find me, if God so wills, righteous in all my dealings.' Answered [Moses]: 'Thus shall it be between

- me and thee! Whichever of the two terms I fulfill, let there be no ill will against me. And God be witness to all that we say!’” (28:22-28).
177. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na‘lam*, p.167.
 178. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.160. Al-Ghazali urged representatives in the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Algeria to organize women’s religious lectures led by female graduates of Muslim Universities. See al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.20. Even if al-Ghazali does not explicitly indicate that women can teach men, this is implied, given his reference to historic instances where women did teach men.
 179. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.17.
 180. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.109.
 181. Al-Ghazali, *Mustaqbal al-Islām*, pp.177-178.
 182. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na‘lam*, p.159.
 183. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.97.
 184. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.52.
 185. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.100.
 186. Hibah R. Izzat, “Al-Ḥaqq al-Murr: al-Shaykh al-Ghazālī wa Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah,” *Islāmiyyat al-Ma‘rifah*, 7 (January 1997), p.91.
 187. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na‘lam*, p.159.
 188. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.87.
 189. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.53.
 190. Al-Ghazali, *Ma‘rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.250.
 191. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Da‘wah al-Islāmiyyah Tastaqbil*, p.86.
 192. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.98.
 193. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.37. Al-Ghazali argues that the majority of jurists are of the opinion that women are not required to serve men. The question is more of a partnership between man and woman, which is guided through emotions of sacrifice not selfishness. Ibid.
 194. Al-Ghazali, *Huqūq al-Insān*, p.121. Al-Ghazali writes: “I had a conversation with a Canadian citizen who was bothered about the Islamic stand towards women. I said to him: ‘Women are free to choose their spouse. They are not forced into marriage, and can carry their marriage contract on their own or appoint their representative.’ Not far from us, was an angry listener who luckily kept silence. Soon after our discussion, the person spoke: ‘It is not allowed for women to carry out their marriage contract on their own because it goes against the religion.’ My response was: ‘You choose to follow an opinion in some schools of law, and I choose the opinion I believe is closer

- to the mentalities of Europeans and Americans.” See al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.29.
195. Al-Ghazali, *Huqūq al-Insān*, p.103.
196. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, p.99.
197. Al-Ghazali, *Huqūq al-Insān*, p.121.
198. Ibid. The Qur’an states: “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband’s) absence what Allah would have them guard” (4:34).
199. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na’lam*, p.146.
200. Al-Ghazali, *Ṣayḥat Taḥdhīr*, p.143.
201. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, pp.6-7. A *maḥram* is a kin with whom marriage is not allowed.
202. Al-Ghazali writes: “A responsible scholar blamed me for greeting my female students with peace which was for him religiously unlawful. My answer was that al-Bukhārī narrated the permissibility and occurrence. His counter-argument was the fact that scholars did not follow al-Bukhārī’s narration. I said: Those scholars are ignorant people who speak without knowledge, and choose the customs of their ancestors over the teachings of Islam.” See al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.67.
203. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.160. Earlier on, al-Ghazali strongly advocated the prohibition of women travelling on their own without any company. Al-Ghazali’s criticism of Khalid’s fatwa illustrates the point: “The ruling regarding women travelling abroad on their own is well-known to Muslim scholars. The Prophet Muhammad said: It is not permitted for a Muslim woman to make a journey of a night unless accompanied by a *maḥram*. This ruling should be observed to the end of the hour. How did Khalid M. Khalid then, a scholar of Al-Azhar, overlook this ruling, encouraging women to travel to Europe and the United States alone?” See Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na’lam*, p.142.
204. Al-Ghazali, *Sirr Ta’akḥkhur*, p.22.
205. Al-Ghazali, *Qaḍāyā al-Mar’ah*, p.166.
206. Ibid., pp.85-86.
207. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na’lam*, p.158. It is unclear why al-Ghazali specified Manufiyyah and Sharqiyyah, instead of Cairo for example or his own city al-Buhayrah.

208. Ibid., p.7.
209. Ibid., p.7.
210. Ibid., pp.159-160.
211. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.49.
212. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.161.
213. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.69.
214. Ibid., p.58.
215. Ibid., p.60.
216. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Islām wa al-Ṭāqāt*, pp.113-122.
217. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.44.
218. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.245.
219. Al-Ghazali, *Min Hunā Na'lam*, p.160.
220. Ibid., p.167.
221. Ibid., *Qaḍāyā al-Mar'ah*, pp.28-29.
222. Al-Ghazali, *Turāthunā al-Fikrī*, p.67.
223. Al-Ghazali, *Ma'rakat al-Muṣḥaf*, p.245.
224. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, p.53.
225. Al-Ghazali, *Ḍaw' alā Tafkīrinā al-Dīnī fī Maṭlai' al-Qarn al-Khāmis 'Ashar al-Hijrī* (Review Spotlight on our Religious Thought at the beginning of the Fifteenth Century) (Cairo: Dar al-I'tisām, 1981), pp.27-28. Mother Teresa (1910-97) is a founder of the Missionaries of Charity, winner of the Templeton Prize and of the Nobel Peace Prize (1979). Born Agnes Gonxha Boyaxhiu, she joined the Sisters of Loreto to work in India, where she went after a brief period in Ireland. Upon completing her noviceship in Darjeeling, she was sent to teach in Calcutta. In her spare time, she worked among the very poor and the sick, and in 1948 she left the Sisters of Loreto, gained some medical knowledge, and returned to Calcutta to found her order. Her nuns, in their distinctive sari-like habit, are now to be found all over the world, working with the poorest in society. Mother Teresa became also a constant campaigner against both artificial birth control and abortion. See "Teresa, Mother" *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*, (ed.), John Bowker, (Oxford University Press, 2000). *Oxford Reference Online*.
226. Al-Ghazali, *Al-Ghazw al-Thaqāfī*, p.80.
227. Al-Ghazali, *Ḍaw' alā Tafkīrinā al-Dīnī fī Maṭlai' al-Qarn al-Khāmis 'Ashar al-Hijrī*, pp.27-28.
228. Al-Ghazali, *Muḥāḍarāt*, pp.159-160.
229. Ibid.

Notes

CONCLUSION

- I. Huwayni, *Ṭalī'at Samṭ al-La'ālī'*, p.66.

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IN HIS PASSIONATE devotion to the task of inviting others to Islam, Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917-1996) presented Muslims with a powerful critique of themselves, not only in their endemic failure to project Islam in the best, most reasoned light, but also in their betrayal of the Qur'an's spiritual principles and the highest standards set by the Prophet Muhammad.

This work analyzes al-Ghazali's critique of *du'āt* (those inviting to Islam) and the practice of *da'wah* work itself (the call to Islam). It also examines his methodology, various proposed solutions, and the juristic responses to his perspective. The evolution of al-Ghazali's thought and the people and factors influencing him are key elements of the study. It is hard to conceive where the state of discourse on *da'wah* and Islamic reform would be without al-Ghazali's outstanding contributions. The powerful stand he took on the importance of education, the significant weight he gave to a free society, his promotion of a decent standard of living for the poor, the qualities of moral and personal excellence he appealed for, and his compassionate, impassioned role as an educator, all these preserve al-Ghazali's reputation, both in his own lifetime and for many generations to come, as one of the twentieth century's most important Muslim intellectual thinkers and reformers. His legacy is founded on a lifetime of service.

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

ISBN 978-1-56564-663-6

