



FAITH AND LOYALTY BOSNIAKS AND THE AUSTRO- HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

DŽEVADA ŠUŠKO

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
Finally, I would have never completed this book without the support of my family, particularly my parents, and friends.

May God, the Almighty, reward all of you.



Above: Military Imam in the Austro-Hungarian Army

Below: Map of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1894 showcasing Bosnia



FOREWORD

The shift in power from Ottoman to Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878 and the impact of this on the Bosnian people suddenly finding themselves under the authority of European rather than Islamic rule, and how they navigated this transition in terms of faith and loyalty, is the subject of this work. One has to imagine the tremendous blow that a people who had lived under Muslim rule for centuries experienced, fearing the horrors of possible slaughter by invading European armies, the potential outlawing of their faith, and the elimination of a Shari'ah system of governance which they had hitherto known, in favor of secular codes to regulate their lives.

But this did not happen. Rather, Bosnia was given the status of a separate entity within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The actual social transformation which took place and the future orientation of Bosniak lives from the period 1878-1918 makes for interesting reading. The author provides a meticulous historical account of these decades, from the moment the soldiers first enter Bosnian towns and villages, to the demise of the Empire itself.

It was a time of great uncertainty and upheaval. There were those who chose to remain and those Bosniaks who chose to migrate to Turkey and Turkish held territories. Of those who chose to remain an extraordinary account ensues of a people who strove to carve out a new Islamic and cultural identity for themselves leading up to the First World War. Delicate negotiations on educational, political, and economic reforms, application of the Shari'ah, even use of language and script (Turkish, Arabic, or Latin) witnessed great Bosniak reformers emerge, some taking high new positions with Austro-Hungarian authorities. The Reis ul-Ulema promoted by the Austrian-Hungarian authorities were an important element of this huge cultural reform. Thus the distinguished Islamic University of Sarajevo was formed at this time. The Bosniaks also set up reading rooms for Muslims to meet and discuss issues of the day, the educational system saw huge modernization and reform, journals were produced and eventually even political parties formed. Despite initial mistrust a rapport of sorts with the Austria-Hungarian occupiers was reached to the extent that Bosniaks even began enlisting in the Empire's military following their religious demands of halal food, Friday prayers (*Jumu'ah*), Ramadan etc. being accommodated.

Two things occurred in this convoluted interaction. Firstly, suspicion and resistance of the Empire ultimately transformed into complex loyalty and

cooperation. Secondly, loyalty to the Islamic faith and religious cultural heritage remained simultaneously intact, despite attempts of certain Bosnian reformers to replace Islam with a patriotic, secular, Bosniak cultural identity, failing in the endeavor. Alija Izetbegović's (first President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) legacy is testament to this, born only two years after the official end of the Ottoman Empire and author of the significantly titled work *Islam Between East and West*, he would see his people through some of the darkest of times as they transitioned once again into a new European reality.

After the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and following World War II, a new constitution was adopted in 1946, recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic within the new Yugoslav state. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to new states arising in former territories, as well as terrible conflicts, with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 wreaking a decade of war that devolved into ethnic cleansing notably the July 1995 genocidal massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys in and around the town of Srebrenica. The war ended in 1995. Today, Bosnia is recognized as an independent, sovereign state.

Where dates are cited according to the Islamic calendar (hijrah) they are labelled АН. Otherwise they follow the Gregorian calendar and are labelled СЕ where necessary. Arabic words are italicized except for those which have entered common usage. They also reflect the Bosnian spelling (which uses both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets) of Arabic loanwords. Diacritical marks have been added only to those Arabic names not considered contemporary. English translations taken from Bosnian references are those of the author. Since the sources used for this book are in Bosnian, German, and French, quotations, expressions, and titles translated into English are in square brackets. The reader will find the translations sometimes in the text itself, sometimes in endnotes. Furthermore, translations of important treaties have been added in Turkish.

Since its establishment in 1981, the IIIT has served as a major center to facilitate serious scholarly efforts. Towards this end it has, over the decades, conducted numerous programs of research, seminars and conferences, as well as publishing scholarly works specialising in the social sciences and areas of theology, which to date number more than six hundred titles in English and Arabic, many of which have been translated into other major languages.

We are grateful to the author, as well as all those directly or indirectly involved in the completion of this book.

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INTRODUCTION

This book is about an intense encounter between “Christian” and “Islamic” Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* It applies loyalty as an academic benchmark using the case of the Bosniak people and examines the response of the Bosniaks to the thorough changes that occurred in Bosnia in the 19th and 20th century. The book will demonstrate that historically residents of Bosnia considered themselves Bosniaks until the 19th century when Orthodox and Catholics gradually declared themselves to be Serbs and Croats respectively. Thus, the term Bosniak remained for the Muslim population only. Hence, today Bosniaks are Bosnian Muslims whose home country is Bosnia with a large diaspora due to several migration waves particularly from the 19th century up to the 1990s during the war.

When Austria-Hungary, as a leading European power in the 19th century, received the right at the Congress of Berlin to occupy and administer Bosnia, the Bosniaks as an indigenous European Muslim society ceased to be an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Bosniaks were at once confronted with a new civilization and with different norms and values in the fields of politics, military, administration, economy, culture and education. In the Austro-Hungarian period from 1878 to 1918, Bosniaks as Muslims had to deal for the first time with non-Muslim rulers, a situation which persisted from 1878 until 1992 when Yugoslavia collapsed.

For the Muslim populations in South-Eastern Europe, a region often negatively perceived as the backward Balkans,¹ the end of the Ottoman supremacy meant a period of forced migrations, ethnic cleansing, genocide, expropriation, and adaptation to new political systems. The Bosniaks, however, represent a special case. In contrast to the rest of South-Eastern Europe Bosnia did not become part of a new nation state, but was first occupied by the Austro-Hungary in 1878, then annexed in 1908, and remained part of this Empire until 1918. Thus, the Bosniaks were included in European affairs and the Central European concept. With the end of World War I, Austria-

* For the sake of simplicity throughout the book the name Bosnia will be used to elaborate on matters within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, the terms Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslims and Muslim Bosniaks are employed interchangeably. The specific usage is contingent upon the contextual relevance and focus in a given passage. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all these terms refer to the same group within the Bosnian context.

Hungary lost the territory of Bosnia and the land was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which later changed its name to Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941). For four years during World War II, Bosnia belonged to the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) (1941-1945), a puppet state of Nazi-Germany. After World War II, Bosnia ended up as a republic of Socialist Federal Yugoslavia (1945-1992). In each Yugoslav state Bosniaks were victims of human rights abuses which culminated in 1992 with the genocide against the Muslim population and the aggression² against the internationally recognized state of Bosnia by Serb led forces of the Yugoslav National Army and Croat military. To end the war in Bosnia in 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed and the international community set up the Office of the High Representative (OHR), a modern and unique form of a semi-protectorate.

These insecure times in the post-Ottoman era are an interesting period to examine, regarding how Bosniaks adapted to the new political, economic, societal and cultural circumstances, and to what extent loyalties shifted. This book will focus on the Bosniaks' first intense encounter with the "West" which was during the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia. Hence, it is interesting to reveal how Bosniaks performed the transition from one civilization (Ottoman) to another culture and way of life (Austro-Hungarian). Additionally, a process of modernization which was introduced during that time meant radical changes for the Bosniak population including the way they affirmed themselves as a European nation. Indicators were for example the preference of the native Bosnian language over Ottoman Turkish language, preference of the new Austro-Hungarian educational system over the previously Ottoman which produced a new intellectual elite, the development of political parties according to the European model, participation in elections as well as in the first parliament, and serving the Austro-Hungarian military, particularly during World War I.

Consequently, it is important to consider the reasoning of the Bosniaks by studying the ideas and discourse of the Muslim intellectual elite through the contemporary media, and analyzing the documents of the Habsburg administration in regard to Bosniaks' adaptability to, and conformity and identification with Western norms and values. Issues around Bosniak identity, citizenship, belonging, engagement or disengagement with politics, education and society will be addressed. In this way, the connections between the Bosniaks' loyalty toward Western political systems and international encounters will be explored and their contribution to stability in Bosnia and in South-Eastern Europe tested.

The topic is new and no research has been done so far to link loyalty with Muslims and Islam and to explore the loyalty of Bosniaks during the Austro-Hungarian period. None of the works published to date explicitly studies the loyalty of Bosniaks to the Austro-Hungarian state. Surely, it is challenging to explore the whole Bosniak population as a unified group. On the other hand, sources used for this research project include, describe and evaluate various Bosniak social classes, such as the landowners, merchants, tradesmen, religious scholars, intellectuals and ordinary citizens (mainly peasants). Instead of the perspective of a polity-centered history of “big men” or elites, this research analyzes as well how local leaders “on the ground” as well as at the grassroots level reacted and behaved towards the decisions of great powers and international policy makers – and most of all, how their perceptions developed over time, thereby creating new perspectives in constructing the image and self image of the Bosniak people. The following questions will be elaborated:

- Did the Bosniaks display loyalty towards non-Muslim authorities?
- How did Bosniaks react to the “Western” encounter in 1878?
- What was the discourse of Bosniak intellectuals? Who was involved? Who led the debate among Bosniaks?
- How did others perceive the response of the Bosniaks?
- How did the contemporary state representatives evaluate the behavior of the Bosniaks?
- What kind of expectations did the international powers have towards the Bosniaks? Were the expectations met?
- Has identification with “Western” values taken part?

In Europe or “the West” in general there is distrust, prejudice and a lack of understanding towards Muslims and Islam. In addition we are all witnesses to growing Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism. Efforts to advance and promote the intellectual, cultural, religious and political exchange are often weak-willed and insufficient. The conscious or unconscious antipathy towards Muslims in Europe is a still ongoing issue. Europe is often quoted as a “Christian club” where immigrant and indigenous Muslim societies are not welcome. However, Europe, particularly in Albania and Bosnia contains large or majority indigenous Muslim populations (Tatars, Bosniaks, Albanians, Pomaks, Gorani, Roma and Turks). Since the end of Ottoman supremacy, these Muslim societies in South-Eastern Europe were often seen as a foreign element which cannot fit into the European context. Such an assumption and further stereotypes led to several attempts throughout

history to eliminate the Muslims from Europe. Hence, elaborating the issue of loyalty in regard to Bosniaks and breaking the stereotypes are necessary contributions to the study of European history and current European politics.

This book aims at contributing to the body of knowledge about the Bosniaks in an international context, offering new perspectives and filling a significant gap in the international literature. Another aim is to test whether Bosniaks as a domestic plurality population in multiethnic Bosnia, have shown in a period of uncertainty and instability to be loyal citizens, to identify with European values and to represent a factor of stability. Furthermore, this research wants to reflect on the experiences of previous Bosniak generations with Europe and with European values as well as to offer a holistic understanding of the most important processes and phenomena in modern European history and politics which affected the Bosniaks. At the first glance, Bosnia was at the core of several fateful diplomatic crises and conflicts of modern European history – such as the Eastern Question, the Congress of Berlin (1878), the Bosnian annexation crisis (1908), the Sarajevo assassination in 1914, and of course the war during the disintegration of former Yugoslavia (1992-1995). However it is evident that a greater part of the background and reasons for these crises are to be sought outside of Bosnia and its society. These events define therefore more the meta-political setting or framework of the processes which this research investigates. However they are not the main focus. Rather, this is a study of intellectual and cultural history about psycho-sociological developments and social change within Bosnia and its Muslim community. Within the given literature it is important to reveal the discourses and concepts regarding the comprehension of state, law, power and authority among Bosniaks.

Sources and Literature

The information relevant for the questions posed in this book can be deduced from three sources: official Austro-Hungarian and German documents which are available in archives, contemporary daily press as well as periodicals and published secondary literature about Bosnia and Bosniaks. Hence, this study uses manuscripts, documents of the Austro-Hungarian administration, the contemporary press (newspapers, magazines), scholarly journals, secondary literature, fiction and non-fiction (biographies, poems, lyrics, novels).³ Thereby, statements, responses, debates and discussions in these written documents will be examined.

In the first place, sources of a normative character were relevant, such as the laws and regulations issued in German and Bosnian language: *Sammlung*

der für Bosnien und die Hercegovina erlassenen Gesetze, Verordnungen und Normalanweisungen (1878-1880); *Zbornik zakona i naredaba* (1881-1886); *Glasnik zakona i naredaba* (from 1887) which are available online at the Austrian National Library⁴ and in the National Archive (*Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine*) in Sarajevo. A serious investigation on Bosnia's Austro-Hungarian past can hardly be conducted without the files of the Austro-Hungarian administration in the Archive of Bosnia. The Austro-Hungarian administration left the country an exhaustive documentation of their 40 year long work dedicated to a far-reaching modernization process in nearly all spheres of life, and guided by the ambitious philosophy to embed the local elite and their traditions in this process as much as possible. This carefully conducted documentation is one of largest in the Bosnian state archive and one might assume that still today not all parts of it have been checked by scholars. One reason for that might be that the manuscripts are nearly completely in German and, until about 1900, written in old German handwriting (*Kurrent* and later *Sütterlin*) which requires some practice even if the scholar otherwise knows German. These archival files consist mostly of two collections: files produced by the *Landesregierung* in Sarajevo (*Zemaljska Vlada Sarajevo*, acronym ZVS, Government) and files produced by the *Gemeinsames Finanzministerium* in Vienna (*Zajedničko Ministarstvo Financije*, acronym ZMF, Common Ministry of Finance).⁵ Of course within these files a lot became visible about positions and moods within the Bosniak community or of single leaders. But concerning their self-representation, Bosniaks had already developed quite a rich press. Contemporary daily press and periodicals were relevant to identify the political genesis of civic movements, including loyalty as well as identity issues.⁶ As this research was mostly aimed at the loyalists, the focus was on the journals *Bošnjak* (1891-1910) and *Behar* (1910-1911). *Bošnjak* was a political journal. It can be understood as an instrument to spread the awareness that Bosniaks are a part of and belong to Europe and therefore postulated loyalty towards Austria-Hungary. Specifically, the journal *Bošnjak*, which is available at the Gazi Husrevbeg Library in Sarajevo, was supported by Austria-Hungary, as the editor Mehmed-beg Kapetanović was known to the administration to be loyal and correct. Indeed, the paper was supposed to combat stereotypes of the Bosniaks and to bring them closer to European civilization. The context of these primary sources is critical for understanding the ideas, topics and the social world of the Bosniaks. Catchphrases such as military service, conscription, political participation, authority, emigration, Europe, identification with new values and relationship to the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary etc. were examined. The journal *Behar* reflects the Europeanization process

among the Bosniaks in the fields of culture and particularly literature. Another focus was on the papers of the Muslim Progressive Party (in 1910 renamed the Independent Muslim Party), which in 1911 became a part of the Muslim United Organization: *Muslimanska Svjest* (1908-1910), *Muslimanska Sloga* (1910-1912), and *Zeman* (1911-1914).⁷

Additionally, observations of foreign diplomats were useful. The Archive of the National University Library in Sarajevo (NUB) provided the correspondence of the German Consulate in Sarajevo. Furthermore, reports and documents of the German consulate in Sarajevo from the *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* in Berlin (PAAA) were valuable. German diplomats sent their reports in short intervals and were present from the late Ottoman period to 1918. Furthermore, files from German military units in Bosnia from the First World War were consulted for this book. From the British side, reports from consul Freemann (1878-1882) from the National Archives in London were used. A considerable amount of documents were accessible in print, some of which are becoming increasingly available on the internet. Indispensable for understanding the internal politics in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy are the *Die Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1867-1918* [Protocols of the Common Council of Ministers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy] as it was the central decision-making body (serial 2, since 1867). Immediately after the Bosnian annexation crisis, official documentation by the Viennese government appeared, such as *Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Hercegovina*, 1909. Other major powers presented similar semi-official collections, also with the intention to explain their policies on the eve of World War I. From German research there is the *Grosse Politik der Europäischen Mächte 1871-1914*, an opulent work in 40 volumes, published in Berlin from 1927 to 1940, which is partially available online, like Volume 2 for the Congress of Berlin. The German *Bundesarchiv* [Federal Archive] also published a full documentation of the Congress of Berlin. From British diplomatic sources a new edition of British confidential files came out in 1991, four volumes alone for the Habsburg monarchy since 1859. Ottoman diplomatic files have been published in 2008, with two volumes on the Bosnian annexation crisis. For World War I and its outbreak, additional collections exist on most European powers online in the “World War One Document Archive.” The Archive of Bosnia edited in the post-war decades collections of documents which cover a variety of fields, in part connected to disputed issues and opposition, workers movements and also culture. Of special value is the volume on the Muslims’ struggle for autonomy.⁸ Bosnia was also represented in the prestigious *Die österreich-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und*

Bild [The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by Word and Image], which demonstrates the rich cultural heritage of the Bosniaks. Moreover, a very special case is the brochure *Die Lage der Mohamedaner in Bosnien* [The Situation of the Mohamedans in Bosnia] published in Vienna 1900. There is no author given, but it is often assumed (even in library catalogues) that this text was written by Benjamin Kállay, possibly with advice from Lajos Thallóczy. Further sources for this study were books and pamphlets from that time. Probably never before the Austro-Hungarian period were so many books printed in and on Bosnia, all in all several hundred, both in German and Bosnian language. Of course these books differ greatly in type, from political pamphlets to tourist guides, itineraries, ethnographic studies and many more. One of the biggest collections of that kind of literature is held in the Library of the *Landesmuseum* (*Zemaljski Muzej*, or National Museum). Some of the books, such as Kapetanović and also of German authors like Heinrich Renner, have been recently reprinted and even translated.⁹ Others, especially of scientific value are now readable online, such as the works of Antun Hangi on the Muslims and their customs.¹⁰

Among the early studies on Bosniaks are works by non-Bosniak witnesses from the Austro-Hungarian period, such as Joseph Neubauer and Maximilian Braun. Joseph Neubauer wrote the book *Wie könnte die europäische Cultur nach Bosnien verpflanzt werden?* [How could the European Culture be Transplanted to Bosnia?] in 1884. His book witnesses the cultural mission performed by the Austro-Hungarian administration. It describes the process of incorporating Bosnia and its citizens into the Central European context. Maximilian Braun, a German Slavist who did his PhD in Berlin in 1934, labels the change brought by the Austro-Hungarians as Western European cultural incursion (*Westeuropäischer Kultureinbruch*). In his book Braun reveals the double mandate of Austria-Hungary which was practiced by all colonists in the Muslim world, i.e. to introduce a more advanced civilization and to exploit natural resources. Recently, in 2009, his book about the Europeanization process of Bosniak literature was reprinted.¹¹

Hamdija Kreševljaković, an eye-witness of the Austro-Hungarian period, presents valuable information about the political and societal situation in Bosnia. His research has greatly contributed to the understanding of the political history of Bosnia in the 18th and 19th centuries. He meticulously studied the last period of Ottoman presence in Bosnia as well as the Austro-Hungarian occupation, particularly in Sarajevo. Thereby, he describes first-hand individual political figures during these changing times and reveals the motives for resistance, submission and migration as well as how Sarajevo

developed during the 40 years of Austro-Hungarian rule.¹² Further, two novels by Rešad Kadić and Edhem Mulabdić, both of whom lived around the turn of the 20th century, very subtly reveal and describe the emotions, motives, feelings, attitudes, thoughts and concerns of the Bosniak population during these changing times.¹³

Until today, one of the most important scholars in Bosniak history is Mustafa Imamović. His study on Bosnia and Herzegovina's juridical position and internal development (1976) became an often reprinted standard for decades. Later in the 1990s, Imamović wrote an extensive and detailed history of Bosnia and of the Bosniaks starting from medieval times. Imamović states that Bosniak history can be divided into three periods: (1) the period of the feudal Bosnian state, (2) the period of the Ottoman Empire, and (3) the modern period that starts with Austria-Hungary's rule in 1878. He claims that all these periods were "practically a continuous fight for survival on its own territory surrounded by enemies. However, the Bosniak genius created envious works in the material and spiritual culture."¹⁴ Muhamed Hadžijahić deals mainly with the origins or ethnogenesis of the Bosniaks. He traces the historical factors that have made the Bosniaks distinctive from other inhabitants of Bosnia. Hadžijahić examines the expansion of Islam in the Balkans and its influence on Balkan inhabitants and he treats the political consequences of the spread of Islam. Thus he involves religious, social and political aspects of the Bosniaks' historical development.¹⁵

Due to the fact that within the Yugoslav political systems (1918-1992) Bosnian language was not recognized and Bosniak identity, history, culture and tradition ideologically suppressed, the Bosniaks were rarely a matter of research. This was the case not only for domestic scholars. Very few foreign scholars focused their research on Bosnia before 1990s, too. However, exceptions were William Lockwood and Robert Donia. Lockwood's book is the first study to be published about the Bosniaks after the World War II in English language. Lockwood, a US scholar, provided as cultural anthropologists precious insights about the persistence of Bosniaks living in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious surrounding for centuries. He conducted ethnographic research in a Muslim village in Western Bosnia in the 1970s and put Bosniaks on the European ethnographic map affirming their European Muslim identity.¹⁶

Donia researched in Sarajevo in the 1970s and published an important book on Bosnian Muslims entitled *Islam under the Double Eagle*.¹⁷ Rigorously dealing with Islam and Bosniaks during the Austro-Hungarian period his research focusses on Austro-Hungarian policies towards Bosniaks in order to establish power. Specifically, Donia analyzes and compares different local

networks and communities among the Bosniaks in the three dominant cities of Sarajevo, Travnik and Mostar. Donia then traces the political movements particularly in the beginning of the 20th century when the Bosniaks started to organize themselves according to European standards within the framework of political parties. During the war in Bosnia, Donia published together with John R. Fine, the book *Bosnia-Hercegovina – A Tradition Betrayed* which encompassed also his PhD study.¹⁸ By this time Bosnian scholar Dževad Juzbašić, who had initially worked on the language question, had set already the main focus of his work on the Austro-Hungarian period. In 2002 he published a collection of his manifold studies and lifelong research.¹⁹ In addition to him, an indispensable book became Tomislav Kraljačić's work on the Kállay era.²⁰ On the occasion of the centenary of the Congress of Berlin (1978), the German *Bundesarchiv* (Federal Archive) published documentation of the Congress by Immanuel Geiss, accompanied by a big volume with international participants also from Yugoslavia.²¹

An important source is Smail Balić who migrated to Austria as a political dissident to the Socialist Yugoslav regime. He promoted extensively the Bosniak nation, Bosnian language and culture. Until the 1990s he was the only scholar in Europe who wrote in the German language about Bosnia and Bosniaks. Balić perceived Bosnia as a unique opportunity for Europe to build a bridge with the Muslim world. His works elaborated the history of Bosnia, the history of Islam in the Balkans, the Bosniak nation, Bosniak ethics, and the relationship towards Europe and secularism. Furthermore, he gave a thorough description of the Bosniaks' cultural achievements in the fields of architecture, calligraphy, painting, poetry, as well as literature in Persian, Arabic, Turkish and Bosnian language.²² During and as a result of the war in Bosnia a renewed interest emerged in the Bosnian case. A series of introductions to Bosnian history were produced, some of high quality. Aside from Donia and Fine's book, the other most important works were from Noel Malcolm, Mark Pinson, Francine Friedman and more recently Marko Attila Hoare.²³

On the eve of the aggression against Bosnia in the 1990s, Tone Bringa, a Norwegian scholar, conducted research on the Bosniaks and analyzed the multi-ethnic setting of Bosnia.²⁴ While Lockwood affirmed the European-ness of the Bosniaks, Bringa added that "Islam as a practiced and lived religion has to be understood in terms of its specific role in the Bosnian context where it forms the main constitutive factor in a collective identity that distinguishes Bosniaks from Bosnian Catholic (Croats) and Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs)."²⁵ Lockwood and Bringa talk of a "Bosnian Islam" stressing the shared history and coexistence of Bosniaks with other non-Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia.

In many of these works in the 1990s the Austro-Hungarian period appeared now in a better light as a *gelungenes Zusammenleben* [successful living together], the title of Valeria Heuberger's collection of postcards from 1994.²⁶ However this trend towards reviving the Austro-Hungarian heritage was maybe strongest in Bosnia itself, especially among the younger generations. It had to do with disillusion about Yugoslavia, and in part a more realistic view of the Germans and the previous image of the "West." Moreover just as the name *Bošnjak* came back into official use, thoughts and concepts of the Austro-Hungarian period were revived in schoolbooks and the public space. A prominent Bosniak scholar, Enes Karić, reinterpreted the classical thinker of the Bosniak national idea Mehmed-beg Kapetanović as an early advocate of what is called Euro-Islam.²⁷ This trend is reflected in reprints of German and Austrian authors. In recent years the Austro-Hungarian period has become one of the key areas of historical research at the University of Sarajevo (i.e. Zijad Šehić and his works on Bosniak soldiers) and the Historical Institute (*Institut za Historiju*) in Sarajevo.²⁸

Srećko Džaja elaborated the role of the intelligentsia in Austro-Hungarian times. Džaja describes the interference of the Austro-Hungarian administration in religious and cultural affairs as well as in the sphere of education. He made a list of all the religious and public schools to illustrate where the intelligentsia was employed and educated.²⁹ In fact research on Habsburg or Austro-Hungarian Bosnia became within a few years quite "global" or transnational, which also indicates that knowledge of the Bosnian language has remarkably grown. One of these researchers is Philippe Gelez from France who did his PhD on Safvet-beg Bašagić and added further studies.³⁰ Another important monograph is that from Robert Okey.³¹ Austrian and German researchers like Clemens Ruthner together with Flemish Professor Stijn Vervaeke tried to adapt postcolonial perspectives to their interpretations, and presented them in the internet portal "Kakanien Revisited."³² Two French scholars, Xavier Bougarel and Alexandre Popović deal with Bosniaks extensively. Bougarel focuses his research on the Bosniaks from the 1990s onwards. He stresses that the Bosniaks constitute an indispensable part of indigenous European Muslims who are furthermore "irreversibly secularized."³³ On the other hand, Alexandre Popović, like Darko Tanasković, Miroljub Jevtić and Dragoš Kalajić, treat Islam and Muslims in South-Eastern Europe rather as a foreign and not indigenous element to Europe.³⁴ They neglect the fact that all monotheistic religions in Europe, Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, Judaism and Islam were imported to Europe. Nonetheless, they perceive Muslims in Europe as problematic, considering them to be not on par with Christians and Jews. Some Turkish scholars, such

as Aydın Babuna already in the 1990s made a major contribution to Bosniak history and identity.³⁵ Hakan Yavuz has as well published several volumes on the Congress of Berlin and the First World War.³⁶ The third Turkish scholar is Kemal Karpat who published many meticulous studies of the Ottoman Empire, including the position of Muslim societies in the newly established states in South-East Europe.³⁷ In terms of loyalty, Karpat is the only scholar who affirms the loyalty of Balkan Muslims towards the states in which they lived. Karpat claims that throughout the last centuries Balkan Muslims were generally loyal to the states they lived in because they were Sunni Muslims who developed a tradition of subordination to power. In his research he noticed no rebellions against new political systems, all of which were, except the Austro-Hungarians, antagonistic towards the domestic Muslim populations and pursued methods of what is today known as ethnic cleansing. Actually, Karpat concludes that expressions of loyalty were the Balkan Muslims' strategy for survival.³⁸ Another scholar who dealt with loyalty was the German scholar Hannes Grandits. He elaborated on power and loyalty in the late Ottoman period, i.e. just before the arrival of the Austro-Hungarians. Grandits analyzed loyalty according to societal and confessional affiliations (Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic contexts) and involved the challenges of the modernization period in the Ottoman Empire (*Tanzimat*). He studied changes in the power system and how it affected the balance of power in urban as well as in provincial areas. Grandits shows that loyalty must be studied from an interdisciplinary perspective, involving history, sociology, religion and politics. He concludes that confessional loyalty was declared "as being of absolutely primary importance vis-à-vis other forms of loyalty" which increased confessional hatred.³⁹

The links of the developments in late Habsburg Bosnia with the broader context of the Islamic reformism of that time was reconstructed by Fikret Karčić. He connected the late Ottoman modernization efforts of the *Tanzimat* period with Habsburg policies. He considers that the "Eastern Question" still exists, remains unsolved and waits for convenient circumstances to be revived again. The recent war in Bosnia (1992-1995) evidently revived the Eastern Question.⁴⁰

In conclusion, regarding Bosniaks and South-Eastern Europe, many works have been written since the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the war in the 1990s against the territorial integrity of Bosnia where Bosniak civilians, who constituted the plurality population, were specifically targeted. Until this period, even among specialists in Islamic studies, Muslims in the Balkans have been a small, largely overlooked area of study. Thus, the older history of the Bosniaks was a topic of academic research mainly for scholars

from Bosnia. However, recent publications reveal an increased interest in the Austro-Hungarian period which seems more than ever to be inspired by the global trend in social sciences towards “encounter studies” and intercultural research. This research situates itself in the framework of these encounter studies according to the specific research focus of loyalty. With this concept, this book is placed between cultural history and political history. The sources used in this research are linked to international power politics, and Austro-Hungarian policies towards Bosnia. The central parts of the research investigate mostly newspapers and selected documents in order to detect how certain individuals and groups in Bosnia responded to the politics of their day.

Theoretical Framework

Various academic disciplines (theology, philosophy, history, political science, international relations, psychology, sociology and economics) deal with loyalty. Each of these disciplines stresses its own perspective and all of these disciplines shape the understanding of politics and society. For this research, a historical, political and theological approach must be included. However, sociological and psychological aspects of loyalty cannot be omitted due to the large-scale changes in Bosnia which affected society and people’s lives. Such an inter-disciplinary approach facilitates a sound picture of the question of loyalty and how Bosniaks interacted and got along with new political authorities. The approaches and understandings of loyalty from these disciplines are often overlapping and complementary. All of them agree that loyalty is about allegiance to an authority (state, government, sovereign); political, cultural and national affiliation; devotion of a person to a cause; active commitment (dutifulness) and obedience to the law. A special case is when scholars (e.g. Grandits) talk of competing (conflicting, divided, various or multiple) loyalties. There are conflicts of loyalty which often accompany a reorientation of loyalties, i.e. when old loyalties have to be changed into new loyalties. It is the intention of this book to examine the reorientation of loyalties among the Bosniaks. It will try to detect, illuminate and analyze elements or examples of loyalty as well as disloyalty. Furthermore, the research will try to find answers to why certain layers of the Bosniak society have displayed or have not displayed loyalty. Thereby, it will try to show that there are neither absolute loyalties nor absolute disloyalties in general but as well within the Bosniak community.

One could say that four main approaches to the issue of loyalty regarding the Bosniaks are relevant. This involves loyalty within the imperial frame-

work; loyalty, state, and national minorities in South-Eastern Europe; multiple loyalties; and loyalty of Muslims to non-Muslim governments. The first centers on the concept of Empire as Bosnia was taken out of the Ottoman Empire and incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian one. The importance of loyalty within the newly created states in Central and South-east Europe and the response of the new national minorities within these states form the second approach of this study. Third, loyalty has proven to be multiple which has caused scholars to talk of competing, conflicting and divided loyalties. Fourth, assessing the relationship of Muslims to non-Muslim rule is of crucial importance to this study. The book will try to address whether Bosniaks rather chose consciously to be loyal citizens to the newly established non-Muslim rule and to adapt to a new surrounding, resist or to reject it and migrate towards Ottoman land. Therefore, the collective focus, volition and individual decision-making processes will be dealt with in order to capture inner lives, personal points of view, feelings and subjective experiences of ordinary people and of the elite.

The book will work within the hypothesis that Bosniaks as European Muslims not only geographically belong to Europe but – particularly since the inclusion of Bosnia in the concept of Central Europe since the late 19th century – have also displayed a pro-Western orientation in terms of political culture, education and way of life. Bosniaks have experienced the encounter between Christian and Islamic Europe. Furthermore, the assumption of this book is that Bosniaks were rather loyal citizens to the various political systems that governed Bosnia starting from Austro-Hungarian monarchy up to today's democracy.

The methodological orientation of this study is qualitative in nature. It is historical research where the relationship of a particular group, the Bosniaks, and a foreign political system is studied in depth. A combination of social factors that produce a specific outcome, i.e. loyalty, will be examined.

Chapter Outline

This partly descriptive, partly analytical study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter seeks to develop a theoretical framework within which the study proceeds and elaborates the various perspectives, approaches, understandings and concepts of loyalty. This chapter shows that the literature dealing with loyalty is very limited. Nonetheless, the approaches by various disciplines (theology, philosophy, history, sociology and politics) highlight the complexity of loyalty as an academic concept. Loyalty of Muslims to non-Muslim rulers will be highlighted through the Qur'an as well as within

the framework of Islamic thought. Important for this research is the issue of loyalty within the disintegrating Ottoman and the expanding Austro-Hungarian Empire where new minorities and loyalties emerged. These will be identified as multiple, competing, conflicting and divided loyalties.

The second chapter presents the Bosniaks as indigenous European Muslims. The Bosniaks are an integral part of Bosnia starting from early medieval times and represent the focus of this research. Historical, political and societal processes led to the term Bosniak coming to be applied to the Bosnian Muslims only as the Orthodox and Catholics started to declare themselves Serbs and Croats respectively. Therefore, the Bosniaks' historical development and main characteristics (religion of Islam and Bosnian language) needs to be elaborated. Discussion will show that for the Bosniaks, the perseverance of Islam, the territory of Bosnia and the Bosnian language have been of utmost importance.

The Austro-Hungarian period cannot be examined fully without including the geostrategic interests of other states. The third chapter elaborates the international political circumstances of the examined period (1878-1918). The European great powers at the Congress of Berlin set a new scene which the Bosniaks had to face. As soon as they were involved in European affairs, they became key targets within the Central European context and the cultural mission of Austria-Hungary.

These changes initially caused competing loyalties which are examined in the fourth chapter where the responses of the Bosniaks to the encounter with Christian European rule are elaborated. This chapter highlights the disorientation of ordinary citizens and the elite and puts it in correlation with Austria-Hungary's previous attempts to conquer Bosnia as well as its policies after the occupation.

Obviously the Bosniaks were torn between showing loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, to an autonomous state of Bosnia, or to Austria-Hungary. Their main fear was to lose their religious identity. Gradually, the Bosniaks accommodated with the new rule and adopted Central European standards. This development is shown in the fifth chapter with examples of loyalty. The publication of journals calling for loyal European citizenry, the first political parties according to European standards and with modern demands, the involvement in the first elections and parliament, and the participation within the Austro-Hungarian military are examples for testing loyalty to non-Muslim rule.

Finally, the concluding remarks summarise key points of discussion across the chapters and reiterate the general framework of the study.



Illustration from the French magazine *Le Petit Journal* on the Bosnian Crisis: Bulgaria declares its independence and its prince Ferdinand is named Tsar, Austria-Hungary, in the person of Emperor Kaiser Franz Joseph, annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II looks on helplessly 18 October 1908, Supplément illustré du quotidien "Le Petit Journal."

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LOYALTY

Loyalty has not frequently been the subject of research in humanities and the social sciences. However, relevant literature in the fields of theology and philosophy has revealed many aspects of loyalty. In the twentieth century disciplines such as history, sociology, political science and economics sporadically introduced the issue of loyalty to scientific research.

The Concept and Meaning of Loyalty

Etymologically, loyalty originates from the French word *loi* or English word *law*. Both are rooted in the Latin word *lex*, meaning ‘law’ and thus connotes legality. Therefore, people tend to equate the term legality with loyalty. Whereas legality is perceived as an external part of behavior, i.e. behaving more or less forcefully according to given laws, loyalty rather relates to an internal attitude, an inner conviction to show affiliation. It is an inner attachment towards a person, group, community, country or any cause. The extent of loyalty depends on expectations regarding the relationship towards the “object.” Thus, one can be loyal to a broad range of things (i.e. family, community, people, nation, state, government etc.).¹

While the word *loial* in old French language signifies allegiance, the English word came into use in the early part of the 15th century to indicate fidelity. Originally, one who is loyal to the feudal lord, the sovereign or the royal family in the feudal medieval sense is lawful (*legalis homo*) in contrast to an outlaw (*exlex* or *utlegatus*).² Thus, one who is loyal has full legal rights as a consequence of faithful allegiance to a feudal lord. This suggests that loyalty is dichotomous, i.e. one can only be lawful or unlawful – there is no median position. Similarly, Fletcher argues that actors can either be loyal or disloyal and never partly loyal.³

The term loyalty can also be used in formal and informal senses. Informal loyalty would pertain to friendships and formal to marriages. Kinship

is a form of inherited loyalty. Immigration might be a form of loyalty by free choice. Hence, the original meaning of the word implies a personal subjective relationship, an inner attitude towards an objectively founded duty. Related terms are affiliation, allegiance, faithfulness, fidelity, devotion, sincerity, honesty, trustfulness, duty, obedience, active commitment or patriotism.

Loyalty in Philosophy

In 350 BCE, Aristotle discussed various aspects of loyalty in his *Politics*.⁴ He accused disloyal persons who found their way into the highest offices.⁵ In the ninth part of Book V, Aristotle devotes several passages to the subject of loyalty and puts loyalty in a clear framework:

There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the highest offices- (1) first of all, loyalty to the established constitution; (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government;...the great preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned - to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stronger than the disloyal. ... It may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if he has political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest.⁶

In the 20th century, Josiah Royce (1855-1916) paved the way to addressing the concept of loyalty in humanities. As an American philosopher teaching at Harvard University, Royce was the first scholar who explicitly dealt with the issue of loyalty in his book *The Philosophy of Loyalty* published in 1908. Since this was the first indepth analysis of loyalty, it attracted much scholarly attention. Furthermore, his book sends out a message and offers powerful conceptual tools for today's troubled times. Shortly after publication, Royce was accused of his idealist approach and loyalty became a matter of debate due to rising nationalism especially during the Nazi regime and the obsolete metaphysics of idealism. Royce asserts in the preface of his book:

I am writing, in this book, not merely and not mainly for philosophers, but for all those who love [...ideals, and also for those who love...] their country, a country so ripe at present for idealism, and so confused, nevertheless, by the vastness and the complication of its social and political problems. To simplify men's moral issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win hearts for loyalty, - this would be, in this land a peculiarly precious mission, if indeed I could hope that this book could aid...towards such an end.⁷

For Royce, loyalty is a virtue, “the heart of all virtues, the central duty among all duties...the central spirit of the moral and reasonable life of man.”⁸ Royce related loyalty to the individual’s conscience and religion.⁹ The idea of loyalty according to Royce is:

*The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. A man is loyal when, first, he has some cause to which he is loyal; when, secondly, he willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when, thirdly, he expresses his devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting steadily in the service of his cause.*¹⁰

The cause has to be an objective one, not one’s own personal gain or to serve narcissism. Royce understands a cause as something “impersonal and super-personal” and adds: “In this cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfilment.”¹¹ Loyalty requires willingness, active commitment and meaning. This mirrors Royce’s life-long attempt to establish a viable and spiritually rich relationship between the individual and the community.¹² Royce examined the conditions necessary for an individual life to become meaningful. To lead a morally significant life, one’s actions must express a self-consciously asserted will. One must contribute toward realizing a plan of life, a plan that is itself unified by some freely chosen aim. Royce began to write more about what today would be called “practical” or “applied” philosophy. When one judges a cause to be worthwhile and freely embraces such a program, several momentous things happen. The individual’s will is focused and defined in terms of the shared cause. The individual becomes allied with a community of others who are also committed to the same cause. Finally, a morally significant commitment to the cause and to the community develops. This commitment is what Royce calls loyalty. He claims that there is only one way to be an ethical individual and that is to choose your cause, and then to serve it:

And so, a cause is good, not only for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a loyalty to loyalty, that is, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my fellows. It is an evil cause in so far as, despite the loyalty that it arouses in me, it is destructive of loyalty in the world of my fellow. My cause is indeed, always such as to involve some loyalty to loyalty, because if I am loyal to any cause at all, I have fellow-servants whose loyalty mine supports. But insofar as my cause is a predatory cause, which lives by overthrowing the loyalties of others, it is an evil cause, because it involves disloyalty to the very cause of loyalty itself.¹³

Thus the community's intended aim makes the individual's action loyal. Royce observes that the highest moral achievements throughout history have involved individuals' loyalty to ideals that promote the formation and expansion of communities of loyalty. Roycean loyalty requires one to scrutinize the aims and actions of such communities and to work to reform their disloyal aspects.

Given the fact of our existence in the world, we must first decide how we are to approach that world, and then develop our philosophical theories accordingly. Kelly Parker says about Royce: "His answer is that we should adopt the attitude of loyalty to goodness and truth, which as real forces in the world are the metaphysical opposite of evil. The loyal member of a genuine community confronts evil and wills to overcome it through the very fact of loyalty to its opposite."¹⁴

On the other hand, John Ladd questions Royce's idealist view of loyalty.¹⁵ Ladd claims that Royce's impersonal and superpersonal cause ignores the duties we have towards individuals and groups and states that:

Loyalty is not founded in just any causal relationship between persons, but in a specific kind of relationship or tie. The special ties involved arise from the twofold circumstance that the persons so bound are co-members of a specific group (community) distinguished by a specific common background and sharing specific interests, and are related in terms of some sort of role differentiation within that group.¹⁶

For Ladd it is conceptually impossible to be loyal to people in general or to a general principle, such as justice or democracy. Loyalty for him is tied to a specific interpersonal relationship. Furthermore, Ladd accuses the idealist approach by saying that man is treated as a mere means to serve an abstract principle rather than as an end in-itself: "It follows that mere blind obedience to every wish of the person who is the object of loyalty is not loyalty; it is the perversion of loyalty."¹⁷ To use an analogy, "a loyal Nazi is a contradiction in terms."¹⁸

Generally, as Ladd claims, "loyalty may be separated into the question of the object of loyalty, and the question of the moral value of loyalty."¹⁹ Royce, as an idealist, responds that the object of loyalty is "a cause beyond your private self, greater than you are ... impersonal and superpersonal."²⁰ On the other hand, in common language loyalty is perceived as something interpersonal or at least to something specific and not something "superpersonal" as Royce puts it. An individual might therefore be loyal to his/her ruler, his/her political party or to a general principle, such as justice, democracy,

human rights, etc. "The special ties involved arise from the twofold circumstance that the persons so bound are co-members of a specific group (community) distinguished by a specific common background and sharing specific interests, and are related in terms of some sort of role differentiation within that group."²¹

Finally, Ladd concludes that loyalty includes fidelity, sentiments and affection requiring "the complete subordination of one's own private interest in favor of giving what is due, and perhaps also the exclusion of other legitimate interests... If we could not count on loyalty of others ... social life would be not only bleak but also impossible."²²

The German historian Martin Schulze-Wessel explicitly elaborated the issue of loyalty as a historical term and research concept. He states that the starting point of loyalty is when the fidelity of a person towards a political figure, such as a king, a prince or a ruler, gets detached and attaches itself instead to an institution which symbolizes the country, such as the *corona regni* (crown of the kingdom) or the *Landtag* (parliament).²³ Thus, lots of scholars like Wessel perceive loyalty as a scholarly issue of the modern era.²⁴ On the other hand, having in mind Aristotle and theological approaches towards loyalty, other scholars claim that the question of loyalty was present much earlier. Obviously, scholars do not agree about the roots of loyalty. Furthermore, the understanding of loyalty throughout history has changed. Wessel defines loyalty in the first place as a category of social action and feeling which does not mean only obedience and contractual compliance but rather an attitude. Loyalty grows from relationships between individuals and institutions and therefore requires reciprocity on vertical and horizontal levels.

Similarly, James Connor contends that loyalty is primarily an emotion or more precisely "a socially negotiated, contested, contingent and reinforced emotion."²⁵ Leaning on Jack Barbalet's standpoint that emotion is central to sociology, since no action can occur in society without emotional involvement, Connor argues even that a sociological view is "the best theoretical perspective to take in explaining loyalty."²⁶ His perceptions of emotions are as follows: Emotions are a constant and necessary aspect of human existence. They infuse the actions, behaviors, thoughts, feelings and decisions made by actors. Emotional feeling crosses cultures and epochs, though curiously some emotional expressions are culturally specific while others are universal.²⁷

Loyalty in the Bible and the Qur'an

Chronologically, one of the early concepts of loyalty are discovered by Hecht who claims that in 650 BCE, the Olmecs, from today's Mexico, used writings to indicate pledges of loyalty to a king. Further early writings are laid down in the Bible and in the Qur'an.

Scholars of religion extracted contents related to loyalty from holy books, such as the Bible and the Qur'an. Since this book deals with the issue of the Bosniaks' loyalty, the focus here is on how Islam and Muslims perceive loyalty. Therefore, Islamic sources, such as the contents of the Qur'an and Hadith (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, *ṢAAS**) are relevant. Having in mind that Bosnia has been a multi-religious setting for centuries, Bosnian Muslims have lived together mainly with Christians (Catholic and Orthodox) but as well with Jews.²⁸ This is why a comparison of the issue of loyalty from a Christian theological point of view will be taken into consideration as well.

Like in other disciplines, loyalty is not a precisely defined term in theology. Starting with Christian theology, loyalty is usually understood and equated with the Latin term *fides* (faith, trust, fidelity). The Bible speaks of loyalty in various layers, from family loyalty (Ruth 3:10) to friendship loyalty (2 Samuel 16:17) and religious loyalty (Exodus 34:14). In Ruth 3:10, Boaz replied: "The Lord bless you! This shows how truly loyal you are to your family. You could have looked for a younger man, either rich or poor, but you didn't."²⁹ In 2 Samuel 16:17, Absalom asked Hushai, "Is this how you show loyalty to your friend David? Why didn't you go with him?"³⁰ Religious loyalty is requested in Exodus 34:14: "I demand your complete loyalty — you must not worship any other God!"³¹

The Biblical understanding of loyalty or fidelity does not depend on a reciprocal relationship between God and the people. God is *per se* trustworthy, faithful and loyal (Psalm 57:10, Psalm 108:4). Even if the people on earth do not trust God and are not faithful, God continues to display his virtues, as Wessel also states.³² Frequently the Bible makes a comparison between legalists and loyalists, i.e. those who just follow the rules and those who display an inner attitude. An example is a dispute (Psalm 119) where people are mentioned who love to serve, carry the law inside and the law is written in their hearts.³³ The Bible even lays the foundation for plural loyalties, as can be seen in the famous verse "Then give back to Caesar what is Caesar's, and

*(*ṢAAS*) – *Ṣalla Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam*. May the peace and blessings of God be upon him. Said whenever the name of Prophet Muhammad is mentioned.

to God what is God's.”³⁴ This sentence is well known in Bosnia and metaphorically used in the daily vernacular: “*Dajte Bogu božije, a caru carevo.*” This theological understanding of the term *fides* was in European medieval history transferred to power relationships. *Fideles Dei et regis* (Fidelity to God and to the king) was an often used formula to describe this relationship.³⁵ Thus, Christianity perceives loyalty as a duty of a Christian to a governmental authority. On the other hand, the Gospel of Matthew (6:24) rejects the notion of dual loyalty: “You cannot be the slave of two masters! You will like one more than the other or be more loyal to one than the other. You cannot serve both God and money.”³⁶ However, among Christian theologians, loyalty is understood according to the above mentioned saying that it is possible to have more than one locale of loyalty.³⁷

In Islam, the main sources are the Qur'an and Hadith. Whereas Muslims understand the Qur'an as God's words revealed through Jibrīl (Archangel Gabriel) to the Prophet Muhammad, the Hadith are reported and authenticated traditions about what Prophet Muhammad said, did or approved. Both of these sources were originally revealed and laid down in Arabic language. Loyalty in Arabic language is primarily translated as *walā* or *walāya*. Basically in Islam, loyalty should be given to God (Allah), to the Prophet, to the Ummah (community of all Muslim men and women throughout the world united in their faith) and to those who are not hostile to Muslims. Surah 3, *Āl-'Imrān*,³⁸ verse 103-104 states:

In this way God makes clear his message unto you, so that you might find guidance, and that there might grow out of you a community [of people] who invite unto all that is good, and enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong; and it is they, they who shall attain to a happy state!³⁹

In Surah 9, *al-Tawbah*, verse 23, the Qur'an advises believers not even to take “your fathers and brothers as allies if they prefer disbelief to faith: those of you who do so are doing wrong.”⁴⁰ Here loyalty (*walāya*) is translated as “alliance.”⁴¹ Believers are not only advised to cooperate with each other, but to be friends and protectors, as Asad interprets Surah 9, *al-Tawbah*, verse 71:

And [as for] the believers, both men and women - they are close unto one another: they [all] enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong, and are constant in prayer, and render the purifying dues, and pay heed unto God and His Apostle. It is they upon whom God will bestow His grace: verily, God is Almighty, Wise!⁴²

Regarding obedience, Surah 4, *al-Nisā*, verse 59 says “O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you” which Sean Oliver-Dee interprets as a clue to the key question whether Muslims should see non-Muslim authority as acceptable.⁴³ Oliver-Dee concludes that it is up to Muslims how they interpret this *āyah* (verse).⁴⁴ However, political or any other alliances should be preferred among believers whereas deniers of the truth (also called disbelievers in Surah 9, *al-Tawbah*, above) should not be taken as allies (Surah 4, *al-Nisā*, verses 139 and 144). Similarly, argues Surah 9, *al-Tawbah*, verse 7: “So long as they remain true to you, be true to them.” Al-Ghazali interprets this verse as follows: “This means that commitments and obligations must be respected and honored by all sides.”⁴⁵ Additionally, the Qur’an asks believers to be consistent and determined in their deeds: “Why do you say one thing and do another?” (Surah 61, *al-Şaff*, verse 2). In Surah 60, *al-Mumtaḥanah*, verses 8-9, the Qur’an reminds believers that friendly relations with unbelievers who are not hostile to the Muslim community are permissible, and even desirable:

As for such [of the unbelievers] who do not fight against you on account of [your] faith, and neither drive you forth from your homelands, God does not forbid you to show them kindness and to behave towards them with full equity: for, verily, God loves those who act equitably. God only forbids you to turn in friendship towards such as fight against you because of [your] faith, and drive you forth: and as for those [from among you] who turn towards them in friendship, it is they, they who are truly wrongdoers!⁴⁶

In comparison to Christianity, in classical Islam there was no distinction between religious institution and state. Whereas in Christendom the existence of two authorities goes back to Jesus who prescribed Christians to give God the things that are God’s, and to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, in Islam the distinction of these two powers (God and Caesar, *sacerdotium* and *regnum*, or the spiritual and temporal powers) was not made. In modern terms this distinction would be the difference between church and state. Until the 19th and 20th centuries, under the influence of Western ideas and institutions, new words in Turkish and Arabic language were found to express the idea of the secular.⁴⁷ The Bosnian language, like many others, just adapted the Latin term (*sekularno*). Another difference that Bernard Lewis reveals is that Western societies classify themselves according to the criterion of nation or country, while in Muslim societies Islam is the most accepted basis for authority as well as the ultimate criterion of group identity and loyalty (the unity of the Ummah).⁴⁸ This contradicts Ramadan’s point of view as he claims that the collective dimension of Ummah does not justify

taking a chauvinistic or nationalist stance because higher ethical and moral principles such as justice, sincerity and solidarity should inspire the behavior of a Muslim believer. Thus, a Muslim individual has to take a clear standpoint even against his own Muslim brothers and sisters if they are unjust, untruthful, treacherous or oppressive.⁴⁹

Thus, loyalty according to Islamic sources is understood as an alliance, friendship or being close or near to one another. It involves loyalty to God (*Allah*), to the Prophet (*Rasūl*), to the Muslim community (*Ummah*) and to those who are not hostile to Muslims. All those who believe in God and are loyal to God should be loyal to each other. As a Muslim belongs firstly and ultimately to God, this belonging influences each social sphere in which he or she is involved. Therefore, the revelation and the Prophet's message, including fundamental values such as faithfulness, honesty and sincerity, have priority over any other ties.⁵⁰ In order to establish a link between the issue of loyalty in the Qur'an, and the topic about the question of the Bosniak reaction to Austro-Hungarian rule, a closer look at the standpoint of loyalty in Islamic thought, particularly loyalty of Muslims to non-Muslim governments is necessary.

Loyalty in Islamic Thought: Loyalty of Muslims to Non-Muslim Governments

Muslim loyalty to non-Muslim rulers has become an ever-lasting issue since the first conquest, colonization and occupation of Muslim societies. From the perspective of traditional Islamic legal, political and ethical doctrines, the idea of Muslim residence and citizenship in non-Muslim states has been a matter of discussion since the eighth century, i.e. two centuries after the revelation of the Qur'an and the establishment of an Islamic state in Madi-nah.⁵¹ In this regard, the notion of hijra (migration, flight) became relevant. While non-Muslims occupied these societies and countries, Muslims feared that they might lose their religious identity and that it was not allowed to live under non-Muslim rule, and they waged for migration towards Muslim land. It is significant, as Andrew March states that "Year One in the Islamic tradition is not the year of Muhammad's birth, his first revelation, his conquest of Mecca, or his death, but rather the year of his flight from persecution in his native Mecca to the city of Yathrib (later Madina)."⁵² This flight towards safe lands called hijra remained an important topic in Islamic literature. Hijra symbolizes salvation of the Muslim community, perseverance of Islamic identity, solidarity among Muslims (as the *anṣār*/citizens of

Madinah welcomed the *muḥājir*/refugees from Makkah), as well as the establishment of an autonomous social, economic, military and political system. It has often been argued that Prophet Muhammad's migration from non-Islamic lands to lands ruled by Islam is a general and permanent duty for Muslims, particularly as *hijra* is mentioned in the Qur'an and in Hadith. Furthermore, the land where a just life is possible for a Muslim could only be an Islamic polity dedicated to the application of the Shari'ah. Hence, residence in a non-Muslim polity was either impermissible or deeply problematic:

One finds both the argument that the issue is settled by divine text (Q. 4:97-100 and 8:72) and six main explanatory arguments: that Muslims must not be subjects to non-Muslim laws or authority, that Islam and Muslims must not be put in a position of inferiority to non-Muslims, that Muslims must avoid aiding or increasing the strength of non-Muslims, that Muslims are forbidden from forming bonds of friendship or solidarity with non-Muslims, that Muslims are required to avoid environments of sin and indecency, and that in non-Muslim environments, it will be more difficult to prevent the loss of religiosity in subsequent generations.⁵³

Hence, there are Islamic doctrines rejecting loyalty to non-Muslims in general, claiming that a Muslim is not allowed to fight against another Muslim regardless of the cause, that a legitimate form of *jihad* is to expand the space ruled by Islam and Muslims, that it is the duty of every Muslim (in and outside a Muslim polity) to join a legitimate *jihad*, that a Muslim is not allowed to contribute to the cause of unbelievers and non-Islamic ruling, and that a Muslim is not permitted to sacrifice his life for non-Muslims.⁵⁴

In this regard, the dichotomy of the concepts of abode of Islam [*dār al-Islām*] and the abode of unbelief [*dār al-kufr*, *dār al-ḥarb*, *dār al-shirk*] played a role in classical Islamic literature. While in the abode of Islam it is assumed one lives a peaceful and ethical life under the guidance of the Shari'ah, in the abode of unbelief, Islamic system of life, society, economy and politics does not prevail. This theoretical construction has been tested by history and eventually deconstructed.⁵⁵ Still this dichotomy is important to understand the reasoning of Muslims who happened to live outside the abode of Islam.

Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd Koningsveld crystallize three situations. The first type of historical situation or precedence occurred in the pre-colonial era when individual Muslims or small groups such as merchants, diplomats or captives of war stayed in non-Muslim territories. At that time, Muslim legal scholars concluded it to be acceptable to stay as long as Muslims could

perform the basic religious prescriptions (the five pillars of Islam)⁵⁶ and as long as their lives were safe. Moreover, the classical scholars of Islamic legal thought explained that Muslims were obliged to obey laws of the land in which they were residing. They also had a duty to respect scrupulously the condition under which the non-Islamic state granted them *aman* (guarantee of safety) offered to foreigners visiting or residing in a territory.⁵⁷

The second type of historical circumstance occurred with the conquest of Muslim territories by non-Muslim rulers where the indigenous Muslim population came under non-Muslim rule. Historical examples are Sicily (the Emirate of Sicily existed from 965 to 1072 and was conquered by Normans), Spain and Portugal (Islamic dominion on the Iberian Peninsula, Al-Andalus, lasted from 711 to 1492 when it was finally terminated by Christian kingdoms) and Bosnia (the Ottoman Empire ruled this province from 1463 to 1878 when the Congress of Berlin decided to surrender it to Austria-Hungary).

The third type of historical circumstance was more radical as it occurred when almost every country with a Muslim majority was occupied by non-Muslims in the Colonial era. Again a severe discussion among legal scholars emerged, but this time all over the Muslim world at the end of the 19th and early 20th century, with different views developed over how Muslims should face this total replacement of their political and economic rule. The topics discussed were: whether a Muslim should continue with armed resistance or emigrate to an area with a Muslim ruler; to what extent could a Muslim adopt Western dressing habits (e.g. wearing a hat); whether it was allowed to study anything other than religious disciplines; whether a Muslim could adopt citizenship of the colonizing state etc.⁵⁸ Until 1878, Bosniaks lived in a society whose structure and fundamental concepts were based on Islamic jurisprudence. But with the advent of the 19th century and the admiration of Western civilization by scholars such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1835-1898), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), the concept of *dār al-ḥarb* was no longer that of a dangerous and uncertain territory, but rather than a model for Muslim advance.⁵⁹ These scholars called for a reform of Islam in order to find new solutions for the changing living conditions of Muslim societies on the basis of the reinterpretation of the Qur'an (ijtihad).⁶⁰ Muslims were supposed to use reason in order to keep up with changing times. Slowly the theological impediments to living in a dominantly non-Muslim country were removed and from the 19th century onwards Muslims started to examine the advantages of staying in and even migrating to non-Muslim countries. Legal scholars basically developed two opposing views: some scholars claimed that Muslims should

leave home and move to the abode of Islam (the remaining Ottoman Empire), others found arguments for the Muslims to stay in Bosnia. The Sarajevo mufti Mustafa Hilmi Hadžomerović and later first grand mufti (Reis ul-Ulema) of the Islamic Community (in office 1882-1893) issued several fatwas in which he rationalized non-Muslim rule as long as the ruler was just, respected by his subjects and allowed religious scholars to perform their functions.⁶¹ The next Reis ul-Ulema Azabagić (in office 1893-1909) was convinced that Bosniaks could stay in their home country under Austro-Hungarian rule as long as they were not forced to abandon their religion and could perform their religious duties. For him *dār al-ḥarb* would become *dar al-Islām* if Islamic rites (daily prayers, *Jumuah* prayer, fasting during Ramadan, Eid prayers) were allowed and practiced. This indicates a reformist approach towards traditional concepts of Islam (*hijra*, *dār al-ḥarb*, *dar al-Islām* etc.).⁶² In an article published in the journal *al-Manar* concerning emigration (*hijra*) and how far it legally applied to the Bosniaks, Rida states:

Hijra is not an individual religious incumbency to be performed by those who are able to carry out their duties in a manner safe from any attempt to compel them to abandon their religion or prevent them from performing and acting in accordance with their religious rites.⁶³

Shadid and Koningsveld conclude: "Such views are tantamount to legitimizing the existence of Muslim communities under non-Muslim rules under certain conditions, and they are directly relevant to the present situation of Muslim minorities in the West."⁶⁴

Bosniaks feared that with the occupation of Austria-Hungary they would live outside the abode of Islam in a state not ruled by Islamic principles. A vivid debate commenced between Bosniak scholars to establish whether to migrate to Muslim lands (Ottoman Empire), where the writ of Divine Law still applied, or to remain in a country where "infidel" courts operated. It should be noted that upto this point in time Bosniaks had no experience of living in a minority situation, nor were they sure of how Islamic sources dealt with the issue.⁶⁵ The question being not simply whether Muslims were allowed to live under non-Muslim rule, but if so, under what conditions. The challenges and questions facing the Bosniaks were for example permissibility of Muslims to serve in a non-Muslim army; how to organize religious affairs and religious education under non-Muslim rule; how to define the relationship between Islam and European culture; how to deal with a new economic system in which interest (usury) was common etc. These

questions influenced Islamic thought in Bosnia and fostered reformist thought among Bosniak theologians and scholars in general.

Hence, the bipolar classification of the world (*dār al-ḥarb*, *dar al-Islām*) was very much thrown into question once it soon became apparent that this categorization was overly simplistic, there being cases of non-Muslim rule under which Muslim subjects enjoyed religious liberties. Thus, throughout history and in Islamic thought, guidelines have been developed for the behavior of Muslim minorities in a non-Muslim state, but more importantly the concept of Muslim citizenship in non-Muslim countries has been expanded by reinterpreting and contextualizing the verses of the Qur'an and Hadith. Islamic scholars have in the meantime developed several arguments for the legitimacy of living permanently in a non-Muslim state. Furthermore, the concept of *al-aqalliyāt* (minorities) was elaborated, considering the variety of circumstances as well as political systems in which Muslims have lived and are living as minorities. Even the necessity of a special law (*fiqh*), such as a *fiqh al-aqalliyāt*, *fiqh al-ghurbah* (Islamic law for refugees), *al-madhab al-Urubi* (European school of law), European Shari'ah or European Islam was discussed.⁶⁶ It was argued that the duty of migration cannot be regarded as practicable as long as Muslims were safe, not forced to secede from Islam and had freedom to manifest their religion as well as to fulfill basic Islamic duties. Interestingly, according to Auda a territory cannot be called non-Muslim land simply on the basis of numerics (i.e. if Muslims constitute less than 50% of the population).⁶⁷ In fact, Muslims being the majority or minority in a land is irrelevant for the land to be classified as an Islamic territory. Indeed, four parameters are required to identify the abode of Islam: (i) Where Islamic ruling is applied;⁶⁸ (ii) Where a Muslim ruler provides security and freedom to its Muslim residents to practice their religion; (iii) Security and freedom to practice Islamic acts of worship as according to Imam Abū Ḥanīfah the purpose of calling a certain land "Land of Islam" or a "Land of disbelief" is not Islam versus *kufṛ*, but security versus insecurity; (iv) Justice as the basis of all the above parameters. Hence, a land which has a Muslim ruler but a leadership not based on justice cannot be considered an abode of Islam, whether or not the Muslims are a majority.⁶⁹

Auda goes into greater detail when identifying a state to which Muslims are supposed to show loyalty. He stresses the freedom of Muslims to perform public acts of worship: the five prayers; calling for the prayers; Friday prayers; fasting in Ramadan; giving zakah (charity); pilgrimage; ablution; Eid prayers; reading the Qur'an; circumcision; sacrificing animals to feed the poor; building mosques and minarets; greeting people with 'peace be upon you'; charitable endowments (*waqf*). He claims that many Muslim-majority countries

would score less than many European countries in assessing this 'index' of freedom of worship.⁷⁰

Thus, as long as Muslims are not oppressed and are free to practice their religion, they can live as a Muslim minority under non-Muslim rule. The argument is that the verses in the Qur'an which talk about hijra refer to Muslims who experienced oppression in Makkah and were constantly being induced to abandon Islam.⁷¹ This relates to several hadith, particularly the saying of 'A'ishah that a Muslim can worship his Lord wherever he may be, i.e. manifest and practice his/her religion even in the absence of a sovereign Muslim polity and under political non-Muslim and legal authority.⁷² Furthermore, as March argues:

... Muslims residing in non-Muslim lands may be the cause of the eventual return of Islam (in the cases of conquered lands) or of its spread, grounded in the belief that Islam is a universal religion, that the entire earth belongs to God, and that Muslims have the duty of "calling" (*al-da'wa*) to Islam. Given this paramount duty, how is it possible that residence in non-Muslim lands could be forbidden?⁷³

Hence, living as Muslims in a dominantly non-Muslim country is seen as a chance to represent and call to Islam. In addition to that, how feasible has it been for masses of Muslim communities during the last centuries until today in the 21st century, to migrate from one country to another as it is uncertain which country to choose in the absence of an Islamic caliphate or land of a Muslim ruler? Even if Islamic jurists would prefer some form of Islamic legal authority for Muslim communities under non-Muslim law, this is not an absolute requirement for residence.⁷⁴

Tariq Ramadan is one of the most prominent contemporary Islamic scholars who claim that there is no contradiction in living as a practicing Muslim under non-Muslim rule. He stresses very much the notion of contract or covenant (agreement, promise) which determines status, duties, rights and actions. Ramadan states that Muslims must respect any sort of ties (family, community, people and nation) as long as their faith is respected and protected, and they are not coerced to act against their faith or conscience.⁷⁵ The respect of treaties and the importance of contracts seems to be fundamental: "Muslims are bound by their conditions [those of the agreements they have accepted]" (Hadith reported by al-Bukhari). In Surah 5 *al-Ma'idah* verse 1 Muslims are warned to be true to their covenants (agreements or contracts) and to fulfill all of them. Asad quotes Raghīb who interpreted the term covenant (*aqd*, *'ahd* and sometimes *mithāq*) as man's obligation to

God, to his soul and to his fellow humans.⁷⁶ Further Qur'anic verses ask Muslims to honor any contract into which they enter, such as Surahs 2 *al-Baqarah*, verse 177: "righteousness is ... to fulfill the contracts which you make"; 16 *al-Nahl*, verse 91: "Fulfill God's covenant when you have entered into it and break not your oaths after asserting them, for you thereby make God your guarantor"; 17 *al-Isrā'*, verse 34: "Fulfill every contract for contracts will be answered for [on the Day of Reckoning]"; 13 *al-Ra'd*, verse 19-20: "It is those who are endued with understanding that receive admonition, those who fulfill the covenant of God and do not violate their agreements." As some might claim that this is valid only for contracts, agreements, covenants or promises made to Muslims:

Jurists from across the Sunni schools are quite clear that contracts made with non-Muslims are as morally binding as those made with Muslims. Muslim behavior in a non-Muslim state is generally treated in relation to the legal concept of *aman*, the formal guarantee of security from a potential hostile entity that is a form of contract imposing obligations on both sides. Jurists are unanimous in holding that the enjoyment of *aman* imposes in the Muslim certain moral and sometimes legal obligations to the non-Muslim entity in question.⁷⁷

Hence, there is even in classical Islamic jurisprudence evidence for loyalty of Muslims to non-Muslim rule with a strict emphasis on the obligation to uphold oaths and contracts. Here the issue of the social contract arises and whether Muslims can be bound by a constitution that allows interest, alcohol and other types of business and behavior that contradict the teachings of Islam. The response is that as long as these constitutions do not force the Muslims to use them, Muslims are able to respect the law in the country they live in. Thus, Islamic law and jurisprudence require from Muslims to submit to the body of positive law enforced in their country of residence. Consequently, as Ramadan puts it: "it is illegitimate for a Muslim to act against the law, or to commit acts of abuse, embezzlement, or fraud."⁷⁸ Once an agreement is concluded, to act according to the law is in itself a way of worshipping Allah. Hence, most scholars consider Muslim residents in non-Muslim polities as bound by a mutual contract of security. This means that as soon as a Muslim has accepted the security of a non-Muslim state, he/she is obliged to follow all of its laws, paying taxes, contributing to the welfare system, serving the military and even going to war as well as defending a non-Muslim state.⁷⁹

To put it briefly, the aim is to "protect the Muslim identity and religious practice, to recognize the Western constitutional structure, to become

involved as a citizen at the social level, and to live with true loyalty to the country to which one belongs.”⁸⁰ Regarding the Ummah, Ramadan makes an interesting analysis on three levels:

First, the notion of belonging based on faith, religion, and brotherhood brings out the very essence of the teaching of Islam and constitutes one of its distinctive characteristics, for it explains that the link with God (*al-rab-baniyya*) is fully realized through an active and positive involvement in society, from the small family unit up to the wide reality of the *umma*. Next, in the light of their faith, Muslims are bound to “the prime aim of justice,” which must be their criterion in every circumstance, rather than to an abstract feeling of belonging founded only on the fact that “we are all Muslims.” In other words, Muslims should feel that they belong above all to God and that the Creator will never accept a lie, a betrayal, or an injustice, especially on the part of a Muslim individual or community, for they should be models of rectitude, honesty, justice, and loyalty. Finally, contracts determine our status, define our duties and rights, and guide the direction as well as the content of our actions. Once settled, the terms of an agreement must be respected, and if one of its points seems to go against the rights of Muslims—or even against their conscience as believers—it must be discussed and negotiated, for Muslims do not have the right to break a treaty unilaterally. On this point, their loyalty must have no exceptions.⁸¹

A further question would be whether Islamic sources allow a Muslim to be a true European citizen. The first answer to this question is that Muslims in whatever context must engage in justice and try to reform and improve the situation. The argument for this comes from a saying of the Prophet Muhammad:

Whoever among you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand [by taking action]; if he cannot, then with his tongue [by speaking out]; and if he cannot, then with his heart [by hating it and feeling that it is wrong] – and that is the weakest of faith. (Hadith reported by Muslim – *Kitab al-Imān*, 49/78)

The primary focus of loyalty to Allah explains the Bosniaks’ first reaction to a non-Muslim ruler, and later the confidence received from the *ulema* (*‘ulamā*, Islamic scholars) for extending loyalty to the non-Muslim ruler as well (all of which is going to be elaborated extensively in the following chapters). In addition to that, it is claimed that wherever Muslims live, they are designed for interaction and cooperation and not for isolation or assimilation. Hence, civilizational cooperation and equal cultural interaction are

priorities to be fulfilled by Muslims especially in the Western world.⁸²

An important consideration about a Muslim's loyalty deserves to be quoted fully:

Muslims today experience, sometimes with a great deal of tension, conflicts of belonging, and if they themselves do not feel it as such, their fellow-citizens sometimes manage to connect them with another belonging—to “their community,” “their brothers” from some other place, as if this attribution were one more sign that they do not really belong to the Western nations. For decades the same intentional process has been directed in Europe against Jews, whose genuine loyalty has always been suspect. Muslims face the same judgment, and international events push them even more onto the defensive. So this issue must be dealt with particularly explicitly. Let us ask the questions clearly and simply: should Muslims be defined in the light of the notion of community (*umma*), or are they simply Muslim citizens of one or another Western country? To which group or collectivity do they belong first, to the *umma* or to the country in which they live as residents or citizens? These are sensitive questions, for behind their outward meaning we find *the* fundamental question—is it possible for a Muslim to be an authentic European or American, a real citizen, a *loyal* citizen?⁸³

This quotation from Ramadan and particularly its questions, reveal that the issue of loyalty today does not differ greatly from the situation of the Bosniaks during the Austro-Hungarian period. The sources discussed in the forthcoming chapters illustrate the great similarities between the debates of today and those of more than a century ago.

Loyalty in Sociology as an Emotional Motivation Actor

Connor dealt precisely with loyalty from a sociological perspective. He sticks to “a historical reading of loyalty and how it has changed depending upon surrounding social relationships [which] can provide insight into the emotion as well as social reproduction.”⁸⁴

Even if emotion is not value-neutral, because it orients the actor to social values, nevertheless, emotions and loyalty are not irrational.⁸⁵ Emotions have as well “learned aspects,” such as hereditary learning and individual learning (personal experience) which involves social learning or history.⁸⁶ Whereas emotions, such as shame, love or trust have been the subject of academic inquiry, loyalty has been neglected.⁸⁷

Connor examines loyalty on various levels, such as family loyalty, national loyalty, sport loyalty and cultural loyalty.⁸⁸ On the one hand, this

diversity of loyalties makes the study difficult. On the other hand, multiple targets of loyalty reveal their influence on individuals and layering also raises awareness that there are multiple influences of loyalty being placed upon the actor.⁸⁹ Furthermore, he argues that “loyalty needs competition because one cannot be loyal to a cause if there is no other cause.”⁹⁰ Generally in Western, English-speaking countries, “loyalty is applied to a myriad of relationships, from the intensely personal and familial, to the nation-state. It is invoked for family, friends, sports, politics, religion, race, ethnicity, class, locality, interest groups and nations to offer a list spanning a wide variety of social interactions.”⁹¹ These various levels of social interaction allow Connor to conclude that loyalty is firstly a layered emotion. Secondly, loyalty is fundamental in furnishing identity as it denotes membership and belonging. Thirdly, loyalty motivates action or it is a justification for action, behavior and cognition.⁹²

Connor starts his inquiry with the following two questions: (a) How does one find and identify instances of loyalty? and (b) When can a researcher and an actor know that loyalty is involved in social interaction? He proceeds with (c) What function does loyalty perform?⁹³ At this point, several remarkable questions might be raised:

- Can there exist a relationship of loyalty without the actor’s acknowledgement?
- How and when does loyalty motivate an actor?
- What purpose does national loyalty serve for society? Have loyalties changed over time?
- Does loyalty give information to the actor regarding social values, norms and reciprocities?
- Does the feeling and understanding of loyalty for the actor give insight into relationships of status and power?
- Can loyalties make decisions easier?
- Does loyalty predispose our actions in particular ways?⁹⁴

The sources of evidence Connor uses are popular culture in the broadest sense: historical sources, newspapers, TV programs, radio interviews, websites, weblogs and books. These sources offer insight into an emotion that occurs across a very diverse range of social sites. This reveals an approach to offer a holistic understanding of loyalty. Historical shifts in the narrative of loyalty have occurred as a response to emotional changes all of which must be considered along with other shifts in mentality and behavior.⁹⁵

Interestingly, Connor studies the language of loyalty and states that “each

language has cultural nuances to the expression and meaning of a particular emotion term. This makes it difficult to be sure that researchers are communicating about the same thing.”⁹⁶ However, the presence of the term ‘loyalty’ in the language is indicative of its importance and relevance to the culture using the term. On the other side, feelings and behaviors associated with loyalty occur across many cultures. Loyalty is socially constructed and learned and it exists to foster social cohesion.⁹⁷

Loyalty in History and Politics

For this study loyalty within the framework of history and politics is relevant within the imperial context, the relationship of state, nation and minorities in Central and Southeast Europe, and the issue of multiple, competing, conflicting and divided loyalties. Judith N. Shklar, for example, studies the relationship between political loyalty and political obligation.⁹⁸ She stresses that conflicts are common between obligations, commitments, loyalties, fidelities and allegiances. Her approach to loyalty is worth quoting in full:

What distinguishes loyalty is that it is deeply affective and not primarily rational. For the sake of clarity we should take loyalty to be an attachment to a social group. Membership may or may not be chosen. Belonging to an ascriptive to which one has been brought up, and taught to feel loyal to it, since one’s early infancy is scarcely a matter of choice. And when it comes to race, ethnicity, caste, and class, choice is not obvious. The emotional character of loyalty also sets it apart from obligation. If obligation is rule driven, loyalty is motivated by the entire personality of an agent. Political loyalty is evoked by nations, ethnic groups, churches, parties and by doctrines, causes, ideologies, or faiths that form and identify associations. When it is a result of choice, loyalty is a commitment that is affective in character and generated by a great deal more of our personality than calculation or moral reasoning. It is all of one that tends to be loyal.⁹⁹

Hence, Shklar raises issues concerning loyalty as a choice of the actor, attachment to a social group and a whole-person commitment. Furthermore, she agrees with Connor that loyalty is an emotion. Shklar argues that “the age of ideology has left us with only one survivor able to make claims upon primary loyalties: nationalism. It is all the more powerful because it has no serious rivals.”¹⁰⁰ Simon Keller conceptualizes loyalty around the keywords friendship, filial duty, patriotism, virtues and values, and also refers to Royce’s “Philosophy of Loyalty.”¹⁰¹ George Fletcher sets loyalty as a central feature of moral and political life and puts it in relationship to religious

imperatives.¹⁰² Anna Stilz elaborates upon liberal loyalty in order to defend committed citizenship in terms of obeying the law, paying one's taxes, voting, participating politically and showing concern for the equality and well-being of one's compatriots. She draws the line at redundant patriotism "my country right or wrong" and nationalism. Related terms for her are faithfulness, fidelity or dutifulness which occurs of one's own free will on a voluntary basis.¹⁰³

Loyalty within the Imperial Framework

After the medieval period as a feudal kingdom, Bosnia formed part of the Ottoman (1463-1878) and Austro-Hungarian Empires (1878-1918). When the Ottoman Empire started to lose its strength, influence and territories, the more powerful states sought to acquire or control these territories. This power vacuum was referred to as the "Eastern Question." Thus, Bosnia, as the most western Ottoman province was an attraction for European empires, particularly the Austro-Hungarian or Habsburg Empire as well as the Russian Empire. Therefore, it is important to focus briefly on the modern concept of imperialism, the characteristics of those empires which influenced developments in Bosnia and to relate this with loyalty. Maximilian Hartmuth's statement in this regard is worth quoting at length:

In the discussion of imperial legacies, Bosnia-Herzegovina can safely claim a prominent place, for it is here that both the Habsburg and the Ottoman legacies overlap. The experience of rule by both empires in different historical periods was in fact, shared by much of the area between Bratislava and Niš; but it is only in Bosnia where one can see minarets towering over streetscapes that could be [...] in any town urbanized during the Austro-Hungarian fin-de-siècle, that both legacies still very visibly overlap. Yet, rather than competing with each other, with the Bosnians of Christian background identifying with the Habsburg legacy and those of Muslim background with the Ottoman, both form an integral element in the present self-understanding and representation of local society. Conscious that it really were the Ottomans who had laid the foundations of Sarajevo's urban tradition, the Habsburg period is less dismissed as a period of foreign rule than understood as one factor in a larger history resulting in the mosaic perceived as characteristic in the country's real tradition; "real" here as opposed to the "imagined" one, which is alleged to have sought to replace the former.¹⁰⁴

Generally speaking, most people have lived in empires until the 20th century, Empire being the most prevalent and effective way of uniting a variety of peoples and extensive territories. However, creating empires

through military conquest was much easier than maintaining them, requiring the consistent skill of rulers to keep a variety of peoples in huge territories together. In other words, it is about integration which consists of centralization and standardization, i.e. to combine and harmonize political, economic and cultural components from the imperial center as well as in occupied territories. A quid-pro-quo relationship between the ruler and subjects needed to be established where the ruler asked for obedience to the laws and taxes (loyalty) while the subjects received security, law and order in return. The introduction of a common language, culture and ideology facilitated integrative policies.

When it comes to Europe, two distinct types of empires were created: the classic and the recent. While the classic type characterized by geopolitical motives is represented by Austria-Hungary (Habsburg) and the Russian (Romanov) Empire, the recent type is characterized by commercial-capitalist considerations and represented by Great Britain, France and Spain.¹⁰⁵ Interestingly, Orest Subtelny does not put the Ottoman Empire into these two categories. This coincides with the idea that the Ottoman Empire was not an empire, but rather a commonwealth *Osmanli devlet*.¹⁰⁶ The term *devlet* does not mean empire or tsardom, but rather a community of peoples where integrative policies do not enter the sphere of culture. This means that individual cultures, particularly religions and languages, were given the right to coexist. Subjects within the Ottoman *millet* system were allowed to live their culture and practice their religion without interference.¹⁰⁷

In terms of loyalty, the Ottoman system required from its subjects religious and cultural allegiance to their respective ecclesiastical heads, and political allegiance to the Sultan, who was obliged to maintain public order and to protect his subjects whom he had the right to tax. Karpát proceeds with a further important point: The “nationality” of the subjects, which meant identification with a group and not with a political state, was based on religious identification. A Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, etc. would call himself first a “Christian” while a Turk, Laz, Kurd, etc., would call himself first a “Muslim,” regardless of his language or ethnic origin. To repeat the point, religious affiliation was the chief factor which determined the group identity of an individual.¹⁰⁸ I would add to this point that for Bosniaks, religious identity took first place, particularly as they feared losing it under non-Muslim rule.

The Austro-Hungarian as well as the Russian Empires had an imperial heritage which means that they “emerged within empires and then sought to recreate similar conglomerates on their own.”¹⁰⁹ While Austria formed the Eastern frontier of the Carolingian and Holy Roman Empires, Russia

formed the periphery of the Mongol and Byzantine Empires:

The heritage of empire was evident in the *Weltanschauung* of the two dynasties. They tried to trace their genealogies back to Rome, they laid claims to lands by arguing that they once belonged to empires to which they claimed to be the legitimate successors, they envisaged themselves as universal monarchies, and they steered clear of narrow, ethnic identification. Finally, they saw their mission in classical terms: to attain predominance over numerous peoples and vast territories and, in the process, to bring order and security to these lands.¹¹⁰

Furthermore, both empires, the Habsburg as well as the Russian, had a continental location consisting of continuous land masses, and not extending their rule overseas like the English, French or Spanish. Both empires understood themselves as defenders of Christianity pushing back the dominantly Muslim Ottomans and the Tatars. In the Bosnian context it is relevant to remember that Croatia as the neighboring country was considered to be the bulwark of Christianity (*antemurale Christianitatis*). After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Pope Callistus III urged all Christians to the Crusades, whereas in the 16th century Pope Leo X called Croatia to fight against the advancing Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire occupied part of Croatia from the 15th to the 19th centuries, and a large number of Croats converted to Islam. Similarly, when Belgrade was conquered by the Turks in 1521 many writers and diplomats pointed out that Belgrade was the bastion of Christianity. Whereas later Austria-Hungary emphasized its role as *antemurale Christianitatis* defending and spreading the Catholic religion, the Russian Empire understood its role as defender of Orthodoxy. However, in comparison to recent West European colonial powers, converting the colonial people (e.g. via missionaries) was not a primary concern, but a secondary one (as in the settlement of colonists). The Habsburgs emerged from a Germanic/Catholic/feudal context and closely related to that background, the purpose of expansion was rather rationalistic. As defenders of Christianity in order to provide a more stable and just government, and to secure trade routes, Austria-Hungary set for itself the right to conquer Bosnia.

Since civilizing backward societies was an important part of modern imperialism, Austria-Hungary wanted to modernize the Bosnian society. Austria-Hungary modernized Bosnia in many ways, such as the education system, infrastructure, economy, and introduced modern techniques and technology (railroads, industry, medical care, defense).¹¹¹ On the other side, the Ottoman Empire had already begun the modernization process

(*Tanzimat*) in the 1830s with institutional reforms in politics, society, law and the military. Thus, correctly speaking, Austria-Hungary *continued* the modernization process in Bosnia. Furthermore, Karpát stresses Europe-centrism in this regard:

[The] absolute superiority of European society, culture and government (...) defend the view that Europe had a moral right to reform, change, and, maybe, to dominate any system, including the Ottoman, which did not conform to its own standards. These views served as a moral justification for imperialism and colonialism. Eventually both of them, disguised in the form of political and economic liberalism, were imposed on the Ottoman governments, although many of these ideas had not yet been applied in Europe itself, at least not in the 19th century.¹¹²

Bosnia became Austria-Hungary's first and only colony with pivotal protrusion into the Balkans. This imperial experiment in Bosnia lasted for 40 years with a crucial impact on the citizens. Therefore, it is important to examine and analyze the Bosniaks' responses to the encounter with this European empire within which they became a religious and national minority.

Loyalty, State and National Minorities in Central and South-East Europe

For the conceptualization of loyalty, this book uses German scholars, such as Peter Haslinger and Joachim von Puttkamer,¹¹³ as well as Otto Luchterhand¹¹⁴ and Martin Schulze Wessel¹¹⁵ who have dealt precisely with state, loyalty and national minorities in Central, East and South-East Europe.

The results of the Reformation and the religious split of the medieval and homogenous *corpus christianum* led to a large-scale problem of religious-confessional minorities. The approach to the problem was either to exterminate the "heretics" or to choose a new path, i.e. the principle of religious tolerance, freedom of worship and free exercise of religion. This latter approach was applied gradually as, firstly, the Religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555 still recommended the principle *cuius regio eius religio* [the one who rules a region determines the religion]. Later in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia established the coexistence of different confessions. With this principle of religious tolerance the clash between secular and religious power was alleviated. Furthermore, a subjects' moral obligation towards God and the sovereign was no longer a matter of conflict. Thus, political loyalty could be arranged alongside but separate from religion.¹¹⁶ The Peace of Zsitvatorok

in 1606 and then the Treaty of Karlowitz¹¹⁷ in January 1699 were an attempt to describe the relationship between Christian great powers and the Muslim Ottoman Empire. This combination of *Idealpolitik* and Imperialism, where new states are obliged to respect and protect the rights of religious minorities, serve as an acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the new states.

In the 18th and 19th century, Europe experienced intense economic and political transformations. With the rise of nation-states and nationalism, the locus of loyalty moved from the lord or master within the feudal system to the nation-state. Indeed, the increased political importance of the centralized nation state and national government created a new focus on loyalty as nationalism and patriotism grew: "This change in governance represented a major shift in context for loyalty and the creation of a new layer of loyalty."¹¹⁸ Now the nation state and sovereign government could be an object of loyalty for the individual. Mass loyalties emerged via many revolutions of the time: the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and the Russian Revolution, including particularly the Industrial Revolution, which caused an intensified division of labor, modernized communication techniques and led to mass production, all of which together with mass armies supported the emergence of mass loyalty.¹¹⁹ Hence, the nation state came to constitute a central component of the change in loyalty, because the nation shapes identity.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, a thorough, precise and uniform scientific definition of loyalty is still lacking even if the term loyalty in scientific research, particularly in the field of history, is increasingly used. Usually people understand loyalty as a form of sincerity, fidelity, faithfulness, allegiance, affiliation, staunchness, constancy or trust. As a conclusion, Wessel summarizes three key characteristics of loyalty: (i) Loyalty is about social commitment and feelings, hence, loyalty is not about pure obedience, such as obeying rules or fulfilling laws, but an attitude. (ii) Loyalty and allegiance are related to each other and require reciprocity. (iii) Loyalty has a limited duration. Loyalty has always a prehistory, i.e. when loyalty emerged. Mostly, loyalty has a post-history, i.e. when loyalty continues to exist or produces similar actions.¹²¹

Furthermore, it is important to set within the theoretical framework of this book the concept of loyalty in relation to national or ethnic minorities. Firstly, Bosniaks became a religious minority due to the 1878 Congress of Berlin's decision to give dominantly Catholic Austria-Hungary control over the territory. Secondly, they continued to be a minority in Yugoslavia because of the results of World War I and World War II. In relation to the question as to whether loyalty of national or ethnic minorities to a foreign country or ruler is important, Luchterhand states two constellations: the first

constellation is that a minority ethnic group has lived in a certain state without any tensions. When the minority slowly becomes aware of its ethnic-cultural identity, it does not receive enough respect and starts feeling foreign. Consequently, the state should take certain measures to ensure its declining loyalty. Propaganda or repressions claiming loyalty might be one method. Another would be to give the minorities certain rights, such as respect and protection. In this case protection of minorities would be a measure to *secure loyalty*.¹²² The second constellation is that of a minority ethnic group coming under the control of a new state due to politically-forced border changes. Thus, loyalty cannot be expected easily. Again, as in the first scenario, repression and manipulation would be one option. Another would be to acquire and cause loyalty. In this case, protection of minorities would be a measure to *acquire loyalty*.¹²³ Thus, Luchterhand analyzes firstly the position of religious minorities in a state that is dominated by another religion. The second aspect is to analyze minorities which become new subjects of a newly created state due to war, treaties or dynastic marriages. The case of the Bosniaks serves as a good example to test Luchterhands' approach.

The following comparison is worth mentioning: the head of the Paris Conference for Peace, George Clemenceau, tried in 1919 to warn Poland of a policy in the *ius publicum Europeum* where great powers would demand certain *principes du gouvernement* from states whose borderlines have significantly grown. This no longer included religious rights, but indeed the protection of national minorities, such as the German minority in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, the newly established states did not feel obliged to conform to the European heritage. In Czechoslovakia, for example, of the 3.4 million Germans, 3 million were expelled from their homes following president Eduard Beneš' wish to make Czechoslovakia a Slavic state where Czechs and Slovaks should dominate and Germans as well as Hungarians emigrate. Every single German was suspected of being a Nazi.¹²⁴ However, those Germans and Hungarians who actively, publicly and wholeheartedly supported Czechoslovakia were perceived as loyal citizens and did not face expulsion. Thus, the criteria of loyalty were ultimately decisive of whether a citizen was fully accepted and preserved from any persecutions.

In acquiring loyalty from a sovereign's new subjects due to territorial border changes, the American principle "no taxation without representation" can be seen as relevant. Citizens were given basic rights, such as involvement in public affairs, a guarantee of personal liberties and private ownership as well as a national representation laid down in a constitution. These rights made it easier for the new sovereign to request loyalty. Altogether, these historical experiences prove that securing and acquiring loyalty can be achieved through giving rights.

Luchterhand summarizes that borderlines and ethnic conflict situations are the root cause for conflicts of loyalty. Loyalty requests are a high political burden particularly for those minorities who live on the border with their mother country. If given the right to self-determination, they would likely have voted for incorporation to the neighboring country. As an explanation, this was the case in East and South-East Europe after the Congress of Berlin, after World War I and after World War II. To the disadvantage of the Germans, Poland, Lithuania and Italy built their states. At the expense of the Hungarians, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia created their political systems and borders. To the disadvantage of Bosniaks, diverse Yugoslav political systems were established. Until recently, at the expense of Albanians, Kosovo was still a part of Serbia. Today, we have similar relationships, such as the case of the Russians in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Estonia or Armenians in Azerbaijan. The issue of self-determination is striking in all these cases. If there is a people geographically living next to the majority of its population, then Luchterhand claims we are not talking of a state minority, but of incorrect drawing of borders. On the other side, one could argue that these peoples wanted to move there if we take the case of Israel's settlements in Palestinian territories. Thus, a constructivist approach is most appropriate to understand that states are constructions and do not always fit nicely around people groups, but are results of land conquests, migrations, and other historical as well as political processes. Typical areas of conflict when it comes to loyalty are, according to Luchterhand:

- Freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
- Establishment of minority organizations for representation of common interests.
- Engaged preservation of national or ethnic traditions related to the mother country (cultural heritage preservation, historical memory, national symbols, preservation of toponyms in the native language).
- Maintaining private and public contacts between individuals and organizations from the minority and the mother country (possibility to receive material and financial help).
- Possibility to contact foreign countries, international organizations and institutions for political support and journalistic help.

Generally, states can react in a variety of ways to minorities, their rights and duties. Either there is no regulation for minorities specifically regarding loyalty, obligation or allegiance, or a duty clause is inserted in the statement of a national minority's rights. A third option is that a duty clause is found

in treaties for the protection of minorities according to international law. Romania, for example, in its constitution of 1991, Article 50, states that faithfulness to the state is holy.¹²⁵

An interesting example shown by Wessel is the case of the Czechoslovak Republic in the period between the two World Wars from 1918 to 1938. There, he discovers various loyalties and elaborates his loyalty concepts based on political, national and cultural affiliations. Again, there are many similarities to Bosnia. Like Bosnia, the new state of Czechoslovakia was established after an imperial experience, and new minorities emerged. The Bosnian or Balkan Muslims after their experience as part of the majority within the Ottoman Empire, turned out to be new minorities with the retreat of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of new nation states in the Balkans. Thus, the old loyalty to the Sultan had to be dissolved and a new loyalty established. From the state perspective, this task was much more difficult because the Ottoman Empire remained a neighboring state for Bosnia as well as Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria or Romania. Furthermore, the Sultan remained, according to the April 1879 Convention, *de jure* the sovereign over the citizens of Bosnia which additionally complicated the loyalty issue.¹²⁶

Hence, loyalty and faithfulness can be found on a vertical and horizontal level. Wessel makes the distinction between loyalty and faithfulness. Whereas faithfulness relates to private relationships, loyalty limits its sphere of influence to the relationship between individuals and institutions or between individuals as a consequence of processes of communalization. Problems arise when a state claims a people's loyalty which might result in loyalty conflicts (desertion, unwillingness to go to war). When Austria-Hungary issued conscription in Bosnia, this led to serious loyalty debates over whether Muslims could serve in a non-Muslim army. Loyalty is also similar to solidarity. Whereas loyalty is rather an inner attitude, solidarity is more an inner need which is expressed externally. Semantically related terms to loyalty are allegiance to the state. Important here is the analysis of concepts and practices of loyalty or disloyalty. Furthermore, the concept of identity serves as indicator for loyalty. The citizen is expected to be loyal even if he is not convinced of a task's usefulness or policy. In understanding identity, including national identity, it is not the top-down elite driven view fostered by national leaders and other figures of importance that is of most value. It is the ordinary person and his or her view of the nation and nationalism that should be studied in an attempt to understand how this creates identity because the emotive power of national identity can be identified by moving beyond elites, intellectuals and nationalist mouthpieces and by looking instead, at how ordinary people affirm the idea of nationhood.¹²⁷

In short, identity is a negotiated understanding of one's place in the world. Our loyalties furnish identity and vice versa as we are loyal to that with which we identify. Actors construct and are constructed by their emotional experiences, and identity partly arises through this emotional process. There, we address a further important aspect of loyalty which is emotion. Emotions are central to social action which explain the "why" and "how" of micro and macro sociological interactions. Since the micro level stands for the family, friends and local area, the macro level involves religion, ethnicity, nation and/or state. Therefore, there are many different possible targets for loyalty in society. One of the reasonings for the micro and macro level perspective is "what is good for an individual is often good for the social unit." Connor's argument for understanding loyalty as an emotion is as follows:

The key advantage of recognizing loyalty as an emotion is that it allows me to bring a range of theoretical tools to bear in explaining and understanding the phenomenon that is loyalty. Thus, I can use the various tools of social constructivism to explain loyalty – such as the focus on emotions being the product of social interaction and not an innate behavior. This position informs the position I take on loyalty, namely that it is socially constructed, guides behavior, contributes to identity and is layered.¹²⁸

Similarly, loyalty can be understood in the first place as a category of social action and feeling, which does not mean only obedience and contractual compliance, but rather an attitude. As loyalty grows from relationships between individuals and institutions, it therefore requires reciprocity on a vertical and horizontal level.

Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the Constitution of Austria-Hungary and of Bosnia or any other official document to see what is the legal basis for loyalty or what is perceived as the constitutionally normative civic duty (e.g. faithfulness to the state, serving in the military, protecting the fatherland, paying taxes to the state, obeying the laws, serving national interests, etc.). Nowadays, as Luchterhand states,¹²⁹ the duty of obedience to the law is so fundamental as well as firmly and completely linked to the functionality of a state that it is not even mentioned in official documents, such as treaties, constitutions etc. Loyalty is self evidently perceived as a basic duty of each citizen which involves expectations and moral values. In the same way, loyal behavior in a reciprocal relationship is a means to create social predictability.

Another similar and interesting approach in terms of measuring loyalty is illustrated by Haslinger. He understands loyalty from two perspectives: internal (mindset) and external (perception).¹³⁰ The individual mindset or attitude directs individual action which can be quantified through partici-

pation in elections, national holidays, or responding to a conscription order. Loyalty can be understood as to what extent power is accepted or, more extremely, the expectation to openly acknowledge a state's goals.

The Changing Face of Political Loyalty: Multiple, Competing, Conflicting and Divided Loyalties

While the previous section already introduced horizontal and vertical levels of loyalty as well as loyalty on the micro and macro level, this section addresses multiple, competing, conflicting or divided loyalties which involve a certain tension.

Interwoven with history, from political science and international relations perspectives, political loyalty in general means allegiance to the sovereign or established government of one's country. It is about the relationship of the state with the individuals that inhabit it and that have been subjected to its sovereign power over a specified territory in accordance with the classical European conception of the state. Political loyalty thus is based on bilateral and reciprocal relations and infers obligation, trust, legitimacy, community and identity.

In states, the rights and responsibilities of state citizens are regulated through citizenship. This does not involve only a promise to participate but also expectations of loyalty. These expectations go back to the understanding of the French term *citoyen* (citizen) who was expected to serve the military, go to war and even die for the state.¹³¹ It was the French Revolution that established the double-sided concept of nation: on the one side nation was a rational, constitutional and contractual affair where citizens were united by rights, duties and privileges; on the other side massive sentiments and aggrandizement of the French state required any other loyalty or identification to be transferred to the nation-state only.

Civil duties (marching to war, paying expenses, honoring flags and anthems) have been central goals of the modern state and reasons for territorialization of loyalty.¹³² In order to maintain power over a territory, political loyalty needed to be taught. Political loyalty for modern European states has been of vital importance as demonstrated by the willingness to use force should loyal behavior be lacking or fail. Among these, the most extreme cases of disloyalty are mutiny or desertion.

However, there are claims that states are losing their capacity to determine the political loyalties of their citizens, and that citizens increasingly see loyalty as a matter of individual choice and political responsibility. This is why creating and maintaining loyalty has been a difficult and endless struggle for the state, particularly because loyalty cannot be taken for granted and

has to be regularly renewed.¹³³ In the meantime, scholars have shown that there are multiple loyalties (political, ethnic, religious, regional, etc.) and that loyalty can be decoupled from state, territory and nation:

The modern state did all in its power to meet challenges that could come from above or below, from inside or outside, by claiming the monopoly power to ensure that national loyalties trumped local or transnational identifications and attachments. Its monopoly power in this sphere was an essential counterpart to monopolies asserted in other fields – notably the state’s sole right to control the instruments of violence and to tax the wealth of subjects or citizens.¹³⁴

Instead of multiple loyalties, some scholars use the terms competing or conflicting loyalties (Grandits) or loyalty layers (Connor). At the time of the occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary in 1878, loyalty to its Monarchy was expected, as was loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Namely, the Congress of Berlin decided that Austria-Hungary had the right to occupy Bosnia, but the Ottoman Empire still retained certain rights towards the country. These different loyalty requests opened up the potential for conflict, and this conflict arose particularly in relation to the issue of conscription. Hence, one’s simultaneous loyalty to different people, places, institutions, concepts and ideas is often a cause for conflict.¹³⁵

With the establishment of the new nation states, the new Muslim minorities were exposed to ethnic cleansing and forced conversion. They perceived the remaining Ottoman Empire as an external home country. For the first time, Bosnian Muslims were governed by a non-Muslim government. Therefore, the complicated process of loyalty reorientation needs illumination.¹³⁶ Here, we can speak of competing (conflicting, divided) loyalties which assume that citizens had interwoven loyalties at various levels.

Stilz’s starting point in defining political loyalty is the simple imperative “We should be loyal citizens” which means to take our political obligations seriously. This implies that we should care about liberal justice in terms of rationalist and universal principles. Furthermore, it involves committed citizenship, moral salience and special duties as a matter of everyday common sense. However, loyalty also has limits: “I am bound to obey and support my own state at least as long as it is sufficiently just.” If a citizen finds himself/herself to be subject to a tyrannical despot who expects his citizens to comply with his orders, the citizens have no obligation to obey him.¹³⁷ Similarly argues Ramadan:

Being a patriot, feeling that one belongs to a society, a nation, or a community of faith is a good thing, but it cannot justify blind, chauvinistic nationalism, advocating a national and/or religious exception or election, or exclusivist religious dogmatism defending one's fellow believers whatever the circumstances. The most respectable attitudes were shown by those who dared take a stand against their own in the name of dignity and justice: those who, during the Second World War, refused to give up Jews (or send them back to the frontier) when their government required them to; those who refused to fight in Vietnam and were jailed for it; those who resisted unfair apartheid laws at the cost of their lives; those who opposed the instrumentalization of religion to produce very Islamic autocratic systems (as in Saudi Arabia) or who opposed the instrumentalization of its so-called modernization to justify dictatorships "in tune with modernity" (as in Tunisia); those who condemned terrorist attacks against innocents when they were perpetrated in the name of their religion.¹³⁸

The most important elements of loyalty to a state are convincingly presented by Stilz. The first indicator of loyalty is to obey the law and directives as a sign of accepting state authority and as obligation of citizenship in order to establish justice. Thus, Stilz leans on Immanuel Kant whose minimal criteria for the guarantee of the equal right to freedom and independence are bodily inviolable: property; freedom of conscience, movement, and expression; equal treatment before the law; and subsistence.¹³⁹ Stilz states that: "No state that does not meet at least these conditions is reasonably interpretable as a freedom guaranteeing state, simply because its laws do not guarantee even the 'core' content of equal freedom."¹⁴⁰ A second indicator of loyalty is to contribute to the legislative process such as participating in formulating laws through political engagement (political debates, elections) or to be elected to legislative bodies. Paying taxes to revenue authorities in order to provide for the functioning and growth of the state is a third indicator. Additionally, fourth, the contribution to redistributive policies and to provision of public goods that benefit fellow citizens Stilz sees as indicating loyalty. A fifth indicator is doing military service and defending one's country in a just war to protect the state borders and the citizens' security and safety. Sixth, working for campaign and advocacy groups in order to show a special concern for the equality and well-being of one's compatriots expresses loyalty. Participating in elections and voting for representatives as a means to show the general will as well as participating politically in organizations and movements in order to improve the status of civil society are seen as further parameters of loyalty. And generally, it is loyal to stay informed in order to be able to follow, understand and articulate political and societal processes.

However, a liberal approach according to the principle of “free human beings” is that it is generally not acceptable to force obligations on people to participate in institutions and practices against their will.¹⁴¹ Further proof of loyalty required by the state might be display of flags on houses at state holidays, being present at state celebrations or giving loyalty oaths. Objects of loyalty may be principles, ideas, ideals, religions, ideologies, nations, countries, governments, parties, leaders, families, friends, regions, racial groups or basically anyone or anything to which one’s heart can become committed.

There are important differences among these duties. Some of these obligations are territorial, such as an obligation to obey the law is applicable even to mere tourists or short-term visitors. Some are obligations of residence, such as that long-term residents have to pay taxes and contribute to redistribution. Ultimately, some are obligations of citizenship only, e.g. only full citizens are obliged to vote and participate politically, to defend the country in war or to do civil or military service. A key question is whether the constitution requires explicitly that citizens be loyal. Whether a state should require loyalty from its citizens is a core issue in political debates.¹⁴²

With Austria-Hungary’s occupation, a double and even triple loyalty of Bosniaks could be observed: loyalty towards Bosnia, the Ottoman Empire, and/or towards Austria-Hungary. This double allegiance towards Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire was a result of the Treaty of Berlin. Bosnia came under Austro-Hungarian administration but according to international law, belonged formally to the Ottoman Empire. Even the Ottoman flag was shown at certain manifestations. This construction was changed with the annexation of Bosnia to Austria-Hungary in 1908. Then the overall picture changed when with advanced modernization and the emergence of Turkish nationalism (the Young Turks movement) no longer solely was religious identity important but the national, the Bosniak identity.

Here the question arises: how difficult was it to detach from old loyalties and to establish new ones? It is important to distinguish between horizontal and vertical loyalty in this regard as explained in the previous section. A new state requires a new vertical loyalty and if there is an additional and aligned horizontal, i.e. cultural and/or religious identification, loyalty is more easily gained. For instance, Croats or Catholics identified themselves more easily with predominantly Catholic Austria-Hungary and were thus preferred when it came to serving the administration and military. However, the smooth functioning of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia depended on the loyalty of the Bosniaks as well. Another important point is that “loyalty can be based either on custom, tradition and sentiment or on a far more pragmatic and instrumental calculation of where personal advantage lies and whether it

can be maximized by shifting allegiances in part or in whole to other associations.”¹⁴³ This exactly describes the situation of the Bosniaks when they had to balance between sentiment and advantage in the making of their loyalties.

Conclusion

The previous sections have attempted to determine which concepts of loyalty have been used in the disciplines important for this research. As this research uses the loyalty perspective to examine the reactions (behavior, discourse) of a certain group of people (Bosniaks) in a changed international, geostrategic, political, societal and cultural setting where religion played an important role, the concept of loyalty needed to be illuminated within various disciplines. Thus, the issue of loyalty in relation to Islam, philosophy, history, sociology and political science was discussed with it thereby becoming clear that for all loyalty signifies a tie that binds. Loyalty can be overt (external behavior, e.g. pledges of loyalty) and covert (inner conviction, virtues, values). As such, emotion that occurs across a diverse range of social sites plays an important role. Loyalty can be on a horizontal (family, nation, Ummah) and vertical (God, government, state) level. Loyalty can be for a subjective (family, friends) and an objective cause (nation-state). Loyalty is mostly understood in terms of reciprocity (give and take) within a relationship. In summary, synonyms for loyalty excerpted from the relevant literature can be listed as alliance, affiliation, allegiance, faithfulness, fidelity, sincerity, trustfulness, obedience, duty, active commitment, devotion of a person to a cause and patriotism.

2

BOSNIAKS AS INDIGENOUS EUROPEAN MUSLIMS

In a national sense, the name Bosniak refers to an indigenous group which historically, geographically and culturally belongs to Europe and has lived in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic setting for centuries. Their norms, values and identity were affirmed as such particularly when Bosnia was incorporated into the Central European concept in 1878.¹ Bosniak identity has undergone significant changes in its meanings, settings and definitions, and it had to be redefined and negotiated under different political and social circumstances and situations throughout its history.

Even before the Ottoman conquest, Bosnia's citizens named themselves *Bošnjani* who were either adherents of the heretic Bosnian Church (often named as Bogumils), Catholics (*Franjevci* or Franciscans) or Orthodox. Throughout history, from the 1189 document, *Povelja Kulina Bana*,² which refers to Bosniaks who live in Bosnia and speak the Bosnian language, until the 19th century, all inhabitants of Bosnia called themselves and were named as *Bošnjak* (plural *Bošnjaci* or *Bošnjani*) in terms of belonging to a people and to a territory.³ This term was used independently from religious belonging. On the other hand, for 400 years within this time, the Ottoman Empire's *millet* system encouraged the formation of communities and identities along religious lines.

Therefore, the people learned rather to identify themselves in religious terms (as Muslims, Orthodox, Catholics, Jews etc.). Thus, from medieval times Bosniaks (*Bošnjaci*, *Bošnjani*) were inhabitants of Bosnia. However, in the 19th century with the "Spring of Nations," i.e. the emergence of nation-building processes in Europe including the Balkans, Serb and Croat nationalist ideologies succeeded in convincing the Orthodox and Catholics of Bosnia to gradually declare themselves as Serbs and Croats respectively. Hence, the neighboring countries also initiated a process of redefining the Catholic and Orthodox populations in Bosnia into Croats and Serbs respectively.

Bosniaks in Pre-Ottoman Times

In the 6th and 7th centuries, Slavic tribes entered Bosnian territory. Since the 1st century, the Roman Empire with Latin as its administrative language ruled over Bosnia, which was later exposed to Christian missions from Rome and Constantinople. But because of Bosnia's mountainous landscape with deep forests, communication was seriously impeded and thus these influences could not be spread that easily. Hence, Donia and Fine talk about Bosnia as a "no-man's-land."⁴ Besides, as Malcolm confirms, mountainous areas are always a refuge for those who are expelled or exterminated in a flat countryside.⁵ Later, Germanic Goths who came between the 3rd and the 6th century as plunderers and settlers to Bosnia as well as Asiatic Huns, Avars and other groups crossed the country. Therefore, like all European nations, Bosniak ethnicity is mixed. Thus, there is no typical Bosniak type as Bosniaks can be blonde or dark-haired, brown-skinned or freckled, big-boned or wiry. Hence, Malcolm concludes that genes of various peoples have contributed to the way Bosniaks are and look today.⁶

The further formation process of the Bosniaks can be summarized through the following successive components: (1) indigenous adherents of the Bosnian Church, (2) immigrant and re-migrant Slavic peoples from neighboring areas, (3) Orthodox and Catholic converts, (4) Turks, (5) non-Slavic immigrants, (6) Albanians, (7) Roma and (8) Saxons.⁷ This chapter traces the path of the development of the Bosniak group consciousness via a historical tour along these experiences and encounters since the Middle Ages.

Bosniaks trace their origin to medieval Bosnia, where the Bosnian Church formed a religious community characterized by its heretical stance and consequently subject to inquisitions from the Pope and Hungary. With the conquest of Bosnia by the Ottoman Empire, adherents of the heretic Bosnian Church as well as the Catholic and Orthodox population converted to Islam. Through history, these converts evolved into a community and gradually adopted characteristics of a nation. In the footsteps of Eric Hobsbawm's concept "Invention of Tradition," we might also consider that the Bosniaks developed an ever changing, invented and reinvented, but nonetheless effective and unique set of signs, symbols and boundary markers.⁸

Generally, "the ethnic map of Europe at any time in its history is littered with the names of ethnicities that have disappeared virtually without trace, and that, as Gellner notes, only a few have 'survived' to give a language [and] a name to a modern nation state."⁹ Indeed, in the European context, the relationship of language and ethnic or national identity is closely interwoven. To these diverse ethnicities belong the Bosniaks whom we can consider to

represent the titular nation of Bosnia. Additionally, as Karić states the Bosniaks are, according to their Bosnian language, the color of their skin, their Slavic origin and the territory they live in, Europeans.¹⁰

Usually, the Bosniaks are reduced to their Islamic tradition only. Thus, there is the impression that the Bosniaks “appeared” with the Ottomans in the 15th century. However, before the Ottomans and the adoption of Islam, the influence of the heretic Bosnian Church cannot be omitted. Some scholars agree that there is a close relationship between the disappearance of the Bosnian Church and the growing number of Muslims in Bosnia. It is important to mention that there was never a mass settlement of Muslim immigrants in Bosnia. The socio-political conditions played a decisive role in this. Firstly, in Bosnia there was no strong organization of any Church and the population was generally still close to pagan traditions. Secondly, with the unification of Croatia and Hungary through the *Pacta Conventa* (1102) Hungarian influence increased in the Slavic regions. These efforts provoked a certain resistance from the local nobles and elites. Thirdly, the mountainous regions of Bosnia distanced the indigenous Slavic population from the Catholic Church in a situation of geopolitical isolation, which fostered the spread of heretic groups.¹¹ From the 12th century, the heretic and persecuted Bosnian Church was dominant, and, like all gnostic-influenced movements, developed an adaptability to confrontations.¹² The similarities between their teachings and Islam can be summarized as follows. In contrast to other medieval dualists, the Bosnian Church admired the Hebrew (Jewish) prophets and their writings; they treated their dead with piety; their *evliya* [good people] served as advocates to God, and their tombs (*stećci*) looked like the early Islamic graves; their ritual prayer was five times a day and they often fell on their knees; baptism, the concept of a holy trinity as well as clericalism were rejected; they saw Jesus as a person and practiced a certain kind of abstinence which could remind one of the fast during the month of Ramadan and the selective nutrition of Muslims.¹³ Enver Imamović adds that the Bosnian Church condemned idolatry and used astral motives such as the crescent and star.¹⁴ These religious practices and views of the Bosnian Church which differed in structure and theology from the Catholic and Orthodox Churches caused persecution, banishment and calls for crusades from the Pope.¹⁵ Simultaneously, this contributed to cohesiveness of and a collective resistance. Under these circumstances of persecution, the *ethnic border* (Barth) probably tightened and the historical, political as well as cultural process of differentiation stopped in a decisive phase.¹⁶ Consequently the adherents of the Bosnian Church likely isolated themselves. This isolation was broken through the following historical

developments: namely the arrival of the decisive identifying feature of the Bosniak nation, Islam.

In the late Middle Ages, from the 14th century, the Bosnian Church was backed and militarily protected by the Kingdom of Bosnia. An Orthodox minority settled in Hum (Eastern Herzegovina) whereas in Bosnia, the Catholics and the adherents of the Bosnian Church competed for dominance. Thus, an ethnic and especially a multi-religious coexistence was already in evidence in pre-Ottoman times during the Bosnian Banate and the Bosnian Kingdom. In any case, as it was demonstrated here, the beginning of the Bosniak formation could be considered to start as late as the 12th century before the arrival of Islam. Thus, the Bosniaks are the native people of Bosnia referring originally to non-Muslims. However as elaborated in the following sections, due to political processes, a huge part of the native Bosniaks left behind this identity (Bosniakhood/*Bošnjaštvo*) and took on the identities of neighboring nations in the Balkans firstly identifying according to religion. Thus, co-religionists became co-nationals. To put it clearly, the term Bosniak was an open national category which even at times included people of religions other than Islam. This perception lasted to the beginning of the 20th century, until the Yugoslav/Serb/Croat national projects prevailed.¹⁷

Bosniaks During Ottoman Times

Early Bosniak Contact with Islam and Muslims

The Southern Slavs' contact with Islam is as old as the appearance of the Southern Slavs themselves. While during the 7th century Slavic tribes left their homeland behind the Carpathians to settle at the Adriatic and Aegean coasts, Muslim Arabs began penetrating the Byzantine Empire. Jorgen Nielsen notes:

In fact, virtually, since the rise of Islam in the 7th century AD there have been Muslims in Europe. This has been the continuous unspectacular presence of diplomats, merchants, craftsmen and travellers. But there has also been the more spectacular presence of migrations associated with the military and political expansions of empires.¹⁸

Even if there were sporadic contacts with Muslims in medieval times, nonetheless it was the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1463 that made the long-term presence of Islam possible. Thus, the Ottomans were not the first Muslims to appear in the region, but their appearance

caused a decisive, intense and continuous presence of Muslims in the Balkans and in current Bosnia. Here the question arises how Islam became the most important characteristic of Bosniak identity. Scholars mainly exclude the idea of mass migrations of Muslim peoples, especially Turks.²⁰ Rather, many scholars speculate that the similarities between the Bosnian Church and Islam provided a fruitful basis for the conversion to Islam.²¹

Moreover, the religious, political and social situation, as reflected in the resistance to the suppression of the Hungarian kings and the Pope, likely led to a desire for self-government and spiritual independence as was eventually offered by the social order of the Ottoman Empire.²² Bringa adds that the literal message of Islam was a call for peace, while it promised equality for all Muslims within its *millet* system and offered a new perspective that was attractive and liberating, giving people incentives to convert.²³

Acceptance of Islam and the Increase of Muslims in Bosnia

Ottoman *defters* (tax registers) and other sources show that adherents of the Bosnian Church as well as Catholics and Orthodox converted to Islam gradually even up to the 17th century.²⁴ However, a part of the Bosnian population fled from Bosnia to Dalmatia, Croatia and Italy.²⁵ Evidence for this can be found in the first registers (1468/69) in which “abandoned lands” are mentioned.²⁶ Sultan Mehmed Fatih’s *Ahdnama* (decree) mentions these abandoned lands, asserting that those who fled would be free and secure if they returned to their land.

Forced conversion to Islam can be excluded as there were rather more group and gradual conversions.²⁷ The argument goes that if forced mass conversion had occurred, other religions would not have survived more than 400 years of Ottoman presence in Bosnia.²⁸ The first census of Austria-Hungary in 1879 shows that the population of Bosnia was dominated by Orthodox (42.88%), then Muslims (38.73%), Catholics (18.08%) and Jews (0.29%).²⁹ This supports the claim that mass conversions to Islam can be excluded. Rather, these numbers show that conversion to Islam happened on a quite voluntary basis.

An often stated but disproved theory is that Christians, especially the Christian nobility, had to convert to Islam in order to save their lands and goods.³⁰ However, if this were the case the Catholic and Orthodox Church would likely not have survived in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Malcolm discovers the following pattern: “in country areas poorly served by priests, Christianity (in whatever form) had probably become little more than a set of folk practices and ceremonies, some of them concerned with birth, marriage and death, and others aimed

at warding off evil fortune, curing illnesses, securing good harvests, and so on.”³¹ The shift from folk Christianity to folk Islam was not very great; many of the same practices could continue, albeit with slightly different words or names. Donia and Fine argue similarly by claiming that there was no strong church organization of any faith in pre-Ottoman Bosnia nor were the citizens of Bosnia deeply convinced believers: “The fact is that by and large Bosnians had never been strong Christians.”³² Indeed, Bosniaks kept some of their pre-Islamic religious practices. Illustrative examples for the fluent integration of the Islamic component into the Bosniak identity are the relics of material culture. The tombs (*stećak* or plural *stećci*) are an authentic sign of this heretical sect in Bosnia. Their pictographic and ornamental iconography slowly adopted Islamic motives such as the crescent.³³

There are even syncretistic elements in Bosnian Islam, stated already in 1888 by Kosta Hörmann, an Austrian anthropologist, who spoke of a “Slavic-Bogumil-Islamic Syncretism.”³⁴ Keeping old habits, customs and practices would have made it easier for people to convert. This again demonstrates continuity; the entrance to a new world did not mean a total break with the past.³⁵ Moreover Hadžijahić states that conversion to Islam in the first Ottoman decades, before the establishment of Islamic education centers (mosques, *medresas*, *mektebs*, etc.), were more declarative (adopting Islamic names and acceptance of Ottoman administration) with compromises towards the practice of religion.³⁶

Thus, next to the lack of a strong and well-organized church, Islam was perceived as a vital, dynamic faith of the strong conquerors. However, besides a sympathy for Islam, Bosnia tended to have an autonomous position within the Ottoman Empire. It seems the Bosniaks tried to maintain their historic and political individuality.³⁷ As the conversion to Islam was a “peaceful process”³⁸ the continuity of the indigenous population was preserved.³⁹ In the 15th century, at the beginning of the Ottoman rule, more people accepted Islam in central Bosnia around Sarajevo than in other parts of the country according to tax lists. In general, people in towns or cities more quickly accepted Islam than in rural areas. The Ottomans’ efforts to build cities and to enhance their economic growth supported the spread of Islam.⁴⁰ After 150 years of Ottoman government, the majority of Bosnia’s population was made up of Muslim Bosniaks. In 1600 in Sarajevo, as Handžić notes, there were 98 mosques while the situation in other Bosnian cities, such as Mostar, Banja Luka, Jajce, Foča, Rogatica and Travnik, was similar.⁴¹ Additionally, a cultural peak could be noticed in the fields of education (establishment of *medresas*, cf. Gazi-Gusrev-beg’s *waqf*); literature (Bosnian language started to be written in a modified version of the Arabic alphabet, *arebica*, which

produced a new literary genre, the *aljamiado* literature), Bosniak authors started to express themselves in Arabic, Turkish and Persian⁴²; architecture (bridges, mosques, cities), arts (calligraphy, music) and generally improved living conditions.⁴³

Nonetheless, the multi-religious picture of Bosnia remained as Bringa notes:

Differences arise but people continue to exist, albeit in competition. People with different names and different religious affiliation share sites and events, but they also have their own sites and exclusive events. For people in these former mixed communities, past and present were a continuous whole and shared, but their communities were at times separate and at others they merged.⁴⁴

Islam in Bosnia is rooted in the Sunni tradition, Hanafi school of law, and Maturidi theology, in which various Sufi orders represent a mystical interpretation of Islam. This mystical interpretation presents Islam as a flexible and generous religion adaptable towards other confessions.⁴⁵ Generally, the religious culture of Muslim communities in the Balkans has largely been shaped by the legacy of Sufism which contributed to tolerance, i.e. tolerance exercised by Muslims towards other Muslims as well as tolerance towards those of other faiths, such as Christians and Jews.⁴⁶

An integral part of religious practice are prayers performed at places of pilgrimage (*dovišta*). The practice itself comes from pre-Islamic times, from medieval Bosnia, where followers of the heretical sect gathered to pray on the hillsides and river banks. Even today, believers meet on fixed days to maintain this tradition. A reformation movement for the revival of Islamic thought became an important element of the Bosniak Muslim identity. In view of the intensive encounters and experiences with various political, social and economic systems, religious scholars felt compelled to find solutions to new living conditions, especially in the late 19th century, when Bosnia was under the administration of Austria-Hungary and when Islam and Muslims were brought into close proximity with European culture.

Within the Ottoman Empire, Bosniaks remained or became aristocratic owners (*aga, beg*), free farmers or free citizens.⁴⁷ Some Bosniaks succeeded in achieving high-ranking positions in the Ottoman administration.⁴⁸ The connection of Bosniak high officials with their old homeland Bosnia and the openness of the Ottomans to integrate Bosniaks in their education system weakened potential barriers and the identification with Islam penetrated gradually into the Bosniak conscience.⁴⁹ In conclusion, the Bosniak ethno-

genesis was a complex and gradual process and the ethnic background is mixed despite the dominant Slavic element. In this regard, Frederik Barth makes the following comment:

So when one traces the history of an ethnic group through time, one is not simultaneously, in the same sense, tracing the history of “a culture”: the elements of the present culture of that ethnic group have not sprung from the particular set that constituted the group’s culture at a previous time, whereas the group has a continual organizational existence with boundaries (criteria of membership) that despite modifications have marked off a continuing unit.⁵⁰

Tanzimat: The Modernization Process of Bosnia and the Bosniaks

Christian Europe posed several challenges towards the Muslim world in general, including the Ottoman Empire, starting in the 18th and particularly in the 19th centuries. Firstly, Europe or the West colonized, exploited and ruled major parts of the world. Secondly, it showed overall progress and was in a superior position when it came to military, economics, industry, education and science. Thirdly, Muslim scholars were faced with challenging ideas of modern European thought, such as philosophical rationalism, nationalism, evolutionism, materialist philosophy, positivism, atheism and secularism.⁵¹ Fourthly, European scholars questioned and criticized Islam and Muslim societies which led to a European interpretation of Islamic thought, history and civilization. Thus, Islam was presented as a fatalistic and inert religion that does not offer a basis for progress. A particular challenge was in the field of social institutions and ethics. Whereas in the Middle Ages, the Ottoman Empire achieved a peak in terms of civilization, with its political, administrative and societal institutions, in the 19th century these institutions lost their efficacy and failed to adapt to the changing environment. Karčić explains this as follows:

The crisis of the political system led to the establishment of authoritative governments which were accepted by apathetic masses and conformist scholars. The basic ideas of Muslim societal ethics – justice, human freedom, responsibility and dignity – were compromised in such a situation.⁵²

Meanwhile, Muslim travellers and scholars who visited Europe were fascinated by the law and order they witnessed in European states. Whatever the Muslims had possessed previously by way of a strong economy, vivid trade, rule of law, an efficient administration, a capable army as well as

advanced science and education, had also become established in Europe. The conclusion drawn was that Europe's achievement and prosperity were a result of its efficient institutions. The solution for Muslim progress, it was thus surmised, would be to introduce legal and institutional reforms. The Ottoman Empire reacted accordingly, and in an effort to stem its own stagnation, introduced reforms and modernization measures according to the European model in the fields of military, administration, politics, law and society.

Bosnia, as the most Western province of the Ottoman Empire, was included in this reform process. The goals of the reforms were to establish a functional, service-oriented bureaucracy as well as to give some representation in the government to various social and ethno-religious groups living within the Ottoman state. Karpat puts it this way:

...Ottoman leaders were attempting to introduce innovations in the government and to redefine its relation to its social bases by reinterpreting the traditional political culture and by reshaping the old institution in such a way as to enable them to perform modern functions. In effect, this Ottoman approach to change resembled the pattern of innovation in England and Japan, just to mention some of the better known examples, where tradition and modernity were reconciled with one another.⁵³

A program of reforms known as the *Nizam-i cedid* (Ottoman Turkish: new order) was begun by Selim III (Sultan from 1789–1807), with measures directed at introducing a European-style military system as its main element. This targeted the Janissary troops, formerly the elite infantry of the Ottoman Empire, who were perceived to have become decadent, despotic, undisciplined, and in need of being put under control. Since the Janissaries were an important military force who had contributed to the victories of the Ottoman Empire, they expected more appreciation as well as gratitude. Fearing to be marginalized, they rebelled and dethroned the Sultan. The issue culminated in 1826 when another Sultan, Mahmud II, succeeded in breaking up a rebellion they had formed and put an end to the Janissaries by killing around 40,000 of them.

In 1839, the Ottoman Empire continued its modernization policy with the proclamation of the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of the *Gülhane* (Imperial Edict of the Rose House). Within this framework, during the following years, a considerable amount of new laws were issued and reforms introduced, collectively known as *Tanzimat-i Hajriyye* (Benevolent Orders). All areas of the societal system, such as the military, administration, education and religion, were to varying extents subjected to Western or European-oriented reforms.

The *Tanzimat* period introduced secular courts, called *Nizamiya*, in front of which all citizens enjoyed equality. However, these reforms were constantly subject to the conflicting pressures of the European powers. Karpát even thinks that “given time these reforms might have succeeded.”⁵⁴

The Constitution was devised as an instrument to give political representation to various groups and foster their loyalty to the Ottoman government, and also pre-empt any interference by European powers in the internal affairs of the country.⁵⁵ Indeed, within the First Ottoman Parliament, the citizens of the Ottoman Empire were supposed to be equally represented following a “‘confessional key’ that was based on a numeric equilibrium between Muslims and non-Muslims”⁵⁶ which is particularly true for Bosnia.

Thus, delegates from Bosnia were Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Jews, ensuring “a numeric equilibrium between Muslims and non-Muslims.” This is why Philippe Gelez refers to “democratic proportional elections.”⁵⁷ However, the European powers had no interest in the success of the reforms because such a success would have prevented their already planned expansionist goals in the Balkans.⁵⁸ These profound changes during the various phases and situations of the *Tanzimat* period were accompanied by geopolitical tension and wars in the whole Balkan region (known as the Eastern Question and discussed later) as well as internal conflicts in Bosnia (e.g. resistance to the *Tanzimat*).

Ultimately, the impact of the *Tanzimat* on Bosnia can be illustrated best in the fields of the military, administration, law, taxes and society.⁵⁹ The Janissaries were abolished and modern military uniforms were introduced as well as new recruiting methods. This caused a strong rebellion among the Bosnian Janissaries who had their headquarters in Sarajevo. The reasons for the lasting resistance to the military reforms were various. Firstly, the Janissaries feared losing their privileges. Secondly, the Bosnian *ulema* was conservative and perceived the changes as *bid‘ah* (innovation which undermines Islamic practice). Thirdly, the citizens were disappointed that the Ottoman Empire gave up territories where Bosniaks lived to the principality of Serbia, which was known for expelling Muslims from newly gained land. Nonetheless, the Ottoman Empire proceeded with the reforms and sent Omer Pasha Latas, who was known as a cruel military leader, to crush the rebellion in 1851. In addition to the military changes, a codification of some parts of Islamic civil law of the Hanafi legal school was introduced, the famous *mecelle*. Prior to the *Tanzimat*, scholars were in charge of Shari‘ah, and after the codification every bureaucrat was in charge of Shari‘ah which meant a shift from ‘*ilmiyye* (religious scholars) to *kalemiyye* (bureaucrats, civil servants).

Furthermore, the Constitutional law established two Houses (a Senate and House of Representatives) where Bosnia was represented in the Ottoman Parliament.⁶⁰ The newly founded secular courts (*nizamiya* courts) allowed *Kadis* as well as Christian and Jewish judges to deal with civil and criminal matters. As there was not enough power to eliminate old institutions, old and new institutions existed next to each other. The duality of institutions also existed regarding courts. There were still Shari'ah courts but also *Nizamiya* courts at the same time. Similarly, traditional Islamic schools (*mektebs*, *medresas*) remained while new schools, such as *rushdiye* (secular school), the *maktab-i hukuk* (law school), the *dar al-muallimin* (teachers' school) and *maktab-i nuvvab* (school for Shari'ah judges) were introduced. Furthermore, the first newspaper in Bosnia, *Bosanski vjestnik* (Bosnian conveyor of news) and *Bosna*, issued in 1866, and later *Sarajevski cvjetnik* (Sarajevo blossom) in 1868, were published in Ottoman Turkish language which gradually set a precondition for an intellectual revival.

Hence, one can clearly claim that Austria-Hungary was not the initiator of the modernization process later on, but "largely implemented plans that had already been drawn up (while indeed only partly implemented) during the rule of the energetic Ottoman governor Topal Osman Pasha."⁶¹ Hartmuth therefore summarizes and concludes:

The "golden" 1860s had similarly seen the publication of the first learned journals (printed with the country's first modern printing press), as well as the establishment of telegraph lines, the first modern public hospital (serving all confessional communities), and the building of new roads. Secular schools to replace the traditional religiously-framed education had similarly been introduced already before the advent of Habsburg rule. While, for all these reasons, declaring the "modernization narrative" a myth perhaps misses the mark, I think it is safe to attest a certain degree of (very probably calculated) exaggeration in contemporary writings about the situation prior to and after the occupation. At least the narrative of a total and sudden modernization is clearly a myth.⁶²

Thus, before the Europeanization and Westernization process of Bosnia could be carried out, at the Congress of Berlin the great European powers decided that it was not the Ottoman Empire that would proceed with these reforms but Austria-Hungary, by incorporating Bosnia into Central Europe.

Bosniaks in Post-Ottoman Times

Nationalist movements in Europe including Bosnia's neighboring countries initiated a process of redefining the Catholic and Orthodox population in Bosnia. Catholic Bosniaks slowly started to identify with neighboring Croats while Orthodox Bosniaks gradually declared themselves as Serbs. Thus, in Sarajevo in the 1860s, organizations were established with the aim to (re-) introduce the terms Serb (*Srbin*) and Croat (*Hrvat*).

Teofil Petranović came from Dalmatia to Sarajevo as a high school teacher urging to instruct particularly uneducated farmers that they should stop calling themselves Orthodox (*rišćani*) and instead Serbs. On the Catholic side, it was Klement Božić, an employee of the German consulate, who propagated the term Croat (*Hrvat*) in the place of Catholic (*katolik*).⁶³ Thus, the term Bosniak started to refer more and more exclusively to Bosnia's Muslim population. On the other hand, the Ottoman *millet* system identified people according to their religious belonging, which made the people accustomed to calling themselves by religious rather than national terms.⁶⁴

Generally, in South-Eastern Europe, the end of Ottoman supremacy led to a period of forced migration, expropriation, and adaptation to new political systems for the Muslim population. Muslim populations were reduced to the status of non-sovereign religious minorities all over the Balkans, with Albania being the only exception:

This explains why, in the early 20th century Balkan Muslims have been defined by state authorities – and to a large extent have perceived themselves – in religious rather than national categories (“Muslims” vs. “Bosniaks”, “Albanians” or “Turks”). The recognition of a “Muslim” nation in the 1960s was less an arbitrary decision of the Yugoslav communist authorities than a reflection of this historical background, as is the still ongoing fight about the naming of the Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace.⁶⁵

During the period of solving the Eastern Question Balkan Muslims suffered a loss of 27% of their population which Justin McCarthy has called a “demographic disaster.”⁶⁶ In another work McCarthy concludes:

By percentage, the worst losses in the period took place among the Muslims in regions taken by Montenegro, Serbia and Romania. In the lands taken by Montenegro all of the Muslims were gone, in the lands taken by Serbia, 91% (119,000) were gone, in the lands taken by Romania 83% (152,000) were gone. Bosniaks fled during a Serbian revolt in 1875 and after a failed Muslim revolt against Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1881-2.⁶⁷

However, the Bosniaks of Bosnia represent a special case. In comparison to the rest of South-Eastern Europe, Bosnia was governed by Austria-Hungary for forty years (1878-1918), incorporated into the Central European concept and exposed to a “cultural mission.” Forty years were enough time to introduce profound changes to a traditional Muslim society.

While the Ottoman Empire tried to introduce the *Tanzimat* modernization reforms which were inspired by European progress, it was only after Austria-Hungary’s direct and intense interference in Bosnia that the Bosniaks were profoundly confronted with different norms and values in the fields of politics, military, administration, economy and education. Hence, Bosniaks had to perform the transition from one civilization (Ottoman) to another way of life (Austro-Hungarian). This modernization process meant radical changes for a traditional Muslim population. The adoption of Central European (Western) standards supported the Bosniaks’ path to become a modern European nation. Indicators were for example the preference of Bosnian language over Ottoman-Turkish language, preference for the Austro-Hungarian educational system which produced a new profile of educated Muslims, the development of political parties according to the European model, and new architecture as well as the changing landscape of Bosnian cities.

With the end of World War I, Austria-Hungary lost the territory of Bosnia, and Bosnia was incorporated into various evolving Yugoslav systems. The first was the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* which later changed its name to the *Kingdom of Yugoslavia* (1918-1941). For four years during World War II Bosnia belonged to the Nazi puppet state *Independent State of Croatia* (1941-45). Then, after World War II, Bosnia became part of the *Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia* (1945-1992), which changed its name to *Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* in 1963. The Bosniaks were at that time marginalized and reduced to being a religious community only. Their national name, their language, literature, tradition and centuries old history were denied or ignored. Furthermore, religious rights were taken away in the communist system. Thus, the Bosniaks were separated from the Central European context within the Yugoslav frameworks. Their identification with Europe was neglected. Additionally, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes introduced an agricultural reform which meant that the largely landowning Bosniaks were deprived of their property. The endowments (*vakuf*) were largely nationalized, i.e. taken away, from the Islamic Community and the Vakuf Bank was devaluated which damaged Bosniak material and spiritual existence dramatically.⁶⁸

In the post-World War II period, people were *en masse* educated in the spirit of the newly established regime – i.e. to spread the communist ideology. The Austro-Hungarian heritage was not only marginalized, but the examination of the whole period seemed to be entangled with the memory of the alleged enemy, the Germans, directed against the Yugoslav idea. It has to be taken into account that the institutions in Bosnia as well as in Yugoslavia were then highly dominated by Serbs and that their national narrative had a deep impact on the curriculum in schools, universities and public memory.⁶⁹ Until the late 1960s and 1970s most studies on Yugoslav nationalities focused on the dominant rivalry between Serbs and Croats, but it became apparent that other ethnic groups, particularly the Bosniaks, play a major role in the nationalities issue, too. Thus, the Bosniaks were given back, although only partially, the legal status of a “nation.” Since 1974 Bosniaks got an equal status within the Yugoslav community under the name *Muslimani* [Muslims]. This explains why in these years scholarly interest arose regarding the Bosnian Muslims. Even though Bosniaks were acknowledged under the misleading label “Muslim in the national sense.” During the socialist Yugoslav period many Bosniaks ceased practicing Islam, and being Muslim meant an ethnic and not a religious identity. Hence, Bosniaks had been marginalized as a political community over the previous century, and still during socialist Yugoslavia, they were deprived of their right to a national name, language, literature, traditions and religious practice.⁷⁰

Having had this experience of living as a marginalized religious minority in different Yugoslav political systems, Bosniaks learned to adapt to the new political, economic, societal and cultural circumstances. Finally, with the declaration of independence of Bosnia from Yugoslavia, the establishment of a democracy and the application of international human rights conventions, in autumn 1993 during the war at the First Assembly of Bosniaks, the decision was made that the Bosniaks would take up again their historical name *Bošnjaci*.

Main Characteristics of the Bosniaks: Religion and Language

This section elaborates the most important aspects of the Bosniak identity which are the religion of Islam and Bosnian language. One could add Muslim names and halal food, but according to Barth, not all distinctive features of group identity must be mentioned, just those which “the actors themselves regard as significant some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied.”⁷¹ Donia and Lockwood confirm this in the Bosniak case:

Such cultural differences between ethnic communities, no matter how minor or insignificant they may seem to outsiders, have great importance for those who maintain them. Most probably, they result from historical differences of origin and contact. Their persistence, however, is due to the interaction of two characteristics of ethnic groups. First, ethnic groups exist within relatively closed communication systems. A primary feature of multi-ethnic societies everywhere is an easier flow of information within each ethnic group than between them. With time this results in unequal diffusion and cultural differentiation. The second important feature of these cultural differences is their conscious maintenance as markers of significant social categories ... They constitute, at one and the same time, focal points of ingroup sentiment and criteria of out-group identification. Such differences, then, serve an important function in marking the ethnic boundaries.⁷²

Hence, the boundary defines the ethnic group rather than the cultural traits. It even canalizes social life so that the emergence and maintenance of ethnic boundaries are an authentic sign of the existence of an ethnic group.⁷³ This means that form and content of the ethnic characteristics are not as important as the sources, reasons and functions of ethnic boundaries as well as their penetrability, manipulability and changeability.

Being Muslim the Bosnian Way⁷⁴

In terms of religion according to Karčić, Bosniaks are Sunni Muslims and followers of the Hanafi legal school, the Maturidi⁷⁵ interpretation of Islamic theology and some Sufi orders.⁷⁶ Bosniaks belong to the Ottoman Islamic cultural zone of the Muslim world together with other Muslim peoples from the Balkans, Anatolia, Caucasus, northern Iraq and Syria.⁷⁷ The main characteristics of Muslims in this zone is their belonging to the Ahl al-Sunnah, Maturidi school in creed (*aqīdah*) and Hanafi school in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). Furthermore, it implies an influence of Turkish language and customs, such as clothing, cuisine, lifestyle, arts, architecture, housing, and Ottoman political culture, such as state concepts, rights and duties. Hence, a strong centralized state and the institutionalization of Islam in a hierarchical structure is a characteristic of this cultural zone as well as the unity of religious and political authority (*dīn wa dawla*).⁷⁸ For the Bosniaks pre-Islamic customs, rituals and holidays play a role in their identity. These were adapted and gradually identified with Islamic practice. Furthermore, among the Bosniaks there is rather a liberal understanding of certain norms of Islamic law. The acceptance of a secular state, Islamic reformism and institutionalized Islam within the Islamic community are seen as further characteristics of the Bosniaks.⁷⁹ Sometimes there is talk of a Bosnian Islam

which tries to describe the understanding and practice of Islam among the Bosniaks.⁸⁰ Lockwood, who conducted ethnographic research in Bosnia in the 1970s, puts Bosniaks on the European ethnographic map establishing their Europeanness while Bringa added that “Islam as a practiced and lived religion has to be understood in terms of its specific role in the Bosnian context where it forms the main constitutive factor in a collective identity” that distinguishes Bosniaks from Bosnian Catholics (Croats) and the Bosnian Orthodox (Serbs).⁸¹ Furthermore, Bringa concludes:

Islam is the key to understanding the Muslim identity in Bosnia. Yet, Bosniak identity cannot be fully understood with reference to Islam only, but has to be considered in terms of a specific Bosnian dimension which for Bosniaks has implied sharing a history and locality with Bosnians of other non-Islamic religious traditions.⁸²

That religion, not religiosity or piety, plays a greater role than language as a feature for national and cultural definition in Europe, can be observed in several cases: Irish and English, Flemings and Dutch, Masurians and Polish, Pomaks and Bulgarians, Turks and Gagauz, Arabs and Maltese as well as Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs who differentiate from each other despite similar idioms. The reasons for the creation and maintenance of different ethnic groups despite linguistic similarities can be explained as follows:

1. Repressive unifying language politics as a technique of governance. In the Bosniak case, various Yugoslav political systems (1918-1992) denied the existence of the Bosnian language and imposed the Serbo-Croatian language as the common language of all Yugoslav peoples.
2. Separate historical developments in the same region allowed differing religious value systems to develop, thus hindering mutual growth and causing estrangement.
3. Political systems where inhabitants are distinguished by religion, such as the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire.
4. Different structural positions, especially economic and political.⁸³

For the development of the Bosniak ethnicity, despite similarities with Croat and Serb languages all four above-mentioned factors are relevant. While the *millet* system helped to preserve confessional society, nationalism placed land and territory at the heart of identity building. In Bosnia, the emergence of nationalism and/or territorially oriented confessionalism (the ideas of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia at the expense of Bosnia) presented a threat to peaceful coexistence.

Finally, when talking about Islam as one of the major characteristics of Bosniaks, two levels need to be taken into consideration: Islam as a universal and Islam as a cultural element. There are, on the one side, Bosniaks who practice Islam regularly according to the five pillars of Islam: (1) declaring monotheism and Muhammad's Prophethood, (2) performing the five daily prayers, (3) fasting during the month of Ramadan, (4) giving charity and (5) performing the pilgrimage to Makkah. On the other side, there are Bosniaks who perceive themselves as Bosniaks and are atheists or agnostics. These understand religion in terms of Islamic heritage. For many Bosniaks, their Muslim identity has much more to do with cultural heritage, ethics and aesthetics rather than a rigid understanding of Shari'ah.⁸⁴ This can be explained through the experience of life in Yugoslavia (1918-1992) where Bosniaks as a nation and Bosnian language were not acknowledged, where they were marginalized as a religious minority, impoverished through the agrarian reform and nationalization of property. Particularly during the Socialist period (1945-1992) several laws and measures aimed at eradicating Islam from the public and private sphere. This is why Islam among today's Bosniaks is rather a cultural thing than religious practice. Hence, the cultural understanding of Islam allows even atheists or agnostics to feel comfortable naming themselves Bosniaks. To sum up Donia states: "Just as their religious heritage sets them off from the Christians living around them, their Slavic origins and language make them distinct from the Turks who first brought Islam to Bosnia."⁸⁵

Bosnian Language

Next to religion, language is the most common criteria determining the Bosniak identity. The Bosnian language stems from the Slavic language such as the Serb and Croat languages. While the Bosnian Church used Bosnian language during service, the Catholic Church used Latin.⁸⁶ The Bosniaks always named their mother tongue Bosnian which is documented in several works but also in travelogues from medieval times.⁸⁷ In oriental literature (Arabic, Persian, and Turkish), the ethnonym Bosniak and Bosnian language are continuously mentioned (Turkish *boşnakça*, Arabic *al-luga al-busnawiya*).⁸⁸ Therefore the Bosnian language not only goes back to an emic attribution or a subjective classification, but was also beyond the ethnic boundaries defined as such.⁸⁹

Relevant traits regarding the Bosnian language are words stemming from Turkish and Arabic. Since the Ottomans introduced a new state system and societal norms and values as well as the Islamic culture, words of material and spiritual contents were absorbed into the Bosnian language.⁹⁰ Until the

20th century Bosnian language developed independently until political circumstances and ethno-cultural differentiation processes changed its status. Still, in 1906, the official language in Bosnia was called Bosnian. However, on 4 October 1907 the Austro-Hungarian administration decided that the official language in Bosnia would be called Serbo-Croatian. Thus, the existence of a former official language was denied. Ironically, the same administration, the Government, had published the handbook “Grammar of Bosnian Language” in Sarajevo in 1890.

Starting from the 19th century, nationalists like Vuk Karadžić initiated linguistic standardization campaigns with the aim to unify all South Slavs, i.e. *Yugoslavs*, as a single people under the leadership of Serbs and Croats and with a common, Serbo-Croat language.⁹¹ When Bosnia was absorbed into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, this conception was linked with an intense Serb domination. Although the major task was to construct a *common* language, the Bosnian language and literature was neglected. Considering the disappearance of the Bosnian language and the Bosniak ethnonym from the beginning of the 20th century until 1993, the Yugoslav state terminology campaign clearly was an expression of mere political calculus.⁹² At the end of the century it was proven that linguistic similarities alone could not be a basis for a successful political integration. As in other cases in history, languages were codified and redefined within various differentiating and nation building processes.⁹³ Thus, in 1993 the Bosnian language claimed its constitutional place and meaning.

As far as the script is concerned, the indigenous script used in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the 12th to the 20th centuries was the *Bosančica*, a similar script to the Cyrillic alphabet.⁹⁴ The people who converted to Islam gradually articulated themselves using *Arebica*. This script is a simple adaptation of the Arabic script to the phonetic system of the Bosnian language. Since the appearance of *Arebica* occurred at the same time as schools were being developed, the script was widely diffused. A whole literature epoch, the *Aljamiado*, was written in *Arebica*.⁹⁵ With the introduction of the Latin script, *Arebica* gradually disappeared. Thus only the Cyrillic, mainly used by the Serbs, and the Latin script, used by Croats and Bosniaks, survived in Bosnia. Instead of a conclusion, Isaković, one of the most prominent scientists in Bosnian linguistics and literature, stated concerning the Bosnian language:

Our language is our moral right and we don't need to put extra effort to describe the term Bosnian language. Bosnian language did not emerge out of Serbian or Croatian language, and it is not their derivation, but one of an objective parallel. Bosnian language had its own development until the beginning of the 20th century, when political circumstances changed its official status.⁹⁶

Conclusion

Bosnia-Herzegovina was initially a border land between Byzantium and the Western Roman Empire. Later it became the westernmost province of the Ottoman Empire and a major theater of war between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. It had significance for setting off the First World War and recently became the war-torn hot spot around the breakup of communist Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Bosnia is the historical result of various civilizations which encountered and mixed on this territory. These elements all influenced and contributed to the demographic, political, ethnic and cultural picture of this region, evolving from the Banate of Bosnia (1180-1377), to the Kingdom of Bosnia (1377-1463), the Ottoman Province (1463-1878), part of Austria-Hungary (1878-1918), the first and second Kingdom of Yugoslavs (1918-1941) and communist Yugoslavia (1945-1992) up to the independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 1992). Thus, the territory of Bosnia, with its titular nation, the Bosniaks, has a historical continuity.

The Bosniak ethnogenesis was in medieval Bosnia where the Bosnian Church formed a community which came, because of its heretical ways, constantly under inquisition. With the conquest of Bosnia by the Ottoman Empire, adherents of the Bosnian Church and a part of the Catholic and Orthodox population converted to Islam. Throughout history these converts became a unit which increasingly adopted characteristics of an independent ethnic group, and eventually a nation. According to their language, skin color, Slavic origins and their territory, Bosniaks are Europeans. However, with nation-building processes in the 19th century Catholic and Orthodox Bosniaks came to be gradually included into the Croat and Serb national identity. Thus, the term Bosniak remained for the Bosnian Muslims only. Consequently, the major characteristics of the Bosniaks are (a) Islam as a universal (*dīn*) and cultural element, (b) Bosnian language, (c) historical experience of life in Bosnia, (d) Muslim names of Arab, Turkish or Persian origin, and (e) halal food. Further relevant traits are family organization and marriage, gender segregation, clothing, music, literature and poetry, cityscape and architecture and handicrafts. Furthermore, ethnicity can change through time in a society; its meaning can increase, decrease or even vanish completely as occurred within the Bosniak community due to various historical-political circumstances. Besides the specific language which produced a particular literature, *Bošnjaštvo* (Bosniakhood) meanwhile grew into a national category. Bosniakhood was constituted and defined by particular values, norms, life habits (customs), material culture and artistic expressions which are essentially shaped by Islam. These various relations to other Muslim cultures became visible and were further developed.

While Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged for over 70 years to various sorts of Yugoslav political systems, the existence of the Bosniak culture and language and its peculiarities was neglected. The dominant, mostly Serbian elites as well as certain Croat nationalist circles used to legitimize their claims on Bosnia's territory and the Bosniaks with the claim that the Bosniaks were just a religious phenomenon within the Serb, Croat or Yugoslav nations, using the 'same Serbo-Croat' language. Bosniaks were just called 'Muslims', whereas other characteristics of Bosniak ethnicity were just ignored.

In summary, the Bosniak ethnic group derives from an 800-year-old ethno-cultural tradition, in which Islam represents an important element besides history, culture and language. In the 20th century, consciousness of belonging to a distinct Bosniak ethnic group and nation was expressed whenever there was a possibility, as seen in democratic elections, population censuses and cultural patterns.

Your Excellency, you know for sure how some European great powers look at the San Stefano agreement, which somehow hinders the European balance of power. This is why my government insists to call for a conference of European great powers to agree on a modification of that treaty. The future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in whose fate my government is very interested, will be one of the most important questions at the conference.

Konrad Vasić, Austro-Hungarian Consul in Sarajevo.⁹⁷

3

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN AND THE INCORPORATION OF BOSNIA INTO EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The 1878 Congress of Berlin has proved to be a first-rate hub in the modern history of Europe. It represents an intersection between the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the First World War. There was no historical event between 1815 and 1914 which involved so many large and small peoples as well as great powers and had such repercussions all over Europe.¹ Indeed, the Congress of Berlin lies almost in the middle between 1815 and 1914, the years that mark two key events in European history during the “long 19th century.” Furthermore, the Congress of Berlin is instructive for understanding the connection of history, politics, diplomacy, economy and society in Europe.² The Treaty of Berlin (and previously the Treaty of San Stefano)³ led to large territorial changes in the Balkans which makes it “the most important single document in the 19th century in tracing the frontiers of the Balkan countries.”⁴ For Bosnia and its citizens, the decisions of the Congress of Berlin meant radical changes. At once they were involved in European political affairs and the modernization or westernization process initiated during the *Tanzimat* period was continued under the auspices of a Central European power.

Since the decisions of the Treaty of Berlin led to deep changes in the society of Bosnia, the reactions of the Bosniak society towards these decisions is elaborated in this chapter. Furthermore, the worldviews and attitudes of the great powers and individual key figures towards Bosnia will be revealed in order to understand the expectations of loyalty, how they treated the new territory and its society, particularly the Muslims. This is important so as to reflect on the Treaty of Berlin which implied that “Christian Europe” encounters “Muslim Europe.” Hence, the responses of the Bosniaks towards the new Emperor must be considered.

The Geopolitical Positions at the Congress of Berlin and their Implications for Bosnia

The Balkans in the last decades of the 19th century were an incalculable source of danger for European peace. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire started to fail in its primary functions, such as defending its borderlines and keeping the population under control.⁵ The lack of manpower, money and an industrial base made the Ottoman Empire uncompetitive in relation to the leading European powers (the German Empire, Britain, France, Austria-Hungary and Russia). Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire failed to construct a collective identity which could have underpinned imperial rule.⁶ Military inferiority led to various defeats in the battlefield causing a huge number of mainly Muslim refugees and much loss of territory. Additionally, the uprisings against the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia which started in June 1875 spilled over to Bulgaria in May 1876 and soon afterwards to the whole Balkan Peninsula.⁷

The Relevance of Bosnia for Solving the Eastern Question

The national and social components of the European Revolutions of 1848/49 caused the creation of the Italian nation-state (1859/61), the double monarchy Austria-Hungary (1867) and the German Empire (1871) all of which influenced in various ways the national movements in South-Eastern Europe. Additionally, the expansionist goals of Russian, British and Austro-Hungarian Empires as well as nationalist movements, particularly the Serbian and the Greek ones, lead to the emergence of the Eastern Question in Europe, or what in German language was called *Die orientalische Frage*. This term describes the power vacuum caused by the persisting military and political weakness of the Ottoman Empire which started with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (also spelled *Kuchuk Kainarja*) in 1774.⁸ It marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire which ended with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Eastern Question could be called a “paradigm for understanding the history of Balkan Muslims until the end of the 20th century.”⁹ European great powers with their competing interests realized an opportunity to fill the power gap caused by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ Hence, the central factors of the Eastern Question were two simultaneous developments: (1) On the one hand, there was a rapid external and internal disintegration of the previously dominant power in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, into smaller states which were characterized by their economic decline, population stagnation and political as well as cultural backwardness. (2) On the other hand, in the neighboring

countries, i.e. the Western European great powers, an economic, societal and political rise could be observed which enabled the dynamics for imperial expansionism.¹¹

For Bosnia and the Bosniaks this meant that the Eastern Question would decide their fate. In the former Ottoman areas which came under Serb rule after the Balkan Wars 1912/1913, Bosniaks living in the Sandžak region, detached from Bosnia, were partially forced to migrate or even executed. The argumentation for this was that Muslims had inherited deficiencies, did not belong to Europe and represented a foreign threat to Europe. Therefore, a “bulwark of Christianity” (*antemurale Christianitatis*) had to be established to preserve the *Pax Christiana* in Europe.¹² However, Austria-Hungary’s interests consisted primarily of strengthening its Empire through the annexation of Bosnia, performing a cultural mission and positioning the Austro-Hungarian Empire in such a way as to gradually secure its access to the sea by establishing relations with adjacent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro.¹³

On the surface, solving the Eastern Question was about avoiding insecurity, conflicts or wars, but ultimately it opened up new opportunities for the great powers to expand their territories, economies and worldviews. Karpat therefore claims:

[...]the Treaty of Berlin distorted and diverted the general course of the socio-cultural evolution in the Ottoman domains by making ethnic and religious affiliations the ideological basis of the newly independent “national” states, and by accelerating the emergence of a socio-economic system which intensified the political, social and ethnic conflicts in the area. In other words, the roots of “Balkanization” and of all its negative implications lay in the incongruity between the basic socio-cultural foundations of traditional Balkan-Ottoman society and the new socio-political system imposed upon it by the European Powers. The latter attempted to solve the “Eastern Question”, not in accordance with the prevailing conditions in the area, but by relying chiefly on their misconceptions about the Ottoman state and by promoting their own power and interests, often to the detriment of the very peoples they were claiming to “liberate” and to bring into the age.¹⁴

The Interests of the Individual Powers Involved in the Congress of Berlin

The interests of the individual powers differed. On the one hand, Austria-Hungary concentrated much of its diplomatic attention on the Ottoman Balkans from the second half of the 19th century on thwarting Russia’s expansion into the region. On the other hand, Russia wanted to secure its position in South-Eastern Europe and perceived itself as protector of the

Christian Orthodox population in the territory of the Ottoman Empire:

From the early 1850s Russia began to assert its military advantages in poorly defended corners of the Balkans (and Central Asia) by establishing channels of patronage among Orthodox Christian Slavs, while at the same time asserting the new and dangerous principle of military domination over previously recognized Ottoman territories in the Balkans. What was ostensibly happening in the crucial 1876-1881 period was the imposition of an idea of territorial expansion justifying forced expulsion of Muslim and Catholic populations in order to realize the expansionist ambitions of Orthodox Christian states in the Balkans.¹⁵

France had economic and trade interests in this part of Europe in order to support its rising middle class which needed new markets.¹⁶ Furthermore, France had a traditional interest in protecting Catholic holy sites as well as being a century-old ally of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, since its defeat by Germany (1870/71) and the transition to the III Republic, France was externally and internally weak and had a rather passive role in the Congress of Berlin. Similarly, Italy also had a passive role. For the first time since its national reunification Italy was present at an international congress. It hovered between its *Risorgimento* pathos (similar to South Slav nationalism) and expansive tendencies towards the opposite Adriatic coast (particularly Albania).¹⁷

However, Russian ambitions in the Balkan territories threatened the balance of power established in continental Europe over the previous half of the century. It is common knowledge that Britain was very sensitive to any changes in the power balance, and thus Britain got involved in the Eastern Question, also in the hope of acquiring new territories, particularly in Arab countries. During the negotiations at the Congress of Berlin, the main conflict was conducted between England and Russia. Namely, the conflict of interest between Russia and England determined the whole constellation of the great powers towards the Ottoman Empire: England wanted to secure its sea route to India, the Suez channel and the Red Sea via the Mediterranean. Therefore it tried to hinder Russia's access to the Mediterranean. Russia, by contrast, tried to access the Balkans and the Mediterranean via Constantinople. Therefore, Russia supported the national movements to smash the Ottoman Empire whereas England was rather interested in keeping the "sick man on the Bosphorus" as a factor in the balance of power in Europe.¹⁸ The best proof for this was Britain's entrance into the Crimean war (1853-56).

Karpat points out that the Eastern Question “was a convenient moral excuse for Europeans, including Russians, to bring Ottoman lands under their own imperial tutelage.”¹⁹ Nationalist and pan-Slavic movements pushed the Russian Tsardom into war to force the Ottomans back. Thus, on 14 April 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as “an unprovoked aggression upon the Ottoman state.”²⁰

The war was concluded with the treaty of San Stefano (a village west of Istanbul, now Yeşilköy) almost a year later in March 1878. The San Stefano peace agreement meant large losses for the Ottoman Empire: Serbia, Montenegro and Romania increased their territories and gained independence, while an autonomous principality Bulgaria was created, including Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia and gaining access to the Aegean Sea. Since Bulgaria was under Russian influence, Russia thus secured a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea through Bulgaria. While Britain was worried about the balance of power in Europe, Austria-Hungary feared Russia’s increasing influence on its Southern border. Both empires protested against this expansion of Russia’s power. They feared that a strong Slavic state might emerge under Russian control. Generally, a weak Ottoman Empire on the South-East borders of Europe was preferable to an expanding, aggressive Russian presence in the Balkans as well as in the Straits of Constantinople and the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the British Navy entered the Sea of Marmara. The British-Russian confrontation was the most evident characteristic of the power constellation directly before and during the Congress of Berlin which endangered the peace in Europe.²¹

To prevent a conflict, the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs Gyula Andrassy suggested a congress to solve the Eastern Question and to install peace, security and stability. Andrassy’s motive for occupying Bosnia was to compensate for Austria’s losses in Italy and Germany in 1859 and 1866, to strategically secure Dalmatia’s hinterland, strengthen the position of the Monarchy at the Adriatic coast and avoid a powerful South Slavic state in the Balkans. Actually, since the first Serb uprising in 1804, Austria’s state maxim was to prevent a “Yugoslavia,” which literally means a state of South Slavs, because it feared that sooner or later South Slavs and various other peoples might initiate a revolutionary nationalist process in Austria, too.²² Therefore, Hartmuth claims:

That half of Bosnia’s population [which] was Muslim even did not appear to be the problem at this time. Circles, rather unenthusiastic of the prospect of occupying Bosnia, were then rather concerned that a million or so Slavs should become Habsburg subjects.²³

Secret consultations held in the 1870s reveal Austria-Hungary's and Andrassy's foreign policy plans where Machiavelli's principle, "might is right", prevailed.²⁴ Thus, Austria-Hungary's foreign policy was strongly linked to military strength and striking capability. Furthermore, Andrassy was against passive, hesitating or temperance-oriented politics. In 1872, he declared the occupation of Bosnia as "desirable," whereas in 1875, in another secret consultation, he asserted that the occupation of Bosnia had to be realized as a constant possession of the country.²⁵

In March 1875, Kaiser Franz Joseph made a spectacular visit to Dalmatia along the border with Bosnia to court the peoples' sympathies, particularly the Catholics.²⁶ However, Austria-Hungary had to perform a balancing act between its own expansion and maintaining the status quo of the Ottoman Empire.²⁷ The only enemy to occupying Bosnia that Austria-Hungary faced was Russia and its satellite states Serbia and Montenegro. Austria-Hungary's foreign policy had to include this rivalry in political calculations. This is why Andrassy supported the independence of Serbia and Montenegro, hoping that the territorial gains might lead to their passivity and even goodwill regarding Austria-Hungary's occupation of Bosnia. The political developments in the years to come, i.e. rising Serb nationalism and the assassination of the Austrian heir, show that this calculation proved wrong.

Since the German Empire was strengthened through German unification in 1871, chancellor Otto von Bismarck saw an opportunity to spread the concept of Central Europe. Already in 1876, Bismarck himself declared that he preferred to keep good relations with Russia instead of caring about the Ottoman Empire.²⁸ He declared himself willing to mediate a peace congress which was held among the great powers in Berlin starting on 13 June 1878 and lasting until 13 July 1878. Nonetheless, Bismarck feared that Russia might fill the power vacuum and small South Slavic states in the Balkans would hinder Germany's expansion towards the Near East.²⁹ At the Congress itself, Bismarck kept an acrimonious work pace and was impatient and petulant particularly towards the Ottoman delegation. This attitude was favorable to the great powers as they could slur over Ottoman objections. Original sources confirm that Bismarck talked about the Ottomans scornfully, sneered at the Ottoman delegation and humiliated the delegates at the negotiation table.³⁰ The Ottoman delegate Karatheodory Pasha himself complained about *l'isolement complet de la Turquie* [complete isolation of Turkey].³¹

The Congress of Berlin attracted international attention and the language of negotiations was French as was common in diplomacy at that time.³² Key diplomats and politicians from seven great powers (Austria-

Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the Ottoman Empire) were present. Furthermore, there were delegates from Greece, Romania and Persia as well as from Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro who had no voting rights, but came to be heard by the congress.

The two Ottoman delegates illustrated the diversity of backgrounds in the Ottoman elite at that time and the possibilities of non-Muslim actors: (1) Alexander Karatheodory Pasha was the first delegate of the Ottoman Empire to the Congress of Berlin. He was one of the many Greek Christians from Istanbul (Phanariots) who worked at the Porte as secretaries, translators and political advisors. (2) Mehmed Ali Pasha was the second delegate of the Ottoman Empire to the Congress of Berlin. With his storybook career he represented the possibility of Europe's loyal service to the Porte. Ali Pasha, originally a Prussian, came as a ship-boy to Constantinople where he converted to Islam and made a career in the Ottoman army. Him being sent as a delegate to the Congress of Berlin was perceived as a tactless provocation.³³

The Results of the Congress of Berlin and its Meaning for Bosnia in Regard to Expectations of Loyalty

The Treaty of Berlin was ultimately signed on 13 July 1878. Thus, the San Stefano agreement was revised: greater Bulgaria was divided into autonomous Bulgaria, Rumelia and Macedonia. The independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro was acknowledged. The Treaty of Berlin included freedom of worship in the newly created states of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania. Nonetheless, the Muslim minorities in these states did not experience this guarantee of religious liberties. They were, rather, exposed to forced migration, conversion to Christianity, expropriation and mass murder.³⁴ Ultimately, Austria-Hungary received the right to occupy Bosnia. Thus, the Russian influence on the Balkans was reduced.

In a territorial sense, the European Part of the Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Berlin encompassed 343,000 km², and with the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, Ottoman territory was reduced to 165,000 km². Bulgaria, Bosnia, Eastern Rumelia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro no longer belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, 178,000 km² of previously Ottoman territory was redistributed.³⁵

Interestingly, at the Congress of Berlin the Balkan states which were established with the Treaty of San Stefano (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia) were not entitled to vote nor were they allowed to participate in the negotiations. However, their delegates at the Congress of Berlin were included in consultations when the great powers considered it necessary to hear the point of view of the small peoples.³⁶ While Bulgaria's interests were

more or less represented by Russia, Greece's advocate turned out to be Britain. The main debates focussed on the issue of a Bulgarian state. Finally, as Batowski puts it, the Congress of Berlin established two Bulgarian states with two different names (Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia).³⁷ While Bulgaria was the first topic to be discussed at the Congress of Berlin, Greece was elaborated upon next, followed by Bosnia and ultimately Serbia and other territorial issues.³⁸ Thus, at the 8th session on 28th June 1878, the issue of Bosnia was considered where Andrassy clearly stated that no other power except Austria-Hungary was interested in regulating the conditions in Bosnia and that the matter around Bosnia was, at the same time, a matter pertaining to Europe.³⁹ Bismarck noted that a stable Bosnia would mean a stable Europe, and therefore he saw the Congress had an overall obligation to look for efficient means to prevent any further conflicts: "Only a powerful state which possesses necessary forces within reach of the flashpoint can reinstall order and secure the fate and future of this population."⁴⁰ The Ottoman delegates responded that they did not see a need for Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia, although they recognized the need for peace and order.⁴¹ French, English, Italian and Russian⁴² delegates confirmed Andrassy's and Bismarck's proposals. Thus, Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin was dedicated to Bosnia. The original French text reads as follows:

Les provinces de Bosnie et d'Herzégovine seront occupées et administrées par l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie ne désirant pas se charger de l'administration du Sandjak de Novibazar qui s'étend entre la Serbie et le Monténégro dans la direction sud-est jusqu'au delà de Mitrovitz, l'administration ottomane continuera d'y fonctionner. Néanmoins, afin d'assurer le maintien du nouvel état politique ainsi que la liberté et la sécurité des voies de communication, l'Autriche-Hongrie se réserve le droit de tenir garnison et d'avoir des routes militaires et commerciales sur toute l'étendue de cette partie de l'ancien Vilayet de Bosnie. A cet effet, les Gouvernements d'Autriche-Hongrie et de Turquie se réservent de s'entendre sur les détails.⁴³

Hence, Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia, whereas Sandžak Novi Pazar (the South-Eastern part of Bosnia) still remained under Ottoman administration. Therefore, Austria-Hungary had the right to keep military units in Bosnia and control the roads for military and commercial purposes in Bosnia as well as in Sandžak Novi Pazar. There is no doubt, as Imamović states, that the Treaty of Berlin did not render Bosnia completely to Austria-Hungary.⁴⁴ While the treaty's article regarding Bosnia used the words "*occupées et administrées*", other articles regarding the

abandonment of territory (such as in Article 58 or 60 where the Porte had to surrender territories) applied the words “*ceder*” or “*incorporer*.” However, Classen notes that the term “*administrer*” [administer] in juridical terminology of the 19th century involved sovereign rights.⁴⁵

Additionally, the Treaty of Berlin introduced new terms into political geography and international law. There were territories legally belonging to the previous owner, but administered by other states whereby military supremacy was also given to the new owner. The Treaty of Berlin established two such territories: Bosnia (administered by Austria-Hungary) and Cyprus (administered by Great Britain). In both cases, the sovereign rights of the Sultan were preserved but *de facto* this was a theoretical and useless provision.⁴⁶ Generally, the status of Bosnia according to Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin was diversely interpreted.⁴⁷ While the persisting Ottoman sovereignty was described as *nudum ius* (bare right) the status of Bosnia was named as *territorium separatum*, *corpus separatum* within Austria-Hungary and as *condominium* of both parts of the monarchy, and Bosnia was generally treated as a *sui generis* organism.⁴⁸ Hence, Bosnia was not simply an occupied territory, it was rather a third state within the Monarchy.⁴⁹

The last sentence of Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin announced that further interpretation and more detailed agreements were needed between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The contents to be clarified were about sovereignty over the citizens because in Article XXV it was not clearly stated which state authority had the sovereignty over the citizens of Bosnia.⁵⁰ Thus, the sovereignty over Bosnia after the Congress of Berlin was mainly interpreted according to the bilateral convention between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary nine months later on 21 April 1879. There, it was stated that the Sultan’s name as Caliph, i.e. leader of Muslims on earth, was allowed to be mentioned during public prayers in mosques, the Ottoman flag (Red Crescent) was allowed to be used, and that Ottoman money could freely be circulated. The purpose was to secure the dignity, customs, religious freedom, possessions and integrity of the residents of Bosnia generally, and the Bosniaks precisely.⁵¹ This reveals the relations of the state of Austria-Hungary towards religion. Its concept is based on recognized religious communities adopted in 1874 which guarantees freedom of conscience and belief as well as private manifestations of religious belief and practice. For the Bosniaks this meant a dramatic change as they now became a religious minority after more than 400 years of being part of the ruling elite of co-religionists.

Article two contains the warning that any assault against the Muslims, their property or religion would be punished severely. This statement might

go back to Hafiz Pasha's (the last Ottoman military commander of Bosnia) report submitted to the Porte in September 1878 after the fall of Sarajevo, where he described the atrocities committed by the Austro-Hungarian military.⁵² Article three states that all income of Bosnia would be used exclusively for the needs of the country, administration and necessary improvements.

The same Convention confirmed also that the Austro-Hungarian Kaiser possessed all administrative, judicial, financial and military sovereignty rights. The last part of the convention (Articles 7-10) is devoted to the rights of the Austro-Hungarian military in Bosnia and Sandžak Novi Pazar where Austria-Hungary clearly wanted to secure military and trade routes. An important consideration is that within this convention, the temporary occupation of Bosnia was not mentioned at all.⁵³ However, the Ottoman Empire kept its sovereignty over Bosnia according to international law despite Bosnia's foreign occupation and administration.⁵⁴ In official documents, as Imamović states, Austria-Hungary confirmed that they fully respected the convention's contents, but in practice, Austria-Hungary deviated from almost all articles.⁵⁵ This certainly would have made the request for loyalty from the citizens of Bosnia more difficult. Arising from this convention are the questions what is citizenship and what would be the legal treatment of the citizens of Bosnia?

The Bosnian situation was additionally complicated as Austria-Hungary wanted to thwart any aspirations of Serbia and Montenegro towards Bosnia. For this reason, Austria-Hungary received the right to occupy Sandžak Novi Pazar with its military. Thus, the new geo-political terms of agreement in South-Eastern Europe were: (1) direct Ottoman possessions, (2) an autonomous province (Eastern Rumelia), (3) a tributary vassal principality (Bulgaria), (4) a territory under foreign administration (Bosnia), (5) a territory under military occupation (Novi Pazar), and (6) three approved sovereign states (Serbia, Montenegro and Romania). The national identity of the new states established in the Balkans after 1878 rested on a religious basis and only secondarily upon language and history. Orthodox Christianity was the main political barrier separating the Orthodox from the Muslim, but also from the Catholic, the Protestant and the Jew. Thus, the Treaty of Berlin (and San Stefano):

[...] not only widened the religious gap between the religious groups by making the religion the psychological basis for nationality but they also undermined and completely destroyed the traditions of mutual tolerance and acceptance practiced for centuries by various ethnic and religious groups under the Ottoman *millet* system.⁵⁶

The Ottoman state was indeed a non-national state as its subjects were grouped by religion, not nationality. A.H. Layard, the British ambassador to the Porte, described the Treaty of Berlin in the same year when it was signed in 1878 and deserves quoting in length:

One of the gravest objections that may be advanced against the Treaty of Berlin is that it would appear to give European sanction to a new principle of public and international law of dangerous tendency and of doubtful morality. The application of this principle to the relations of private life would enable a man who coveted his neighbor's house to establish a right to it by corrupting the servants, taking possession of the hall, and robbing the larder. For several years past Austria has wished to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. She fomented troubles in them, the frontier authorities allowed arms to be sent freely to the insurgents, she protected them when they crossed the frontier into her territory, allowed them to go back, and threw every difficulty in the way of the Porte when it sought to extinguish the insurrection. She demands the possession of those provinces on the pretext that she must put down the disorders of which she herself has been the cause. Servia [Serbia], with a contempt for justice and moral obligations of which history can scarcely furnish one example, seizes the moment of Turkey's defeat and prostration to invade her without even a colorable pretext, and is rewarded by an accession of territory. ... Montenegro is encouraged to carry war into peaceful districts by the premise that all she can filch from Turkey she will be allowed to retain.⁵⁷

The result of the Treaty of Berlin for the Muslim population in the Balkans were countless cases of outrage, cruelty, rape and massacre committed by Orthodox peoples (Russians, Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins) upon the Muslims.⁵⁸ Never had the Ottomans, even in the worst days of their history, been guilty of such indiscriminate slaughter, such shocking outrages on women and female children, such universal destruction of property, and such general religious persecution. Ultimately, some 200,000-300,000 Muslims in Bulgaria, Serbia and other areas of the Balkans were killed. More than a million Muslims were forced to flee their homes into safe Ottoman areas. Istanbul harboured at one point 170,000 refugees, of whom thousands died due to disease and starvation. This is why McCarthy described the destiny of the Muslim population during and after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire as a "demographic disaster."⁵⁹ The newly emerged Balkan states which were dominantly Orthodox equated more or less Muslim populations with the Ottoman Empire or treated them as the Ottoman's legacy ("Turks"). As these Balkan states were established according to the principle

of “one nation – one state” where national identity is firstly based on religion and then on language or history, Muslims’ physical and material existence did not fit into their worldview and had to be destroyed.⁶⁰

Additionally, British consular reports mention the wholesale destruction of mosques and cultural sites. European journals and the Rhodope Commission investigated and wrote about the massacres, but soon everything was forgotten.⁶¹ Next to the atrocities committed against the Muslim peoples in the Balkans, the Ottoman spirit of tolerance and mutual acceptance which for centuries had made possible the peaceful coexistence of so many different peoples in the Balkans collapsed completely. This is why again the British ambassador to Constantinople, Layard claimed on 19 August 1878 that the Treaty of Berlin “may contain the seeds of future disorders and troubles, if not of future wars.”⁶² Furthermore, the unclear status of Bosnia and its citizens as it was formulated in Article 25 in the Treaty of Berlin and the historical experience of Bosnian citizens with various Austrian invasions helps to explain the behavior, attitudes and responses of the Bosniaks to their encounter with Austria-Hungary in the summer of 1878.

In summary, the Treaty of Berlin succeeded in hindering Russia’s expansion at least for several decades while Germany and Austria-Hungary extended its territory to South Eastern Europe pursuing the idea of Central Europe. The Ottoman presence in the Balkans was preserved until the Balkan wars (1912/13). South-Slavic national movements were given full sovereignty while Bosnia was occupied by Austria-Hungary.

The Concept of Central Europe and its Importance for Bosnia and Bosniaks

The idea of Central Europe played a significant role for the Bosniak identity and Bosnia. Originally, this geopolitical idea stemmed from Germany and hence the German term *Mitteuropa* is often used. In the course of the 19th century, it became the keyword for efforts to build a German-Austrian block.

While the German romantic nationalist movement emerged, simultaneously, the Ottoman Empire started to decline. This gap meant an opportunity for new ideas, such as the concept of Central Europe. All these phenomena were linked with each other and introduced change in Europe. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 set a legal framework for this change. The forty years of Austro-Hungarian occupation was enough time to introduce and perform this shift of civilizations within the Bosnian state and society.

Main Ideas and Representatives of the Central European Concept

Geographically, the term Central Europe involves the area between the rivers Rhine and Vistula, the Western Alps and the Carpathian arc, as well as between the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas. However, it is more than just a geographical description as it also stands for political ideas or concepts. This is why scholars call it “the concept of Central Europe”, “the idea of Central Europe,” or in German *Mitteuropa-Gedanke* or *Projekt Mitteleuropa*. Until 1914 Central Europe encompassed approximately Austria-Hungary, including Bosnia, the German Empire, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and parts of Poland.⁶³

Economically, Central Europe developed its own characteristics. Central Europe’s western areas had rather urban handicraft, manufacturing and industry whereas eastern Central Europe evolved its own feudal system with manorial economy and large-scale landholding. Politically, it was closely linked to the idea of “Greater Germany” which was strongly debated at the first freely elected German Parliament, the so-called Frankfurt Parliament (*Frankfurter Nationalversammlung*) in 1848. Greater Germany included the future German Empire as well as the Austrian Empire. Additionally, Central Europe was understood as a demarcation towards Eastern Europe and the rest of the Balkans. The aim was to replace French, British and Russian dominance in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the historic mission was to protect Central and Eastern Europe from Islam and the Ottomans, and to keep together the predominantly Catholic peoples of *Mitteleuropa*, particularly the Danube region. Within that concept, Germany was perceived as a driving force behind the rise of Europe as a coming world power. In their defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866, Habsburg lost their leadership of the German alliance and thus Germany became the leading force within the Central European project. Additionally, the Austro-Hungarian settlement in 1867 (*Ausgleich*) consolidated the political supremacy of Germans and Hungarians at the expense of South Slavic peoples.⁶⁴

The key representatives of the concept of Central Europe are Clemens von Metternich (1773-1859), Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), Friedrich List (1789-1846), Karl Ludwig von Bruck (1798-1860) and Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919). Clemens von Metternich was a German-Austrian politician, statesman and influential diplomat. He was considered a practitioner of realism and the balance of power theory. Metternich predicted the disastrous effect of nationalism and stood up for peace, stability and security in Europe.⁶⁵ This was particularly visible at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 where Metternich played the key role. However, the idea of freedom was not that important for Metternich. He also opposed new social and political

forces. The Congress of Vienna reflects the various concepts of Europe in this era. Metternich cultivated the idea of Central Europe which he did not understand as being German but rather more a confederation of states and nations. His point of view was to include the Ottoman Empire in the European community.⁶⁶ The Ottoman Empire covering different territories and including various nations resembled multiethnic Austria-Hungary. Metternich's standpoint was that Europe needed the Ottoman Empire to keep Russia in check. Within the European balance of power, Russia had to keep its already defined position and transfer its conflicts to Asia, i.e. far away from Europe. In summary, Metternich saw Europe as a continent of independent states that were equal regarding law, status and security but unequal regarding power, responsibility and influence. He wanted Prussia and Austria to lead Central European politics and resist Russian and British influence.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, a stable European system turned out to be an illusion as aggressive nationalism appeared and new nation-states emerged mainly at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

Otto von Bismarck, the founder and first Chancellor of the German Empire (1871-1890), focused his foreign policy on balance of interests and a system of alliances. The new German Empire meant a threat to the power play of Europe. Bismarck wanted to weaken France and to adopt a rather defensive policy in order to keep Central Europe out of war. By doing so, he strengthened his relationship to Austria-Hungary and Russia (League of the Three Emperors). His standpoint was that only a strong consolidated Germany lying at the heart of Europe could act as a unifying force in and for Europe. During the Balkan crises (1875-1878) Bismarck tried to shift the conflicts among the great powers to the periphery. In 1878, Bismarck chaired the Congress of Berlin where he put an end to the Balkan crises and surrendered Bosnia to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Friedrich List, as an economist, argued to set up a customs union against economic pressure from Britain. He was the architect of the German customs union (*Deutscher Zollverein*) aiming for a profitable exchange of industrial and agrarian products under German hegemony up to the Black Sea.⁶⁸ Generally, the German Empire at the end of the 19th century had transformed into an industrial state which was characterized by a strong middle class, work force and social democracy to the detriment of agriculture and the landowning aristocracy.

Karl Ludwig von Bruck, an Austrian politician of German origin, supported the German national movement in favor of the Greek Revolution. Since the Greek war for independence (1821-32), intellectuals were inspired by Greece as the homeland of European culture (Philhellenism). Von Bruck

was a representative in the Frankfurt Parliament and stood for the idea of a Greater Germany. Therefore, during his mandate as trade minister, he introduced a Central European customs union to adjust German and Austrian customs, currency and fiscal systems. While being an envoy in the Ottoman Empire, he supported the expansion of the railway systems.

Friedrich Naumann, a German Protestant theologian and liberal politician became later one of the most popular representatives of the idea of Central Europe. His book *Mitteleuropa* firstly published in 1915 was a best-seller during the Nazi era. There he asked for a German-Austrian association of states with economic unity and military conventions according to liberal imperialism where nationalities and religions were respected. Thus Naumann focused on the economic advantages of the concept Central Europe, as well.⁶⁹ Naumann's critics though accuse him of being too naïve in treating the nationality problem and in assuming a voluntary union of various nations under German leadership.

Even if the concept of Central Europe stresses economic advantages, it had a strong impact on culture. Due to tight economic cooperation, strong social contacts were needed. Thus, cultural and civilizational similarities within the Central European zone emerged. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary perceived its role in Bosnia as a cultural mission, and a modernization project in order to change the backward society of Bosnia into a modern central European state.

The geo-strategic anticipations of Central Europe were in general: an increase in the workforce, the initiation of a new entrepreneurship, a better supply of resources and food and control of trade routes along the river Danube to the Black Sea, Constantinople and the Middle East. Similarly, the strategic interests of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia were to secure further expansion into South-East Europe, provide a market for its industry and raw materials, prevent a large South Slavic state from forming and securing its already achieved possessions on the Adriatic Sea from Istria to Boka Kotorska (Bay of Kotor).⁷⁰ The economic interests were particularly important due to the general economic crisis which emerged in 1873. Hence, new opportunities for trade, exploitation of raw materials, cheap labor and fruitful land were urgently needed. Bosnia was one opportunity, but at the same time securing access to markets as far as the Near East was an aspiration of Austria-Hungary.⁷¹

Incorporation of Bosnia into the Central European Framework

In order to realize these interests within the Central European context, Bosnia needed to be incorporated in the Austro-Hungarian system. This

involved a legal, political, economic, educational and cultural assimilation strategy which was called a cultural mission. The cultural mission was perceived as a task to transform a backward country in a cultured, civilized Central European state. Hence, Bosnia was treated as a part of the Central European idea. The situation in 1878 was, de jure, that the Austro-Hungarian occupation was considered a temporary measure to install peace and order in the region. De facto, Ottoman presence in this part of Europe was over and Ottoman diplomacy proved to be ineffective in protecting Muslims who stayed in the lost territories. Thus, Bosniaks were left alone to deal with the new occupiers who could carry out their cultural mission. This cultural mission required financial resources which were to be secured by Bosnia itself through a legal act in 1880.⁷² Actually, this meant a tax increase for Bosnian citizens who in this way paid the price for becoming a modernized part of Central Europe. Benjamin von Kállay, a Hungarian aristocrat, diplomat and Bosnia's finance minister for 22 years was the key leader of the cultural mission within Bosnia.

The results of the cultural mission were as follows: Within the Bosnian society, a new class of entrepreneurs, a Bosniak middle class, emerged. These entrepreneurs started to play a prominent role as personal achievement became an important criteria for social promotion instead of hereditary status.⁷³ Furthermore, the landscape of Bosnian cities changed. Impressive public buildings, such as administrative offices, courts, barracks, theaters and post-offices were built in Central European style.⁷⁴ Thus, a clear difference from Ottoman Bosnian architecture signalled the introduction of modern elements into a traditional environment. Interesting is that the building of schools as well as other public buildings (e.g. city hall *Vijećnica*) were in a semi-Oriental "pseudo-Moorish" style leaning on the architecture of Andalusia or even from the Mamluk architecture of Cairo. The architectural style was not Ottoman at all, rather Arabic. The Austro-Hungarian policy was to deter the Bosniaks from the Ottoman Empire, but the new buildings constructed by the Monarchy reminded one rather of Arabic material culture pleasing the general Muslim heritage but still pursuing the aim to get rid of Ottoman legacy.⁷⁵ Generally, the new streets and new buildings particularly in Sarajevo resembled Vienna. Hartmuth claims that "it must have been on purpose that 'the Austrians' did away with the Ottoman past."⁷⁶ However, he makes an interesting comparison:

In terms of the exhibitionism necessitated by the cultural mission, it would have hardly been in the interest to have the 'old' Sarajevo disappear. Quite to the contrary, it played an important didactic role, for what could the 'new'

Sarajevo mean to the assessor without a sample of the 'old' for the sake of comparison; the 'after' without the 'before'? [...] the approach taken in Sarajevo was perhaps closer to that of colonial France in North Africa after the 1860s. A not too farfetched point of comparison, the Austro-Hungarian half of Sarajevo developed as an exact contemporary of the French core in Tunis. This was a *ville nouvelle* built not on the ruins of the pre-existing town, but next to it. The aim was not to demonstrate limitless power by sheer destruction, but to impress the 'native' with the elegant new quarters (which, it must be admitted, developed for infrastructural reasons; image was a welcome side-effect).⁷⁷

A further significant change meant not to intimidate but to impress was introduced with the new types of schools designed according to Central European education systems. These schools produced new profiles of educated Muslims and with them a new public and cultural life. For the Bosniak community this meant a split within the Muslim educated class.⁷⁸

Those students who finished the traditional high schools used to continue their studies at universities within the Ottoman Empire and represented the religious scholars (*ulema*). The graduates of the new type of schools went to universities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Zagreb, Budapest, Vienna, and Graz) and represented secular scholars (the intelligentsia).

This distinction between the *ulema* and intelligentsia was established for the first time in Bosniak history by Austria-Hungary. Additionally, the change in the language of instruction (from Turkish to Bosnian) and the introduction of the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic meant a profound change.⁷⁹

Finally, the new nature of authority, bureaucracy, the growth of nationalism, the emergence of political parties and a new political culture gradually led the Bosniaks away from Ottoman identity and towards a European identity. This affirmation of Bosniak European identity was visibly displayed in lifestyle. Within this new concept of life, European coffeehouses (*Kaffeehäuser*) emerged in separate quarters next to traditional Ottoman coffee shops.⁸⁰ For the Bosniaks, "Europe" meant Central Europe, just as for Moroccans, Europe was identified with France or Britain for Indians.

Conclusion

Evidently, the modernization process occurred in two phases and in two different contexts, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. As a result,

the modernization process had an impact on the economy, e.g. through industrialization, developments in science and technology, the transformation of agriculture from subsistence to trade. This process formed a special challenge to those societies which became a minority under non-Muslim rule as was the case with the Bosniaks under Austro-Hungarian rule.

Actually, the modern era is specific because, for the first time in Muslim history, a large number of Muslims became a minority. As a result, there was an urgent need to find a relevant response to whether Muslims could remain, live and practice Islam in their home countries. Furthermore, a chain of several widespread historical events and factors led to the Congress of Berlin. Basically, the Eastern Question, the rise of nationalist revolutionary movements in the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire and the traditional rivalry among the great powers set the framework for the Congress of Berlin.

The Congress of Berlin was an example of European diplomacy where competing great powers decided the fate of smaller countries and peoples. The decisions of the Congress of Berlin dramatically changed the status of Bosnia and Muslims in the Balkans in general. The Treaty of Berlin destroyed the pluralist order and the multi-ethnic and multi-religious concept of social organization which had prevailed in the Ottoman state. In general, the newly independent Balkan states adopted the narrow idea of a single-ethnicity and single-language nation embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, exclusive ethnic nationalism and inquisitorial spirit of Pan-Orthodoxy.

The occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary was a prelude to further conflicts, such as the annexation crisis in 1908/09 and the assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand by the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo which ultimately led to the First World War.

The concept of Central Europe was basically an economic, administrative and political alliance of all states and peoples living from the Northern Sea to the Adriatic Sea, including the territory of Bosnia. The incorporation of Bosnia into the concept of Central Europe and into the Habsburg system significantly altered the Bosnian economy, society, education, culture, public administration and politics.

Having in mind all of these changes, a change in identity could not be omitted. Bosniaks slowly started identifying themselves with the Habsburg system and way of life. Additionally, a transformation of political loyalty occurred as the Sultan was no longer the ultimate political leader.

The concept of Central Europe had cyclical resurgences, and until today, in the 21st century, Bosnians remember the prosperous times during the Austro-Hungarian Empire with nostalgia. The following poignant lament describes the fate of Bosnia in the 19th and 20th century:

Ode Turska, ode majka
Ode Švabo, ode babo
Dodje bre, uze sve.

[Turkey's gone, mother's gone
The German's gone, father's gone
Bre (Serbs and Montenegrinians) came
and took everything away].⁸¹

4

COMPETING LOYALTIES OR A STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL: LOYALTY TO BOSNIA, THE SULTAN OR TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY?

From being the most western part of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia came to be the most south-eastern corner of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From belonging to the dominant Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire, the Bosniaks ended up being a minority in Austria-Hungary. In response to this turmoil, Bosniaks were disoriented, confused and reacted differently: some showed resistance, some migrated to remaining Ottoman lands, some adapted to the new situation and others remained silent hoping that everything would be fine soon. In order to explore the issue of loyalty, it is important to analyze the initial reaction of the Bosniaks towards the Austro-Hungarian occupation.

The Political and Societal Situation in Bosnia in 1878: Quest for Autonomy, Resistance Movement, Migration or Submission

Following the Ottoman defeat in Vienna in 1683 and the gradual loss of previously Ottoman territory west of the Danube to Austria-Hungary, Bosnia became the most Western region of the Ottoman Empire. Many refugees from these lost territories settled down in Bosnia. The Ottoman reputation slowly began to decrease. At the same time, Bosnia's importance as a political entity among the domestic population increased. The victory in the battle of Banja Luka in 1737 in which Bosniak soldiers lead by Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha defeated Austria contributed to that image. Within the aristocracy, a new influential class of notables emerged: *kapetani* and *ajani* who belonged to the military and whose positions were inherited. Sarajevo became the Janisaries' headquarters and the main center for trade and entrepreneurship. In

the beginning of the 19th century with the introduction of reforms, resistance and uprisings against the Ottoman Empire broke out. The Bosniak aristocracy feared that the Ottoman Empire would take away their privileges. Bosnia became a state within a state because the Bosnian aristocracy did not perceive Bosnia as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, rather as a sort of federal unit within the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the central power of the Sultan and of the *vali* (the Sultan's main representative in Bosnia) weakened.¹

The following analysis demonstrates that five different and partly overlapping reactions emerged to the Austrian takeover: (1) while some were convinced that only Austria-Hungary could save Bosnia from its current disorder (uprisings, loss of power of the Ottoman Empire), (2) others perceived the Ottoman Porte's action as a betrayal since the Sultan gave Bosnia to Austria-Hungary; (3) the masses lead by religious scholars worried mainly about their religious identity in a dominantly Catholic Austria-Hungary and did not see any option other than rebelling against the occupation; (4) some reasoned that Austria-Hungary's military was stronger and that any sort of resistance was useless and (5) the upper class remained against any political changes fearing loss of their property and privileges.

The Quest for the Autonomy of Bosnia

In the beginning of the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire introduced reforms to recover from internal and external problems, the reactions in Bosnia were adverse. What followed were janissary rebellions which were supported by Bosnia's aristocracy. The aristocracy feared that they would lose their rights and privileges and the reforms were understood as a danger to their Islamic faith. In this power vacuum, the idea of an autonomous Bosnia led by a Bosniak was raised, and Bosnian notables elected Husein Kapetan Gradašćević as their political and military leader in 1831. However, the Herzegovinian aristocracy under the leadership of Aliaga Rizvanbegović and Smailaga Čengić were against Gradašćević and in favor of Ottoman reforms. Thus, a societal and geopolitical split emerged between Bosnia in the north and Herzegovina in the south. While Bosnia was larger and richer in terms of fertile land and more important in military and political terms (the Janissaries' headquarters were in Sarajevo and the *valis* resided for a time in Banja Luka, Travnik and Sarajevo), Bosnia was more hit by the reforms. On the other side, Herzegovina was smaller and poorer. Thus, Bosnia always had a political, economical and military advantage over Herzegovina. These differences led in critical times to negative competitive behavior between Bosnia on the one side and Herzegovina on the other. Gradašćević fought heavily on many sides for Bosnia's autonomy and was even chosen as Vizier

and Pasha. The people of Bosnia proclaimed him ultimately as the “Dragon of Bosnia” [*Zmaj od Bosne*]. However, Gradaščević’s movement for Bosnia’s autonomy failed mainly due to a lack of unity and support from Bosniaks in Hercegovina.²

Since the break-up of the Janissaries in 1826 and the failed autonomy movement in 1832, disorder became a key characteristic of the following years. The Ottoman Empire proved to be unable to introduce law and order in Bosnia. Furthermore, Kreševljaković complains that the governors sent by the Ottoman Porte were not qualified nor did they show sympathy to Bosnia and its population.³ Bosniaks, on the other hand, were disappointed by the Ottoman Empire and were desperately hoping that the idea of an autonomous Bosnia might come true. Thus on 27 May 1878, after the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, a petition (*adresa* or *ittifakname*) circulated where signatures were collected to request from the Ottoman Porte autonomy for Bosnia and in which all citizens of Bosnia were required to protect their home country from Montenegro, Serbia and Austria-Hungary.⁴ In June 1878, according to Kreševljaković, the *Times* reported on this petition stating that the Ottoman military and administration should leave Bosnia and that instead Bosniaks should govern their country. There, it was stated also that Muslims and non-Muslims co-existed very well and that Bosnian language is used rather than Turkish.⁵ Indeed the National Committee [*Narodni odbor*], which was established to proceed with the requirements in that petition contained representatives from all four religions (Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish). Nonetheless, the interests of the European great powers regarding the Eastern question did not correspond to the interests of the Bosnian citizens. Already ten days before the Congress of Berlin was concluded, on 3 July 1878, the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs sent a message to Sarajevo to the consul Konrad Vasić concerning Austria-Hungary’s mandate to occupy Bosnia. Consul Vasić informed Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, the mayor of Sarajevo. According to a report from the consul sent to Andrassy, Mazhar Pasha, Mehmed-beg Kapetanović and Konrad Vasić promised to do everything so that the masses would accept Austro-Hungary’s occupation. But the responses to the new situation in July 1878 varied. The National Committee made the Ottoman military commander in Bosnia resign which showed that they wanted to resist the military occupation by Austria-Hungary, and resist the order by the Porte to surrender.⁶

Resistance Movement Against the Austro-Hungarian Occupation

Being a borderland of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia faced two centuries of continuous wars and tension along the European frontier. In 1683 when the

Ottomans lost the battle of Vienna, the existence of Muslims became instantly precarious and many Muslims fled from lost territories to Bosnia. Thus, contact between the Bosniaks and “Christian” Europe was mainly on the battlefield and therefore enthusiasm for Austria-Hungary and liberal ideas was hardly to be expected. Furthermore, in situations of continuous warfare on the borderline, conservatism is natural, as Karčić concludes.⁷

The news of Austria-Hungary’s plan to occupy Bosnia caused anarchy and confusion. In Sarajevo, Hadži Lojo became a key figure in organizing the resistance movement against Austria-Hungary’s occupation. The enthusiasm for resistance grew as various rumors spread concerning the Sultan’s abandonment of Bosnia, how to organize resistance, who was involved in the resistance movement and what could happen if Austria-Hungarian troops arrived. For the first time the term *Švabo* circulated which pejoratively meant Austrian and German. Letters were sent to the Ottoman Porte requesting confirmation of the news and whether the Porte would be supporting the citizens of Bosnia militarily. A clear response never arrived in Bosnia although on 12 July 1878, one day before the conclusion of the Congress of Berlin, the new (and last) Ottoman military commander Hafiz Pasha came to Sarajevo. Hafiz Pasha’s task was to advise peace, calm the irritated population and help ensure the occupation proceeded smoothly. Consul Vasić stated on 15 July 1878 that the Orthodox population promised the Muslims that they would support them even with guns.⁸ On 20 July 1878 a cable was sent to Bismarck in which signatories in the name of the people of Bosnia protested against the conclusions of the Congress of Berlin warning that the people of Bosnia would defend their home country.⁹ Indeed, when Mazhar Pasha resigned on 28 July 1878, the citizens (Christians, Muslims and Jews) established a National Committee [*Narodni odbor*], changed their European dress into national clothes and concluded that they would resist the occupation with any means.¹⁰ Josef Koetschet, a Swiss citizen in the Turkish medical and diplomatic service, stated that eminent Muslims and Christians gathered on 30 July 1878 to say goodbye to Mazhar Pasha and other Ottoman representatives. There, Mazhar Pasha stated:

I am leaving this unlucky country with pride as I have always performed my obligations to the Sultan. You have not done anything to me, but to the Sultan. You are actually doing us a great favor which you currently cannot understand. I am just sorry for the poor who will have to suffer from the consequences.¹¹

Koetschet concluded that not even the harshest enemies of the Ottoman Empire could have imagined a more shameful departure of the crescent

from a territory they had governed for 400 years.¹² The German Consul Frommelt remained in Sarajevo during these turbulent times analysing in his reports sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin the national, social and religious motives prevailing during the resistance movement. On 9 August 1878 Frommelt commented on the disempowerment of Mazhar Pasha and it is worth quoting his observations in length:

There is no longer any administrative body in the proper sense. The existence of a pseudo-governor in the person of Hafis-pasha cannot obscure this fact should not be deceiving, nor can the so-called "Provincial Council," which in fact independently exercises supreme power, be regarded as the representative of a new order of things. It is a form of Paris Commune that appears here. The real leader, the soul of the entire thing – as was the case during the first unrest – is Hajji Loyo. Despite him being known as a brigand, he is worshipped almost like a saint by the Bosnian Mohammedans [Muslim] ... Hajji Loyo's behavior so far poses, when considering his high degree of fanaticism and his earlier activities, a riddle, which – if one does not suspect him to possess a higher degree of insight – can hardly be solved. For there is no doubt that it is essentially thanks to his influence when evil excesses directed against Christians and Jews did not occur yet. Incidentally, the new rulers are certainly not lacking in terrorism. It expresses itself particularly in his views with regard to the recruitment of the Mohammedans for the Bashi-Bosuks. ... 'All who are not under the protection of a consulate were obliged to don the Bosnian dress, a person in Frankish or Turkish clothing could be certain that his clothes would be violently torn from his body. There are a variety of factors, which in combination brought about the current situation. Most visible are certainly the religious and the national one. However, a social factor is not missing, and should perhaps be afforded greater meaning than one may think at first glance. In any case, the whole current movement primarily draws support from the Mohammedan proletariat. This since a long time suffering country and in particular its capital with its large mob, currently accommodates only too many elements which, until this point, have been restricted to the most basic lifestyle and are eager to make use of such an opportunity to live without work at the cost of the property-owning class, at a far higher level than they had previously enjoyed. In such a situation in which anarchy reigns, they can only win. Hidden under the guise of religious zeal and patriotism, in many cases the actual driving motives are to be found in subversive tendencies.¹³

Interestingly, Frommelt saw similarities between the resistance movement in Sarajevo and the revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871 stressing the grassroots agitation among the Muslim "proletariat." Furthermore, he

stated that there were no transgressions or excesses against non-Muslims since Hadži Lojo saw the resistance as a patriotic movement primarily to preserve the cultural, including the Muslim and non-Muslim, identities of Bosnia. Indeed, Hadži Lojo's influence grew and with him the opinion that the conclusions of the Congress of Berlin would not be accepted by the citizens of Bosnia. However, on 31 July 1878, a proclamation from the Austro-Hungarian Emperor to the people of Bosnia was distributed in Sarajevo stating that Austria-Hungary possessed the right to occupy Bosnia by the decision of the Congress of Berlin and with the consent of the Porte, and that any rebellion would be understood as a resistance to the Sultan and to Europe. Nonetheless, a weapon store was plundered and guns were distributed to Christians and Muslims. The first news of resistance came from Banja Luka on 1 August 1878. The day before, Austro-Hungarian troops had entered Banja Luka without resistance. Tuzla as well as Mostar did not show strong opposition. On 3 August, a response from the grand Vizier in Istanbul arrived stating that the conclusions of the Congress of Berlin had been signed in the name of the Sultan, that Austria-Hungary would for a certain period of time govern Bosnia although the details were not clear, and that Bosnian citizens should not resist with arms. The grand Vizier's response caused chaos and confusion and even increased the willingness to resist with arms. In response the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina signed a protocol stating that the citizens of Bosnia were armed, did not need advice from Istanbul and would protect their home country and religion.¹⁴

It is important to mention that Christians and Muslims united to protect their home country. This confirms a proclamation (*Objava*) from 7 August 1878 which was posted in the streets of Sarajevo in which all citizens, no matter of what faith, were requested to resist the Austro-Hungarian occupation:

We who live in Bosnia, Muslims, Christians, and Latins [Catholics], agree that we must resist our enemy. We, if we continue to be decisive and enthusiastic, and if we remain against our enemy although this comes with sacrifice, the enemy – with God's help – will be destroyed. And we, on the most glorious pages of history, shall forever be remembered as great patriots and we shall enjoy the thanks of Muslims and other peoples in the east and in the west. ... Protection of the homeland is today the duty of all peoples who live here ...¹⁵

Interestingly, this announcement, elaborating Bosnia's history, did not mention the Ottoman Empire, the Turks nor the Sultan. Kreševljaković interprets this as an indicator that Bosnia was supposed to protect itself with

the help of its citizens only.¹⁶ Soon news arrived in Sarajevo from the rest of the country, including Mostar's occupation without resistance and Jajce's fall. On the other hand, in northern Bosnia, Maglaj resisted occupational forces and Sarajevo leaders left for Žepče, Tuzla and Zvornik to support the resistance movement.¹⁷ On 29 July 1878 the first Austro-Hungarian units crossed the river Sava into the north of Bosnia, but soon there was a need to increase the numbers of occupying troops. Austria-Hungary did not expect such a strong resistance. Additionally, the mountainous landscape made it more difficult to press the army forward. Karčić quotes Donia who states that the initial number of Austro-Hungarian soldiers was 72,000 which was increased to 268,000 soldiers. On the Bosnian side there were 93,000 fighters.¹⁸

Gradually, more and more voices raised the opinion that any resistance from a military perspective was unrealistic and that no other alternative remained than to submit weapons to the Austro-Hungarian forces. Indeed, lead by Joseph Filipović, these were stronger, with Sarajevo falling on 19 August even though military resistance throughout Bosnia lasted until October 1878. It took Filipović's troops around 20 days to occupy Sarajevo since their entrance into Bosnia over the river Sava at Brod in the north. The Vienna War Archive (*Wiener Kriegsarchiv*) counts 60 larger and smaller battles during the occupation, where 6000 soldiers and officers lost their lives while losses on the Bosnian side are not known.¹⁹

In conclusion, the uprising in Bosnia lasting from June to October 1878 began under the leadership of the Bosniaks and was directed against the Austro-Hungarian occupation of their land because the Muslims feared mass persecution, killing, expropriation and rape as suffered by other Muslims in the rest of the Balkans. Their fears were confirmed in the summary trials and executions of hundreds of insurrectionists, and the wanton killing of the population, notably in Sarajevo by the Austro-Hungarian military. The insurrection in Bosnia rapidly became a sort of national Bosnian-Herzegovinian movement involving Muslims, Christians and Jews alike. The movement aimed at achieving autonomy against the Porte and against any other powers, including Austria-Hungary. However, Bosnia was not strong enough to counter the aims set by the European great powers.

Migration to Remaining Ottoman Lands

One of the most visible reactions of the Bosniaks to the initially military encounter with Austria-Hungary was migration towards remaining Ottoman lands and leaving behind their estates and properties.²⁰ On their way to remaining Ottoman lands, some reached Sandžak, Macedonia, Anatolia and some even ended up in the Near East.²¹ Their religious and cultural link with

the Ottoman Empire, the initial (feared and real) harshness of the new political system towards its opponents, the (anticipated and actual) proselytism of the Catholic Church, and the preference given to the settlers from Austria-Hungary (colonists) encouraged these Bosniaks to leave.²² The migration process took place over a period of forty years. There were continuous emigrations but also four mass emigration waves: in 1878, directly after the occupation; in 1882 at the institution of general conscription, causing approximately 8,000 migrants; in 1899-1901 after political upheaval, resulting in 13,000 emigrants; and in 1908, after the annexation of Bosnia at which time around 28,000 Muslims departed. These migration waves prove that these were years of exceptional stress. The reasons were manifold. Firstly, the psychological challenge of a Muslim to become suddenly a citizen of a non-Muslim state. Secondly, the conscription law prescribing that the Bosniaks should serve in a non-Muslim army caused insecurity, particularly from a religious-legal aspect. Thirdly, the introduction of a new economic system impoverished large parts of the society and made life very difficult. The majority of the emigrants were free peasants, craftsmen, laborers, and merchants. Thus, members of all social segments decided to migrate, but mainly peasants.²³ An important role was played also by the Ottoman government which wanted to settle Muslims in several regions along the border to Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece in order to counter-balance the dominant Orthodox presence there.²⁴

The first migration wave occurred in the second half of 1878 when the Austro-Hungarian military occupied Bosnia and Muslims feared losing their religion. The second huge migration wave of 1881 resulted from the conscription law issued in November 1881 which also caused a rebellion in 1882.²⁵ Conscription strengthened the position of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and crushed the hope that the Ottoman Empire would return. Muslims were particularly against the idea of serving the army of a non-Muslim state but the Serbs in Herzegovina also showed resistance. In the Ottoman Empire they did not have to serve in the military. The agrarian conditions combined with the conscription law firstly made things difficult especially for families who lost the work capacity of a son when he went to the army. Secondly, it was a motive for political agitation.²⁶ However, many Bosniaks gave up resistance and plans to migrate:

Many Muslims gave up the initial intention to leave the country rather than to submit to the oppressors. They realized that the government had not cut back privileges, but instead insisted on strict fulfillment of the duties of the *kmets*, asked emphatically for payment of duties, and did not hinder the free practice of religious and public customs and traditions.²⁷

Previously, in a report sent from the German Consulate in Sarajevo to Berlin dated December 4, 1881, the Consul said that the Conscription law came as a surprise to the people, as they had believed that Bosnia would return to Ottoman rule. The report describes the atmosphere among the Bosniaks and Serbs as follows:

The introduction of the conscription is – to the extent that one can tell – not welcome among the citizens. The Muslims cannot understand that they shall no longer serve in the military of the Sultan, but rather in the military of the Christian sovereign. [...] The Greek-Orthodox population does not seem to be happy about the new measure because they do not favor the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Many people – especially the Muslim inhabitants – first interpreting the law as a provocation, immediately expressed the intent no longer to remain in the country. Indeed, many Muslim families (in Sarajevo about one hundred) applied for passports in order to emigrate. However, it is quite safe to say that the actual number of emigrants will not be very high. [...] the public mood, following the publication of the conscription law, is, as far as I found out, very excitable. [...] The concerns and objections against military service, which could be raised by the Muslims with reference to their religious regulations, were appeased from the beginning by issuing special provisions taking them into account.²⁸

One should recall that, as previously elaborated, prior to the Congress of Berlin, Bosnia and Austria-Hungary had only come into contact with each other on the battlefield. Austria-Hungary had attempted to occupy Bosnia on several occasions, and cities and towns had been overrun and partially burnt down in the course of these incursions. Thus, the *occupation* and *administration* of Bosnia, to use the terminology of the Berlin Treaty, was regarded by many Bosnian Muslims as a kind of final victory of an old enemy. It meant, first and foremost, a psychological challenge for the Muslims, as they felt themselves compelled to become citizens of a non-Muslim state. The people simply felt lost and disoriented – the Ottoman Empire was not protecting them from the new ruler, and the Sultan had not sent a clear message regarding how to behave themselves in the new situation. The Bosniaks identified the Sultan, the Shaykh al-Islam, Istanbul, and the Ottoman Empire with Islam, and feared that separation from the Ottoman Empire might also mean separation from their religious identity. Additionally, they assumed that Austria-Hungary would reform the system of inherited feudal rights without regards to their religion or the societal system. This *shift of civilizations*, of empires, of a change of the sides of the world, of East and West, as well as a *shift of masters* explain why masses of

Bosniaks showed resistance in the first months of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and why, when this failed, they fled Bosnia to remaining Ottoman lands immediately following the occupation in summer 1878.²⁹

At the same time, Austro-Hungarian authorities tried to influence broad Muslim masses by way of religious scholars. A heated discussion took place among various scholars to find an acceptable answer to questions concerning the permissibility of Muslims to live under non-Muslim rule, whether Christian Europe and European culture was acceptable for Muslims, whether Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian rule could be treated as *dār al-Islām* or as *dār al-ḥarb*,³⁰ and whether a Muslim could serve in the military under a non-Islamic flag:

In the 1880s *hijra* [migration] from Bosnia was growing so fast that it roused the ‘*ulama*’s concern for the future of Muslims in Bosnia. Such anxiety, in fact, reflected the Muslims’ loyalty to Bosnia and to the Ottoman Empire. In this new situation these ‘*ulama*’ came to see that it was the *vatan* (Bosnia) and not the *din* (Islam) that was in danger, as [the] continuation of *hijra* would gradually empty Bosnia of its Muslims.³¹

Fatwas were issued. Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović (1816-1895) played an important role in convincing the Muslims not to emigrate and to serve in the Austro-Hungarian military. He issued several fatwas in which he legitimized non-Muslim rule as long as the ruler was just, respected by his subjects and allowed religious scholars to perform their functions. As the first Reis ul-Ulema he contributed to the establishment of a separate Islamic Community that further distanced the Muslims from the Ottoman Empire and incorporated them into the Austro-Hungarian system.³² Furthermore, he issued a fatwa in which he called on Muslims to follow the Conscription law and serve the Austro-Hungarian military.³³

Another relevant scholar dealing with migration is Hafiz Muhamed Hadžijahić (1837-1892) who wrote in 1884 several articles against the *hijra* in the newspaper *Vatan*. He was a respected theologian from Sarajevo who had studied in Istanbul and taught at Gazi Husrev-beg medresa. He exhorted Muslims not to leave the lands of their birth and warned of the negative consequences of migration, such as the disappearance of Islam in certain areas and demographic losses for Muslim communities.³⁴ A collection of witness reports of Bosniaks who had migrated to Ottoman lands and returned to Bosnia confirms the economic and psychological impact of these demographic upheavals.³⁵ The migrants expected a better life and thought that in Turkey they would be given fertile land, housing and cattle. However,

these reports of altogether 308 migrants who chose to return reveal that they were met with an array of challenges, beginning, for instance, with their ignorance of the Turkish language, but also including unemployment, lack of income and finances, as well as lack of food and clothing. They also had to contend with low living standards, disease, barren and rocky land, poor housing, the new condition of being a foreigner, discrimination against Bosniaks, and the unwelcoming behavior of the locals. This combination of factors prompted them to return to Bosnia, sometimes on foot. Many of them begged for money in order to survive and be able to return to Bosnia. For example, Mehmed ef. Jahić from Banja Luka noted that eight members of his family decided to leave for Turkey, where they were told to settle down in Ankara. There they were given only one room of six square meters where they had to eat and sleep. After months of no improvement, they spent their savings, started begging, and decided to make the journey home on foot, which took them three months. According to his account, almost all the Bosniaks suffered similar hardships. He concluded that he would never go to Turkey, nor would he advise anyone else to go there.³⁶ Some admitted in these reports that they had fled to Turkey in order to avoid serving in the Austro-Hungarian military.³⁷

Another religious scholar even more influential than Hadžijahić was Mehmed Teufik Azabagić (1838-1918). In 1893, after Hadžiomerović's retirement Azabagić was appointed as Reis ul-Ulema. He published a treatise entitled *Risālah fī al-Hijrah* [Treatise on Migration] in 1884 in Arabic to tackle the issues that sparked discussions in theological circles. In 1886 in order to address a broader audience, he published it in Turkish in the Bosnian newspaper *Vatan*.³⁸ Although the treatise contains the word migration in its title, it is rather about life under non-Muslim rule in general. He was of the opinion that the Muslims of Bosnia should not migrate but stay in their dwelling places as long as they were not forced to abandon their religion and whilst they could perform their religious duties. Karić describes the discourse of migration (*hidžra*) versus the discourse of staying as follows:

The discourse of *watan* or staying (or of homeland and patriotism), as exemplified by the short epistle *Risala Concerning Hijra* by Mehmed Teufik Azabagić from 1884, was also the choice made by the Islamic Community Rijaset³⁹ (founded in 1882). In its fatwas, views and activities, Rijaset promoted a new interpretation of *hijra*. Its advocates claimed that emigration to Turkey did not amount to performing *hijra* according to its original purposes. Therefore, a *hijra* to Turkey could hardly compare with the Prophet's *hijra* from Makkah to Madinah in 622. Practically speaking, at the end of the

nineteenth century Bosnian Muslim authorities re-evaluated classic Muslim views on *hijra*. The new discourse of adaptation is clearly visible in officially issued statements about the then current issues. A good example is *Rais al-ulama* Hilmi ef. Hadžiomerović's (1816-1895) support for the new law of conscription into the Austria-Hungarian army, with which he encouraged Muslims to join in.⁴⁰

Azabagić's thought is closely linked to the reasoning of Muhammed Rashid Rida, a Syrian jurist and exegete of that time. Later, in 1909, in an article published in the journal *al-Manar* about emigration (*hijra*), Rida wrote on the situation of the Bosniaks:

Hijra is not an individual religious incumbency to be performed by those who are able to carry out their duties in a manner safe from any attempt to compel them to abandon their religion or prevent them from performing and acting in accordance with their religious rites.⁴¹

Azabagić was unquestionably one of the leading reformist thinkers of the time in Bosnia, as he took into consideration the real political and societal circumstances. His hope was to contribute to the progress and advancement of Muslim Bosniaks, while applying human rationale and trying to reinterpret the sources of Islam (Qur'an and Hadith) and to adapt it to the challenges of his time. For Azabagić, *dār al-ḥarb* would become *dār al-Islām* if Islamic religious rites and observances like Friday prayers (*Jumu'ah*) and fasting were allowed and practiced even if non-Muslims ruled in that country. The importance of this interpretation lies in the modernist or reformist approach towards traditional concepts of Islam (*hijra*, *dār al-ḥarb*, *dār al-Islām* etc.).

Even if Azabagić's elaboration influenced future generations of Muslim scholars, there was also a voice calling for migration. Omerović ibn Husein Taslidžali, known as Bosnali Omerović-baba, advised the Bosniaks not to migrate to Istanbul, as it had become too westernized. He suggested migration to those lands where the Shari'ah law was applied, such as Syria, Palestine and the Sinai in the Near East. His perspective was, as Karčić puts it, typical for scholars who live on the borderlands of the Muslim world and who were disappointed with the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, leading them to a traditional, conservative and anti-modern understanding of religion.⁴² However, Azabagić's view was groundbreaking and popular on both the Muslim and non-Muslim sides.

Another reason for migrating to Ottoman lands was the establishment of the Islamic Community in Bosnia independent of the Sultan and the

Shaykh al-Islam. The Convention of Istanbul signed in April 1879 between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire promised that the Sultan would remain the religious sovereign of the Bosniaks, for which reason the establishment of the Islamic Community was understood as a threat and as an attempt to split the Bosniaks from their religious centre.

There were additionally several cases of Bosniaks who were even involved in persuading their neighbors to leave so that they could buy their property cheaply and sell it for a high price.⁴³ Little was done to improve the situation of the Bosniak peasants who numbered 80,000 people according to the census of 1910. Emigrants were helped with transport facilities and financial aid.⁴⁴ The *Landesregierung* supported the emigration of Muslims and hindered those who wanted to come back to their hometowns because the policy was to immediately settle colonists in previously inhabited Bosniak dwellings.⁴⁵ Within Austro-Hungarian rule, various groups of immigrants settled in Bosnia. These were soldiers, civil servants, scientists, workers, entrepreneurs (often the so-called *kuferaši*).⁴⁶ Thus, the number of foreigners increased to 114,591 (6.04%) of the whole population of Bosnia.⁴⁷ The majority of them (55,705 settlers) came from neighboring countries and understood the Bosnian language. The second largest number of colonists was German (22,968), then Polish (10,975), Ruthenian (7,341), Czech (7,045) and Hungarian (6,443). Thus, the German language became the most dominant foreign language in Bosnia. Furthermore, the Catholic and Protestant presence increased. Among the Germans, there were mostly Protestants dwelling mainly in rural areas.⁴⁸ Sugar comments on the Protestants' role:

Protestantism made its appearance shortly after the occupation. Some of the Austro-Hungarian officials were Protestants, and the new, mainly German, villages established by the government in northern Bosnia had a Protestant majority. The Protestants never became an important factor, but they were the only element of the population on whose support the government could rely under all circumstances.⁴⁹

Generally, colonists were given priority when it came to acquiring land and meeting their needs to start a new life in Bosnia. After the Congress of Berlin, several groups aimed at gaining land in Bosnia. For example, German newspapers had announcements saying that in Bosnia there was cheap land to be bought.⁵⁰ Bosnia was attractive because it was not that far away from home like America or Brazil which were at that time the main destinations for German settlers. Bethke talks even of *Auswanderungsfieber* [a migration craze] to buy fertile land and to proselytize, i.e. to spread the idea of

Christianity in order to bring European culture to Bosnia.⁵¹ Soon there were 54 small colonies, mainly in northern Bosnia close to the cities of Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Teslić, Maglaj, and Bijeljina.⁵² For the colonists as for the Bosniaks, religious identity and language were most important. The troublemakers and challengers for the colonists however were not the Bosniaks, but the Orthodox Serbs. On the one side their understanding of religion and religious practice was mostly rather pagan customs and superstition, whilst on the other they made with the help of Russian funding propaganda for Greater Serbia.⁵³

The Austro-Hungarian administration stated, however, that the main reason for emigration was the change from a barter economy to a monetary economy, from a natural economy to a money-oriented economy, and the hatred of foreign people and institutions.⁵⁴ When Austria-Hungary started to import industrial goods, the merchants particularly faced severe economic difficulty. The prices of craftsmen's products fell while living costs increased. Generally, the prices increased dramatically after the occupation while the prices of local products declined.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the Bosniak merchants no longer had their previous best clients, the Ottoman officials.⁵⁶ Thus, emigration was encouraged by a continuous impoverishment of the Bosniak middle class enabled by Austria-Hungary.⁵⁷

In conclusion, these economic changes, amounting to a shift to capitalism, hit the middle class most, but not the upper class (landowners), whose estates continued to have a value in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and whose large-scale landholdings were not dependent on economic trends. A report dated 14 September 1900 confirms this and identifies the decline of domestic trade due to the development of the railway, the abolishment of customs duties, the increasing demand for cheaper products and mass import of cheaper goods from Austria-Hungary.⁵⁸ Having lost their domestic market, many Bosniaks who were dealing with this part of the economy decided to find other opportunities in remaining Ottoman lands.

These circumstances made a smooth transition of loyalty from the Sultan to the Kaiser difficult. Since loyalty is based on reciprocity, there was an urgent need to find a means to establish a relationship of mutual "give and take" between Austria-Hungary and the Bosniaks. Austria-Hungary saw a primary need to distract the Bosniaks from Istanbul towards Austria-Hungary in order to strengthen its position in Bosnia, to please as well as tie the Bosniaks to its administration, and eventually to weaken the Porte's influence. An important point to be made is that loyalty to Austria-Hungary was achieved gradually as the state's policy convinced the Bosniaks, for whom

religious identity had always been important, that conversion to Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) did not mean an advantage in terms of career, taxes or even physical existence as in the neighboring nation-states. Furthermore, while the Kaiser was Catholic, leading political figures of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia, such as Benjamin Kállay and Wilhelm von Württemberg, were Protestants.

However, the impoverishment of the peasant population spread and the colonists' pressure increased. Imamović mentions that immediately after the occupation, 12,000 Croat farmers settled in Krajina, in the north-western part of Bosnia, on the border with Croatia.⁵⁹ From 1891 the government noted the emigration in numbers and according to professions. Thus, from 1891-1897, 3,764 peasants (71.27%), 555 craftsmen (10.51%), 280 traders (5.30%), 118 adherents of liberal professions (*slobodnih profesija*) (2.24%), 395 laborers (7.46%) and 170 others (3.22%) left Bosnia. In comparison, the 1879 census stated that the number of Muslims in Bosnia was 448,613 (38.73% of the total population). The census in 1885 numbered them at 491,710 (36.88%) while the census of 1895 counted 548,632 (34.99%) Muslims. The percentage fell in 1910 to 32.25% of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian population (612,137 persons).⁶⁰

The fall in percentage can mainly be explained through the emigration toward Ottoman lands. However, scholars do not agree about the number of Muslim emigrants. While Austria-Hungary estimates that 61,114 Muslims left Bosnia during the period 1878-1918, others state 140,000 and 300,000 Muslims fled from the Austro-Hungarian occupation.⁶¹

At a certain stage, Austria-Hungary feared that a huge number of Muslim emigrants could disrupt the demographic balance among the dominant religious groups in favor of the Orthodox element. This could pose a threat to the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans because the Serbs were unhappy with Austria-Hungary ruling Bosnia. Thus, a dominant Serb-Orthodox population would make it even more difficult or even endanger the Monarchy's position in Bosnia. The Monarchy tried already after 1883 to stop migration and to accommodate the Bosniaks as they showed signs of preferring peaceful cooperation. Therefore, Hartmuth claims that: "The Muslims were the Habsburgs' *raison d'être* in Bosnia; and so it was vice-versa."⁶² Imamović cites an Austro-Hungarian general stating that he was under the impression that the Bosniaks were the most polite and reliable part of the Bosnian population.⁶³

There were two reasons why the continuing emigration was no longer in the interest of Austria-Hungary. Continued migration meant a shrinking of the Bosniaks and a rise of the Serbs to form a clear majority who could

claim Bosnia for themselves. Secondly, Austria-Hungary preferred rather to win over the Bosniaks in order to avoid any unfortunate developments which might endanger the stability and influence of Austria-Hungary in the region.⁶⁴ Thus, Austria-Hungary tried in the 1880s to come closer to the Bosniak citizens, particularly the upper class. On 11 October 1883, an order was issued that introduced a mandatory official approval for emigration which made emigration more difficult.⁶⁵

As elaborated, among the first priorities (the territorial inclusion of Bosnia into the monarchy, establishment of a modern administration and expansion of road and rail networks), Austria-Hungary aimed at establishing a loyal elite through engagement in religious and cultural affairs.

Submission of Bosnia to the New Emperor

The reason why a part of the Bosniak society accepted the new Emperor without revolt was the conviction that resistance to Austria-Hungary's strong military would be useless. Furthermore, the upper class feared the loss of its property and privileges and tried to accommodate as soon as possible and as smoothly as possible to the new government. This is why the leading classes of the society proved to be quickly loyal to the Monarchy.⁶⁶ The British Consul Edward Freeman stated that the Bosniaks in the cities were the most intelligent, the wealthiest and most influential citizens and it would be a great tragedy for the country if they were forced to migrate or were exterminated.⁶⁷ However, during the first months of Austria-Hungary's presence in Bosnia, a harsh policy towards the Bosniaks, as well as to all participants in the resistance movement, was applied.

Nonetheless, the initial attempt to come to terms with the new regime and offer loyalty to it arose from some nobles. In November 1878, leading Muslims prepared a letter to be presented to General Filipović expressing loyalty to the Emperor as well as the wish to be a part of Austria-Hungary instead of the Ottoman Empire as long as their religion, property and the territory of Bosnia was protected.⁶⁸ In total 58 individuals from Sarajevo signed this letter, and represented the elite who understood that an alternative to Austria-Hungary would not have been the reestablishment of the Ottoman Empire but an even less acceptable inclusion in a Serb or Montenegrinian state where the Muslims could be exterminated.⁶⁹

On 30 April 1879 the German Consulate sent a report to Berlin stating that among the Muslims there seemed to be a large number, particularly from the upper class, who were reconciled with Austria-Hungary's occupation as their desire for peace and quiet outweighed any other considerations. Accommodation with Austria-Hungary was increasingly possible as

the Bosniaks realized that their lives, properties and religion were not in danger, as was not the case in other parts of the former Ottoman territories where Muslim populations were ethnically cleansed, their property seized, their religious material culture destroyed, and they were forced to convert to Orthodoxy or leave their homelands.⁷⁰

Initial Challenges: Advantageous and Disadvantageous Circumstances for Loyalty

As explained earlier, loyalty grows from relationships between individuals and institutions and therefore requires reciprocity on vertical and horizontal levels. Thus, loyalty is based on bilateral and reciprocal relations and infers obligation, trust, legitimacy, community and identity. In order to ask the Bosniaks to put themselves dutifully into the service of a foreign power, i.e. Austria-Hungary, certain preconditions needed to be fulfilled.⁷¹

Bosnia had never initiated a war nor had the political elite waged a war. However constituting the most western border of the Ottoman Empire which was constantly attempting to expand or defend its territory, Bosnia and its people had not only served in the Ottoman military but also participated in the expansion and defense of Ottoman lands. This experience of Bosnia with its neighbors explains why loyalty at the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian occupation could not proceed as smoothly as perhaps expected.

Previous Attempts to Conquer Bosnia

Since the end of the 17th century, Austrian and Venetian troops had tried to conquer Bosnia from the Ottoman Empire. However, these attempts were unsuccessful and ended up in peace treaties confirming Ottoman sovereignty over Bosnia. In 1697, Prince Eugene of Savoy, one of the most successful military commanders in modern European history, who rose to the highest offices of the Habsburg monarchy, occupied Sarajevo for two weeks and devastated the city. Nonetheless, Ottoman forces regained dominance which was confirmed in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), and in the Treaty of Passarowitz⁷² (1718). Again from 1787 to 1791, another Austrian force overran Bosnian territory, and this attempt ended with the Treaty of Sistova⁷³ (1791) in favor of the Ottoman Empire. The local defense of Bosnia's borders from invading Austro-Hungarian and Venetian forces provides an explanation for the willingness to resist Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878. This resistance was strong and vivid particularly among the ordinary citizens who had served in the Ottoman army.

Edhem Mulabdić, a witness to the events in 1878, describes in his novel *Zeleno Busenje* the atmosphere on the day the Austro-Hungarian forces entered the Bosnian city of Maglaj. The following passage is impressive and psychologically powerful as it describes this historical moment in the lives of the Bosniaks:

The sun had already fallen to the prayer of ‘*asr*, as it had shone from above and baked the sand on the shore. Everyone was exhausted from the heat, and their souls were tired with concern, they walked in the town worried, or sat in front of their houses and peacefully waited for the coming of their unpleasant fate. It was silent as a graveyard. Suddenly, like thunder through the silence a voice – deep and mournful – was heard: ‘There, a German!’ ...and the horror began.⁷⁴

This clearly describes the strong emotions felt by the Bosniaks while they waited for the Austro-Hungarian (German – *Švabo* – and Austro-Hungarian were the same) forces to cross the river Sava, the northern border of Bosnia, during a hot summer day when the people were not only worried about their insecure future, but also tired from their everyday field work.

After the severe resistance from the domestic population (including some deserted Ottoman units) against Austro-Hungarian troops was overcome, active and multi-layered efforts were made to establish the new administration. The first period of Austro-Hungarian occupation is most interesting because it reveals the clashes, reactions and instances of loyalty that surfaced at the very beginning. At this point in time, the differences and divergences are easy to identify.

Regarding the overall population, the first Austrian census in 1879 recorded the religious groupings: 448,613 Muslims (38.73%), 496,485 Orthodox (42.88%) and 209,391 Catholics (18.08%). The census revealed that no group had an absolute majority, and that the smallest of the three, the Catholics, became the coreligionists of the ruling power. Similarly, Bosniaks under Ottoman rule also did not constitute the majority but their position as coreligionists of the ruling power made them strong. While the first Austro-Hungarian census (1879) indicated religious groupings, the second census (1885) additionally categorized the population by profession: 2.06% landowners, 29.75% free peasants, 50% *kmets* (peasants who were bound to the land and landowner through taxes and obligation of service) and 18% other occupations. Thus, 80% of Bosnia’s population dealt with agriculture. The fourth and last census was conducted by Austria-Hungary in 1910 and records numbers as follows: 612,137 Muslims (32.25%), 825,418 Orthodox

(43.49%) and 434,061 Catholics (22.87%). These numbers reveal that from 1879 to 1910, the proportional share of the Catholic population increased by 4.79%, that of the Orthodox population increased by 0.61%, and the share of the Muslims decreased by 6.48%. The increased percentage of Catholics was due to the planned settlement of Catholics in Bosnia while the decreased percentage of Muslims again can be attributed to emigration to remaining Ottoman lands as explained in the previous section.⁷⁵

Promises and Failures within the First Months of Governing Bosnia

The first address of Austria-Hungary towards the citizens of Bosnia, dated 28 July 1878, contained (a) the announcement that military troops were about to cross the borders of Bosnia; (b) the promise that they were coming as friends to end insecure times and install peace and prosperity; (c) the order that each citizen would be treated equally and that his/her life, religion, property and language would be protected; (d) respect of local tradition; (e) the claim that old laws would remain in force until new laws would be issued; (f) the assertion that the income of the country would be exclusively used for the needs of the country; and (g) the imperative in the last sentence that residents should obey the authorities and return to work. In terms of authorization, the proclamation declared that the European states unanimously agreed (*einstimmig beschlossen*) on Austria-Hungary's role as protector. The protocols of the Congress of Berlin however do not confirm this statement.⁷⁶ The proclamation was distributed by Austro-Hungarian soldiers to the citizens in Turkish and Bosnian language.⁷⁷

Initially, the occupation of Bosnia posed political, constitutional and financial problems. It was not clear who precisely should head the administration. Representatives of three ministries (military, external affairs and finance) from both monarchies (Austria and Hungary) were supposed to be involved in Bosnia's administration. The costs, according to the bilateral Convention, should be covered by Bosnia itself. Besides that, the Double Monarchy was not sure whether the new territory should be governed by the Austrian or the Hungarian half, and ultimately a compromise was reached that Bosnia would be administered by the Joint Imperial Finance Ministry. Pinson infers that: "One consequence of this was that the province was subject to the assemblies of both halves of the empire, which slowed implementation of policy."⁷⁸

Taking this and the following circumstances into consideration, Pinson writes of an "unusual nature of governance": the supreme authority was the commander-in-chief of the 15th Army corps who supervised the *civil adlatus* (*aide-de-camp*), a position designed to control the civil administration.⁷⁹

Again, Pinson criticizes the regime saying that the administration in Bosnia was rather an “institutional tinkering” than a “full-fledged all-out effort to bring everything into line with standard *K.u.K.*⁸⁰ practice immediately.”⁸¹

When it comes to the status of citizens, legally the residents of Bosnia were Ottoman citizens. Bearing in mind that the legal sovereignty belonged to the Sultan, nonetheless real power was in the hands of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary enabled double citizenship and introduced an undefined “land belongingness” (*Landesangehörigkeit*) which did not include the same civil or political rights as the citizens of Austria-Hungary.⁸² The first organ of Austro-Hungarian power that was established in Bosnia was the court martial (*Standgericht*). Regarding law, until 1910 when the Bosnian Parliament (*Sabor*) was established, there were several sets of legal sources:⁸³ (1) laws, decisions and orders of the common ministry, the Government (*Zemaljska vlada*) and the court (*Zemaljski Vrhovni sud*); (2) laws issued during the Ottoman period including Shari‘ah law;⁸⁴ (3) family law according to Catholic and Orthodox canonical law as well as Jewish religious law; (4) customary law; and (5) the Austrian civil code from 1811.

Austria-Hungary’s aim was to establish a state under the rule of law which included a bourgeois legal order. From 1878 to 1880, Austria-Hungary did not issue any laws or orders regarding civic rights. In the beginning, it simply took over all Ottoman regulations regarding civil law.⁸⁵ All legislative power belonged to the Kaiser. Each of his orders was understood as obligatory law which had to be followed by any other organ. Therefore, until the introduction of Bosnia’s constitution in 1910, there existed no difference between an order and the law.⁸⁶ As a consequence, until 1910, to be a loyal citizen in terms of obeying the law meant obeying the Kaiser’s orders.

However, while civil and agrarian law used mainly Ottoman legislation, Austria-Hungary issued special laws in the fields of penal law and criminal trial law for Bosnia. On 1 September 1879, the penal law became effective, and on 1 January 1881 the criminal trial law entered into force. Thus, the establishment of an Austro-Hungarian legal system in Bosnia began, and almost daily new legal orders, proclamations and laws were issued to enable the proper functioning of the new administration.⁸⁷

Another specific trait of Bosnia was that the head of the government (*Landesregierung*) was always an Austro-Hungarian military officer, whereas in no other province of the Monarchy could a military commander become head of the government.⁸⁸ Many laws and orders were issued which interfered in all spheres of life and which neglected the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire. Classen therefore states that Austria-Hungary was, from the very beginning, violating the Treaty of Berlin.⁸⁹ Generally, due to the

circumstances of occupation, internal relations, financial and socio-cultural problems, incorporation of Bosnia into the Monarchy was slow and difficult.

In conclusion, from the start of Austro-Hungarian rule, the citizens of Bosnia had to obey a specific legal system which was composed of the old Ottoman and the new Austro-Hungarian law. This specific legal system remained unfinished, like the whole Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia, and it had the character of a provisional arrangement which remained unique and inconsistent towards the societal circumstances.⁹⁰

Austria-Hungary's Policies Towards the Bosniaks After the Establishment of Power

Social and religious antagonisms among the people in Bosnia forced Austria-Hungary to keep a balance, since favoring one of the three dominant groups would endanger the Monarchy's status. Bosnia was at that time exposed to massive nationalist pressure from neighboring states (Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia). Croats, for example, celebrated Austria-Hungary's occupation of Bosnia. They expected a lot from officer Josip Filipović who was not only understood as the chief Austro-Hungarian military commander but also as a representative of the Croatian-Catholic idea.⁹¹ The first reaction of the resident Muslims was deep distrust, hate and helplessness towards the "Germans" (*Švabo*). Imamović recounts that there were elder people who did not want to leave their houses in order to avoid meeting a *Švabo* in the street. Similarly, Mita Živković, a witness of the first years of the occupation, says that Muslims were much more dissatisfied with the occupation than the Orthodox, but since they were used to following blindly, they remained quiet and tolerated it.⁹² Osman Nuri Hadžić, a witness to this period, wrote in the magazine *Behar* under the pseudonym Abdulhak:

Thus came the year 1878 and many were disappointed. European great powers gave Austria-Hungary the mandate to occupy these territories, to install peace and prosperity for all. But the pioneers of the new administration came as liberators for some and as victors for others. Therefore, the Muslims at first glance looked at this event as the end of their freedom and liberty while other non-Muslim peoples perceived it as their rescue and were looking forward to it.⁹³

Generally, the occupation brought the Bosniaks into an inferior position

regarding culture, politics and economics. This inferior position is a reason for the stagnation of the Bosniaks.⁹⁴ After 30 years of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia, 94.65% of the Muslim population was illiterate in a European sense.⁹⁵ Bosniaks knew the Arabic letters to read the Qur'an and even the Bosnian language was still sometimes written in Arabic letters (*arebica*). However, Austria-Hungary used Latin and Cyrillic letters which made the Bosniaks largely illiterate. On the other hand, the order in 1880 to use "Bosnian" names for months (*januar, februar, mart*, etc.) in addition to the existent "Croat" names (*sječan, veljača, ožujak*, etc.) was adopted to show that the Catholic population was not being favored.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, Cyrillic script was not strange to Bosnia as the Bosnian language had been written in Cyrillic letters since medieval times (*bosančica*). Official documents, such as for example death notices were printed in German and Bosnian language including the place to insert information either in Latin or Arabic letters.

Because of local military resistance in the beginning of the occupation, the Austro-Hungarian occupation forces under the leadership of Filipović took a harsh stance towards the Bosniaks. Filipović did not trust the Muslims and favored the Catholic population. In his reports he called the Bosniaks "wild" and an "animal horde," and during his first visit to leading citizens of Sarajevo on 23 August 1878, the priest Trifković noted that he offended the Muslim representatives by accusing them of being "thieves," "cowards" and "wrongdoers."⁹⁷ The British Consul in Sarajevo, Edward Freeman, criticized as well the unnecessarily harsh and disrespectful treatment of citizens, particularly the Muslims.

Bandžović quotes the witness Vladislav Škarić who confirmed that in the first months of the occupation Austrian soldiers invaded Muslim houses and shops and took whatever they wanted.⁹⁸ Austrian soldiers treated their prisoners even worse, keeping them chained and almost without food and water at the Christian-Orthodox cemetery during hot summer days. Among them were children below the age of 10.⁹⁹ This inhumane treatment towards the Muslim population may have induced Andrassy to dismiss Filipović as even he was informed that Filipović aimed at rooting out the Muslims. On the other side, Freeman reports that this crudeness and brutality encouraged continued resistance.¹⁰⁰ Thus, Filipović did not lay fertile ground for loyalty among Bosniaks. Furthermore, mosques were taken away from the Muslims to be used as military storehouses where even religiously *ḥarām* (forbidden and sinful) lard and alcohol were kept.¹⁰¹ Thus, Freeman sees Filipović as the main culprit for the disadvantageous developments in the first period of Austro-Hungarian presence in Bosnia. Taking over from Filipović, Duke Wilhelm von Württemberg displayed very different behavior, adopting a

different policy towards the Muslims. He showed respect, tried to calm the Muslims and to establish trust.¹⁰²

Thus, the instances of violence are associated particularly with the period directly after the occupation, and subsequent developments showed that they did not represent the general policy of Austria-Hungary. Babuna has explained this according to: (1) the historical experiences of Austria-Hungary as a multinational Empire, (2) the internationally unsolved constitutional status of Bosnia, (3) the variety of political organizations within the dual monarchy, (4) the long-term interests of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and (5) the moral obligation of Austria-Hungary to perform a cultural mission in a country which belonged for centuries to an Oriental culture.¹⁰³ Ultimately, when Kállay came to Sarajevo in 1882 as the joint finance minister, he tried instead a unifying approach “to elicit loyalty by attempting to introduce an official Bosnian nationality, to which all the religious groups of the province would belong....”¹⁰⁴

Benjamin von Kállay as a Progressive Force in Bosnia

Benjamin von Kállay was the most important figure of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia. His origins were from Hungary and he was born in 1839. During his studies he specialized in South Slavic affairs, spoke Bosnian language fluently and wrote books on the South Slavs, their history and contemporary affairs. In 1868, Kállay was appointed as Consul General in Belgrade. He stayed there until 1875 and wrote a book entitled “History of the Serbs.” Generally, “Kállay in younger days had nurtured dreams of Serb-Hungarian cooperation for a great Danubian confederation on democratic foundations uniting different but roughly equal nations.”¹⁰⁵ However, the more mature Kállay feared Russian expansionism and perceived the Slavic Orthodox world as an Eastern threat to European civilization.¹⁰⁶

On 4 June 1882 he was appointed Austro-Hungarian Joint Minister of Finance and administrator of Bosnia and he fulfilled this office for a period of 21 years until his death.

The ideology of Kállay’s regime was built upon three elements: (a) the realization of the goals set by Austria-Hungary with the occupation of Bosnia, (b) the historical experience and tradition of the Monarchy, and (c) political and social relations in Bosnia.¹⁰⁷ He wanted to awaken in Bosnia “the spirit of the West.”¹⁰⁸

The method which Kállay adopted was a systematic realization of certain measures and the avoidance of any sort of violence or force.¹⁰⁹ Kállay with his intellectual abilities and a charismatic personality knew that one had to win people’s hearts and minds in order to demand loyalty. Political, cultural

and national affiliation with Austria-Hungary among the residents of Bosnia could not have been achieved by force alone.

He clearly stated that no other Balkan dynasty had as close family relationships to the Habsburgs as the dynasty of Bosnia (*"in unmittelbarem Verwandschaftsverhältnisse"*). Interestingly, Kállay stressed very much the pre-Ottoman history of Bosnia and the continuity of the nobility from medieval up to modern times.¹¹⁰

Thus, Kállay firstly intended to make economic reforms to raise the living standard, then to concentrate on education and finally to turn to political self-government.¹¹¹ During his tenure, most of the roads, railway networks and industrial enterprises were built to enable coal and iron mining industries as well as a modern forestry industry. Thus, various industrial branches were launched (paper and spirits manufacturing, distilling, food-processing, carpet-making and cigarette production). Except forestry, as Okey notes, these were all state enterprises which were managed by immigrant personnel.¹¹² The method of his goals was to keep political and religious pressure under control until the economic transformation in Bosnia established new social and cultural conditions. Therefore, Sugar states:

It was Kállay who made the office of the Joint Minister of Finance practically independent of all checks and controls as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned, and it was he who gave the numerous administrative, social, educational and economic institutions of the province their final form. Kállay, in contrast to his predecessors, knew exactly what he wanted to achieve in Bosnia Herzegovina and never forgot this final aim during his long years in office.¹¹³

Kállay's argument stipulated that "a satisfied population was the best guarantee" to foster Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia.¹¹⁴ However, the ultimate imperial authority, the Finance Ministry in Vienna, was not interested in huge investments, particularly because, in the very beginning, Austro-Hungarian policy was that all the costs for Bosnia were to be covered by domestic income. Since there was no massive influx of state capital, a significant shift from small-scale agriculture to more efficient large-scale units as well as a remarkable advance of agricultural technology to increase the production and provision of cheaper and more rapid means of getting products to markets outside Bosnia could therefore not be realized.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, there were initiatives, such as the railroad from Bosanski Brod to Sarajevo, but the key links from Sarajevo to an Adriatic port or to Istanbul were not built. Additionally, the cost of the administration itself was a further factor which affected economic growth. Sugar compiled statistics

regarding the immense growth of the administration: in 1878 the Ottomans had about 120 officials whereas Austria-Hungary employed 600 civil servants in 1881, which grew to over 7,000 by 1887, and over 9,500 by 1908.¹¹⁶

Regarding the Muslim Bosniak population, Kállay realized that they were conservative and the most stable element in Bosnia. He was sure that they would be the most sincere and loyal in support for Austria-Hungary.¹¹⁷ He indeed wanted to integrate the Bosniaks on an equal level and wondered how it would be possible to combine modern progress with the Muslim way of life.¹¹⁸ Kállay thought that the Bosniak nobles were direct descendants of the medieval Bosnian aristocracy who accepted Islam to retain their predominance in the land. Thus, he was attracted by the independent spirit of the medieval Bosniak aristocratic elite and hoped to utilize the historical Bosniak consciousness in the interests of the Monarchy.¹¹⁹ Actually, he thought that the Bosniaks were the leading class and the core element of the Bosniak nation, representing the indigenous aristocracy and fighting for its existence and preserving Bosnia's independence and integrity.¹²⁰ Thus, he clearly opposed Serb tendencies towards separation and fragmentation of territory.

Furthermore, he hoped that the Muslims would sooner or later return to Christianity.¹²¹ Even though the Catholic population in Bosnia was the most Austrophile part of the society, they were few in numbers and poor, and therefore, Austria-Hungary sought to attract the Bosniaks who were the wealthiest and large in numbers.

A report from the German Consulate in Sarajevo stated on 20 February 1880 that the Bosniaks were averse to the dominantly Croat civil servants who were neither professional nor moral but mainly were interested in personal gain and spreading Croat nationalist ideology.¹²² Nonetheless, Kállay had to ensure that the Bosnian Catholics would not, like the Serbs, adopt the national ideology of their co-religionists in neighboring states. This caused a series of conflicting pressures which could only be controlled by a strong government in Bosnia.

In a secret agreement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia signed in June 1882, Serbia made a pledge not to allow any political, religious or any other propaganda against the Monarchy to emanate from its territory, including to Bosnia and Sandžak.¹²³ From that point, Kállay focused on a principle which had already been applied by the Ottomans: religious tolerance and respect of equality to strengthen the feeling of a Bosnian uniqueness and Bosniak nationality (*Bošnjaštvo*) among citizens as well as Bosnia's statehood. Kállay argued for this idea of Bosniak uniqueness via claims about the historical continuity of Bosnia as a state. He was convinced that

only the Monarchy could provide the necessary framework for the continuation of the Bosniak idea given the claims of Serbia and Montenegro. To put it clearly, Bosnia and the Bosniak nation could only survive under the leadership of Austria-Hungary.¹²⁴

However, Kállay allowed the establishment of the Serb magazine *Prosvjeta* in 1902 and accepted the term "Serbian" in order to attract the leading Serb bourgeoisie for his means.¹²⁵ Nonetheless, the Serb national movement in Bosnia became strong and influential and was most developed which culminated in 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie by Gavrilo Princip.

The "Cultural Mission" Applied within the Education System

When it came to the creation of an educational and cultural infrastructure according to European standards, the general Muslim population in Bosnia wanted to preserve all Islamic institutions. Thus, Austria-Hungary pursued three options:

- (1) leaving these institutions in place, even though they correspond little to Austrian practice, and so providing minimal provocations for local Muslims;
- (2) eliminating them quickly and totally and replacing them as completely as possible with standard Austrian institutions, a procedure that would have been bound to produce maximum antipathy and possibly even resistance;
- or (3) leaving them in place and trying gradually to phase out some and modify others to bring them into conformity with standard Habsburg administrative practice.¹²⁶

The Austro-Hungarian administration preferred the third option. Thus, *waqfs* (endowments)¹²⁷ and educational institutions were allowed to continue functioning. A Bosnian Islamic hierarchy and religious leadership (Islamic Community) was to be established by Austria-Hungary. However, since these new institutions were established by Austria-Hungary, and not by the previous religious leadership in Istanbul, their legitimacy was questioned.

Kállay pursued this dual approach and kept certain traditional schools but also introduced new primary as well as secondary schools. The traditional *mekteb*, *medresa* and secular school *rushdiyya* continued to work. However, *mektebs* were reformed into Muslim primary schools (*mekteb-i ibtidai*). The newly opened modern educational centers were based on a combination of Islamic and European curricula. Thus, domestic higher education in Bosnia was fostered, such as the Shari'ah Judge School

(*Šerijatksa sudačka škola* or *Mekteb-i nuvvab*) which was founded in 1887. The aim was to educate judges (*kadis*) and Muslim civil servants who were taught Islamic Law (Shari‘ah) and European (Austrian) Law. Hence, Muslim students were given the opportunity to combine Islamic with European knowledge. This school was highly recognized and completely financed by the *Landesregierung* (Government). Karčić cites prominent Islamic scholars of that time who claimed that this school was one of the best Shari‘ah schools.¹²⁸ Further modern schools, such as industrial, technical, commercial, teachers’ high schools, *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* were opened. Interestingly, in these schools Muslims had Islamic religious classes, and in gymnasiums they had the choice to study Arabic instead of Greek.

Ultimately, the graduates of those schools were products of the Austro-Hungarian modernization project.¹²⁹ The schools aimed at providing general knowledge to a ‘backward’ society and train pupils for a specific role in society. They had to produce a new middle class with a higher level of specialization where social mobility would be enabled via personal performance rather than hereditary status.

Furthermore, there were new Christian schools with their own textbooks used by Catholics and Orthodox. For the Muslim girls particularly, it was a challenge to attend the new schools as there was the fear that these new schools (*Švapske škole*), pejoratively German schools, might influence the girls negatively, i.e. estrange them from their Islamic identity.¹³⁰ Until this point, Muslim girls had attended the traditional *mektebs* only. Nonetheless, the first female Muslim schools (*Muhammedanska ženska škola*) were opened in the 1890s which meant another step towards modernization.¹³¹ In 1903/1904 the first generation finished their degrees and became the first female Muslim teachers in schools which were opened by Austria-Hungary. However, by the end of the Austro-Hungarian rule, Muslim women still remained largely illiterate.

The changes in the education system meant radical changes for the Bosniak community. The most important consequence was a split among the Muslim educated class. On the one side were graduates from the traditional Islamic institutions and on the other side were graduates from Austro-Hungarian schools. In the middle position were graduates of modernized Muslim institutions which caused a conflicting competitiveness between Islamic scholars and the new intelligentsia. While the *medresa* graduates continued their studies at universities in Istanbul or Cairo, graduates from the new modern schools proceeded with their studies in Central Europe.

Similarly, the Austro-Hungarian intervention in the education system of Bosnia led to a change in language and script. While Turkish was the language of the Ottoman administration, Arabic was the language of Islamic knowledge and education, Persian was used for poetry and Bosnian for everyday communication. Bosnian language was even written in Arabic letters which is known as *Aljamiado* in literature. Austria-Hungary established Bosnian as the official language which was written either in Latin or Cyrillic. The change in script made the majority of Bosniaks illiterate and caused conflicting reactions towards the modernization process of Bosnia. The change in language and script was visible in the 15 Bosniak journals and newspapers which were published during Austro-Hungarian rule. Initially there were some newspapers in Turkish language and some still used Arabic letters for Bosnian language, but slowly they adapted to the changes and switched to Bosnian language written in Latin script.¹³² Furthermore, in 1880 the Cyrillic alphabet received equal status with the Latin alphabet and was increasingly used in official publications.¹³³ A serious change came in 1907, when the Government ruled that the official language in Bosnia would be called Serbo-Croatian instead of Bosnian. This was the official suspension of the Bosnian language which implied giving up the idea of a collective Bosniak identity and allowing nationalist aspirations to take their course.

Conclusion

During his tenure of 21 years, Kállay pursued a broad modernization project in Bosnia. His intellectual project aimed at linking Bosnia to Austria-Hungary and separating it from its Balkan neighbors. He initiated economic development by improving transportation, expanding the exploitation of natural resources and encouraging industrial development. However, his goal to transform agricultural workers into industrial workers and subsistence agriculture into industrial agriculture could not be realized. That said, new agricultural schools taught new methods of farming as well as increased exploitation of forests and minerals. On the other hand, in the field of trade the reforms were quite successful. Due to improved infrastructure, transport was facilitated and the exchange of agricultural products between Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the rest of Central Europe intensified. Furthermore, developments in science and technology, higher levels of specialization and new enterprises led to a new class of entrepreneurs where personal performance was much more important than hereditary status. Changes within the administration and politics, the rationalization of power,

bureaucracy, a new political culture within the concept of Central Europe and nationalism affected the mentalities of people in Bosnia.

Thus, social mobility, new forms of communication, new modern schools, higher education, and new rules of social ethics changed the lives of the Bosniaks. All these innovations were introduced by Austria-Hungary under the leadership of Kállay in order to spread a Central European understanding of modernization. But Kállay's vision did not remain in schools only; it included the establishment of museums and journals. The continuing spread of the press, such as the journals *Bošnjak* and *Behar*, the increasing number of coffee houses (*kiraethane*), and later the establishment of the first Bosniak political parties caused an intellectual revival and improved social as well as political life.

*Look around, brothers,
and see where we live
and in what time we live.
Then we will know
that we are in the 19th century,
in the heart of Europe.*

Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, 1893

5

BOSNIAK INTELLECTUALS AS MEDIATORS TO SPREAD LOYAL EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

This chapter elaborates on the influential role which Bosniak intellectuals, including religious and secular scholars, played. It shows that education, the establishment of reading clubs (*kiraethane*), newspapers and journals as well as political parties ultimately paved the way for the Bosniaks to affirm themselves as loyal citizens who adapted to European political culture.

Reis ul-Ulemas and Other Religious Scholars Asserting Bosniaks' Religious Identity and Life Under Non-Muslim Rule

Austria-Hungary established a Bosnian Islamic hierarchy which was a completely new institution aimed at separating as much as possible the Bosniaks from their previous religious centre in Istanbul, the Shaykh al-Islam and the Sultan.¹ However the Porte was not willing to give up the jurisdiction over the Bosniaks and saw the Istanbul Convention as a means to still exert influence over the Bosniaks and religious matters in Bosnia. There exist many letters and evidence of diplomatic pressure in this regard, particularly in relation to the appointment of the Reis ul-Ulema and other religious officials.²

The establishment of the Islamic Community (*Islamska zajednica*) was not an easy endeavor. A document dated 18 October 1881 shows that respected Muslims from Sarajevo headed by the Mufti of Sarajevo Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović³ sent a request to the Austro-Hungarian authorities asking for a religious leader with the title Reis ul-Ulema.⁴ The argumentation was that the Muslims needed a spiritual leadership like the other religious communities in Bosnia. They suggested that next to the Reis ul-Ulema, a council (*majlis*) would be needed to make decisions in religious matters,

appoint religious functionaries and evaluate them. After several diplomatic interventions, on 22 March 1882 the Mufti of Sarajevo Hadžimerović was appointed by the Shaykh al-Islam as the Mufti of Bosnia which was something new. Until then muftis were appointed for cities only, as it is common until today. Thus, Hadžimerović was authorized to appoint religious scholars, Shari'ah judges and to hold lectures in the Gazi Husrev-beg medresa. This approval by Istanbul could be interpreted as an initial move or even tacit approval to the establishment of an Islamic Community in Bosnia.⁵

Eventually, the first Reis ul-Ulema Mustafa Hilmi Hadžimerović was nominated on 17 October 1882 through a Decree issued by the Kaiser. This title, Reis ul-Ulema, is used only and until today in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new organizational structure of the Islamic Community was headed by the grand mufti (Reis ul-Ulema) and a four-man council of religious scholars (*majlis al-ulema*). The structure leaned on the religious hierarchy established in the Ottoman Empire: ritual scholars (*imam, khatib*); educational scholars (*muderris*), legal scholars (*kadi*). All of them were appointed by decree and there were ranks within all categories.

Like Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, Hadžimerović was among those Bosniaks, mostly from the upper classes, who had already in 1878 signed a declaration in which the occupation by Austria-Hungary was appreciated and linked with the suggestion to establish a Muslim leadership independent of Istanbul. He belonged in addition to a delegation of all four religious representatives who had visited general Filipović on 21 August 1878 to approve Austria-Hungary's rule in Bosnia.⁶ Eventually, the Shaykh al-Islam agreed to his nomination by Austria-Hungary and appointed him as the head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hadžimerović eventually retired in 1893 due to age and illness, and the *Landesregierung* in its concluding report to Vienna pointed to Hadžimerović's loyal attitude and special allegiance (*loyale Haltung und seine besondere Anhänglichkeit*).⁷ Hadžimerović also played an important role in persuading the Bosniaks not to leave their home country and to serve Austria-Hungary:

Mustafa Hilmi Effendi Hadžimerović, the Mufti from Sarajevo, who was appointed by the Porte, is a very devoted and reliable person to Your Majesty, and has [...] issued a fatwa on our request according to which the Muslims have been asked to submit to the Conscription law. Thus, I think that the appointment of this loyal person through the Porte is a very opportune circumstance that can be used perfectly by Your Majesty to appoint him [...] as Reis ul-Ulema.⁸

However, because the Islamic community had been established by Austria-Hungary and not by the previous influential religious leadership in Istanbul, its legitimacy was questioned.

A severe crisis in the otherwise improving relations with the Porte developed in 1885. This crisis represents an interesting piece of cultural history. Hadžiomerović received a personal letter from the Shaykh al-Islam in which he was advised to send him the seals of the Shari'ah judges to confirm the documents they were disseminating. Hadžiomerović was not sure how to respond and asked for advice from the government who intervened sharply. For the Austro-Hungarian administration, the letter's request meant nothing else but an attempt to regain control of the decisions of the Shari'ah courts. They realized that this request followed the pattern of former times when each *kadi* had to send a "reprint" of his seal ring to Istanbul, so that documents could be compared with the deposited copy and thereby formally acknowledged. The Austro-Hungarians feared a blow to their efforts in the country by establishing a "second instance" (judicial authority) in major juridical issues in Istanbul. The issue was that such a seemingly "non-harmful" step could influence many juridical procedures in administering the country and went far beyond the contact with "spiritual chiefs" foreseen in the Convention of 1879. *Landeschef* Appel decided that no response whatsoever was to be given in order to avoid any further discussion on the issue.⁹ This affair, however, is crucial background for the opening of a Faculty of Islamic Law in Sarajevo (*Šerijatksa sudačka škola*) only two years later, as the first of its kind in Central Europe. The institution became the nucleus of today's Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. The aim was to gradually educate religious scholars in Bosnia and to reduce the size of students who received their Islamic higher education in Istanbul as well as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the architecture of that building was remarkable designed in Moorish style,¹⁰ other similarly designed buildings would follow built during the Austro-Hungarian period.

Another leading Bosniak religious scholar was Mehmed Teufik Azabagić. Having obtained a University degree in Istanbul he was appointed on his return as director of a high school in Sarajevo and later in Tuzla. At the same time he also acted as Shari'ah judge (*kadi*) and was chosen as the mufti of Tuzla.

Succeeding the retired Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović in 1893, he became the second Reis ul-Ulema, head of the Islamic Community. Azabagić played a key role in averting Bosniaks from leaving Bosnia, convincing them of the feasibility of living as Muslims under non-Muslim rule so long as they were not forced to abandon their religion and could perform their religious

duties. This shows that Austria-Hungary appreciated his and any reformist perspective as the Monarchy was very much interested in separating Bosnian Muslims from their spiritual centre in Istanbul.

Landeschef Appel reported to Vienna the reasons for this appointment: Azabagić, Mufti of Tuzla since 1883, was already in 1879 among those who had publicly declared himself – as a *muderris*, a professor – in favor of the incorporation to Austria-Hungary. He was decorated with the Golden *Verdienstkreuz* (cross of the order of merit) and, by 1886, with the order of the Iron Crown. A year later, in 1887, he became director of the new Islamic Juridical Faculty (*Scheriatsrichterschule*) which was founded by the Austrians. Later he was appointed as president of the Vakuf Commission. Appel mentioned that Azabagić had received a “recommendation” for his texts against emigration, and praised him as one of the most educated and enlightened religious scholars (*ulema*) in the country. He praised his devotion to duty and his capabilities (*Pflichteifer und seine Leistungsfähigkeit*), his brilliant intelligence (*glänzende geistige Begabung*), and pronounced that he was at the same time imbued with the deepest loyalty (*von der tiefsten Loyalität durchdrungen*). Appel also reported on Ibrahim-beg Bašagić stating that he came from a very well respected family from Nevesnje, and used to be the former *kaymekam* (governor of a sub-province) and a member of the Ottoman Parliament. He had received medals like Azabagić. Appel praised his extraordinary characteristics and sincere as well as intense loyalty (*hervorragende Eigenschaften und aufrichtige tiefste Loyalität*), and his exemplary integrity (*musterhafte Redlichkeit*). He remained in his post until 1901.

Muderris Hafiz Sulejman ef. Šarac was suggested as director of the *Scheriatsschule* (Shari‘ah School). He was known as a liberal and enlightened religious scholar and full of loyalty. It is interesting that Šarac turned out later to be one of the supporters of the fight for *vakuf* autonomy. Nevertheless he became the successor of Azabagić as Reis ul-Ulema in 1910.¹¹

The last Reis ul-Ulema during the Austro-Hungarian period was Mehmed Džemaludin ef. Čaušević (1870-1938) from Arapuša close to Bosanska Krupa in northwest Bosnia. He was appointed in March 1914 on the very eve of World War I and remained in the position of Reis ul-Ulema until 1930. Čaušević has been one of the most influential reformers in Islamic thought of 20th century Bosnia.

Mehmed-beg Kapetanović's Efforts to Affirm the Bosniaks as European Muslims

In the first years of Austria-Hungary's presence in Bosnia, a leading figure among the Bosniaks was Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak (1839-1902;

Mayor of Sarajevo 1876-1878 and 1893-1898). He was born to a wealthy family of Bosnian nobles (*beg* or *beys*) in Ljubuški (Western Herzegovina). This is why, in addition to his name Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, the name of his hometown Ljubuški was added. He completed his education in a *mekteb* in Mostar and came back to Ljubuški to listen to the teachings of a popular imam Mustafa ef. Krehić. He spoke Ottoman, Arabic and Persian. Next to his good knowledge of religion and languages, at the early age of 22 he performed various high functions and ranks (*kaymekam*, *kapıcıbası*) in Bosnia within the Ottoman administration as well as its military.

What makes Kapetanović interesting and different to other influential and lettered Bosniaks were his extensive travels across Europe. In the 1870s he had travelled around Western Europe (Trieste, Venice, Padua, Verona, Tyrol, Salzburg, Vienna and Budapest). He continued his travels in the Mediterranean (Corfu, Egypt, Izmir and Istanbul) and finished with Rumelia (Varna, Ruse, Bucharest). Along the rivers Danube and Sava Kapetanović returned to Bosnia.¹² There is no clear evidence as to what he exactly did on his travels, but his future political views were obviously influenced by these extensive journeys.

When in spring 1875 the great Herzegovinian uprising took place, Kapetanović realized that the Ottoman Empire was too weak to find a long-lasting solution to the existing socio-political problems. He left Herzegovina in 1876 and moved to Sarajevo where he married the daughter of the influential Mustaj Paša Babić. There he was soon appointed Mayor of Sarajevo. Ambitious by nature and due to his social position, he was quickly named a delegate in the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul in 1877.

For Kapetanović it was soon clear that only Austria-Hungary could bring peace and stability to Bosnia which is why he maintained close contact with Austro-Hungarian representatives who trusted him and appointed him as governmental counsellor in 1879.¹³ According to an appraisal by the *Landeschef* Appel in 1891, he was known for his sympathies with Austria-Hungary even before the occupation. Furthermore, he was among the first Bosniaks to join Austro-Hungarian services. Soon he became a promoter of a positive and calm attitude towards the new situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He travelled around Bosnia and Herzegovina and advised the citizens not to leave the country. Thus, intellectually there was no stronger personality who was clearly committed to accommodate the new situation and to break the stereotypes against the Bosniaks. This is why he is still today called a "cultural reformer." He perceived the new Emperor as a new reality in Bosnia where the Bosniaks had to find a way to get along with each other.

If the Bosniaks wanted to stay in Bosnia and represent a constitutive, rather than a peripheral factor, they had to reveal the advantages brought by the new Empire without giving up their religious identity.¹⁴

With these views Kapetanović soon became a political leader of his community and a pillar of Austro-Hungarian rule. On his visit to Vienna as part of a Bosnian delegation on 16 April 1879, he received the medal of the Iron Crown 3rd rank as one of those Bosniaks who deserved decoration for ministries in office or in the public sphere. In a contribution to the Vienna newspaper *Die Presse* (The Press) on 5 June 1879, he stressed the benefits of the new rule in Bosnia and demonstrated distance towards the Porte.¹⁵ Consequently, on 11 August 1879 he was appointed *Regierungsrat* (Councilor) and a few days later he even received the title *Graf* (Count).

In his presentation to the Kaiser on the 30th of July in Römerbad (today's Slovenia), Minister of Finance – and thereby governor of Bosnia – Leopold Friedrich von Hoffmann discussed this appointment with a number of far reaching strategic considerations by the *Landeschef* Wilhelm von Württemberg. According to him, the future duties of Kapetanović would be 1) to take part in drafting new laws and regulations, and bringing them into line with the “former norms and especially with the prescriptions of the Muslim population”; 2) to influence the Muslim population in special missions; 3) to inform the Austro-Hungarian administration about former institutions and regulations; and 4) to observe the mood among the Muslim population. Notably, in early 1881, Chief of the government, Duke Württemberg, even sought to nominate Kapetanović to the *Ritterstand* (the order of knights), likely making him the first Muslim to be incorporated into the Central-European nobility.¹⁶

A major test of Kapetanović's abilities was the uprising in Herzegovina in 1881/82. The strategy of Serbian leaders was to advocate for a Serbian-Muslim brotherhood against the “foreigners” (Austrians). Kapetanović had to counteract this campaign. Even though Austro-Hungarian local officials did not follow all of his advice (like the suggestion to form local Muslim *Pandur* militia-units as armed frontier security guards, citing the Latin slogan: *si vis pacem para bellum*, if you want peace, prepare for war), his expedition to the local Bosniak communities in eastern Herzegovina (Mostar, Nevesinje) during the crisis doubtlessly contributed to the collapse of the Montenegrinian/Serbian strategy.¹⁷ His reports from this mission give a detailed account of the situation in eastern Herzegovina at the time, where local communities were often divided about how to react. Many were unsure whether a Christian authority could be acceptable for them at all. Kapetanović registered a lot of insecurity for which he blamed not only the

“enemy” (local Serbs or “Greeks”), but also newspapers from Montenegro and Istanbul, and even the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna. Whereas some of the Herzegovinian Muslims were obviously agitated enough to join the Serbian movement on the grounds of “localist” emotions, while others wanted to emigrate, Kapetanović was more aware and warned them about Serbian national aspirations and goals: “In talks I said frankly that they should stay true to the government, as it is determined by fate, that the only salvation for Muslims in Bosnia is in the power of Austria.”¹⁸ In his reports he also pointed out that even though there were a lot of rumors, the number of those who really wanted to emigrate was comparably little. Energetically he demanded more participation of Bosniak and Muslim leaders, and to integrate them into the new administrative structures. On the other hand he gave valuable recommendations and hints to the Austro-Hungarian administration for calming the Muslim population with symbolic gestures, like renovating mosques, and on whom to rely; these were instantly approved by the *Landeschef* Dahlen.¹⁹ A few months later, when Kállay entered office (June 1882), Kapetanović had already proven himself to be a loyal, valuable and reliable figure who influenced the pro-Bosniak policies of the following years. *Landeschef* Appel recommended to Kállay a number of Bosniaks in 1892 who should be rewarded, full of praise for their “Extraordinarily fruitful engagement in the interest of the public well-being and their proven loyal attitude.”²⁰ Kapetanović was mentioned at the first place and acknowledged in a several page long commendation for his long-term contribution to politics, literature and as a member of the *Vakuf* Commission. This was seen as an expression of his “*loyale[n] Gesinnungen und seine[r] Treue*” [loyal attitude and faithfulness].²¹ For all these merits, Kapetanović received the Franz Joseph medal *Comthur-Kreuz des Franz-Josef Ordens*.²² His appointment as mayor of Sarajevo in 1893 – despite not having received the most votes as the Muslim member of the City Council – and then member of the *Vakuf* Commission is therefore not surprising.²³ However, when Kapetanović was supposed to receive an Ottoman medal in 1899, he rejected it, complaining that he was a pawn of an intrigue only.²⁴

Kapetanović worked not for his own personal benefits, but promoted the interests, images and positive perceptions of his community in the new political framework. Even though he dressed “à la Franca” meaning European clothes, as Renner pointed out, he was a collector of traditional Bosnian folk poems, stories and wisdoms.²⁵ He insisted also on donating copies of his work *Narodno blago* to the Kaiser’s personal library.²⁶ The Joint Minister of Finance supported this wish, underlining “his loyal leanings.” The *Landesregierung* sponsored the publication and to “spread the popularity of

the valuable work” 500 copies of the second volume of *Istočno Blago* were bought and distributed as gifts.²⁷ Like the National Museum of Bosnia (founded in 1888), *Narodno blago* sought to define and reaffirm a set of more “ethnic” rather than only “religious” expressions and symbols of identity, by demonstrating the uniqueness and richness of Bosnian folk culture. As a result, the perception of the Muslim *millet* was transformed and reinterpreted, to appear henceforth as a *Kulturnation* [cultural nation] of its own: the Bosniaks.

In fact, his own measures to adapt to the new situation were, next to the magazine *Bošnjak*, especially two highly significant brochures *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni* (1886) [What Muslims Think in Bosnia] and *Budućnost ili Napredak Muhamedovaca u Bosni i Hercegovini* [The Future or Progress of Muslims in Bosnia] (1893).²⁸ His booklets reflect the political and intellectual pragmatism which he as a leading political figure followed. Kapetanović wrote them in Latin letters, a sign of familiarity with European letters and an indicator of accepting norms set by the new system. Furthermore, he defended the idea of the Westernization of Bosniaks and their right to constitute a proper nation in the face of Croat and Serb nationalism.

The first booklet *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni*, is a direct response to the polemics initiated by anti-Muslim and anti-Bosniak orientalisks. One of the anti-Muslim pamphlets was issued anonymously in Leipzig in 1886 in German language entitled *Die Gegenwart und nächste Zukunft in Bosnien* [The Present and Near Future in Bosnia] which partially appeared later in the journal *Obzor* (Volume 12-14, 1886), translated in Bosnian language with the title *Sadašnjost i najbliža budućnost Bosne* [The Present and Near Future of Bosnia]. There, Bosniaks are accused of being a conservative, lazy and a disturbing element who would never accept Austria-Hungary as the new political and cultural system.²⁹ Kapetanović responded clearly that the Bosniaks might not be “civilized according to the new system,” but the Bosniaks are profound, loyal, correct, and the religion of Islam requires them to be honest and sincere and to follow the laws of the country which gives a Bosniak his rights.³⁰ Indeed, as to Kállay’s argument, Bosniaks are an old conservative element, nonetheless Austria-Hungary could rely on them.³¹ In this text it became clear that the Bosniaks were fully aware that Ottoman rule would not be reinstalled in Bosnia.³²

Kapetanović argued that the Bosniaks would serve the Kaiser the same way they had served the Sultan because the Kaiser had provided the most important preconditions which were (1) equality, (2) governmental neutral stance towards all religions, (3) equality of all religions, (4) citizen’s rights that would not be reduced due to religion, (5) the same manner of protec-

tion of each citizen by the state.³³ All elements were therefore fulfilled to allow Bosniaks to continue to live as Bosniaks, and as practicing Muslims.

In the booklet *Budućnost ili Napredak Muhamedovaca u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Kapetanović clearly stresses that Bosniaks would be loyal to the government since Austria-Hungary did not pursue systematic extermination of Muslims as had happened in Montenegro and Serbia:

As soon as the Austro-Hungary's forces crossed the river Sava, as soon as they entered our home country, they could have chased us out of our country as happened at the same time to our brothers in Nikšić and in many places in the Serb kingdom. Thank God Austria-Hungary did not behave like this, nor will it ever as long as we remain faithful and loyal. Austria-Hungary behaved like this as a cultural and powerful country. Before crossing the Sava river, Austria-Hungary guaranteed equality in a proclamation, gave us religious freedom and full civil rights which all citizens of all faiths fully enjoy.³⁴

Kapetanović even took the stance that Bosniaks should not be passive, but rather active participants in the new power structure. He was against national lethargy and fatalism, but in favor of full activism, crystallizing new chances and perspectives for the Bosniaks within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The reasons for this Kapetanović perceived in the guarantees set by Austria-Hungary in the fields of religion, culture and citizenship. As Austria-Hungary gave to several Bosniak institutions³⁵ high levels of autonomy, Bosniaks were allowed, supported and not hindered from prospering in the fields of culture, religion, education, and economy:

We, Muslims from Bosnia, if we will work and try hard as our times require from us, if we learn and accept everything as long as it does not oppose our faith, then without a doubt our future is going to be better and more secure.³⁶

He referred to the benefits of Austro-Hungarian rule, for instance Bosniaks did not have to send their children to school abroad because Austria-Hungary had provided elementary as well as higher education at home. This goes along with his standpoint concerning migration. Kapetanović was clearly against emigration and saw it as a betrayal of the Bosniak ancestors who had cultivated the land, defended it against enemies and endured troublesome centuries. Therefore, in his view those emigrating did not really love their home country, and he saw no reason for any emigration since Austria-Hungary had offered protection of religious freedom.³⁷ Throughout his texts Kapetanović supports his views with reference to quotes from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and stresses again and again the

importance of education, arguing that everything was acceptable so long as it was not forbidden in Islam.³⁸ Kapetanović was also involved in religious issues. He participated in the election of a new head of the Islamic community in 1881 and was nominated a member of the Vakuf Commission in 1883.

He claimed that the Bosniaks owed respect and loyalty to the ruler who cares for freedom of faith, safety and justice: "Religion does not prevent anyone from being truthful and serious. A pious person must be a friend with heart and soul to any government that allows them to practice their religious rights."³⁹ He emphasized the congruity between the progressive spirit of Islam and the modernization reforms of Austria-Hungary. Then he stressed universal values which are common to Islamic civilization and to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as diligence, responsibility, respect, seeking knowledge, professionalism, determination, agility, and shared lives with other religious communities. Kapetanović criticized conservative and traditional positions (often nostalgic for the Ottoman Empire): "You should not cling to old times, which were once precious, but instead, you should adapt to the new challenges of the present."⁴⁰

Not surprisingly, Kapetanović displays much praise for Bosniak soldiers he was visiting in Vienna, who had achieved high positions in the Austro-Hungarian army.⁴¹ Furthermore, he not only called for unity among the Bosniaks (*Viribus unitis*), but also for a peaceful and prosperous coexistence with other peoples living in Bosnia:

We have a holy responsibility towards our fellow citizens and our neighbors the Orthodox and Catholics, to behave kindly and constantly. There is nobody who is more important than the neighbor. We have lived together for many centuries and the better we live together, the better it is for all of us.⁴²

This was appreciated by the Orthodox priest Sava Kosanović (1887). Generally, Kapetanović was not a lone voice, others shared his views. Thus, a new generation of Bosniak writers next to Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, such as Edhem Mulabdić, Ibrahim-beg Bašagić and Mehmed Hulusija, worked on the adaptation of the Bosniaks to the new societal and political circumstances.⁴³ In 1898, Kapetanović had a stroke, and resigned from his post. He died in 1902. His newspaper *Bošnjak* stressed in its farewell eulogy that it was Kapetanović who had worked for the Bosniak cause.⁴⁴

In conclusion, there is no doubt that Kapetanović together with others contributed to the cultural transition period of the Bosniaks.⁴⁵ In order to spread literacy and knowledge among the citizens of Bosnia, Kapetanović founded together with intellectuals, such as Bašagić a reading room

(*kiraethane*) in Sarajevo. These reading rooms were places where the newly founded newspapers and journals were read and where current politics was discussed. Eventually, they turned out to be the places where the first political parties were founded. Before turning to these political parties, the relevance of the journals *Bošnjak* and *Behar* will be discussed.

The Journals *Bošnjak* and *Behar* as Instruments Expressing European Loyalty and Islamic Identity

Bošnjak [The Bosniak]

After the Bosniaks succeeded in establishing a reading room (*kiraethane*) which was understood as a Bosniak cultural organization, they attempted to launch a Bosniak cultural and political weekly journal. This journal, entitled *Bošnjak* [The Bosniak] (1891-1910), was initiated by Mehmed-beg Kapetanović and his colleagues, and Kapetanović became its editor. In his appeal to Kállay as head of the Government to allow publication of the paper, Kapetanović explained that the Serb and Croat press sought to attract the Bosniaks while his paper aimed to protect feelings towards the Bosnian fatherland.⁴⁶ Appel summarized the journal's place in the contemporary media sphere:

[The] intelligent Muslims here think that the Turkish language and alphabet appearing in '*Vatan*' [another journal] will anyway reach only a small part of the Muslims, because larger segments of the Muslim portion of the population do not know this language and alphabet.⁴⁷

For this reason, there was need of the new journal in the local language. In the same document Appel expresses that "the Slavic publications cannot be taken into consideration when it comes to articulating the interests of the Muslim element." He goes on that the Muslims had reason to fear that the sharply marked national positions in the Croatian and Serbian press "would in most cases also reach the religious level." The envisaged journal would therefore be produced in a "patriotic, meaning a Bosnian sense," explaining why the name *Bošnjak* was chosen. Appel continues that "Kapetanović himself would guarantee a correct and loyal leaning in respect to our administration and our idea of state."⁴⁸ Thus the first issue of *Bošnjak* was released on 2 July 1891. The subtitle of the journal *List za politku, pouku i zabavu* [Paper for politics, knowledge and entertainment] reveals to a certain extent the objectives of the magazine: to inform readers about politics, to educate and to entertain them. This included civil education, destroying

stereotypes about Muslims, and bringing news from all over the world to the readers in Bosnia.⁴⁹

The Serb and Croat press heavily attacked the idea of the the journal *Bošnjak*, particularly the Serb magazine *Bosanska Vila* [Bosnian Fairy] and Croat *Obzor* [Horizon] as they did not want to accept a separate Bosniak identity to continue to exist, their language to remain Bosnian or for them to combine their religious identity with a European one. The first issue made it clear that it was a Muslim publication, but also one that would defend and propagate the integral Bosniak national idea as it was pursued by Benjamin Kállay.⁵⁰ A text from *Bošnjak*, dated 23 July 1891, from the cover page entitled “We respect the other but we are proud of ours” (*Svačije poštujemo a svojim se dičimo*) describes the Bosniaks’ attitude to respecting different peoples and habits, while maintaining pride in characteristics belonging to Bosniaks. Interestingly, *Bošnjak* reported on the ongoing anti-Semitism in other parts of Europe at that time, harshly criticizing the pogroms. The journal characterized these acts as barbarism and clearly stood in solidarity with the Jewish community.⁵¹

From the outset, the journal tried to be a general patriotic paper in which all citizens of Bosnia were addressed and included. Nevertheless, as the nationalist propaganda grew successfully, it became a journal for Bosniaks only. However, it often stressed that the leading role of a society should be held by the aristocratic class. The paper had a clearly loyal stance towards Austria-Hungary, supporting Kállay’s policies in Bosnia, and called for the adoption of European culture and way of life.⁵² For example, in volume 22, on 22 February 1892, Kállay was praised for having secured the land, introducing rule of law and building roads, railways, factories and ships under the Bosnian flag.

At the same time the influential intellectual Safvet-beg Bašagić, who would complete his doctoral thesis at the University in Vienna in 1910, started to write articles about the history of Bosnia.⁵³ There were regular “debates” with the Serbian and also the Croatian press, and “letters to the editor” which were used to explain political positions. In addition to the paper’s attention to national aspects, another agenda was to educate women and men as well as students. When Kapetanović was elected Mayor of Sarajevo in 1893, Kállay ordered *civil adlatus* Kutschera that Kapetanović (at least formally) resign from his position as editor, because the paper should be apolitical. In Kutschera’s response it was clear that Kapetanović would continue to run the paper. According to the report, it was first thought to give his post to Ibrahim-beg Bašagić, father of Safvet-beg Bašagić. But Bašagić felt offended (*verschnupft*) as Azabagić, and not him had become president

of the *Vakuf* Commission earlier that year. Therefore, Jusuf-beg Filipović appeared as publisher till his death in 1906 when his son took over that function. Bašagić senior got this desired post after Azabagić was appointed Reis ul-Ulema in October that year.⁵⁴ These maneuvers reveal how closely under the given circumstances the Austrian policy was coordinated with a (small) group of Bosniaks from the magazine itself. A patriotism for Bosnia (*Landespatriotismus*) was worked out which was not directed against the Empire, but still claimed Bosnia clearly as the home of the Bosniak people. It is interesting that after the election of Kapetanović as Mayor, the national importance of Sarajevo was elaborated. In the *Bošnjak*, Sarajevo was conceptualized as the capital of the Bosniaks. Additionally, the newly founded National Museum (*Landesmuseum, Zemaljski muzej*) in Sarajevo presented Bosnia's national history and culture:

Here is our best school teaching about the lives of our peoples, a school for learning about our home country's past – this is our good and bountifully-arranged museum. Therein are amassed so many riches and treasures that any educated foreigner who comes here is surprised that something like that exists.⁵⁵

Later, in volume 38 on 19 September 1901, the *Bošnjak* stressed that the government is the strongest safe haven to be relied upon. The journal *Bošnjak* continued until 1910 and remains a symbol for the Bosniak struggle to maintain their identity in a non-Muslim environment.

Behar [Blossom]

A further serious step towards the Europeanization of Bosniaks was pursued by a group of cultural workers around the journal *Behar* [Blossom] (1900-1911). The leading figures were Safvet-beg Bašagić, PhD-holder from Vienna in Middle Eastern and Oriental studies, poet, enlightener and politician (died 1934), Osman Nuri Hadžić, writer and religious enlightener (died 1937), and Edhem Mulabdić, writer (died 1954). In a literary sense only, Musa Ćazim Ćatić (died 1915) also belonged to this group; for a period he edited the family journal *Biser* [Pearl] (1912-1914, 1918). These four intellectuals accompanied the Bosniaks into the 20th century and supported them in overcoming conservatism, stagnation and resignation. On the one side, they admired Europe's material and intellectual superiority. On the other, they remembered their own once prosperous past. As a synthesis, they wanted to galvanize the Bosniaks in order to push for progress through education according to European standards and through modern working methods as well as a modern way of life while still preserving the Muslim identity.⁵⁶

First reports of a new journal “to spread Islamic interests” reached the government by September 1899 from the periphery of Bosnia in the town of Ključ. According to this report, the group was led by Safvet-beg Bašagić and consisted of university-trained young people. The local administration was skeptical. Next to the leading figure Safvet-beg Bašagić, the leader of the political party *Muslimanska narodna organizacija* (MNO, Muslim People’s Organisation) Adem Mešić, an entrepreneur from Tešanj, was also a formal holder of the journal. The launching of the journal was approved by Appel in 1900, although not in the Turkish language as originally planned but in Bosnian language (*Landessprache*, i.e. local language). It was just some weeks previously that Kállay had received an article entitled “A Letter from Bosnia” published on 12 February in the Istanbul (close to court) newspaper *Mahmat*, where the author had sharply criticized the journal *Bošnjak* for promoting the Bosnian language – the languages of the fatherland in public and religious life being Arabic and Turkish.⁵⁷

Behar appeared from 1 May 1900 twice a month, without Arabic subtitles but differing from *Bošnjak* – both dating systems (the Christian and the Islamic calendar were used) on the title page. According to Appel, the paper was supposed to address the moral and religious education of the Muslims (*sittlich-religiöse Ausbildung des mohamedanischen Elementes gerichtet sein*). Mešić was characterized by Appel as both intelligent, liberal and progressive (*intelligent, seinen Anschauungen liberal und fortschrittlich gesinnt*), but the personality of Bašagić would lead the journal to success, claimed Appel, as he had a university degree and belonged to the most literate and profound writers among the Muslims (*besitzt Hochschulbildung und zählt unstreitig zu den belesensten und gründlichsten Schriftstellern unter den hierländigen jüngeren Mohamedanern*).⁵⁸

Behar printed lots of literature. However, modern education of younger generations and religious awareness (*Islam i prosvjeta*) were the two main goals of the intellectuals surrounding *Behar*. The very first sentence in the editorial of the first issue on 1 May 1900 starts with a saying from the Prophet Muhammad that education and knowledge are obligatory duties. Interestingly, the subsequent article by Mehmed-Teufik Azabagić elaborated the issue of seeking knowledge and quoted Islamic sources as well as Arabic proverbs that Islam asks its believers to seek knowledge everywhere (even in China) and from everybody (Muslim, non-Muslim, believer, non-believer): “If you make friends with somebody, look at his knowledge and not religion because his belief belongs to him and his knowledge to you.”⁵⁹

The edition notice contained the prime duty of the journal which was to break with prejudices against Islam that were widespread among the

South Slavs. One of *Behar*'s tasks was explained in an article by Osman Hadžić in one of the first issues to affirm the term "Muslim" against the still widespread term "Mohamedans." This however was not done fatwa-style, but in the manner of a Western-styled article critically reviewing the etymology. No Islamic formulas and almost only Western sources were used to promote a deeply religious issue with crucial meaning for the Bosniak group identity.⁶⁰

The journal *Behar* was backed by the journal *Bošnjak* as well as *Gajret* [Support] (1907-1941) an organisation that aimed at helping Muslim students. When *Behar* ceased to be issued, the journal *Biser* tried to fill the gap although it focused on pan-Islamic ideas. *Behar* was similar to the paper *Bosanska vila* and other journals from the second half of the 19th century which dealt with domestic or foreign poetry and fiction.

Indeed, the rapid transformation of Bosnian society during the Austro-Hungarian period can be well observed in the field of literature. In his seminal work, Maximilian Braun elucidates the Europeanization, i.e. modernization or Westernization process of the Bosniaks in the field of literature. He stresses that this process had a psychological, spiritual and intellectual momentum which influenced the literary works of the new period. Braun tries to show the change in the Bosniak intellectual field with the help of literature, and thus gives a literary-historical analysis.⁶¹ Braun emphasizes that the religion of Islam represents the most important element in the Bosniak identity which "needed to be defended continuously," and which "in the conscience of the Muslims in Bosnia grew into an absolute fact, a direct psychological necessity for the proper existence."⁶² When the Bosniaks were faced with European values, they started to examine Islamic sources from another perspective. With such an approach, the rationalization and modernization of Islam (Reformist movement) was established in Bosnia.⁶³ He concludes that the whole Bosniak literature displays a very intense love of one's native country adoring Bosnia's various peoples.⁶⁴

Behar was supposed to be written in simple Bosnian language so that an ordinary or average Bosniak could understand the contents and in order for it to attract as many readers as possible. Bosniaks were supposed to receive through the contents elaborated in *Behar* a profound knowledge of Islam and at the same time to adapt to the new, modern European political and societal system. *Behar* was not a political journal but it asked for tolerance, understanding and respect of the principles of coexistence.⁶⁵ *Behar* devoted a part of its content to events occurring in the world (*Pogled po svijetu*) whereby readers were informed of political and social news mainly in Austria-Hungary but also in other parts of the world (Germany, France,

USA, Turkey, South Africa, etc.). Books written by Europeans were discussed and evaluated. Thus, readers could gradually gain a feeling for Europe, the West and its way of life and preferences. Within almost a decade *Behar* formed a reading society and laid the foundations for progress in literature and culture towards European standards.⁶⁶

From today's perspective, the most remarkable aspect of *Behar* was probably that it simultaneously combined a positive approach to Austria-Hungary, with a pronounced religious reformist vision. Whereas *Bošnjak* was more politically orientated, *Behar*'s aim was to make Islam (and the values of the Shari'ah) applicable to everyday life in modern societies. Simultaneously, with the slow decline of *Bošnjak*, the government became gradually more flexible regarding language. In 1901, Kállay advised not to allow a Jewish paper (*Kajon*) to be written in Hebrew, in the same way that *Bošnjak* did not use Turkish or Arabic letters (*arebica*).⁶⁷ In 1906, however, when the latter Reis ul-Ulema Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević joined the editorial board of *Behar*, it was decided to add a four page supplement to the journal with Bosnian and Turkish texts in Arabic letters, "to ease the use of the religious books written in Arabic language and to make the literature aimed at reform of religious education more available."⁶⁸ At the same time, the program of the journal would be expanded to "questions social and economic in nature, insofar as [they are] related to the Muslims, the household, education of children and the agrarian question."⁶⁹ Whereas it was easily approved that the journal would evidently be more pan-Islamic, the Chief of the government Albori had at the same time no doubts that it would be *Behar* which remained moderate and objective. Mešić and Čaušević would guarantee that the paper remained on a "completely correct course."⁷⁰ In conclusion, *Behar* contributed to a change of the Bosniaks' internal mindset and perception of the external world, i.e. Austria-Hungary, and values of a previously unknown and dominantly Christian Europe.

Bosniak Political Parties with 'Modern' Political Demands

In the meantime, a new generation of Bosniaks finished their university education in Central Europe and a new profile of educated Muslims appeared in Bosnia alongside the traditional religious scholars (*ulema*). This new generation of modern Bosniak intellectuals supported the democratization process of Bosnia. Generally, with the modernization process in the fields of economics, society, culture and education, the citizens became more aware of their societal and political roles. This new middle class came up with new ideas and mainly lead the movement for religious-educational

autonomy (*Vakufsko mearifksa autonomija*, often quoted as cultural autonomy). For decades, Kállay sought to establish a conservative political nucleus of wealthy layers of all religions and foster strong relationships with the upper class of each national community in order to link them socially and economically to the Monarchy. His death on 16 July 1903 enabled a new form of political life:

After Kállay's death in 1903, there came about a gradual easing of the absolutist, bureaucratic occupation regime. This took the form primarily of the abolition of preventive press censorship, tax reform, resolving the issue of religious educational autonomy, and acknowledging the need for Bosnia-Herzegovina to gain a degree of self-government. It was in these circumstances that some national political movements formally organized and constituted themselves as parties.⁷¹

The establishment of political parties and civil associations was another expression of getting along with and showing active commitment to the new system. Political movements and civil society in Bosnia had two important stages of development. The first stage was the attempts at religious and educational autonomy which lasted until the first decade of the 20th century. Hence, until the first political parties were established in Bosnia, a political movement regarding religious rights preceded it. The first serious political movement within the Bosniak community during Austro-Hungarian rule began in 1899. At that time, the Bosniaks felt a need to resist the Austro-Hungarian cultural mission and to preserve their domestic religious identity. This movement was known as the struggle for religious-educational or cultural autonomy (*Vakufsko mearifksa autonomija*).

The second stage started in the first decade of the 20th century when the first political parties were formed. The emergence of political parties was one of the most striking changes in Bosnian society, as the political party was a new Western tool for promoting political interests. Generally, in the first decade of the twentieth century, religious and educational movements turned into "civic political parties, largely equivalent in form, political ideology, and psychology to the kind of national organizations that emerge in countries under colonial rule as they struggle for national liberation."⁷²

MNO – Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija [Muslim People's Organization]

The first civic political party in Bosnia which presented its party manifesto was the *Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija* (MNO) [Muslim People's Organization]. The MNO had a party newspaper entitled *Musavat* [Unity].

The foundation of the party was a totally new form of public engagement. Interestingly, the MNO as well as subsequent political parties revealed ethnicity and religion to be some of the most important aspects of political life in Bosnia.⁷³

The MNO was founded on 3 December 1906 in Slavonski Brod by the initiative of Alibeg Firdus from Livno and his colleagues. They organized a meeting of all leading Bosniak personalities, mostly landowners. The party was headed by an Executive Committee whose office was to be in Budapest, and the first elected chairman was Alibeg Firdus. As the first political party, the MNO set its goals to gather Bosniaks, articulate their interests starting from religious autonomy and extending to the political autonomy of Bosnia.⁷⁴ Thus, the autonomy movement for religious-educational or cultural autonomy from 1899 became transformed into the political party MNO. In terms of loyalty, Donia states:

The evidence suggests that the politicization of the Muslims was a gradual and erratic process. The Muslim autonomy movement was not the work of activists who endured years of smouldering hostility to Austrian rule and then suddenly burst forth in angry self-assertiveness. Many individual Muslims held conflicting loyalties for some time and only slowly developed an allegiance to the notion of Muslim autonomy. The protracted interaction between the Austrian regime and the Bosniaks contributed in large measure to this polarization.⁷⁵

The political awakening of the Bosniaks under Austro-Hungarian rule was not a typical European nationalist revival as the political movement “was not preceded by large-scale social changes such as rapid industrialization, urbanization or a rise in literacy rates that have frequently been noted as contributing causes to political nationalism.”⁷⁶

More importantly for this research the MNO was a reflection of Bosniak national development and a new level of organization according to contemporary European standards. Thus, the Bosniaks had an institutional structure as a means for negotiating societal, political, economic and cultural goals. This meant that they were firmly integrated to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For example, as the majority of the members were landowners, they demanded that the peasants should become ordinary wage-earning laborers or leaseholders in large estates.

Furthermore, the party program encompassed initiatives to allow Bosniak emigrants to return and the establishment of civil rights and equal participation in the administration of Bosnia.⁷⁷

At the beginning of 1907 elections took place all over Bosnia in which 130,000 adult Bosniaks participated to form local committees which would send their delegates to the first party congress in Budapest on 11 March 1907. As leading Bosniaks supported the MNO, *Musavat* reported that István Burián, Kallay's successor and new joint finance minister, was asked by Hungarian politicians to respond to the needs of the Muslims' legitimate representatives.⁷⁸ *Musavat* describes how the MNO and their request for religious autonomy gained publicity outside the borders of Bosnia, particularly in Hungary where Parliamentarians declared their willingness to support the Bosniaks in achieving their civil rights.⁷⁹ However, this support came mainly from opposition in the Hungarian Parliament, rather than the ordinary Hungarian citizens who were likely not informed.⁸⁰

Nonetheless, the government acknowledged the Executive Committee of the MNO as the representative of Bosniak citizens and accepted on 5 June 1907 the presentation of their requirements to minister Burián. During the months that followed, several negotiations were held in which the government had to realize the Bosniaks were not only asking for religious autonomy, but this related also to Austria-Hungary's sovereignty. According to the MNO, the Sultan as Caliph should be the sovereign in religious affairs as Austria-Hungary was only given the right to administer Bosnia, but not to regulate religious affairs. The MNO insisted that the head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia should be appointed by the Sultan who was understood as the leader of all Muslims in the world.⁸¹ This traditionalist approach was logical insofar as every minority tries to find protection and to connect with a "bigger brother." An analogy might be the link of the Catholics to the Pope. Just as Catholics perceived the Pope as their religious sovereign, Bosniaks understood their connection with the Caliph in Istanbul in a similar way. Bosniak history has shown that Muslims as religious minorities without outside leadership do not have effective protection against the political and territorial aspiration of neighboring countries. Thus, the existence of Muslims was endangered, which explains the increasing role of pan-Islamism.

In the negotiations between the government and the MNO, it was ultimately decided that three candidates for the head of the Islamic Community could be suggested by domestic Bosniaks, one of the three would be chosen by Austria-Hungary, and the religious leader in Istanbul would confirm the selection. The newspaper *Sarajevski list*, volume 118, dated 2 October 1908, reasserted that this decision was made to meet the needs of both the Bosniaks and Austria-Hungary. Another achievement of the MNO was to gain control of the Muslim charitable organization *Gajret* [Support] which distributed scholarships, but primarily published the newspaper *Musavat*.⁸²

While social life for Catholics and Orthodox Christians occurred rather around choirs, Muslims gathered in coffeehouses which served as reading clubs (*kiraethana*). The MNO opened 116 new reading clubs. Actually, more than half of Bosniak clubs were reading clubs.⁸³ Thus, on one hand MNO can be seen as a leading movement to meet the religious needs of the Bosniaks but also to promote literacy, dialogue and the overall well-being of the Bosniaks. On the other, the MNO can be understood also as an oppositional movement. MNO tried to attract as many adherents as possible by promising that the Sultan might return to Bosnia, spreading insecurity by claiming that the *Vakuf* property might be distributed to Christian monasteries. Nonetheless, an opposition is the backbone of European democracy and therefore it can be stated that the MNO was a political party according to European standards and contributed to the development of a pluralist system in Bosnia.

MNS – Muslimanska Napredna Stranka [Muslim Progressive Party]

Another political party was the MNS (*Muslimanska napredna stranka*), the Muslim progressive party which tried to realize a cultural and national renaissance in the same way as many other European political movements. The party was founded on 24–26 August 1908 in Tešanj and lead by businessmen Adem-aga Mešić and Zijabeg Donlagić, at which time, the party manifesto was set and the party newspaper *Muslimanska svijest* [Muslim conscience] established. The party manifesto stated that the MNS sought to address all layers of Bosniak society in order to protect their needs, particularly those of religion, property, social status and individuality. Politically they were in favor of keeping the status quo according to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin and the Istanbul Convention of April 1879 for the sake of protecting the Bosniaks. This is why MNS-adherents were understood as “loyalists.” The party program stressed that they would struggle using all available means against Bosnia’s attachment to Serbia, Montenegro or any other Balkan country.⁸⁴

Similar to the MNO, they supported the movement for religious autonomy and were clearly against emigration to Ottoman lands. The MNS wanted to keep the Bosniaks in Bosnia and protect their civil rights and land ownership. However, since the MNS’s focus was to initiate a cultural revival, it launched several clubs, associations, journals and even a printing office. Its founders established the above mentioned journal *Behar* [Blossom], the sports club *El Kamer* [Moon], several reading clubs, an Islamic printing office (*Islamska dioničarska štamparija*), the paper *Ogledalo* [Mirror] the charitable organization *Gajret* [Support] – which was later taken over by

leading Bosniaks of the MNO – and several other clubs and activities.⁸⁵ Many of these organization were established before the MNS. MNS, like Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, worked on the cultural revival of the Bosniaks including the important two-fold affirmation of Bosniak Slavic origins, which made them immediately close to the West, but still stressed and maintained the Islamic culture. These two components gave birth to the idea of Bosniaks as mediators or as a bridge between Western and Eastern cultures.⁸⁶

The journal *Behar* confirmed this attitude throughout its contents. They accepted the Austro-Hungarian administration as well as the new schools according to European standards for the sake of progress:

Let our wealthy beys and agas come to reason and educate their sons better than our *Kulturtraeger*. Thus, they would establish an independent intelligence which would ask for our rights in another way. The representatives of the Monarchy would accept our delegates differently. Diplomats would care about us differently. The public would talk about us and our requirements differently.⁸⁷

Even if the MNS tried to fight illiteracy and called for a European model of education, they could not reach the masses nor could they eradicate conservatism and ignorance.⁸⁸ It was difficult to reach the masses as European literacy, i.e. the Latin script, among the Bosniaks was weak in comparison to *Arebica*, i.e. Bosnian language written in Arabic letters.⁸⁹

The party platform claimed for the Bosniaks to be an indigenous autonomous population with the right to govern and decide about Bosnia. The key for success was seen in educating the Muslim masses with Islamic and Central-European curricula. Thus, all Muslims should attend eight obligatory years of ordinary school, and then enroll in various trade and professional schools. Again like the MNO, it focussed strongly on identifying with Europe, i.e. bringing citizens closer to the idea of civil and political rights, establishing a national parliament, self-rule of municipalities, independence of judges and reducing military service.⁹⁰

Soon the MNS was accused of being pro-Croatian which made them revise their program and change the name on 31 January 1910 to MSS *Muslimanska samostalna stranka* [Muslim Independent Party]. During exactly these years, Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia caused again a period of insecurity but at the same time asserted the Bosniaks' full integration into the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Full Integration of the Bosniaks into Austria-Hungary: Annexation, Constitution, Parliament, Elections

When the Young Turks initiated their revolution in July 1908, Austria-Hungary concluded that the Ottoman Empire had ultimately collapsed. Furthermore, once the Young Turks forced the Sultan to renew the Constitution of 1876, and due to the fact that this was supposed to include an article about the inseparability of Turkish territories, Austria-Hungary decided that the time had come for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The growing pan-Serb movement was also a contributing factor leading to annexation, as establishing a Greater Serbia would involve the territory of Bosnia. Again the Eastern Question became relevant and multilateral negotiations between the great powers were held which led to a crisis. That turned out to be a decisive step towards the First World War.

On 5 October 1908, Bosnia was formally annexed and subsequently fully incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This involved a parliament⁹¹ and a constitution.⁹² Actually, one reason for the annexation was to establish a constitution and a parliament as Kaiser Franz Joseph wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm II:

Since a constitution can be granted only by a sovereign power, I shall find myself forced to announce the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. We shall inform the Ottoman Empire of this and at the same time shall notify it, as proof of our policy of peace and our rejection of any thought of acquiring territory in the Balkans, we shall withdraw our troops stationed in the Sanjak [of *Novi-Bazar*] and in the future shall renounce the privileges granted to us in the Sanjak by the Treaty of Berlin.⁹³

Thus, the Kaiser replaced the Sultan and became the ultimate sovereign. A day later, on 6 October 1908, a proclamation was distributed across Bosnia: 6,200 copies in Latin and Cyrillic were posted at public places.⁹⁴ Additionally, public criers (*talal*) were in charge of informing the citizens of the annexation. The annexation was announced as a historical event to be celebrated. Cities were full of lights and decorations. There were musicians in the streets and the *Landeschef* prepared a welcome for various delegates.⁹⁵ However, not everyone was pleased by this new turn of events.

The Annexation of Bosnia and Bosniak Responses

The annexation was perceived and interpreted in various ways by the Bosniaks and among others who were directly or indirectly involved. On the one hand, some felt confident and supported the annexation, such as the

MNS. For example, the MNS mayor of Sarajevo, Esad ef. Kulović (1854-1917), led a delegation of 64 influential Bosniaks (mayors, landowners, religious scholars and merchants) to Vienna on 4 November 1908 to declare their full loyalty to the Kaiser and to officially accept the annexation. On the other hand, others were insecure about what the annexation would really mean, expressing the same fears as in 1878. This caused a specific psychological momentum, as Gelez describes it: "The Annexation was definitely in favor of Vienna: they were now called upon to adapt permanently or to leave this country whose ruler was European and Catholic."⁹⁶ Thus, the annexation meant definitely that the Bosniaks must live under a non-Muslim sovereign, continuing the encounter of "Muslim" and "Christian" Europe.

At the same time, some continued to place hope in the Ottomans. For example, Safvet-beg Bašagić suggested that the Young Turk revolution would strengthen the Ottoman Empire to which the Bosniaks 'belonged'.⁹⁷ However, as discovered by Ali-beg Firdus (1862-1910), head of the MNO and a leading personality around the issue of the annexation, the Ottomans and Young Turks were not strong enough to change anything about the position of Bosnia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Firdus organized a petition against the annexation and took it to Istanbul in November 1908 where he went for Ottoman advice about how the Bosniaks should behave regarding the annexation. He asked for permission to attend the planned conference of the signatories in Berlin in order to submit it. This petition included the claim to Bosnia's autonomy and the desire to be governed by a Turkish prince. While Firdus politically opposed the annexation, he acknowledged the loyalty of the Bosniak leadership to Austria-Hungary, stating, in an interview with the Young Turk journal *İkdam*: "All our intelligence is on the governments' side and the government dictates as it likes and they are executing it as if it were an honour."⁹⁸

However, the Young Turk committee in Istanbul called for peace and recommended that he should wait for things to develop.⁹⁹ Firdus was serious about his petition and even consulted Sultan Abdulhamid, the Shaykh al-Islam, and leading Bosniak emigrants, but ultimately, he could not achieve anything in Istanbul. He did not get a clear response from any of the influential addresses in Istanbul. Therefore, the options were either to adapt to the situation or to migrate.

Not only were Bosniaks insecure about the annexation but diplomatic circles and other European powers, also disagreed immediately with this increase of power for Austria-Hungary. This is why the period around the time of annexation was called the annexation crisis. Eventually, the agreement between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire and the

acceptance of the annexation was laid down in February 1909. The Ottoman Empire received 2.5 million pounds as compensation for the lost territories. Nonetheless, many Bosniaks who did not agree perceived it as a desperate blow and initiated another wave of emigration.¹⁰⁰

In the meantime, the lasting issue about the *vakuf* and educational autonomy still remained unsolved. While *Muslimanska svjest*, the newspaper of the Muslim Independent, formerly Progressive Party (MSS), regularly attacked the competing *Musavat* from the MNO for being Pro-Serbian, for example by writing its name ironically in Cyrillic letters (Шта је то? [What is this?], 16 December 1908), it also recognized in the very same issue the importance of the religious *vakuf* autonomy (*Naša Vjerska Vakufska Autonomija*), however with a somehow ambiguous connotation. They were already fed up with the issue but claimed that it had to be reached, as this would secure the survival of Islam in the country. But it was noted that even though the question was important and so much effort and money had already been spent, nothing had been solved, for which the Executive Council and the administration were blamed. Following annexation, it was at least evident that the Bosniaks would have to solve the issue on their own. Modern life in Bosnia would demand many reforms in religious affairs, but these needed to be in line with the fundamental principles of Islam. To make use of these large *vakuf* possessions according to modern standards for the benefit of the Bosniaks and their administration, they should be centralized and administered by professionals who would keep their correct use also in line with Shari'ah law. *Muslimanska svjest* objected that the Executive Council cared for too many things especially during annexation and even cooperated with Serbs. Obviously the loyalists (MNS/MSS) were ready to accept annexation but at the same time had ambitious goals of their own.

It took the MNO a year to adapt to the fact of annexation. Even though the MNO made it clear in its party journal *Musavat* that it did not accept the annexation, it nevertheless opposed emigration.¹⁰¹ Similarly, *Behar* (15 June 1909) declared emigration as “unjustified and senseless” (*neopravdanim i besmislenim*) and described it as a devastating and fateful movement asserting that among *Behar* readers there were no adherents to the “annihilating migration movement” (*pa smo uvjereni, da megju čitaocima našim neima pristaša toga ubitačnog pokreta*).

The new situation furthermore meant a setback for oppositional Bosniak parties like the MNO who opposed the annexation. The *Bošnjak* reported that the Executive Committee of the MNO had misled people for 10 years by giving false promises and hopes about Bosnia's eventual autonomy. The *Bošnjak* exhorted the MNO to end such promises, and, like the Progressive

Party, proceed with constructive consultations with the Austro-Hungarian government. Indeed, against the background of the international crisis regarding the annexation, the Austro-Hungarian government was now ready to make substantial concessions. By the imperial statute of 15 April 1909, the Bosniaks received autonomy concerning cultural, religious and educational matters (*vakufsko mearifksa autonomija*).¹⁰² At about this point, any further rapprochement of Serbian (Yugoslav) and Anti-Austrian Bosniak opposition mainly represented within the MNO was deemed to failure. This rapprochement was built on emotions rather than rational calculations and it never recovered again. Finally, on 8 February 1910, the MNO accepted the annexation and swore allegiance to Austria-Hungary as a proof of its loyalty.

Apart from these dynamics, there were reports confirming that local Croats had provoked the Bosniaks in particular but also Serbs regarding the annexation.¹⁰³ The journal *Bošnjak*¹⁰⁴ called on the Bosniaks to accept the new political situation, to proceed with cultural and economic progress and rejected Croat claims. One could observe just this reaction in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gradačac, Srebrenica, Ljubinje, Ljubuški and Bijeljina, where the Bosniaks manifested their loyalty to Austria-Hungary.¹⁰⁵

The overall previously mentioned circumstances explain why it took 15 months to get a constitution. Furthermore, the constitutional controversy between Austria and Hungary, the treatment of the agrarian relations in Bosnia, and political antagonisms between Austria and Hungary particularly when it came to the differing pretensions towards Bosnia hampered formulation of the Constitution.¹⁰⁶

The Constitution and Parliament of Bosnia and Hercegovina

While the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina to Austria-Hungary occurred on 5 October 1908, the Constitution was only laid down on 17 February 1910 under the title *Landesstatut für Bosnien und die Hercegovina*,¹⁰⁷ in which Bosnia was considered basically a third entity within the Double Monarchy. It is structured in three parts: general civil rights, the parliament and the sphere of influence of the parliament. The Constitution initially stated that Bosnia and Hercegovina would remain under the leadership of the Joint Imperial Finance Ministry and the Government. The first part included the rights of citizenship (*Landesangehörigkeit*), religious liberties (right to confess one's religion); religious practice; autonomy of educational, cultural and charitable institutions; Shari'ah law for Muslims in issues concerning family, marriage and inheritance law; language (all citizens were guaranteed the preservation of their language); freedom of expression (abolishing preventive censorship); guaranteed education; inviolability of

ownership; freedom of association; and the right of the government to declare martial law or emergency rule in cases of war or other dangerous security situations.

The second part of the Constitution was devoted to the establishment of a representative legislative body, a parliament, to acknowledge, represent and administer citizens' rights in Bosnia. The newly created Bosnian Parliament (*Landtag*) was supposed to represent the given religious and social structure of the Bosnian society. §22 designated the members of the Parliament: (1) Reis ul-Ulema, Vakuf-Mearif director, Muftis from Sarajevo and Mostar plus the oldest Mufti; (2) Four Serbian Orthodox Metropolitans and the vice president of the Educational Council of the Serbian Orthodox School; (3) the Catholic Archbishop, two diocesan bishops, two provincialates of the Franciscans; (4) Sephardic chief Rabbi of Sarajevo; (5) president of the Higher Court; (6) the president of the lawyer's chamber; (7) mayor of the capital Sarajevo; (8) the president of the commercial and industry chamber; and 72 elected delegates. Thus, there were 20 *ex officio Virilisten*¹⁰⁸ out of whom there were, equally, five representatives of the Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic communities plus one Jewish representative and four secular functionaries. The parliament was led by a president and two vice presidents appointed by the Kaiser who came from each of the three dominant religious communities in Bosnia.¹⁰⁹ All members of the parliament were expected to swear an oath of allegiance (*Angelobung der Treue und des Gehorsams*) to the Kaiser, the laws and the fulfillment of his duties. Furthermore, any laws passed by the parliament had to be approved by the Kaiser. A nine-member council would be nominated by the parliament which would be in charge of contacting the Austro-Hungarian representatives. The 72 elected delegates would be elected by three curias: (1) Landowners, intellectuals, religious scholars, active and retired civil servants, teachers, railway and military officials, as well as retired officers; (2) all city inhabitants who did not belong to any of the previously mentioned categories; (3) all village inhabitants who did not belong to the first curia.

The third part of the constitution dealt with the parliament's sphere of influence. It stated that the parliament dealt only with Bosnian matters with the exception of certain issues related to conscription, trade, transport and customs, as laid down in previous legal acts. The following §42 stated the law-making competencies of the parliament in 27 points, such as the budget, criminal law, civil law, education, culture, agrarian issues, taxes, penal institutions, railway, roads, health resorts, provincial organizations, etc.

In conclusion, the Constitution had not significantly changed the administration of Bosnia. The ultimate power remained within the Joint Imperial

Finance Ministry in Vienna and its agency, the Government (*Landes-regierung/Zemaljska vlada*) in Sarajevo. The most important innovation was that a representative parliament was instituted in Bosnia, even though its legislative powers were restricted.¹¹⁰

First Parliamentary Elections

After all the leading Bosniak politicians and intellectuals accepted the constitution as *fait accompli*, elections were announced on 24 March 1910 to take place 18–28 May 1910. All male citizens at least 24 years old were allowed to participate in the elections. The voter turnout was massive even within the third, the “village curia”, where it was least expected. When it came to Bosniaks voter turnout, from 105,734 registered Bosniak voters in the “village curia”, 88,205 or 83% participated in the elections.¹¹¹ In the same curia, 85% of Serbs and 61% of Croats gave their votes. The results were as follows: MNO received all 24 Muslim seats, the Serb National Organization (*Srpska Narodna Organizacija*, SNO) received all 31 Orthodox mandates whereas the 16 Catholic mandates were divided between the leading Croat national community (*Hrvatska Narodna Zajednica*, HNZ) and Josip Stadler’s movement. Thus, the Muslim Independent Party (MSS, previously the Muslim Progressive Party, MNS) did not receive a mandate; they appeared to be not so popular among the citizens. For example, within the “city curia” there were 98,814 registered Bosniak voters out of whom 91,217 voted for the MNO, and 7,597 for MSS.¹¹²

After the elections, but in the same month of May, Kaiser Franz Joseph visited Sarajevo and called for the first session of the Parliament on 15 June 1910. Ali-beg Firdus was appointed president of the Parliament whereas Vojislav Šola and Nikola Mandić were appointed vice presidents. The following debates within the Parliament soon revealed “That almost every issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to Serb and Croat national aspirations, adopts a national-political, respectively a constitutional character.”¹¹³ Hence, Imamović claims that the Parliamentary debates uncovered Serb and Croat nationalist aspirations towards the nations and the territory of Bosnia. Regarding the functioning of the parliament after elections Pinson makes an interesting remark:

When the Bosnian parliament finally came into being and the question of *kmet* [peasants who were dependent on the landowner] obligations came up, the bargaining among the government and national parties included discussions of how to avoid massive emancipation, showing once more how involving the Muslim landlords in the government had ensured their loyalty.¹¹⁴

Additionally, despite accusations of being pro-Serb or pro-Croat, the Bosniak political parties decided to launch negotiations about uniting themselves into one Bosniak political organization. These negotiations began in March 1911 and were concluded on 14 August 1911. Thus, the United Muslim Organization (*Ujedinjena Mulimanska Organizacija*, UMO) was established. This new party was supported by the already well-known influential Bosniaks, such as Safvet-beg Bašagić and Adem-aga Mešić. Now the Bosniaks could speak with one voice, particularly when it came to sensitive topics, such as agrarian reform, Bosnian language, Bosniakhood etc.¹¹⁵ Interestingly, the Viennese paper *Die bosnische Korrespondenz* writing already on 29 October 1909 on the political parties in Bosnia in general, suggested the creation of a common Bosniak political party since the two leading parties (MNO and MSS) basically had the same goals:

Almost the entire Muslim intelligence belongs to this party (MSS). Although the party – when one examines its followers – currently represents only a minority, its influence upon the Muslim population should not be underestimated. At the recent Constitutional Enquete, the representatives of the progressive party were the leaders of the complete ‘Muslimhood,’ and their applications were supported and accepted by the conservative Orthodox party (MNO). And so a strange picture emerges, in which the minority truly leads, and on the other side there are two party factions calling for the same thing.¹¹⁶

During the Balkan Wars of 1912/1913 and on the eve of the First World War, Serbian and “Yugoslav” propaganda in Bosnia intensified remarkably, fueled by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars and Serbian territorial gains in Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandžak. At the same time, demands for agrarian reform – which eventually reached the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – increased sharply. Still, this “agrarian reform” as a topic was not aimed at improving agricultural and overall productivity in Bosnia, but to split in any case the possessions of the Bosniak elite and distribute them among Serbs. Due to this situation, the Bosniak loyalist (MNS/MSS) preference to ally with the Croats increased. The loyalists had a stronghold among the younger intellectuals who studied in Vienna and at the University of Zagreb, so this is not so surprising. *Landeschef* Potiorek wrote to Vienna in 1912: “One might notice that among the Muslims there is a strong tendency to be friendly to the Croats”, and cited some who made their way from a “national” Muslimhood to a Croat orientation, like Sulejman-beg Sulejmanpašić and Avdaga Šahinagić. Others in the MNS/MSS party like Esad Kulović, however, objected to this alignment. According to Potiorek,

he represented the most conservative landowners who only supported the government because they had no alternative, while rejecting any kind of nationalism. Here it becomes clear that the “loyalists” were indeed a coalition, but had long united behind rejecting Serb and Yugoslav aspirations in Bosnia, while preferring to be a part of Austria-Hungary, even though for some it was only out of necessity and simply a lesser evil.¹¹⁷ Thus, it seems the Bosniak political leadership ultimately concluded and communicated to its people that the only way was to be united, proceeding with a European way of life, while keeping its Islamic tradition.

Bosniaks Serving in the Austro-Hungarian Military

The division of Bosnia between Austro-Hungarian occupation and administration on the one hand and the Sultan’s sovereignty on the other hindered the Monarchy’s call for recruitment.¹¹⁸ However, as early as January 1881 sessions of the common government discussed a draft of the Conscription law in Bosnia (*Entwurf eines Wehrgesetzes für Bosnien*) and issued a provisional conscription law.¹¹⁹ A further Decree addressed the treatment Muslim citizens were to be given as members of the military (*Behandlung der Mohammedaner während der activen Militärdienstzeit*).¹²⁰ However, the people of Bosnia reacted negatively.¹²¹ Bosniak Muslim soldiers would have to serve in an army led by non-Muslims. This raised the question of whether serving in a non-Muslim military was permissible at all from an Islamic perspective. Objectively, this conscription law was a clear offense to the April Convention with the Ottoman Empire from 1879. Nonetheless, this law obliged all male citizens of Bosnia not only to protect the borders of the then-occupied countries (Bosnia and Sandžak Novi Pazar), but also to defend the territory of the whole Monarchy. Eventually, it could have happened that Bosniaks would have to fight against the Ottoman Empire, i.e. against the Sultan. This is why yet another new wave of emigration occurred.¹²²

The decree related to the Conscription law was addressed to the people of Bosnia and was published in the Sarajevo newspaper *Sarajevski list*.¹²³ According to the text of the law, the existence of the armed forces was a necessity in all countries, as without the armed forces the state would not be able to maintain peace and order or protect the lives and property of its citizens against external enemies. The law also contained the following assertion: “Henceforth, the time has come for the sons of the country to fulfill their duty, and without regard to religion they shall honorably bear weapons to protect the home country. [...] Noone, whatever religion he may belong to, shall be hindered in the fulfillment of his religious duties.”¹²⁴

The decree declared that the ruler accorded the same respect to all religions, as well as to the creeds and sentiments of the peoples of his empire and the customs and habits of Bosnia, and that he would not tolerate any preferential treatment for any group among his subjects.

The provisional conscription law, which consisted of 36 articles issued in German and Bosnian, set the duration of military service, the age of the conscripts, preconditions, exemptions, consequences for conscientious objection, identification of conscripts, conditions for sending substitutes, and conditions related to the reserve. In the context of this inquiry, the following details are relevant: the law obliged all male citizens of Bosnia fit for military service to participate in the protection of the country and the Monarchy. Article 11 is most interesting, particularly in terms of religion, as it enumerates the religious positions that were exempted from military service: priests, chaplains, monks, imams, Shari‘ah judges, Muslim lecturers (*muderis*), Friday prayer leaders (*khatib*), religious scholars (*shaykh*), Sufis (*dervish*) and religious teachers (*hodža*). Doctors were also exempted, as were veterinarians and pharmacists who were practicing their professions. Interestingly, Article 12 expands the exemption to theology students who were studying at an institution of higher education that was acknowledged by the Ministry. Furthermore, Article 13 exempts a single male relative (husband, son, brother, grandson) in a family the members of which were dependent on the income or labor of that single male.

Of utmost importance is the Decree related to the treatment of the Muslims during their military service, which was attached to the provisional conscription law and published in the Sarajevo newspaper a few days later.¹²⁵ This supplement to the Conscription law demonstrates the intention of the Monarchy to attract the Bosniaks, nurture loyalty among them, and motivate them to serve the Kaiser instead of the Sultan. The Decree included precise and detailed guidelines regarding the treatment of the Muslim conscripts of Bosnia. It prescribes respect for the religious laws and customs in eight points. First, “soldiers of Muslim faith” were given days off on Fridays as well as the three days of Ramadan Bayram (*Eid al-Fitr*) and four days of Kurban Bayram (*Eid al-Adha*). Second, Muslim soldiers were allowed to have a separate kitchen with their own pots and pans, to cook their own food, and to buy necessary things. The cookware was to be branded in order to ensure that it would not be mixed up with the pots and pans of the non-Muslims, because as the text says, “[i]n all cases, attention must be paid to the fact that Muslims are prohibited from eating pork, lard, wine and the meat of clubbed animals.”¹²⁶ If the cookware were to be mixed up, new implements were to be purchased. Thus, Muslim soldiers would be assured that they would only

eat halal food. Furthermore, the law stipulated that there were to be no restrictions regarding when meals were to be served. This allowed Muslims, who would sometimes fast (particularly during the month of Ramadan), the liberty to adapt their meal times according to their religious calendar. Third, at medical examinations, the Islamic understanding of indecent parts of the body was to be respected. Hence, medical examinations were to be performed individually in a separate room, where only the doctor and the patient were present. Fourth, Muslims were free to perform the Friday prayer (*Jumu'ah*) between 11:00 o'clock and 13:00 o'clock as well as the Bayram prayers (*Eid*) in a mosque. If there was no mosque nearby, then a special room was to be designated for that purpose. Additionally, for the religious ablution, the necessary number of metal washbasins and pots was to be provided. Fifth, in the case of a funeral, the reception was to be conducted silently, accompanied by readings from the Qur'an without music. Sixth, Muslims were allowed to purchase whatever they felt would be necessary for themselves. Seventh, imams were to be appointed to lead the prayers for the Muslim soldiers and to provide spiritual care.¹²⁷ According to the eighth and final point, some Muslim soldiers were to be taught nursing in order to enable them to look after fellow Muslims who had been injured or fallen ill and to provide spiritual care for the dying and even wash corpses.¹²⁸

When it comes to the reaction of the Bosniaks to the Conscription law, Baron Dahlen, who was the head of the provincial government (*Landeschef*) and general commander in Bosnia (1881-1882), ordered all districts (*kotar*) to inform him precisely about the mood and sentiments of the masses and in the district councils (*majlis*) to the Conscription law.¹²⁹ Having received information from people on the ground, Dahlen sent a report to the Common Ministry of Finance in Vienna, which was in charge of Bosnia, to inform it of the situation in Bosnia after the proclamation of the Conscription law. This report, which is dated December 11, 1881, characterized the atmosphere as extremely tense and explosive, particularly in Foča and Eastern Herzegovina. The report states that: (a) Muslims were applying en masse for emigration to the Ottoman Empire, which was understood by Dahlen as part of a strategy to convince the authorities to refrain from enforcing recruitment; and (b) members of the Orthodox Church would be willing to serve in the military if the agrarian question were to be resolved, i.e. if lands were to be taken away from Muslim landlords and given to the Orthodox peasants (*kmets*). Interestingly, although the situation was very delicate and a rebellion was launched, the Austro-Hungarian government in Bosnia decided not to modify its principles in agrarian policy.¹³⁰ They wanted to preserve good relationships with the Muslim landowners and hoped that

the landowners would call for peace among the Muslims and influence them positively.¹³¹

Austria-Hungary indeed had, as already shown above, the support of loyal landowners and religious scholars, such as Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak (an intellectual and politician), Mustafa-beg Fadilpašić (the Mayor of Sarajevo), Muhamed Emin Hadžijahić (a prominent religious scholar), Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović (the Mufti of Sarajevo and the first Reis ul-Ulema), and particularly Mehmed Teufik Azabagić (second Reis ul-Ulema).

Furthermore, the Sultan did not protest against the Conscription law which crushed the last hope and illusion that Austria-Hungary would only remain in Bosnia for a certain period of time.¹³² In addition to that, indignation died down as religious scholars approved serving the military and special rules were issued to protect the religious rights and needs of the Muslim soldiers. Thus, Muslim soldiers were allowed to maintain their religious practice even on a daily basis. The respectful treatment of the Bosniak soldiers' religious needs undermined their mistrust about serving in a non-Muslim army and contributed to building confidence.¹³³

Bosniak Responses to the First World War

Since the annexation of Bosnia to Austria-Hungary in 1908 and the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, the situation in Southeast Europe had become unstable and unpredictable. After the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were assassinated during their official visit to Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, an ultimatum was addressed to Serbia as the alleged perpetrator – Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip, belonged to the terrorist organization *Mlada Bosna* [Young Bosnia] which planned the assassination. The student organization *Mlada Bosna*, in cooperation with another organization *Crna ruka* [Black Hand] fought for the expulsion of Austria-Hungary from Bosnia. Their ultimate aim was to establish a Greater Serbia by attaching Bosnia to Serbia and expelling all non-Serbs, particularly Muslims.

From the perspective of political and military loyalty, the time of war is seen as a litmus test. Wars are very important probes for loyalty. In cases of emergency and states of defense against an external enemy, loyal performance is crucial and tested. Hence, in ordinary everyday life loyalty is not that clearly and easily measurable. Bosnian Serbs took rather sides with Serbia and its military, whereas Bosniaks and Croats sided with the Austro-Hungarian military. Common experiences in military and war set preconditions as well as a need for probation, integration and equality.¹³⁴

Joyous Welcome for German Soldiers

After the eruption of World War I, the Scutari detachment passed through Bosnia. This military unit was assembled in 1913 and dispatched to Albania as part of an international peace force following the Balkan Wars. In late August 1914 it withdrew from Scutari (Albania) via Bosnia. Several telegram messages sent from Sarajevo to Berlin in August and September 1914 describe the situation in Bosnia as well as the mood among the population.¹³⁵ These telegrams claim that the Scutari military unit was welcomed by the population with rejoicing and embraces (*mit brausendem Jubel begrüsst*). In Mostar, the people as well as the Bosniak mayor of Mostar appeared in the middle of the night at the railway station to welcome the detachment. The Mayor welcomed the detachment with cheers for the Kaiser, Germany and the German army. Except for the local Serb population, all were involved in preparing a celebration for the soldiers. In Sarajevo, ordinary citizens and official representatives welcomed the unit warmly. Muslims gave generous gifts; some Muslim women presented self-made gold handiwork to which others remarked that it was the first time Muslim women had done such a thing.¹³⁶ The head of the Islamic community (*Mohamedanische Oberhaupt*) came personally and distributed gifts to the soldiers. From Sarajevo to the northern border of Bosnia at Bosanski Brod, the soldiers were welcomed at every railway station with warm greetings, gifts and food. As mentioned in a report dated 8 September 1914, the majority of these people were Muslims (*Besonders zahlreich waren überall die Moslems erschienen*).

Proclamation of Jihad

During World War I, the interwar period and World War II, Germany launched a special Middle Eastern policy in which jihad¹³⁷ played a key role in mobilizing Muslims including those in Bosnia. Most probably for the first time in history, the concept of jihad was used in a “modern global coalition war among Western powers. This was the starting point for the development of a so-called Euro-Islam by a bellicose axis of non-Muslims and Muslims.”¹³⁸ On the one side there were France, Britain and Russia and on the other side, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the Ottoman Empire was the most important ally of Austria-Hungary and Germany. This closeness was due to political, strategic and economic reasons, as many German companies (Mannesmann, Philip Holzhausen AG, Siemens) were investing in the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁹ This is clearly linked to competition with British interests and to the spectacular 2,000 km Baghdad railway built for economic and strategic reasons to exploit oil and transport weapons. Soon, the British applied the same strategy of jihad, making promises to

Arabs under Ottoman rule if they fought against the Ottomans. Ultimately, the British Empire and Germany used Muslims for imperial purposes.

The reasoning was that if Muslims considered these battles jihad, then their allies would have their total commitment. This would be an asset for winning the war. Furthermore, the British and French would have to remove their soldiers from Western Europe and send them to the Middle East and North Africa. An office was established in Berlin entitled the *Büro für den Dschihad* [Jihad Office] to organize this issue and the phrase “Jihad made in Germany” was coined.¹⁴⁰ Generally, Kaiser Wilhelm II had a positive relationship with the Ottoman Empire. He displayed closeness and friendliness towards the Muslim world during his visit to Sultan Abdulhamid II and in Damascus where he stated already on 8 November 1898 that 300 million Muslims could be sure of the fact that Germany was their friend.¹⁴¹

The beginning of World War I posed again a period of insecure times for the Bosniaks who were still unsure how to behave. They needed instructions for how to react to this crisis. Until 1924, when the Caliphate was abolished, the leader of all Muslims in the world, the Caliph, was seated in Istanbul and represented together with the Shaykh al-Islam the ultimate and highest authority for setting guidelines and giving legal as well as religious opinions.

The Statute for Religious and Cultural Autonomy, §141, allowed the Bosniaks to ask the Shaykh al-Islam for his legal opinion in critical, dogmatic issues as well as in questions relating to Shari‘ah. Thus, on 11 November 1914, a fatwa (legal opinion) was issued by the Shaykh al-Islam Mustafa Hayri. On 26 November 1914 he addressed a letter in Bosnian language to the head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia Reis ul-Ulema M. Džemaludin Čaušević.¹⁴² In this letter, the Shaykh al-Islam analyzed the current political situation and issued a fatwa regarding the participation of Muslims on the side of a dominantly non-Muslim military. He stated firstly that Russia had proven itself to be the enemy of Islam and Muslims. Its criminal politics (*zločinačka politika*) were supported by England and France and aimed at destroying the Ottoman Empire as well as Muslim populations in the Balkans. In order to prevent the realizations of these goals, the Shaykh al-Islam issued a fatwa to proclaim a jihad against them. Jihad was addressed to all Muslims as a binding order, and was directed against the countries Russia, England and France. On the other side, the Shaykh al-Islam stressed that the Muslims should behave with friendliness and live peacefully in those countries which respected the treaties and were kind to Muslims. Thus, it would have been against this fatwa for Muslims under the rule of England, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and their allies to fight against Germany.

In the letter the Shaykh al-Islam expressed his expectation that the head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia would take action regarding this issue. Indeed, the day after receiving the letter from Istanbul, on 3 December 1914, Reis ul-Ulema M. Džemaluddin Čaušević sent a letter to the government in Sarajevo to inform them about the issued fatwa.¹⁴³ Čaušević announced that he would gather all *muftis* from Bosnia to inform them about the fatwa so that they might distribute the message around the country. Within that same letter Čaušević confirmed the Monarchy as an ally of the Muslims and assured the Land Government that the Muslims would serve the Austro-Hungarian military, perceiving it as a religious duty. He even called the Austro-Hungarian army “our army” (*naša vojska*) and promised that every Bosniak would serve the army as if it were under the flag of Islam. The goals of Austria-Hungary and the Bosniaks would be the same: destroying the common enemy. Furthermore, the Bosniaks would additionally participate as well within the Red Crescent (*Hilali Ahmer*).

Within two days, on 5 December 1914, the government responded to Čaušević in German confirming the political analysis of the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul. It agreed that Russia was a “criminal enemy of Islam” (*verbrecherischer Feind des Islams*) and a “cruel enemy of the Muslims” (*grausamer Gegner der Muslims*). It claimed that England and France as Russia’s helpers aimed at destroying the Islamic Caliphate in Istanbul as well as the Ottoman Empire. The government also expressed its gratitude to Reis ul-Ulema Čaušević for supporting the Shaykh al-Islam in order to encourage the Bosniaks to fight on the side of Austria-Hungary. Thus, on Friday, 11 December 1914 at *Jumu’ah* (Friday prayers) the fatwa was read all over Bosnia to the Bosniaks and was basically a call to enter World War I on the side of Austria-Hungary.

The Bosniak Elite Unit (Bosniakenregiment)

Bosniak soldiers not only protected the borders of their home country but they were also deployed during the First World War to various battle grounds abroad. Bosniak regiments were mainly sent to the Russian and Italian fronts. On the Russian front, Bosniaks fought in Galicia between the rivers Vistula and Bug. Many of them did not make it back home. On the Italian battleground, Bosniaks had to participate in nine scenes of fierce fighting between the Austro-Hungarian and the Italian armies around the province of Gorizia close to the city of Trieste. Thus, many Bosniaks lost their lives fighting on the side of Austria-Hungary during the First World War.

Hans Fritz, an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army, wrote after World War I a book entitled *Bosniak*. There, Fritz stated that “the legend about

Bosnian-Herzegovinian units – elite units in the Austro-Hungarian army – passed out of mind in the new state,” and therefore he wanted to give thanks to his fellow combatants, his ever-loyal friends the Bosniaks, and devote to them a literary memorial.¹⁴⁴ For himself, Fritz states: “A German by birth and attitude, nonetheless I will always remain a Bosniak.”¹⁴⁵ The Bosniaks built a military elite within the Austro-Hungarian army. They were praised because they were the youngest, described as the most courageous, cooperative, cordial, and persistent of men, extremely loyal to their task and work.

Eduard Wagnes composed already in 1895 a march for the Bosniak troop only, with the title *Die Bosniaken Kommen* [The Bosniaks are Coming] referring to soldiers coming from Bosnia. Since the Bosniaks were known for their loyalty and courage, the chant *Die Bosniaken Kommen* was used to spread fear among the enemies.¹⁴⁶ The same composer wrote another march entitled *Bosna Selamljik* [Greeting to Bosnia] as a special greeting to Bosnia.

The Bosniak infantry regiment was particularly appreciated for its courage on the battlefield around the mountain Meletta-Fior in 1916. Otto Wiesinger in his book *Der Ost-Korpus* [The Eastern Corps] writes about its “inherent courage”:

Diese angeborene Tapferkeit war mit viel Beständigkeit und Weisheit fest an die notwendige Disziplin und an die Tradition der alten Armee angepasst und machte dieses „Angeborene“ für einen modernen Krieg sogar besonders fruchtbar.¹⁴⁷

In the cemetery of Lebring, District Leibnitz, in Steiermark, Austria there is a burial ground for soldiers where one can find 805 Bosniak graves and interestingly, each grave has on top a *fes*, the typical Bosniak headcover which used to be the integral part of the uniform independent from the religious identity of the soldier. This cemetery is called *Bosniakenfriedhof* and is witness to the Bosniak loyalty to Austria-Hungary. The commemorative plaque reads: “*Zur Erinnerung an die tapferen Bosniaken, die im Ersten Weltkrieg das gemeinsame österreichische Vaterland bis zum letzten Tag heldenmütig verteidigten.*”¹⁴⁸ Every year Austria organizes a commemoration at that graveyard to honor the Bosniak soldiers who fell at mountain Meletta in 1916.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the last Sunday in the month of October in the Austrian province of Steiermark is called *Bosniakensonntag*, when Bosniaks are commemorated.¹⁵⁰

One correspondent of the Berlin Daily (*Berliner Tageblatt*) wrote about the “Holy war in Berlin” and the Bosniaks who were accommodated in the Vienna *Rudolfskaserne* (Rudolf barracks) and fought in Poland within the

infantry forces.¹⁵¹ Within these barracks there were 600 Bosniaks who were described as tall men with typical Slavic traits. The correspondent gave a detailed description of a Friday prayer (*Jumu'ah*) led in the barracks by the military imam Husein efendi Durić.¹⁵² The imam wore a dark grey officer's coat and a grey *fes* like the Bosniak soldiers. The Friday prayer was performed meticulously with Qur'an recitations, a sermon (*khutba*) given in Arabic and Bosnian, and a common prayer in a separate room on carpets provided for the Muslim soldiers. In the *khutba*, the imam informed soldiers of the fatwa issued by the Shaykh al-Islam, that as Russia, England, France, Serbia and Montenegro had formed a plot against Islam and Muslims, jihad had to be performed against them. No Muslim was allowed to stay away from this jihad. The prayer was concluded by the words "Let us pray for the glory and victory of our ruler the glorious Kaiser and King Franz Josef." The praying Bosniaks did not show any reaction, but the correspondent concluded:

The faces did not reveal anything regarding the proclamation of jihad. The Bosniak does not like to reveal his feeling through gestures or exclamations; yet the call for jihad will be seen in the battlefield as they know from their ancestors how to fight for an idea.¹⁵³

This stance reveals the readiness to devote oneself to a cause which is a description of loyalty. The correspondent describes another officer who assisted the imam and who was a scholar from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo. This again reveals that even a religious scholar educated in the Ottoman Empire accommodated to the new situation and sided with Austria-Hungary.

In conclusion, conditions within the Austro-Hungarian military indicate that Bosniaks were respected and acknowledged. Bosniaks obviously showed allegiance to Austro-Hungarian authority and responded to expectations of loyalty, such as serving the military.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to elucidate the existence of loyalty amongst Bosniaks by demonstrating that differing layers of Bosniak society (Islamic community, religious scholars, writers, politicians, businessmen, peasants etc.) displayed this loyalty through various avenues (within journals, political parties, the education system, parliament, elections and war). It points firstly to the important role played by intellectuals in affirming the Bosniaks

as an integral part of Europe and Austria-Hungary. Key figures in this include Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, Safvet-beg Bašagić, Osman Nuri Hadžić and Edhem Mulabdić. In particular, as noted, it was those intellectuals educated in Austro-Hungarian universities who realized the advantages of European progress through education, establishing as one of their first initiatives therefore reading rooms (*kiraethane*) to serve also as coffeehouses. Here Muslims were able to gather, read newspapers and discuss current issues whether politics, society, culture or the economy. These reading clubs best reflect the character and habits of the Muslim world. A further step was to publish journals to inform Bosniaks of current topics, educate them and formulate general positions of the Bosniaks as a group. The journals *Bošnjak* and *Behar* were the most prominent of the papers. A further step was to launch political organizations which functioned as lobbies for Bosniak interests. The first political party formed was the MNO and the second most influential at the time was the MNS although both had similar party programs. What is striking is that both affirmed the European-ness of the Bosniaks whilst still stressing their Muslim identity. The MNO and MNS can be understood as a reflection of the political, societal and economic situation in Bosnia during the Austro-Hungarian period.

Collective action is best explained by the efforts of identifiable, organized groups to promote their aspirations, and hopes to make their grievances heard. Even if the annexation crisis caused again a period of uncertainty, nonetheless Bosniaks adapted to the new challenges. They succeeded in acquiring the religious *vakuf* as well as educational autonomy, participated in elections and contributed to the functioning of parliament. A litmus test was World War I. The question being how would Bosniaks react and would they fight on the side of Austria-Hungary? The fatwa of the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul, for all Muslims to join the jihad against Russia, England, France and their allies, gave a clear answer as well as instruction to the Bosniaks. The Bosniaks turned out to be among the bravest and most loyal soldiers within the Austro-Hungarian military. A Bosniak elite unit was formed, while several hundred graves, and written documents confirm the loyalty of the Bosniaks during this most critical period of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In concluding this scholarly work, it becomes evident that the narrative has navigated through the intricate dynamics of an encounter between the Christian and Islamic spheres within Europe, situated specifically in the context of Bosnia. This text has employed the notion of loyalty as a critical analytical framework, particularly focusing on the Bosniaks. It has rigorously examined the multifaceted responses of the Bosniaks amidst the substantial transformations characteristic of the transitional period in Bosnia during the 19th and 20th centuries. Central to the discourse presented in this volume are the pivotal elements of these changes, notably encompassing the realignment of loyalties from the Ottoman to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the sustained adherence to Islamic faith, and the extensive adaptation to the new political, societal, economic and educational system.

The erosion of the old power structure cannot be measured in terms only of territories or battles lost but also with reference to the issue of loyalty of the previously governed population. This is why a chapter is devoted to the Congress of Berlin wherein it was decided by European great powers that Bosniaks would be ruled by Austria-Hungary. While Britain, France, Holland and Russia had already colonized dominantly Muslim countries in the Near East, Far East, Central Asia and Africa, Austria-Hungary was the last European state to assume control of a country with a significant Muslim population if we exclude the Italian occupation of Libya and Somalia later. At the peak of the Eastern Question (1875-1878), Bosnia became the center of European politics to be later repeated in 1914 and in 1992. Generally, due to the geostrategic situation during the uprising in 1875 and the Eastern Question, Bosnia was of key interest in European affairs. The events in the Balkans in 1877-1878 showed how easy it was for any ethnic group which had the support of one of the European great powers to uproot and drive away other ethnic or religious groups and establish its own political domination.

The decisions of the Congress of Berlin established a specific state system in Bosnia which allows several comparisons with today's situation. In 1878, the great powers decided on the government and borders of Bosnia as in 1995 when the great powers, led by the United States, concluded the Dayton Peace agreement. A specific and unique situation was created, not to mention an experiment. While in 1878, Austria-Hungary established its administration and stationed its military in Bosnia, the territory de facto

still belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Bosnia represented a legal provisorium and a legal anomaly. In the first place this was an international treaty which defined the status of Bosnia, and then a bilateral convention was needed to set the details. Similarly in 1995, another legal surprise: a peace agreement also contained a state constitution which, after almost thirty years has proven itself to be inefficient and unworkable.

Additionally, the problem of sovereignty which has occupied scholars was complicated when it came to Bosnia's status in 1878 and also today, since 1995. The several levels of governance within the political system of post-Dayton Bosnia (state, entity, canton level) do not reveal a clear locus of sovereignty of Bosnia, particularly because Republika Srpska's leading politicians clearly reject the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such and work for secession.

While economic growth was hindered during the Austro-Hungarian period due to the cost of the administration, the same scenario has been repeated since 1995 when the administration of Bosnia with its approximately 180 ministries (on state, entity and canton level) spends about 60% of the budget. Thus, a full-fledged all-out effort to establish a workable, stable and prosperous economy was not provided. Another comparison can be made regarding the negotiations. During the negotiations in Berlin, it was clear in advance that Bosnia would belong to Austria-Hungary's sphere of interest, and yet it remained a European issue. At Dayton in 1995, the USA was the main mediator but nonetheless Europe was involved through EU and NATO representatives. Still within the OHR (Office of the High Representative) the PIC (Peace Implementation Council) is the decisionmaking body and contains international representatives.

Bismarck's comment at the Congress that a stable Bosnia meant a stable Europe, is interesting for he saw it had an obligation to look for efficient means to prevent any further conflicts through a powerful state which possessed the necessary forces within reach of the flashpoint to reinstall order and secure the fate and future of this population.

Another point of comparison is the issue of the "unusual nature of governance." While during the Austro-Hungarian period, the supreme authority was at the same time the commander-in-chief of the 15th Army Corps who supervised the *civil adlatus* (aide-de-camp), a position designed to control the civil administration, the situation today in Bosnia is a unique form of semi-protectorate where the OHR has ultimate power but still insists on political ownership of local politicians who reveal a profound lack of willingness to work towards consensus.

Generally, the history of Bosnia reveals many similarities with and traits of European history in general. Roman presence, migration of peoples (Avars, Huns, Goths), early reformation via the proto-Protestant schismatic Bosnian Church, Bosnian dynasty as a part of European dynasties and nation building processes during the spring of nations, show that Europe or the West is a part of Bosnia's history and not at all unfamiliar to the Bosniaks. The Bosniaks, once the guardians of the medieval Bosnian state and the defenders of the northwest border of the Ottoman Empire against Austria-Hungary, became subjects of its old rival. Bosnia after having belonged for centuries to one societal system, became overnight a part of the non-Islamic European civilization. In comparison to other mainstream European countries, Bosnia developed delicate religious and national structures. With Austria-Hungary, the status of the Bosniak population changed totally. Bosniaks, like all the Balkan Muslims, became a religious minority. The new Austro-Hungarian monarchy was quite different from the Islamic-Ottoman political system, to which they previously belonged. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian period represents one of the most important periods for Bosnia in modern times. This was a period of deep internal changes regarding politics, economy, society and culture. These circumstances made it difficult to postulate loyalty, develop allegiances to the new authorities, and cultivate patriotism for the new state. Old loyalties faced new loyalties, and a reorientation of loyalties was required.

This study has shown that Bosniaks have gone through an interesting development initially showing severe resistance to Austria-Hungary, and eventually identifying fully with Austria-Hungary during World War I. In addition to their centuries old compatibility with diversity, as Bosnia has always been a multi-religious country, Bosniaks developed an adaptability to different political and societal systems.

From being a peripheral Ottoman province, Bosnia was incorporated into the concept of Central Europe and developed into the realm of modern capitalism. In all areas of economy, Austria-Hungary introduced modernized large-scale production and initiated mainly in the field of industry strong trade activity. Furthermore, a modern legal state and bourgeois organization of power was established. A duality of institutions was kept in order to provide a smooth transition from Ottoman to Central European standards. Thus, secular and religious courts existed next to each other, and religious schools continued to function while new schools with mixed curricula were introduced. Gradually, modern civic and cultural movements emerged which led to the formation of national political parties having differing and exclusive political as well as national goals. Thus, the research

has shown that a gradual adaptation to new political, economic and societal norms took place.

In terms of the key and initial question posed, whether the Bosniaks displayed loyalty towards non-Muslim authorities, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- a) In the extremely difficult times which followed the occupation Bosniaks, disoriented in a maze of complex historical and political processes, reacted by understanding Islam and Europe selectively. The process of incorporating new European values whilst maintaining Islamic precepts and identity evolved gradually, from an initial position of denial and resistance to acceptance with the passage of time and changing circumstances. The study has uncovered and examined multiple competing and conflicting loyalties which arose as a consequence. While ordinary citizens, especially in Sarajevo, revolted against the occupation and fought for the autonomy of Bosnia, others thought it useless to face a strong Austrian military and remained silent hoping for better times, with the more wealthy class fearing loss of their privileges accepting the new status quo and submitting to the new Empire. Hence, the significant break in Bosnia's course in 1878 provoked some to be activists, some statisticians and others observers.
- b) While initially reservations arose towards the new standards which were introduced firstly by the Ottoman Empire (*Tanzimat*) in the 1830s and then by Austria-Hungary (the 'cultural mission'), Bosniaks realized that overall progress goes hand-in-hand with education according to modern standards. The fact that Austria-Hungary did not pursue the same policy as its neighboring Orthodox states, where Muslims were exposed to forced migration, mass executions, forced conversions to Christianity and expropriation, made a change of loyalty easier.
- c) However, change from one civilization to another culture and way of life cannot occur easily, quickly or be free of pain. Even years after the occupation, Bosniaks felt lost and disoriented and had to decide whether to adapt to the new situation or to fail. Another option was to migrate to the remaining Ottoman lands. Mass migrations occurred when new political or economic measures were introduced by Austria-Hungary, such as the occupation in 1878, the introduction of conscription in 1881, and after the annexation in 1908.
- d) Within the Austro-Hungarian double monarchy, Bosnia was one of the few common initiatives of Austria and Hungary, and thus of special interest to both monarchies. Muslims were divided in pro- and anti-Austrian camps, but this was due to the fact that Austria-Hungary

preferred the privileged class of the Bosniaks over the ordinary citizens who were at that time mainly peasants. However, this does not mean that the Bosniak intellectual elite was either in favor of or against Austria-Hungary. This study has shown that they were more aware of the political circumstances, voiced criticism and demanded certain rights (e.g. campaign for religious and educational autonomy) using modern means (petitions, establishing political parties, participation in elections, involvement in parliament, etc.).

- e) Even if initially the Congress of Berlin was supposed to install peace, stability and security, this could not materialize immediately or easily. Within forty years, a terrible war occurred on European soil, the First World War. The Eastern Question was obviously not solved.
- f) Despite insecure times resulting from the Congress of Berlin and the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, after a period of being in opposition to the new ruler, gradually the Bosniaks started identifying with the new state which offered them religious freedoms and did not endanger their physical nor material existence. Thus, clear elements of loyalty could be identified, such as the influential mediating role of Bosniak intellectuals (religious and secular), the pro-Austro-Hungarian contents of several journals, modern political parties demanding what would today be understood as human rights participation in elections as well as the parliament, and the devoted commitment of the Bosniaks in the First World War on the side of Austria-Hungary. Ultimately, it can be concluded that the Bosniaks with these proofs of loyalty contributed to stability in Bosnia.

Gradually a change of mind took shape among the Bosniaks. With the rediscovery of Bosnia's pre-Ottoman history, the establishment of an Islamic community, *Vakuf* autonomy and the increasing role of reformist religious scholars, gradually Islam came to be separated from the Ottoman context and scholars tried instead to find answers to religious questions in original Islamic sources. This was particularly visible in the approach taken by Safvet-beg Bašagić and the journal *Behar*, wherein Islamic identity was more important than Ottoman heritage. The journal *Bošnjak*, in comparison focused on patriotism towards Bosnia as an integral part of Europe.

Throughout history, scholars have noted the Bosniaks' love for their native country Bosnia, that religious identity is important to them, that they display military courage when their lives are endangered and that they are loyal citizens. It is clearly apparent that for all Bosniaks there is an interplay of three elements necessary for the display of loyalty: Islam, Bosnia and the

Bosnian language. History bears witness that as long as their religious identity and practice, as well as the territorial integrity of their home country Bosnia and Herzegovina, and mother tongue has not been endangered, Bosniaks have adapted to new political, social and educational systems.

APPENDIX

THE POPULATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1878-1910*

Census in the Year	Orthodox		Muslims		Catholics		Jews		Others		Grand Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1879	496,485	42.88	448,613	38.73	209,391	18.08	3,426	0.29	249	0.02	1,158,164	100
1885	571,250	42.76	492,710	36.88	265,788	19.89	5,805	0.43	538	0.04	1,336,091	100
1895	673,246	42.94	548,632	34.99	334,142	21.31	8,213	0.52	3,859	0.24	1,568,092	100
1910	825,418	43.49	612,137	32.25	434,061	22.87	11,868	0.62	14,560	0.77	1,898,044	100

*This table is taken from Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegowina*, p.39.




Example of a title page
from the journal
Bošnjak (2 July 1891).
Gazi Husrev-bey Library



Musavat party
newspaper of the first
political party, the
MNO (Muslim
People's Organization)
in Cyrillic, Arabic and
Latin letters.
Gazi Husrev-bey Library



Hadži Lojo.
His name is written in Arabic letters. The Bosnian language, originally a Slavic language, was also written in Arabic letters that the people called *arebica*.
Wikimedia Commons.




Postcard showing the impressive cityhall Vijećnica (German Rathaus) built during the Austro-Hungarian period in a pseudo-Moorish style. During Socialist Yugoslavia this building was used as a university library. In August 1992, Serb forces burned it with two million books and manuscripts. EU rebuilt it after the war and today it serves as the Office of the Mayor of Sarajevo, gallery and a place of cultural events.

Gazi Husrev-beg Library



Postcard with cityhall Vijećnica built during the Austro-Hungarian period with the tram. The first electric tram in Europe was introduced in Sarajevo. Until today the tram drives the same route along the river Miljacka.

Gazi Husrev-beg Library



At the railway station in Sarajevo. Ulama and the Mayor Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak with a fes as headcover. Photo taken around 1898.

Gazi Husrev-beg Library



Students of a Primary School in Sarajevo (*VI Osnovna škola*) with their teacher Hamdija Kreševljaković, a relevant historian whose sources have been used for this book. The photo was taken on 26 June 1914, two days before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. *Gazi Husrev-beg Library*



Students of a Medresa during the Austro-Hungarian period. Photo taken in the beginning of the 20th century. On the top its says in German language Turkish students. These were not Turkish but Bonsiak students. “Turkish” stood for “Muslim.” *Gazi Husrev-beg Library*



Photo of the Reis ul-Ulema Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević and Oskar Potiorek. On the occasion of the nomination of Džemaluddin Čaušević as Reis ul-Ulema, the head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia in Sarajevo on 26 March 1914. Čaušević is in company of Oskar Potiorek who ruled over Bosnia from 1912-1914, and members of the Ulama majlis. They are walking towards the Emperor's mosque (Careva džamija) where Čaušević will receive the official document (*menšura*) that confirms his position as Reis ul-Ulema. Gazi Husrev-beg Library, Sarajevo.



APPENDIX

The following two photos are taken from the Austro-Hungarian marine cemetery in Pula, Croatia (*K.u.K. Marinefriedhof Pola*). The cemetery was established in 1862 and contains the graves of about 150,000 people. The gravestones show that Bosniaks were part of the Austro-Hungarian marines and fell as soldiers for Austria-Hungary. One should take into consideration that a marine is a more sophisticated and more professional unit of the military which requires the utmost loyalty and underlines the allegiance of these Bosniaks. The Arabic text on the gravestone in the photograph below reads:

He (Allah) is Eternal!

*Here is buried one who was among the best in service on the African continent
Hadži Kabil Efendija.*

May Allah be merciful to him.

1334 / 1915





NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University, 1997 and 2009).

² The war that occurred in 1992-1995 in Bosnia has been called various in various ways (a war of conquest, aggression, civil war, religious war). Yugoslav political leadership under Slobodan Milošević clearly stated “all Serbs in one state” which meant the establishment of a Greater Serbia. Thus, Yugoslavia under the leadership of Serbia forcibly wanted to keep Yugoslavia and did not accept the democratic referenda as well as the declarations of independence firstly of Slovenia, then Croatia and lastly Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the war in Bosnia was a typical example of an aggression and a war of conquest. Furthermore, Serbia wanted to split one part of Croatia and attach it to Serbia, too. Later, Croatia under the leadership of Tudjman aspired to gain a part of Bosnia and attach it to Croatia. As Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) civilians, their property (e.g. houses) and Islamic material culture (mainly mosques) were targeted most, elements of a religious war (Christians against Muslims) became evident. Local Serb and Croat separatist movements within Bosnia which were armed and took territory by force gave it traits of a civil war. Additionally, Bosnian Serb and Croat militias were infused with soldiers from Croatia and Serbia. However, countless Bosnian Serbs and Croats also fought on the side of the Bosnian army aiming at preserving a multi-ethnic as well as multi-religious state of Bosnia.

³ All necessary translations from Bosnian, German and French language into English were done by the author.

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CHAPTER 1

1 Loyalty is often mentioned, if not even a key term, in economics, business and particularly marketing, related to binding the customer to a product, a brand or a company in general. Marketing literature is heavy with the term loyalty, but lacks, as Connor puts it, the "emotion of loyalty". See James Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty* (New York: Springer, 2007), p.vii. In the era of consumer capitalism it is surely a relevant element. However, this book focuses on loyalty to and between people, communities, institutions and governments, and will not be illuminated from that perspective.

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28 The Sephardic Jewish community in Bosnia immigrated in the 15th and 16th century when they were, alongside Muslims, persecuted by the Spanish crown during the *Reconquista*. Then Sultan Mehmed Fatih guaranteed the Jews a safe haven and religious freedom within the Ottoman Empire. Later in the 19th century during Austro-Hungarian rule, Ashkenazi Jews settled in Bosnia. Thus, Bosnia has Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jewish communities to this day.

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- 56 The five pillars of Islam are proclaiming that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His messenger, praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, giving alms, and performing the pilgrimage to Makkah.
- 57 Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld, 'Loyalty to a non-Muslim Government: An Analysis of Islamic Normative Discussions and of the Views of some Contemporary Islamicists' in *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in non-Muslim States* (Kok Pharos, 1996), pp.86-87.

58 Ibid., p.88. In the 1920s as a part of French assimilation policy, French authorities offered French nationality and citizenship to Tunisian and Algerian Muslims only if they accepted French civil law and abandoned Islamic law. This led to a fierce resistance from some Muslim legal scholars, and many equated the adoption of French citizenship with apostasy.

59 It is said that Abduh commented about the West and East as follows: "I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Abdul_Aziz. Accessed 23 January 2012.

60 This school of thought launched its influential scholarly journal *al-Manar* which was aimed at raising Muslims' awareness and unity. See Enes Karić, *Tumačenje Kur'ana i ideologije XX stoljeća* (Sarajevo: Bemust, 2002), pp.13-24.

61 Ismet Bušatlić, 'Hadži Mustafa Hilmi-efendija Hadžiomerović', *Islamska Misao* 82 (1985), pp.3-8.

62 Azabagić's treatise *Risālah fi al-Hijra* published in 1884 dealt among others with life under non-Muslim rule. It was translated by Osman Lavić in 1990, Mehmed Teufik Azabagić, "Risala o hidžri," [Writings about Emigration]. Anali Gazi Husrev begove biblioteke 16-17 (1990), pp. 197-222. Osman Lavić, "Iseljavanje Bošnjaka Muslimana iz BiH za vrijeme Austro-Ugarske vladavine i risala Mehmeda Teufika Azabagića" [Emigration of Bosnian Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule as Written by Mehmed Teufik Azabagić], Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke 17-18 (1996), pp. 123-129.

63 Rida as quoted in Muhamed Mufaku Al-Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878-1918: Two Hijras and Two Fatwas', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 5 (2) (1994), p.253.

64 Shadid and Koningsveld, 'Loyalty to a non-Muslim Government,' p.87.

65 Not only Bosniaks, but Balkan Muslims in general as well as Muslims in the Caucasus, Lebanon, India and Nigeria were seeking fatwas regarding their life in non-Muslim societies.

66 In an undated book edited by Jasser Auda, these authors present the various aspects of Muslims under non-Muslim rule, particularly in the West: Jasser Auda (ed.), *Rethinking Islamic Law for Minorities: Towards a Western-Muslim Identity*. Published 5 December 2016. http://www.jasserauda.net/new/pdf/kamil_fiqh_alaqalliyat.pdf. Without page numbers (*sine pagine*). Accessed 19 April 2022.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid. However, scholars have not been able to ascertain what they mean by it. Moreover, the concept of law (*qanūn* or legal statutes) were not known even in Muslim majority states until 19th century.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*, p.168.

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72 Al Bukhari, 4312 in Ibn Hajar, v. 8, p. 32.

73 March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*, p.168.

74 In this regard, several attempts were made, such as the the initiative of Mustafa Cerić, previous grandmufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some other influential scholars to establish an institution of a European mufti. However, this initiative could not be realized yet, mainly due to the heterogenous composition of Muslims in Europe and a lack of consensus about leadership. On the other side, the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), a Dublin based foundation composed of Islamic theologians and scholars presided at the time by Yusuf al-Qardawi was established in 1997 and aims at representing Muslim minorities in the West. The Council issues fatwas and asserts the life of Muslims in non-Muslim states. Some of the questions they deal with are relevant to the issue of loyalty: application for citizenship to a non-Muslim country of residence which implies an oath of citizenship, adherence to a monarchy, constitution, military service; political participation in the secular political system by joining political parties, supporting (non-) Muslim candidates, congratulations to non-Muslims on their religious holidays, acceptance of a court ruling from a non-Muslim juridical system based on non-Muslim law etc.

75 Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, p.88.

76 Asad, *The Message of the Qur'an*, p.139.

77 March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*, p.185.

78 Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, p.96.

79 March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*, pp.186, 190-196.

80 Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, p.27.

81 Ibid., pp.92-93.

82 This reference is taken from Mustafa Cerić in the paper 'Towards a European-Islamic Identity' in Jasser Auda, *Rethinking Islamic Law for Minorities*.

83 Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, p.86.

84 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*, p.18.

85 Ibid., p.35.

86 Ibid., p.17.

87 Ibid., p.1.

88 For example, 1 May is proclaimed Loyalty Day in the United States where the heritage of American freedom is celebrated and parades as well as ceremonies are organized. General examples can be the conscription debate during the World Wars and Vietnam conflict. In the Bosnian case, the conscription debate is highlighted below, concerning Austria-Hungarian introduction of conscription in Bosnia. National loyalty is fostered through a common language, geography, history, traditions, suffering and sorrow. For example, remembrances and celebrations are very important, such as the Commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide on 11 July, the Days of *Ajvatovica* (a traditional Muslim pilgrimage in Bosnia), and Independence

Day on 1 March, etc. These give individuals a sense of their country's history and character. Connor includes sporting events and reminds his readers that the Sydney Olympics was one of the most nationalistic events that has occurred in Australia. Similarly, in Bosnia the national football (soccer) team causes national hype all around the country.

89 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*, p.47.

90 Ibid., p.48.

91 Ibid., p.2.

92 Ibid., p.5.

93 Ibid., pp.4-5.

94 Ibid., pp.14-52.

95 Ibid., p.11.

96 Ibid., pp.38-39.

97 Ibid., p.18.

98 Judith N. Shklar, 'Obligation, Loyalty, Exile', *Political Theory* 21 (2) (May 1993), pp.181-197.

99 Ibid., p.186.

100 Ibid., p.186.

101 Simon Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

102 Fletcher, *Loyalty*.

103 Anna Stilz, *Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

104 Maximilian Hartmuth, 'Between Vienna and Istanbul: Imperial Legacies, Visual Identities, and "High" Layers of Architectural Discourse in/on Sarajevo, c. 1900 and 2000' in *Images of Imperial Legacy*, Tea Sindbaek and Maximilian Hartmuth (eds.) (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011), pp.79-80.

105 Orest Subtelny, 'The Habsburg and Russian Empires: Some Comparisons and Contrasts', in Teruyuki Hara and Kimitaka Matsuzato (eds) *Empire and Society: New Approaches to Russian History* (Sapporo, 1997), pp.73-92.

106 Ferid Muhić, 'Mit o kršćanskoj Evropi i Islamskom Orijentu. Bosna kao povijesna i kulturna paradigma Evrope' [Myth about Christian Europe and Islamic Orient. Bosnia as a historical and cultural paradigm of Europe]. Unpublished paper presented at XVI Znanstveni Skup u Islamskom Centru Zagreb [25th Scientific Symposium in the Islamic Centre of Zagreb], Zagreb, May 2011.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCEiLDNzi8M>. Ferid Muhić, *Islamski identitet Evrope* (Sarajevo: CNS, 2014). Accessed 18 April 2022.

107 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in South East Europe After 1878: A Reinterpretation' in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), (Wiesbaden: Franz-Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp.385-410.

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- 108 Ibid., p.389.
- 109 Subtelny, *The Habsburg and Russian Empires*, p.79.
- 110 Ibid.
- 111 Ibid., pp. 78-90.
- 112 Karpát, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp.355-356.
- 113 Peter Haslinger and Joachim von Puttkamer (eds.) *Staat, Loyalität und Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1918-1941* [State, Loyalty and minorities in East-Central and SouthEast Europe 1918-1941], (München: Oldenbourg, 2007).
- 114 Luchterhand, *Nationale Minderheiten*.
- 115 Wessel, 'Loyalität', pp. 1-22.
- 116 Luchterhand, *Nationale Minderheiten*, p.27.
- 117 In Bosnian *Karlovački mir*, Turkish *Karlofça Antlaşması*.
- 118 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*, p.12.
- 119 Morton Grodzins, *The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason* (Cleveland: Meridian, 1956), pp.10-11.
- 120 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*, p.12.
- 121 Wessel, 'Loyalität', pp. 1-3.
- 122 In Copenhagen in 1993, the European Union set additional requirements for membership, particularly for former communist states of Central, East and South-East Europe. Thus, aspirant countries for the European Union have to show respect and protection for minorities, establish stable democratic institutions, adopt a market economy, adapt to the rule of law and apply human rights.
- 123 This applies to the case of Austria-Hungary's policy towards the Bosniaks. In contrast to the neighboring Orthodox countries and diverse Yugoslav political systems (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Kingdom of Yugoslavia; Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Austria-Hungary after establishing its rule, did not pursue a policy of repression, but rather protection.
- 124 Luchterhand cites Beneš: *Der Teufel spricht deutsch...Es gibt keine guten Deutschen...Das ganze deutsche Volk ist für Hitler, Himmler, Henlein und für Frank verantwortlich, und das ganze Volk muss auch die Strafen für die begangenen Verbrechen tragen*. [The devil speaks German ...There are no good Germans...The whole German population is responsible for Hitler, Himmler, Henlein and Frank and the whole German population has to undergo a punishment for the crimes committed]. See Luchterhand, *Nationale Minderheiten*, pp.25-33.
- 125 See loyalty declarations in Luchterhand, *Nationale Minderheiten*, pp.56-66. Declarations of loyalty were required in the first Bosnian constitution introduced by Austria-Hungary.
- 126 Wessel, 'Loyalität', p.3.
- 127 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*, p.50.

- 128 Ibid., p.33.
- 129 Luchterhand, *Nationale Minderheiten*, p.16.
- 130 Peter Haslinger and Joachim von Puttkamer (eds.) *Staat, Loyalität und Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1918-1941* [State, Loyalty and Minorities in East-Central and South-East Europe 1918-1941], (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), pp.1-16.
- 131 Wessel, 'Loyalität', p.12.
- 132 Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Political Loyalty and the Nation-State* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p.1.
- 133 Ibid., pp.1-2.
- 134 Ibid., p.2.
- 135 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*, p. 134.
- 136 Wessel, 'Loyalität', p.13.
- 137 Stilz, *Liberal Loyalty*, pp.vii-7.
- 138 Tariq Ramadan, *What I Believe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.39.
- 139 Stilz, *Liberal Loyalty*, pp.4-8.
- 140 Ibid., p.93.
- 141 Ibid., p.8.
- 142 Wessel, 'Loyalität', p.7.
- 143 Waller and Linklater, *Political Loyalty*, p.6.

CHAPTER 2

1 Thus, Bosniaks are often perceived as a bridge between East and West. However, during the war in 1992-1995 they felt betrayed by Europe as no clear support was shown for the survival of Bosnia and its citizens.

2 This document is issued by Kulin Ban, a medieval ruler of Bosnia, guaranteeing safety and security to merchants from Dubrovnik. It is often claimed to be the birth certificate of Bosnia because this document proves that there is a country called Bosnia which is ruled by a Ban (head of state) and whose borders are approximately like today's borders (river Sava in the north, Una in the west, etc.), the inhabitants are Bosniaks and Bosnian language is spoken. Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* (Sarajevo: Preporod, 2006), p.32.

3 See Smail Balić, 'Der ethische Habitus der patriarchalischen Bosniaken' [The Ethical Habitus of the Patriarchal Bosniaks], *Anatolica* 3 (1960-1970), pp.213-235; Smail Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien* (Köln: Böhlau, 1992).

4 Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine Jr., *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.4.

5 This experienced Bosniak refugees between 1992-1995 when fleeing from Serb and Croat military forces to Bosnia's deep forests in the mountains.

6 Noel Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens* [The History of Bosnia], (translation of the book *Bosnia. A Short History*), (Frankfurt, 1996), p.19.

7 Saxons (Bosnian *Sasi*) are German immigrants who mainly came as miners to Bosnia and other regions of South-Eastern Europe. On the formation process of the Bosniaks see Muhamed Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta* [From Tradition to Identity], (Sarajevo, 1974); Muhamed Hadžijahić, 'Bogumilstvo i Islamizacija' [Bogumilism and Islamization] in *Islam i Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Islam and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina], M. Mrahorović (eds.) (Sarajevo, 1991), pp.39-142; and Srećko Džaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche" und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg* [The "Bosnian Church" and the Islamization Problem in the Researches After the Second World War], (Munich, 1978).

8 Eric Hobsbawm, *Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: CUP, 1983).

9 Elizabeth Tonkin, Malcolm Kenneth Chapman, Maryon McDonald (eds.), *History and Ethnicity* (London: Routledge, 1989), p.18. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

10 Enes Karić, *Essays (on behalf) of Bosnia* (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), p.89.

11 Mehmed Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine* [Islamization of Bosnia-Hercegovina], (Sarajevo, 1940).

12 The Bosnian Church showed certain similarity with the doctrines of Persian dualism according to which there are two principles: on the one hand there is a heavenly and rationally intangible father as a creator of an invisible world (the principle of light) and on the other hand, there is the evil spirit (principle of the dark: the devil, Lucifer, profane creator of the visible world). See Nijaz Duraković, 'Muslimani – od religioznog do nacionalnog' [Muslims – from religious to national], *Pogledi* 4 (1983), pp.66-78; Smail Balić, 'Der Islam zwischen Donau und Adria. Sein Werden und Wesen' [Islam between Danube and Adriatic. Its growth and character], *Anatolica* 1 (1967), pp.93-104; and Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*. The roots of this heretical doctrine coming from Asia Minor spread through the Middle Ages via the Balkans to Northern Italy and Southern France (Cathars, Waldensians) and influenced the views of heretical sects in East and West roman churches. In Turkish sources Bosnian heretics are named *krstjani*, *gebr* or *kafir*. See Tayyib Okić, *Les Kristians (Bogomiles parfaits) de Bosnie d'après de documents turcs inédits* [Kristians (Bogumils) from Bosnia according to unedited Turkish documents], *Südosteuropaforschungen* 19 (1960), pp.108-133. Džaja, in contrast, mentions Latin sources in which adherents of the Bosnian Church are named as Bogumils, Katharers, Manichaers, Heretics, Pagans (*infideles*) or just Bosnians. See Džaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche"*, pp.39-45. Also see L. Von Südland, *Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg*. [The South-Slav Question and the World War], (Zagreb, 1918); Dominik Mandić, *Etnička povijest Bosne i Hercegovine* [Ethnic History of Bosnia-Hercegovina], (Toronto, 1982); and Enver Imamović, *Korijeni Bosne i Bosanstva* [Roots of Bosnia and Bosniandom], (Sarajevo, 1995).

13 Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine*, pp.10-16; and Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien*, p.90.

14 Elvira Bijedić, *Der Bogomilenmythos. Eine umstrittene 'historische Unbekannte' als Identitätsquelle in der Nationsbildung der Bosniaken* [The Bogumil Myth. A Disputed 'Historical Unknown' as Source of Identity for the Nationbuilding of the Bosniaks], (Phil. Diss. Heidelberg 2009).

15 Enver Imamović, *Korijeni Bosne i Bosanstva*, p.166.

16 Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine*, p.31; Džaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche"*, p.36; Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1995); and E. Imamović, *Korijeni Bosne i Bosanstva*, pp.153-160.

17 Balić makes an interesting comparison: "The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina maintained towards the Croats the same type of relationship as German Swiss and Austrians might have towards Germans. (...) They build their own communities of fate. There are also examples abroad: The Boers in South Africa who migrated from the Netherlands no longer see themselves as Dutch but developed their own identity in their new homeland. It is similar for the Bosniaks. Until they were ready to understand themselves as a separate nation with their own identity and until they were accepted by their neighbours, the Serbs and Croats, a learning process needed to be undergone which was accompanied by difficulties." See Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien*, p.90. See more on "ethnic boundaries" in Frederic Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Oslo: Waveland, 1969).

18 The native nobility had relationships with European dynasties which reached Hungary, Poland and France. For example, Queen Jadwiga of Poland was the daughter of Elizabeth of Bosnia from the Kotromanić dynasty and King Louis from Hungary. She was the first woman to become Queen of Poland. Her sarcophagus still stands in Krakow, the medieval capital of Poland, in the main chapel where all medieval political and religious leaders of Poland are buried. Interestingly, Krakow became later an integral part of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, the concerns of the Bosnian Church were discussed even at the Council of Basel (1433) with the presence of its representatives.

19 Jorgen Nielsen, 'Muslims in Europe: An Overview', *Research Papers* 12 (1981), p.1.

20 Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine*, p.26; and Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, p.74.

21 This concept is still contested among scholars. Noel Malcolm, for example, disagrees with this argumentation.

22 Muhamed Hadžijahić, *Porijeklo bosanskih Muslimana* [Origins of Bosniaks], (Sarajevo, 1990), pp.100-109; Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien*, pp.97-98.

23 Bringa, *Being Muslim*, pp.16-17.

24 Hadžijahić refers to two sources. Petar Masarechi, a Christian traveler, who described the mass conversion to Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1624 as follows: "I was told that near to Sutjeska six or seven thousand Catholics left their faith." Also, Marko Trebinjac noted in 1509 that many abandoned the Orthodox Church and converted to Islam. See Okić, *Les Kristians*, pp.108-133; Hadžijahić, 'Muhamed, Bogumilstvo i Islamizacija', pp.51-52.

25 Hadžijahić, 'Muhamed, Bogumilstvo i Islamizacija', pp.40-41.

26 Ibid., p.40; and Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, pp. 72-73.

27 See Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine*, pp.20-22; Balić, 'Der Islam,' pp.99-103; Bringa, *Being Muslim*, 14-15; Gerhard Neweklowsky, *Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime. Geschichte. Bräuche. Alltagskultur* [Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims. History. Customs. Everyday culture], (Klagenfurt and Salzburg: Wieser, 1996)15; and Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, pp. 74-84.

28 In simple terms, if every year 1% of the population had converted to Islam, within approximately 450 years of Ottoman presence in the Balkans, mathematically the Balkans, including Bosnia, would have an absolute Muslim majority.

29 Srećko Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegovina in der österreichisch-ungarischen Epoche, 1878-1918. Die Intelligentsia zwischen Tradition und Ideologie* [Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Austro-Hungarian Period 1878-1918. The Intelligentsia between Tradition and Ideology]. *Südosteuropäische Arbeiten*, vol. 93, (Munich, 1994), p.39.

30 Fine, John V. A., *The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries* (New York and London: Boulder, 1975), p. 382.

31 Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, p.58.

32 Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p.42.

33 Džaja counted 66,867 such *stećak*-tombs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Džaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche"*, pp.21-26. Also see Bringa, *Being Muslim*, p.17; Neweklowsky, *Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime*, p.14; E. Imamović, *Korijeni Bosne i Bosanstva*, pp.145-260; Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, pp.48-50.

34 Hadžijahić, 'Muhamed, Bogumilstvo i Islamizacija', p.82.

35 Until today, several pre-Islamic habits remain a Bosniak tradition, such as to meet the first Tuesday after *Ali un* on the mountain *Konjuh* close to the city Kladanj to stay overnight and pray. This custom goes back to pagan times. See Hadžijahić, *Porijeklo bosanskih Muslimana*, pp. 80-87; and Hadžijahić, 'Muhamed, Bogumilstvo i Islamizacija', pp.83-89.

36 Hadžijahić, *Porijeklo bosanskih Muslimana*, p.80.

37 This is visible in the Bosniak uprisings against the interferences of the Ottoman administration especially in the 19th century and in their demands towards Austria-Hungary. Enver Redžić, 'O posebnosti bosanskih muslimana,' [About the Peculiarities of Bosnian Muslims], *Pregled* 40 (4), 1970, pp.468-469.

- 38 Robert J. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina 1878-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p.3.
- 39 Redžić, 'O posebnosti bosanskih muslimana', p.462.
- 40 Hadžijahić, 'Turska komponenta u etnogenezi bosnanskih muslimana' [Turkish Component in the Ethnogenesis of the Bosniaks], *Pregled* 18 (1966), pp.489-49; and Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, pp. 72-87.
- 41 Mehmed Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine* [Islamization of Bosnia-Hercegovina], (Sarajevo, 1940), p.27.
- 42 Arabic was the language of Islamic knowledge, Turkish was the language of the Ottoman administration, Persian was the language of fine arts and poetry.
- 43 Smail Balić, *Kultura Bošnjaka. Muslimanska komponenta*, 2nd edn. (Zagreb: R&R Tuzla, 1994), pp. 77-183.
- 44 Bringa, *Being Muslim*, p.18.
- 45 Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien*, p.105.
- 46 Karić, *Essays (on behalf) of Bosnia*, p.93.
- 47 Avdo Humo, 'Istorijski i aktuelni aspekt nacionalnog položaja Muslimana' [Historical and Current Aspect of Muslims' national status], *Pregled* 60 (1970), p.431; and Donia and Lockwood, 'The Bosnian Muslims', p.191.
- 48 Mehmed Paša Sokolović is one example of an originally Orthodox Christian family from Eastern Bosnia in Višegrad who became an influential Ottoman statesman in the 16th century.
- 49 Hadžijahić, *Porijeklo bosanskih Muslimana*, p.103; and Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, p.86.
- 50 Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, p.38. The Bosniak "continual organizational existence" can be traced back to the Bosnian Church, the affiliation to Islam, Bosniak cultural and political newspapers, magazines, organizations, parties as well as sports, folklore and cultural clubs. See more in Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegovina*.
- 51 Fikret Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi modernosti. Kasni osmanlijski i habsburški period* [The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity], (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 2004), p.25.
- 52 Ibid., p.28.
- 53 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in South East Europe After 1878: A Reinterpretation' in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), (Wiesbaden: Franz-Steiner Verlag, 1982), p.391.
- 54 Ibid., p.394.
- 55 Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations', p.392.
- 56 Philippe Gelez, 'Towards a Prosopography of the Deputies from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the First Ottoman Parliament' in *The First Ottoman Experiment in Democracy*. Christoph Herzog and Malek Sharif (ed.), (Würzburg: Ergon, 2010), p.223.
- 57 Ibid.

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58 Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations', pp.392-393.

59 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, pp.33-70.

60 Gelez, 'Towards a Prosopography', pp.223-227.

61 Hartmuth, 'Between Vienna and Istanbul', p86.

62 Ibid., p.86.

63 Neumeyer and Schmidl noticed in their research on Bosniak military units within the Austro-Hungarian army that Orthodox and Catholics declared themselves as Bosniaks and belonged to the Bosniak regiment. For example, they entitled the biography of Gojkomir Glogovac (1883-1922) "*Mit Fez und Maschinengewehr*" [With fez and machine gun], referring to a Bosnian Croat/Catholic who, as shown in an illustration, wore what is today considered as a Muslim headcover the *fez* as part of his military uniform. Similarly, Stevo Duić or Pero Blašković, clearly Orthodox names, belonged to the Bosniak regiment wearing uniforms made for Bosniaks only, including the *fez* headcover. See Christoph Neumayer and Erwin A.Schmidl (eds.), *Des Kaisers Bosniaken. Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Truppen in der k.u.k. Armee. Geschichte und Uniformierung von 1878 bis 1918* [The Kaiser's Bosniaks. Bosnian-Herzegovinian troops in the k.u.k. army. History and Uniforms from 1878 to 1918], (Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2008), pp.316-322.

64 Interestingly, Bosnia and Lebanon are reminders of the diversity that existed throughout the Ottoman Empire before it was leveled by the emergence of nation-states in the Balkans. See Florian Bieber, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multireligious States,' *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (April 2000): pp.269-282; and Eşref Kenan Rašidagić, *Conflict Resolution Theories in Practice: Cases of Bosnia and Lebanon Examined* (Sarajevo: Rabic, 2002).

65 Xavier Bougarel, 'Balkan Muslims and Islam in Europe,' *Südosteuropa* 55 (4) (2007), p.341.

66 Karčić quotes McCarthy in Fikret Karčić, *Islamske Teme i Perspektive* [Islamic Topics and Perspectives], (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2009), p.113.

67 Justin McCarthy, *Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire. An Annotated Map*. Turkish Coalition of America, 2010.

<https://www.turkishstudiesproject.com/mccarthy-map>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

68 The above mentioned saying describes the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 19th and 20th century. When the Ottomans (Turkey) left Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims felt as orphans left without their "mother" while the Švabo (German/Austrian) was perceived as a father-figure as Austria-Hungary displayed strength, order and discipline, and did not pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing, forced migration and expropriation as was common in the rest of South-Eastern Europe against the remaining Muslim populations. With the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*bre* is a catchword used in Serbian and Montenegrin language), Bosnia lost its sovereignty and the Bosniak identity, language, culture and

property was taken away. At the end of the Austro-Hungarian period, the political system changed and anti-Muslim governments were established from 1918 which lasted until 1992. Another proverb says *Nesta Franje, nesta hrane* [Francis (Austrian emperor) gone, food gone]. Collected by Neweklowsky, *Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime*, p.190].

69 History was taught in conformity with the ideology of the socialist Yugoslav regime, for example by demonizing Germans (including Austria-Hungary) and heroizing Gavrilo Princip and the organization Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia).

70 In the census of 1948, Muslims had three options. They could declare themselves Serbs of Muslim faith, Croats of Muslim faith or nationally undecided. In the following census of 1953, official politics enforced the spirit of the Yugoslav nation, and at once about 900,000 “Yugoslavs” appeared in Bosnia. Muslim was on purpose written with a small letter “m”, whereas later a capital letter “M” was introduced to signal Muslim as a nation. This is why there is talk of “*Muslimani sa malim i velikim ‘M’*” [Muslims with a small and capital letter ‘M’]. Being named in a national sense as Muslims was an invention by the state institutions. On the other side, it might indicate that for the Bosniaks religion, Bosnian language and territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were of utmost importance. So if Bosnian language was not recognized, at least they were recognized within the then federal republic of Bosnia and as a religious community. On the other side, communist ideology largely reduced religious practice and there were paradox situations of those who might have declared themselves as Muslims in a national sense and were atheists.

71 Barth, *Ethnic Groups*, p.14. As an example, Christian women in provincial areas would rather wear small black or white headscarves while traditional Bosniak headscarves are larger (*šamija*). Bosniak men would instead wear the French style black beret (*francuzica*) while non-Bosniak men rather wore hats.

72 Donia and Lockwood, ‘The Bosnian Muslims’, pp.199-200.

73 Barth, *Ethnic Groups*, p.15.

74 This title is taken from Tone Bringa’s (1995) book.

75 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (died 905) established the theological school which elaborated the principles of Abū Ḥanīfah (died 767). Thus, the spread of Islam under Ottoman rule meant in the same time the spread of Māturīdī’s understanding of theology and Hanafi interpretation of Shari‘ah.

76 Fikret Karčić, ‘Šta je to “Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka”?’ [What is “the Bosniak Islamic tradition”?], *Preporod* 841 (1 December 2006), pp.14-15.

77 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islam: Religion, History and Civilization* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).

78 The established hierarchy in the Ottoman state had no precedent in the early history of Islam. Within this hierarchy several categories were established: ritual *ulema* (imams, khatibs), educational *ulema* (muderris), jurisprudential *ulema* (mufti, kadi),

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and on the top level was the Shaykh al-Islam, the highest religious figure among Sunni Muslims. Muftis in Bosnia were appointed by the Shaykh al-Islam.

79 Karić, *Essays (on behalf) of Bosnia*, p. 93.

80 William G. Lockwood, *European Moslems: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia* (New York, 1975); and Bringa, *Being Muslim*.

81 Bringa, *Being Muslim*, p.7.

82 Ibid., p.231.

83 Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, *Homo Creator*. (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1962), p.216.

84 Christian Moe, 'A Sultan in Brussels? European Hopes and Fears of Bosnian Muslims' in *Balkan Muslims and Islam in Europe* (Südosteuropa: Zeitschrift des Südost Instituts, 2007), p.385.

85 Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle*, p.1.

86 See Isaković, 1993, p.6; Senahid Halilović, *Bosanski jezik* [Bosnian language], (Sarajevo, 1991), pp.14-17; and Ivo Pilar, Ivo, *Eine Geschichte Kroatiens, Serbiens und Bosniens* (Heiligenhof: Bad Kissingen, 1995), p.147.

87 Halilović mentions dozens of historical sources from different countries which talk about the existence of a Bosnian language used by various peoples living in Bosnia. See Halilović, *Bosanski jezik*, pp.19-34; Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta*, p.22; and Isaković, 1993, pp.16-18.

88 There are about 4 million Bosniaks living in Turkey today. This is due to various emigration waves during the Austro-Hungarian occupation 1878-1918. But also World War I, World War II, the establishment of the communist regime and the war in 1992 caused further migration waves towards Turkey. Those emigrants still partially identify themselves as Bosniaks. See Safet Bandžović, 'History in a "Broken Mirror": Demographic De-Ottomanization of the Balkans and Identity Changes of the Refugees' in *Both Muslim and European. Diasporic and Migrant Identities of Bosniaks*, Dževada Šuško (ed.), (Leiden: Brill, 2019), pp.17-56.

89 Muhamed Hadžijahić, 'Die Anfänge der nationalen Entwicklungen in Bosnien und der Herzegowina' [The Beginnings of the national developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina], *Südostforschungen* 21 (1962), p.184; and Halilović, *Bosanski jezik*, p.25.

90 There are approximately 10,000 Turkish words in the Bosnian language. Abdullah Škaljić, *Turcizmi u srpskohrvatskom-hrvatskosrpskom jeziku* [Turkish words in Serbocroatian-Croatianserbian language], (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1973), pp.23-26.

91 Isaković, 1993, p.6; Halilović, *Bosanski jezik*, pp.13-17.

92 Alija Isaković, *Karakteristične leksike u bosanskome jeziku* [Characteristic Lexica in Bosnian Language], (Wuppertal: Bambi, 1992), p.24.

93 When the Netherlands separated from Germany in 1648, their language was still perceived as German. However, during a political nation building process the Dutch language emerged and became classified. Similarly, the Dutch speaking Boers

developed a new language, Afrikaans, when they migrated in the 17th century to Africa. Harald Haarmann, *Die Sprachenwelt Europas. Geschichte und Zukunft der Sprachnationen zwischen Atlantik und Ural* [The World of Languages. History and Future of National Languages between the Atlantic and Ural] (Frankfurt: Campus, 1993).

94 Hadžijahić, 'Die Anfänge', pp.176-177; Halilović, *Bosanski jezik*, p.71; Malcolm, *Die Geschichte Bosniens*, p.123.

95 Halilović, *Bosanski jezik*, pp.72-73; Dževad Jahić, *Jezik Bosanskih Muslimana* [The Language of the Bosniaks], (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Kljucanin, 1994), pp.92-99; Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien*, pp.271-278.

96 Isaković as quoted in Elvedin Subašić, 'Narodni preporod Alije Isakovića' [People's renaissance and Alija Isaković]. *Preporod*, 6 (968) (2012), p.37.

97 The Austro Hungarian Consul addressed the still acting Ottoman governor Mazhar-pasha in Sarajevo with these words. See Konrad Vasić, Austro-Hungarian Consul in Sarajevo, quoted from Rešad Kadić, *Hadži Lojo* (Sarajevo: Starješinstvo Islamske zajednice, 1982), p.19.

CHAPTER 3

1 One exception is the European Revolutions of 1848/49, known also as the Spring of Nations.

2 Imanuel Geiss, 'Der Berliner Kongreß – Eine historische Retrospektive' [The Berlin Congress – A historical Retrospective] in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.) (Wiesbaden: Franz-Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp.31-49.

3 In Bosnian *Sanstefanski mir*, Turkish *Ayastefanos Antlaşması*.

4 Aydin Babuna, 'The Berlin Treaty, Bosnian Muslims, and Nationalism' in *War and Diplomacy* (Hakan Yavuz (eds.), (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2011), p.198.

5 According to Erik-Jan Zürcher, the Ottoman Empire in 1844 had a population of 32 million. In comparison, European great powers had around the middle of the 19th century the following populations: Great Britain, 27.3 million; France, 35.8 million; Austria-Hungary, 30.7 million; and Germany, 41 million citizens. See Erik-Jan Zürcher, 'The Ottoman Empire 1850-1922 – Unavoidable Failure?', (Leiden: no date), p.4. <http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/turks/Ottomans/ejz31.pdf>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

6 Zürcher, 'The Ottoman Empire', pp.7-8.

7 Karpat claims that Ignatieff's memoirs reveal that the uprisings and insurrections in the Balkans were engineered almost to the smallest detail in Russian or Austrian embassies and consular offices. See Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations', p. 393.

8 In Bosnian *Kučukkainardžijski mir*, Turkish *Küçük Kaynarca Antlaşması*.

9 Karčić, 'The Eastern Question', p.635. It has been argued that the Eastern Question was never solved because the interests of the great powers and the mentality among contemporary Balkan Christian national elites have survived until today in the 21st century. Thus, whenever there have been moments of political instability, this issue has had cyclical resurgences, particularly from Serbia, Russia and Turkey. See Karčić, 'The Eastern Question;' and Matthew Z. Mayer, 'The Eastern Question Unresolved. Europe, US and the Western Balkans', *International Journal* 60 (1) (2004/2005), pp.237-246. Mayer states: "The constant redrawing of the Balkan map by European statesmen in the late 19th and early 20th centuries continues to divide the different ethnic groups, many of whom harbor feelings of resentment and mistrust against the great powers for treating their ancestors like pawns."

10 M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.388.

11 Lothar Gall, *Die europäischen Mächte und der Balkan im 19. Jahrhundert* [European Powers and the Balkans in the 19th century] in Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (ed.) *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878* (Wiesbaden: Franz-Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp.1-16.

12 Karčić, 'The Eastern Question', pp.640-648.

13 Ibid., p.637.

14 Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations', p.38.

15 Isa Blumi, 'Seeing Beyond the River Drin: Sarajevo, Ottoman Albanians and Imperial Rivalry in the Balkans after 1878', *Kakanien Revisited* (Vienna, 2007), p.2. <https://www.kakanien-revisited.at/beitr/fallstudie/IBlumi1.pdf>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

16 Gall, *Die europäischen Mächte*, p.5.

17 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, p.xiv.

18 Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

19 Karpat, 'The Social and Political Foundations', p.388.

20 Ibid., p.385. Karpat states that "one of the reasons which induced Russia to launch the war under the pretext of 'liberating the Christians' was the fear that the reforms contemplated by Mithat Pasha, and his embryonic, 'republican-populist' group might take root and succeed in solving the country's problems" Similarly, Bandžović states that the Ottoman Empire had the role of a fridge which kept the Balkan nationalisms in a frozen status. When the Ottoman Empire declined, nationalisms awoke with the help of some European powers. See Safet Bandžović, 'Demografska deosmanizacija Balkana i kretanja bosanskohercegovačkih muhadžira (1878-1914)' [Demographic deottomanization of the Balkans and the migrations of Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees (1878-1914)]. Conference proceedings of the international conference *Bosna i Hercegovina u okviru Austro-Ugarske 1878-1918* (Sarajevo: Faculty of Philosophy, 2011), p.207.

21 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß – Eine historische Retrospektive*, p.34.

- 22 Ibid., p.38.
- 23 Hartmuth, 'Between Vienna and Istanbul', p.84.
- 24 Horst Haselsteiner, 'Zur Haltung der Donaumonarchie in der Orientalischen Frage' [On the attitude of the Danube monarchy towards the Eastern Question] in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), (Wiesbaden: Franz-Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp.227-229.
- 25 Ibid., p.234.
- 26 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, p.xiv.
- 27 Haselsteiner, 'Zur Haltung', p.236.
- 28 Andreas Hillgruber, *Südosteuropa in Bismarcks Außenpolitik* [Southeast Europe in Bismarck's Foreign Policy]. In Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (ed.), *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878* (Wiesbaden: Franz-Steiner Verlag, 1982), p.183.
- 29 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß – Eine historische Retrospektive*, p.37.
- 30 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, pp.xx-xxiii. Geiss quotes C. Hohenlohe's memoirs where he mentions that once Bismarck's dog had barked at a minister. Bismarck commented that his dog's training is not finished yet, and the dog doesn't know whom to bite. If the dog knew, Bismarck said, it would have bitten the Turks. Ibid., p.xxiii.
- 31 Ibid., p.xxiv.
- 32 Interestingly, as Geiss (1978: XIX) states, the British delegate Beaconsfield (Disraeli), who barely understood French, communicated without the consent of his colleagues in the English language. This was the first time on an international Congress that English was used at all. Bismarck commented that if the Russian delegate Gortschakov who did not understand English started to speak Russian, it might get funny.
- 33 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß – Eine historische Retrospektive*, pp.47-48.
- 34 Justin McCarthy, 'The Population of Ottoman Europe before and after the fall of the Empire' in *IIIrd Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey* (Princeton University, 24-26 August 1983). H.W. Lowry and R. S. Hattox (eds.), (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1983), pp.275-298.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Henryk Batowski, 'Die territorialen Bestimmungen von San Stefano und Berlin' [Territorial clauses of San Stefano and Berlin] in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*, pp.56-57.
- 37 Ibid., p.58.
- 38 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, pp.11-12.
- 39 Ibid., p.240. Interestingly, there are striking similarities between the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995). Both treaties in some ways experimented with Bosnia as a territorial unit. While Bosnia was administered and militarily occupied by Austria-Hungary, it still belonged *de jure* to the Ottoman Empire. So far in history, such a constellation had never existed. 117 years later, the

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Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and at the same time contained a constitution for the state of Bosnia. Again, to that date in history, no peace agreement had ever included a constitution. Until today, Bosnia exists under a semi-protectorate of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which is led by the Peace Implementation Council of representatives from other states, mainly European. Hence, the history of Bosnia has shown that whatever interests might exist, the land is primarily a European issue.

40 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, pp.243-244. Even today, at the beginning of the 21st century, Bosnia needs a powerful ally which is capable of installing peace, security and stability in the region. Therefore, Bosnia is trying to become a member of the EU which promises security, stability and prosperity.

41 Ibid., pp.244-247.

42 Even if Russia might have been interested in securing Bosnia and Herzegovina for its own purposes, a secret deal between Austria-Hungary and Russia on 15 January 1877 gave Austria-Hungary the guarantee that Russia would support Austria-Hungary in the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Lothar Classen, *Der völkerrechtliche Status von Bosnien-Herzegowina nach dem Berliner Vertrag vom 13.7.1878* [The Status of Bosnia-Herzegovina in International Law according to the Berlin Treaty of 13.7.1878], (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004), p.59.

43 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, p.388. The English translation is as follows: The Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The Government of Austria-Hungary, not desiring to undertake the administration of the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar, which extends between Serbia and Montenegro in a south-easterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitz, the Ottoman administration will continue to exercise its functions there. Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political condition, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient *vilayet* of Bosnia. To this end the governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves to come to an understanding on the details.

<https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1878berlin.asp>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

44 Mustafa Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnji politički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine od 1878 do 1914*. [Legal position and internal political development of Bosnia-Hercegovina from 1878 to 1914], (Sarajevo: Bosanski Kulturni Centar, 1997), p.23.

45 Classen, *Der völkerrechtliche Status*, pp.73-75.

46 Batowski, 'Die territorialen Bestimmungen', pp.58-59.

47 Classen, *Der völkerrechtliche Status*, p.3, p.64. Here, in a legal register, status relates to a legal situation which involves rights and obligations. Ibid., p.1.

48 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.29.

49 Ibid., p.31.

50 Classen, *Der völkerrechtliche Status*, p.2.

51 Interestingly in the original document, in French the term “*musulman*” was used, while for the translation in German language the term “*Mohammedaner*” was chosen. The correct term for people belonging to the religion of Islam is Muslims (French *Musulmans*), and not “Mohammedans”.

52 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.18.

53 Ibid., p.19.

54 Classen, *Der völkerrechtliche Status*, pp.84-92.

55 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.20.

56 Karpat, ‘The Social and Political Foundations’, p.386.

57 Ibid., p.395.

58 See Justin McCarthy, ‘The Population of Ottoman Europe’, pp. 275-298; and Karpat, ‘The Social and Political Foundations’, p.398.

59 McCarthy, ‘The Population of Ottoman Europe’, pp. 275-298; Justin McCarthy, *Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire. An Annotated Map*. https://www.tc-america.org/files/grants/Forced_Displacement.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2022.

60 Bandžović, ‘Demografska deosmanizacija’, p.209.

61 Karpat, ‘The Social and Political Foundations’, pp.398-399.

62 Ibid., p.400.

63 Arnold Suppan, ‘Der Begriff “Mitteleuropa” im Kontext der geopolitischen Veränderungen’, [The term Central Europe in the context of geopolitical changes], *Mitteilungen der Österreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft* 132 (1990), pp.193.

64 Imamović, *Bosnia and Hercegovina*, p.195.

65 Golo Mann, *Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* [German History of the 19th and 20th Century], (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1996), p.115.

66 Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte Europas* [History of Europe], (Wien: Böhlau, 2000), p.96.

67 Schulze, Hagen, *Phoenix Europa* (Berlin: Siedle, 1998), p.187.

68 Arnold Suppan, ‘Der Begriff “Mitteleuropa” im Kontext der geopolitischen Veränderungen’, *Mitteilungen der Österreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft* 132 (1990), pp.197.

69 Hence, even after the breakdown of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the idea of Central Europe again gained significance during the period of National Socialism (Nazism). *Mitteleuropa* became a catchphrase for German expansionism.

70 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, p.82.

71 Palotas investigated the various standpoints during the Congress of Berlin regarding economic policy. See Emil Palotas, ‘Die Wirtschaftlichen Aspekte der Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns um 1878’ [Economic Aspects of Austro-Hungarian

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Balkan policy around 1878] in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp.271-285.

72 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, p.87.

73 Ibid., p.90.

74 Ibid., pp.91-92.

75 Hartmuth, 'Between Vienna and Istanbul', p.83.

76 Ibid., p.91.

77 Ibid., pp.92-93.

78 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, pp.92-94.

79 Ibid., pp.95-97.

80 Ibid., pp.86-103. In 2008, hotel *Europa* was rebuilt with a typical Vienna coffeehouse. Furthermore, quarters remembering Habsburg architecture are restored to their original appearance, and until today, large numbers of Bosniak students go to Budapest, Vienna and Graz to get their university degrees.

81 This saying describes the fate of Bosnia in the 19th and 20th century. When the Ottomans (Turkey) left Bosnia, the Muslims felt as orphans left without their "mother" while the *Švabo* (German/Austrian) was perceived as a father figure as Austria-Hungary displayed strength, order and discipline, and did not pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing, forced migration and expropriation as it was common in the rest of South-Eastern Europe against the remaining Muslim populations. With the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*bre* is a catchword used in Serbian and Montenegrin language), Bosnia lost its sovereignty and the Bosniak identity, language, culture and property was taken away. At the end of the Austro-Hungarian period, the political system changed and anti-Muslim governments were established from 1918 which lasted until 1992. Another proverb says "*Nesta Franje, nesta hrane*" [Francis (Austrian emperor) gone, food gone]. Collected by Neweklowsky, *Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime*, p.190.

CHAPTER 4

1 Hamdija Kreševljaković, *Sarajevo u doba okupacije Bosne 1878* [Sarajevo during the occupation of Bosnia 1878]. (Reprinted in 1991) (Sarajevo: 1930), p.25.

2 Ibid., pp.25-48.

3 Ahmed Mazhar-Pasha was the last Ottoman pasha governing Bosnia (1877-78) and once while observing Sarajevans he said: "If our government succeeds in staying in Bosnia, then it has to expel all these stubborn people to Anatolia without mercy because with them no progress or cultural activity is possible." Ibid., p.75.

4 Ibid., p.76.

5 Ibid., p.77.

6 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.15.

7 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, p.41.

8 Kreševljaković, *Sarajevo u doba okupacije*, p.88.

9 Ibid., p.89.

10 Ibid., pp. 93-95.

11 Ibid., p.97.

12 Ibid., p.97.

13 The original quote is as follows: “*Von einem Behörden-Organismus ist keine Rede mehr. Die Existenz eines ScheinGouverneurs [sic] in der Person des Hafis Pascha kann darüber nicht täuschen, und ebensowenig vermag man in dem sogenannten “Provinzial-Rath”, welcher thatsächlich allein die höchste Gewalt ausübt, eine neue Ordnung der Dinge zu erkennen. Es ist eine Art Pariser Kommune, welche hier zur Erscheinung kommt. Der eigentliche Leiter, die Seele des Ganzen, ist – wie bei den ersten Unruhen – der Hadschi Loyo, welcher des von ihm betriebenen Räuberhandwerks ungeachtet, fast wie ein Heiliger von den bosnischen Mohammedanern verehrt wird [...]. In dem bisherigen Verhalten des Hadschi Lojo, zusammengehalten mit seinem hochgradigen Fanatismus und seinem früheren Treiben, liegt – falls man ihm nicht einen höheren Grad von Einsicht zutrauen will – ein kaum zu lösendes Räthsel, es ist nämlich eine unzweifelhaft feststehende Thatsache, daß wesentlich seinem Einflusse es zu verdanken ist, wenn böse Excesse gegen Christen und Juden bisher nicht vorgekommen. An Terrorismus lassen im Übrigen die neuen Machthaber es keineswegs fehlen. Er äußert sich namentlich in Bezug auf die Einreihung der Mohammedaner unter die Baschi-Bosuks. [...] “Alle, welche nicht unter dem Schutz eines Konsulats stehen, sind genöthigt worden, die bosnische Tracht [...] ein in fränkischer oder türkischer Kleidung erscheinen- der Landesangehöriger hätte mit Sicherheit zu gewärtigen, daß ihm Jene ohne Weiteres unter Mißhandlungen vom Leibe gerissen würden. [...] Es sind verschiedene Faktoren, deren Zusammenwirken die dermaligen Zustände herbeigeführt hat; am meisten tritt wohl zwar der religiöse und der nationale hervor, allein auch ein sozialer Faktor fehlt nicht, und ihm ist vielleicht eine größere Bedeutung beizumessen, als derselbe auf den ersten Blick zu haben scheint. Jedenfalls findet die ganze jetzige Bewegung ihren Halt vorwiegend im mohammedanischen Proletariat. Das solange schon von Noth heimgesuchte Land und speziell dessen Hauptstadt mit ihrem zahlreichen Pöbel, beherbergt gegenwärtig nur zu viele Elemente, die, bisher auf die kärglichste Lebensart beschränkt, eine so günstige Gelegenheit gern benutzen, um ohne Arbeit auf Kosten der besitzenden Klasse, und zwar weit besser wie sonst, zu leben. Sie können bei anarchischen Verhältnissen nur gewinnen. Unter dem Deckmantel des Glaubenseifers und des Patriotismus liegen als eigentlich treibende Motive gewiß vielfach subversive Tendenzen verborgen.”*

14 Kreševljaković, *Sarajevo u doba okupacije*, p.101.

15 The original quote is as follows: “*Mi koji u Bosni živimo, Islami, Hristijani i Latini, složni smo u misli odupirati se neprijateljima. Mi, ako postojani budemo u ovoj slozi i oduševljenju, iako s požrtvovanjem protiv neprijatelja postupali budemo, neprijatelj će se*

pomoću Boga upropastiti i mi ćemo se u najsjašnjijim listovima istorije gazilukom i patriotstvom vječno spominjati i uživati u pohvalu Islamskih i drugih čovječnijih naroda na istoku i zapadu. ... Čuvanje domovine dužnost je danas svih naroda koji u njoj žive”. The complete text is available in Kreševljaković, Sarajevo u doba okupacije, pp.102-104. Interestingly enough, Jews were exempted from arms and fighting in the battlefield, but they had to pay a military tax. Ibid., p.103.

16 Ibid., p.104.

17 Ibid., p.101.

18 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, p.77.

19 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.16.

20 Bosniaks migrated mainly for religious reasons as they feared that they would have to convert to Catholicism. The term chosen for this sort of migration was *hidžra* (Arabic *hijra*) remembering the migration of Prophet Muhammad from Makkah to Madinah.

21 Thus, today the traits of Bosniak emigrees are visible through the surname “Bushnaq” in Arab countries. In Turkey, Bosniak immigrants had to change their names which makes it difficult to trace Bosniak names.

22 Zoran Grijak, ‘O nekim važnijim aspektima problema konverzija na katolicizam u Bosni i Hercegovini u austrougarskom razdoblju u svjetlu neobjavljenih arhivskih izvora’ [On Some Important Aspects of the Problem of Conversion to Catholicism in Bosnia during the Austro-Hungarian period under the Aspect of Unpublished Archival Sources]. Conference proceedings of the International Conference Bosna i Hercegovina u okviru Austro-Ugarske 1878-1918’ (Sarajevo, March 2009), pp.143-165.

23 Babuna, ‘The Berlin Treaty, p.203.

24 Osman Lavić, ‘Iseljavanje Bošnjaka Muslimana iz BiH za vrijeme Austro-Ugarske vladavine i risala Mehmeda Teufika Azabagića’ [Emigration of Bosnian Muslims from Bosnia-Hercegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule and Treatise by Mehmed Teufik Azabagić], *Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke*, 17–18 (1996), pp.123–129.

25 Please have a closer look on conscription law in the chapter on Bosniaks serving in the Austro-Hungarian military.

26 Aydın Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der österreichisch-ungarischen Epoche* [The national development of the Bosniaks. With special consideration of the Austro-Hungarian period], (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), pp.53-58.

27 *Der Aufstand in der Hercegovina, Süd-Bosnien und Süd-Dalmatien 1881-1882. Nach Authentischen Quellen dargestellt in der Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte des k.k. Kriegs-Archivs* [The Uprising in Herzegovina, South-Bosnia and South-Dalmatia 1881-1882. According to Authentic Sources in the Department of War History of the K.u.K. War Archive], (Vienna: 1883), p.5.

28 *German Consulate to Bismarck*, Sarajevo, December 4, 1881. Nacionalna i Univerzitetska Biblioteka Sarajevo. The original quote is as follows: *Mit Beifall ist – soweit es sich übersehen läßt – die Einführung der Wehrpflicht von den Landesangehörigen nicht begrüßt worden. Den Mohammedanern will es gar nicht in den Sinn, dass sie nicht mehr dem Sultan, sondern dem christlichen Souverän Kriegsdienste leisten sollen [...] Die griechisch-orthodoxe Bevölkerung scheint durch die neue Einrichtung nicht freudig gestimmt, weil ihre Sympathien der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie nicht zugewendet sind. Von vielen Seiten – namentlich aus dem Schoße der mohammedanischen Einwohner – wurde unter dem ersten Eindruck der Provokation sogleich die Absicht geäußert, in dem Lande nicht länger zu bleiben, und in der That haben zahlreiche mohammedanische Familien (in Sarajevo sollen es über hundert sein) bei den Behörden um Pässe zum Zwecke der Auswanderung nachgesucht. Indes läßt sich mit ziemlicher Gewissheit annehmen, dass die Ziffer der wirklichen Auswanderer keine sehr bedeutende sein wird. [...] die öffentliche Ordnung ist nachdem was ich in Erfahrung gebracht in Folge der Bekanntwerdung des Wehrgesetzes so lebhaft [...] Den Bedenken und Einwendungen welche gegen diesen Dienst von den Mohammedanern aus ihren religiösen Vorschriften hergeleitet werden konnten, ist durch die in kluger Berücksichtigung der letzteren erlassenen Sonderbestimmungen von vornherein die Spitze abgebrochen.*

29 Enes Karić, 'Aspects of Islamic Discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Mid 19th till the End of the 20th Century: A Historical Review', *Sehrayin Die Welt der Osmanen, die Osmanen in der Welt: Wahrnehmungen, Begegnungen und Abgrenzungen* [Illuminating the Ottoman World Perceptions, Encounters and Boundaries] Yavuz Köse (ed.), (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012), p.6.

30 These terms have been discussed in the chapter *Loyalty in Islamic Thought: Loyalty of Muslims to Non-Muslim Governments*.

31 Muhamed Mufaku Al-Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878-1918: Two Hijras and Two Fatwas', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 5 (2) (1994), p.248.

32 Bušatlić, 'Hadži Mustafa', pp.3-8.

33 Omer Nakičević, *Istorijski razvoj institucije Rijaset* [Historical Evolution of the Institution of Rijaset], (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske Zajednice u BiH, 1996), p.83.

34 Lavić, 'Iseljavanje Bošnjaka', p.6.

35 Sandra Biletić, 'Iskustva bosanskohercegovačkih povratnika iz iseljništva za vrijeme austrougarske uprave (1878–1903)' [Experiences of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Returnees from Places of Emigration during the Austro-Hungarian Administration (1878–1903)]. *Grada Arhiva Bosne i Hercegovine* 5(5) (2013), pp.20–182.

36 Ibid., p.35.

37 Ibid., p.48.

38 Gazi Husrev-beg Library in Sarajevo holds two manuscripts of this treatise in Arabic. Osman Lavić translated the treatise *Risala o hidžri*, 1990, pp.197–222.

39 Rijaset is the central administrative and executive organ of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

40 Karić, *Aspects of Islamic Discourse*, pp.286-287.

41 As quoted in Al Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims', p.253.

42 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, pp.115-116.

43 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.53.

44 Ibid., p.111.

45 Ibid., p.109; Babuna, 'The Berlin Treaty', pp.203-204.

46 *Kuferaši* are considered to be settlers who came with just one suitcase (in Bosnian language *kufer/kofer*). Another interpretation of the term *kuferaši* might be "non-believer" as it resembles the word *kufr* in the Arabic language. *kufr* means "unbelief". It could be that the non-Muslims who settled down in Bosnia were perceived as unbelievers and named as such with this newly coined word. Carl Bethke, "The Bosnische Post: A Newspaper in Sarajevo, 1884-1903," in *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire*, (eds.), Markian Prokopovych, Carl Bethke, and Tamara Scheer, pp. 87-114.

47 Ilija Hadžibegović, *Postanak radničke klase u Bosni i Hercegovini i njen razvoj do 1914. godine* [The formation of the working class in Bosnia-Herzegovina until 1914], (Sarajevo, 1980), p.116.

48 Carl Bethke, 'German "Colonists" in Bosnia (1878-1914). Perception, Ideology and Social Practice in the Sources of the Evangelical Church', Conference proceedings of the International Conference Bosna i Hercegovina u okviru Austro-Ugarske 1878-1918, (Sarajevo: Faculty of Philosophy, 2011), p.236.

49 Peter F. Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1963), p.38.

50 Bethke, 'German "Colonists"', p.238.

51 Ibid., p.241.

52 Bethke quotes a pastor describing how two Bosniaks performed their prayer in a waiting room at a railway station: "I was impressed by the two Turks who publicly without wanting to be pharisaic confessed their faith, and I thought that we might need such fearless believers." Interestingly, another pastor, Julius Kolatschek, who perceived the country as a missionary territory which is to be raised to European culture, expressed his happiness that after 300 years again a Protestant chorale was heard in Bosnia. This is clearly leaning on the assumption that the Bosnian Church was understood as a proto-Protestant movement like others around medieval Europe. Bethke, 'German "Colonists"', pp.258-259.

53 Ibid., pp.242, 247, 265.

54 Prezidijalni spisi, 584/1884; and Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegovina*, p.209.

55 Babuna, 'The Berlin Treaty', p.203.

56 Aydın Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der österreichisch-ungarischen Epoche* [The national development of the Bosniaks. With special consideration of the Austro-Hungarian period], (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), p.49.

57 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.109.

58 ABiH, 1180/2726 J.B.

59 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.111.

60 Ibid., pp.111-113.

61 Mark Pinson, 'The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918' in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*. Mark Pinson (eds.), (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.94; Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, pp.112-113; and Babuna, 'The Berlin Treaty,' p.203.

62 Hartmuth, 'Between Vienna and Istanbul', p.90.

63 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, pp.113-114.

64 Al Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims', p.251.

65 Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung*, p.52.

66 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.71.

67 Edin Radušić, 'Uspostavljanje austrougarske vlasti u Bosni i Hercegovini prema izvjestajima britanskog konzulata u Sarajevu' [The establishment of Austro-Hungarian power in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the reports of the British consulate in Sarajevo]. Conference proceedings of the International Conference on Bosna i Hercegovina u okviru Austro-Ugarske 1878-1918, (Sarajevo, March 2009), p.47.

68 Tomislav Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini 1882-1903* [Kallay's regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1882-1903], (Sarajevo, 1987), pp.352-353.

69 Radušić, 'Uspostavljanje austrougarske', p.51. Full text of that letter is available in Bosnian language in Enes Durmišević, 'Uspostava i pravni položaj Rijaseta Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini 1882-1899' [The establishment and legal position of the Rijasat of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1882-1899], (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2002), pp.103-106.

70 This can be confirmed by many sources, including the press at that time (Sarajevski list, no.104, 14.10.1884).

71 Luchterhand, *Nationale Minderheiten*, p.18.

72 In Bosnian Požarevački mir, Turkish Pasarofça Antlaşması.

73 In Bosnian Svištovski mir, Turkish Zistovi Antlaşması.

74 The original quote is as follows: "Sunce već spalo na samu ićindiju, pošto je dotle peklo odozgor i upravo zažeglo onaj pijesak na prudu. Svak klonuo od silne žege, a duhom umoran od puste brige, kretao se čaršijom zabrinut, il' sjedio pred svojom kućom i spokojno čekao udarac nesretne sudbine. Svud grobna tišina. Najedanput kao sami grom razleže se ovom tišinom odnekle glas krupan, tugaljiv: -Eno, Švabee!... Nasta strava." Edhem

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Mulabdić, *Zeleno busenje* [Green moss]. (Original work published in Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1898), (reprinted in Sarajevo, 2006), p.87.

75 I. Tepić and A. Džanić (eds.), *Bosna i Hercegovina od najstarijih vremena do kraja drugog svjetskog rata* [Bosnia and Hercegovina from the oldest times until the Second World War], (Sarajevo: 1994), p.174.

76 Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*, 1978.

77 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.16..

78 Pinson, 'The Muslims', p.92.

79 Ibid., p.92.

80 K.u.K. is an abbreviation for *Kaiser und König* which designates the double monarchy of the Austrian *Kaiser* and the Hungarian *König*. It is often used as a synonym for Austria-Hungary.

81 Pinson, 'The Muslims', p.92.

82 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, pp.25-27.

83 Ibid., p.37.

84 A collection of Shari'ah regulations relating to family law was issued in Vienna in 1883 under the title "*Eherecht, Familienrecht und Erbrecht der Mohammedaner nach hanefitischem Ritus*".

85 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.39.

86 Ibid., p.40.

87 Ibid., p.41.

88 In Croatia for example the possibility of a military commander becoming head of the province was clearly excluded. The Landeschefs of Bosnia were the following: *Feldzeugmeister* (ordinance officer) Josip Filipović (1878) and Herzog von Württemberg (1878-1881); Generals Hermann Dahlen (1881-1882), Johann v. Appel (1882-1903), Eugen v. Albori (1903-1907), Anton Edler v. Winzor (1907-1909), Marjan Varešanin (1909-1911), Oscar Potiorek (1911-1914) and Stephan von Sarkotić (1914-1918). Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.68.

89 Classen, *Der völkerrechtliche Status*, p.111.

90 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, pp.41-42.

91 Ibid., p.69.

92 Ibid., p.105.

93 "Stagnacija u našem životu", *Behar*, 3 (6), 1 July 1906, p.50.

94 Abdulgafar Velić, *Evropa u djelima Bošnjaka u periodu austrougarske uprave nad Bosnom i Hercegovinom 1878-1918* [Europe in the Works of Bosniaks during Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918], (Unpublished Master thesis, Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, 2010), pp.23-24.

95 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.115.

96 *Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen für Bosnien und Hercegovina* [Collection of Laws and Acts for Bosnia-Hercegovina], 1880, p.319.

- 97 Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta*, pp.214-215.
- 98 Bandžović, 'Demografska deosmanizacija' p.216.
- 99 Radušić, 'Uspostavljanje austrougarske vlasti', p.37.
- 100 Ibid., pp.38-40.
- 101 Ibid., p.41.
- 102 Ibid., p.42.
- 103 Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung*, p.47.
- 104 Pinson, 'The Muslims', p.103.
- 105 Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg 'Civilizing Mission' in Bosnia, 1878-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.56.
- 106 His main task in Belgrade was to establish within Serbian society, particularly its political elite, the confidence that Austria-Hungary was a benevolent neighbor. Thus, Russian influence should have been eliminated and replaced with Austro-Hungarian dominance in Serbian affairs. Tomislav Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini 1882-1903* (Sarajevo: 1987), p.49.
- 107 Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, p.45.
- 108 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, p.58.
- 109 Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, p.74.
- 110 Benjamin Kállay, *Die Lage der Mohammedaner in Bosnien. Von einem Ungarn* [Situation of Muslims in Bosnia. From a Hungarian], 2nd edn. (Vienna, 1990), p.19.
- 111 Peter F. Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1963), p.56.
- 112 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, p.59.
- 113 Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, p.54.
- 114 Pinson, 'The Muslims', p.113.
- 115 Ibid., pp.115-116.
- 116 Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, p.29.
- 117 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, p.59.
- 118 Kállay, *Die Lage*, p.4.
- 119 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, p.63; and Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, p.81.
- 120 Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, p.82.
- 121 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, p.60.
- 122 *Deutsches Konsulat Sarajevo, Lagebericht. An das Auswärtige Amt in Berlin*, Sarajevo 20.2. 1880.
- 123 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.70. Nevertheless this pledge was short lived as the Bosnian organizations, such as *Mlada Bosna* were in direct contact with Serbia. Bože Čović (ed.), *Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates, Documents, Cartographic Reviews* (Zagreb: Centar za strane jezike, 1993).
- 124 Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, p.81.
- 125 Ibid., pp.201-206.

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126 Pinson, 'The Muslims', p.95.

127 *Waqf* is in Bosnian language *vakuf* and means a religious endowment serving the benefit of the Muslims and the Islamic Community. It is different from other acts of piety and charity being an ongoing sustainable charity that goes beyond the present, immediate and future needs of the needy. The aim is to generate an endless profit to the needy and a reward to the donors. When a person decides to give his or her property as a *vakuf*, it ceases to be his or her property, and neither he nor anybody else can either give it or sell it to any person. Also, no one can inherit anything out of it. In Bosnia the most popular donor (*vakif*) is Gazi Husrev Beg who basically donated his possessions in Sarajevo's Baščaršija to the Islamic Community (mosque, *medresa*, library, *hanikah*, shops).

128 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, pp.91-92.

129 Ibid., pp.92-93.

130 Remzija Hurić-Bećirović, 'Školovanje muslimanki u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom vlašću' Kreševljaković' [Education of Muslim females in Bosnia-Hercegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule], (Unpublished Master's thesis, Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, 2011).

131 The journal *Bošnjak* (1896, VI/47, pp.2-3) notes that at the Millennium exhibition in Budapest in 1896, three Muslim female schools from Bosnia-Hercegovina won Millennium medals.

132 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi*, pp. 93-95.

133 Aydın Babuna, 'The Berlin Treaty, Bosnian Muslims, and Nationalism' in *War and Diplomacy*. Hakan Yavuz (eds.), (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2011), pp.198-225.

CHAPTER 5

1 The Shaykh al-Islam used to be the head of the Ottoman Islamic community. He was appointed by the Sultan who also held the title of Caliph. With the title Caliph, the Sultan signified that he followed Prophet Muhammad in line of succession as the head of the entire Muslim community and was responsible for the maintenance of the two holy cities in Islam Makkah and Madinah. Whenever the Sultan issued a decree, it would be submitted to the Shaykh al-Islam who would determine whether or not the decree was in accordance with the Qur'an and the Hadith.

2 A similar situation existed in Tunisia after the retreat of the Ottomans. There were two main muftis (*baş müfti*). One of them interpreted Shari'ah law according to the Hanafi legal school as a representative of the Ottoman Empire, and the other an adherent of the Maliki legal school to which belonged the largest part of the Tunisians. Similar action took the French government in Algeria and the Russian government in territories that were lost by the Ottomans. See Durmišević, 'Uspostava i pravni položaj', pp.108-111.

3 Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović was born in Kulen Vakuf on the North Western border of Bosnia in 1816. He studied Islamic theology in Sarajevo and Istanbul. After his studies he worked as a lecturer and imam in Sarajevo. In 1856 he was appointed Mufti of Sarajevo and remained in this position for 26 years. At the age of 66 he was appointed as the grand mufti for Bosnia (Reis ul-Ulema). He retained this position for 11 years when he resigned in 1893 due to health issues.

4 ABiH, ZMF-BH, ad 1087/881. Hamdija Kreševljaković, 'Sarajevo za vrijeme austrougarske uprave (1878-1918)', [Sarajevo during the Austro-Hungarian administration], (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1969), pp.186, 212-215.

5 Dževada Šuško, 'Sjećanje na prvog reisu-l-ulemu Mustafu Hilmi-ef. Hadžiomerovića', [Remembering the first Reis ul-Ulema Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović], *Takvim* 2018. Mustafa Prljača (ed.) (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 2017), p.173.

6 Kreševljaković, *Sarajevo u doba okupacije*, p.123.

7 See Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, pp.353-356; *Landesregierung beantragt Pensionierung des Reisel- Uleima Omerović* ABiH ZMF Präs. 984 4.9.15.10 1893.

8 Vermerk über Vertrag betreffend die Einsetzung eines Reis-el-Ulema und eines Medzhis-el-Ulema für die Cultus-Angelegenheiten in B.-H. ABiH ZMF Pr. 1939/1882. Interestingly, Benjamin Kállay personally gave a lecture to the Kaiser about this topic. He consulted Kutschera as well and included his remarks. *Vortrag betreffend die Einsetzung eines Reis ul Ulema u. Medželis Ulema für die Kulturangelegenheiten der Mohamedaner in B. u. H.* Vienna, October 13, 1882; seq. ibd. 1957/1882.

9 *Land. Reg. in Betreff eines Schreibens des Scheich ul Islam an den Mufti und Reis el Ulema Omerović Effendi* ABiH Präs. 2.2.-9.2.1885 ZMF 67 1885.

10 Hartmuth, 'Between Vienna and Istanbul', pp.79-104. These impressive architectural buildings in city centres were supposed to express an appreciation for Islamic heritage by adopting Andalusian-Moorish or Mamluk architectural elements while avoiding explicitly "Ottoman" ones. A further impressive building in Sarajevo is the city hall (*Vijećnica*).

11 *Landesregierung beantragt Ernennung des H. Mehmed Teufik Ef. Azabagić zum Reis ul eima, des Ibrahim B. Bašagić zum Präsidenten der L. Vakuf Commission und des Sulejman Ef. Šarac zum Director der Scheriatsschulen* ABiH ZMF Präs.4.9.-15.10.1893; List of the members of the Commission: *Landesregierung beantragt Wiedererennung der Vakufmission Mitglieder*. Ibid. 3087 21.-28.3.1898.

12 Esad Zgodić, *Bosanska politička misao: austrougarsko doba* [Bosnian political thought: Austro-Hungarian period], (Sarajevo: DES, 2003), p.306.

13 Kapetanović, Mehmed-beg, 'Ein bosnischer Beg wider Stambul', *Die Presse*, 153 (32) (5 June 1879).

14 This outstanding historical figure who had such a far reaching impact on modern nation-building among Bosniaks. Basic biographical information can be found in Gelez, 'Towards a Prosopography', pp.242-247; Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegovina*,

p.208; Muhsin Rizvić, *Bosansko-muslimanska književnost u doba preporoda 1878-1918* [Bosnian-Muslim literature during the renaissance period 1878-1918], (Sarajevo: Mešihat Islamske zajednice BiH, 1990), p.80. See also the dossier from Appel, *Der Chef der Landesregierung: Seiner Exzellenz dem Herrn k.k. wirklichen geheimen Rate gemeinsamen Finanzminister Benjamin Kállay de Nagy Kalló in Wien*. Sarajevo 16 November 1892. ABiH Präs. ZMF 776 21/11 1892; and biographical remarks in: Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, in *Bošnjak*, 31 July 1902.

15 ABiH Präs. ZMF 1445, 12-20.4.1879; Gelez, 'Towards a Prosopography', p.245; Vladimir Ćorović, *Mehmed-beg Kapetanović*. Reprinted in M. Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga, 1911), pp.136-183; See also Babuna, *Die nationale*, p.231. *Ein bosnischer Beg wider Stambul* [A Bosnian bey against Istanbul], in *Die Presse*, 5 June 1879.

16 Duke Württemberg investigated the legal requirements for nomination which focused on ancestry. Only legitimate children with full heritage rights could be nominated. At first, the Duke's expert advisors were skeptical, due seemingly to prejudices against "orientalism" and derogatory images and discourses about Muslims. However, contrary to these stereotypes, Muslims in Bosnia generally had monogamous marriages (they were otherwise strictly restricted by the Qur'an to not more than four wives) which were officiated by a *Kadi* (judge). Ultimately, it was concluded that there were no legal obstacles to nominating a Muslim as a member of the *Ritterstand mit vollem Rechte* [order of knights with full rights/privileges]. *Präsidium der Landesregierung in Bosnien und Hercegovina: An das hohe k.k. Ministerium des Äusseren in Wien* Sarajevo am 1.2.1881 ABiH Präs. ZVS 160/1881; *ibid.* 9.1.1881, 37/1881.

17 ABiH Präs. ZMF 3038 30.12.1881; *Präsidium der Landesregierung für Bosnien und Hercegovina: Hohes Ministerium!* Sarajevo 14.2.1882 ABiH ZVS 358/82.

18 Copy of the translation of a report of the councilor Kapetanović. Mostar, 16 December 1881 to the Presidency of the Land government. Kapetanović was also involved in religious issues. He participated in the election of a new head of the Islamic community in 1881 and was nominated as member of the Vakuf Commission in 1883. Gelez, *Towards a Prosopography*, p.245.

19 Dahlen, *Präsidium der Landesregierung für Bosnien und die Hercegovina: Hohes Ministerium*. Sarajevo, 29.12.1881 ABiH ZVS Präs. 3460 1881; *Landesregierung Sarajevo legt vor den Bericht des Reg. R. Mehmed Bey Kapetanovic über die Situation in der Herzegovina* *ibid.*, 15.1.1882 62 1882; Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, p.52.

20 *Ibid.*: "hervorragend erspriessliche Thätigkeit im Interesse des öffentlichen Wohles und ihrer erprobt loyalen Gesinnung."

21 In this dossier, his collection of Bosnian folk poems and stories, *Narodno blago* [People's treasure], was also mentioned, and it was further positively noted that he worked on translations of Turkish, Arabic and Persian poems, which were later to be published as *Istočno Blago* (The Eastern Treasury). Moreover, appreciation was also

expressed that his book “What the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina think” had rejected the “wrong opinions” about the Muslims in BiH.

22 Appel, *Der Chef der Landesregierung: Seiner Exzellenz dem Herrn k.k. wirklichen geheimen Rate gemeinsamen Finanzminister Benjamin Kállay de Nagy Kalló in Wien*. Sarajevo 16.11.1892. ABiH Präs. ZMF 776 21.11.1892.

23 *Wahlresultate der Gemeinderathswahlen in Sarajevo* ABiH Präs ZMF 3005 14/3 1893; *Gemeinderathswahlen Sarajevo –Ernennung von Bürgermeister und Vize-Bürgerm.* ibd., 3549 23.27.3.1893; ibd., *Ernennung des Bürgermeisters u. Vizebürgermeisters* ibd. 5017 26.-30.4.1893.

24 *Betreffend die Verleihung des Osmanje-Ordens III Cl. an den Exbürgermeister Mehmed-beg Kapetanović in Sarajevo* 2/9 1899 ABiH Präs. ZVS 2573 2/9 1899.

25 Heinrich Renner, *Bosnom i Hercegovinom uzduž i poprijeko* [Through Bosnia-Herzegovina criss-cross], (Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga). (Original work published 1896). [Translation of the book *Durch Bosnien und die Herzegovina – kreuz und quer*. Berlin: 1896], (Reprinted in 2007), p.63.

26 *Beilagen zu dem Allerunterthänigsten Vortrage des treuehorsamsten k.u.k. Reichs-Finanz-Ministers Leopold Friedrich Freiherrn von Hoffmann*. Römerbad, 30.7.1879 ABiH Präs.ZMF 4016 5/8 1879.

27 Renner, *Bosnom i Hercegovinom*, p.5.; *Landesregierung befindet über die Drucklegung des II Bands von ‘Istočno Blago’* ABiH Präs. ZMF 9267 5.-9.8.1896; ibd.8168 14.-29.7.1897; ibd.10708 27.9.-2.10.1897.

28 The booklet *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni* [What Muslims think in Bosnia] published Kapetanović in 1886 in German language entitled *Eine Entgegnung vom Standpunkte des Islamismus auf die in Leipzig erschienene Broschüre ‘Bosniens Gegenwart und nächste Zukunft’* [A response from an Islamic point of view to the brochure ‘The present and near future in Bosnia’].

29 Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegovina*, pp.209-210.

30 Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Budućnost ili Napredak Muhamedovaca u Bosni i Hercegovini* [The Future or Progress of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina], (Reprinted in M. Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga, 1893, pp.24-49).

31 Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, ‘Streit-Schrift eines bosnischen Begs’ [Polemic of a Bosnian Bey], (*Die Presse*, 1879), p.115.

32 Gelez, ‘Towards a Prosopography’, p.45.

33 Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini*; and Kapetanović-Ljubušak, Mehmed-beg, *Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni* [What Muslims in Bosnia think], (Reprinted in M. Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga, 1886), pp.51-75.

34 Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Budućnost ili Napredak*, p.29.

35 Kapetanović-Ljubušak enumerates all the following institutions: *Rijaset* [Administrative body of the Islamic Community], *Reis ul-Ulema* [head of Islamic Community], *Vrhovni šerijatski sud* [Shari'ah Court], *Viša šerijatksa sudačka škola* [Shari'ah Law School], *muftije* [regional religious leaders], *Zemaljsko vakufsko povjerenstvo* [Vacuf management commission], *mearif-medžlis* [Steering Board for ordinary schools as well as *mektebs* (religious schools)], *ruždije* [ordinary schools], *medrese* [high schools], *darul mualimin* [Teacher's school for Turkish and Bosnian language], *Ženska škola* [school for girls only where they are taught handicrafts, such as sewing, knitting etc.], *Kiraethana* [reading circles where people gather to discuss and read newspapers, such as *Bošnjak* and *Vatan*], *Velika gimnazija u Sarajevu* [Gymnasium], *Preparadija* [Teacher's school], *srednja trgovačka i tehnička škola* [Trade and Technical High School], *dječačko odgajalište-Knaben Pensionat* [male boarding school], *radionice za umjetničke i tradicionalne zanate* [workshops for artistic and traditional handicraft], etc. See Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Budućnost ili Napredak*, pp.32-34.

36 Ibid., pp.34-35.

37 The rhyme *Bolje učiti gimnaziju nego ići u Aziju*. [It is better to study in a gymnasium than move to Asia] exactly reflects his attitude. Ibid., pp.36-48.

38 Kapetanović was also involved in religious issues. He participated in the election of a new head of the Islamic Community in 1881 and was nominated a member of the Vakuf Commission in 1883.

39 Kapetanović, *Šta misle muhamedanci*, p. 55. Original text: 'Vjera nikome ne stavlja zaprijeke da ne bude istinit i ozbiljan, već baš tko temeljito svoj zakon izvršuje, mora biti prijatelj i srcem i dušom onoj vladi, pod kojom bez zapriekesvoja sveta prava uživa.'

40 Kapetanović, *Budućnost ili Napredak*, p. 12. Original text: 'Ne treba se vazda onoga starog načina držati, koji je nekada nešto vrijedio, već se treba kretati kako vrijeme iziskuje.'

41 Kapetanović-Ljubušak, *Budućnost ili Napredak*, p.41.

42 Ibid., p.46.

43 Many influential Bosniaks, such as Mustaj-beg Begtašević, Širbeg Širbegović, Rustan-beg Alibegović, Muhamed-beg Alajbegović, Mehmed Ali-beg Pašić, beg Teskeredžić, Salih-beg Kopčić, Sali-beg Uzeirbegović and Ibrahim-beg Bašagić were in solidarity with him and thanking him for his effort. See Ćorović, *Mehmed-beg Kapetanović*, p.153.

44 ABiH Präs. ZMF 7146 12/7 1898; Gradonačelnik Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, in *Bošnjak*, 14.7.1898; Mehmed-beg Kapetanović-Ljubušak, in *Bošnjak*, 31.7.1902.

45 Maximilian Braun, *Začeci Evropeizacije u književnosti slavenskih muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini* [The Europeanization beginnings of the literature of the Slavic Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina], (Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga) (Original work published in 1934).

46 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.73.

47 *Landesreg. Sarajevo Concession zur Zeitung Bošnjak* 6.4.-11.4. ABiH 150/1891.

48 Ibid.

49 Kruševac, Todor, *Bosansko-hercegovački listovi u XIX veku* [Bosnian-Herzegovinian papers in the 19th century], (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1978), pp. 236-261.

50 Mustafa Imamović, *Bosnia and Hercegovina. Evolution of its Political and Legal Institutions* (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2006), p.213.

51 "Hajka protiv jevreja. Antisemitizam," [Persecution of Jews. Antisemitism], *Bošnjak*, 24 February, 1898; "Pokolj Jevreja," [Slaughter of Jews], *Bošnjak*, 14 May 1903; "Dobrovoljni prolozi za postradale Kišenevskejevreje," [Voluntary contributions for the suffering Jews of Kishinev], *Bošnjak*, 23 July 1903; "Antisemitizam," *Bošnjak*, 15 October 1903.

52 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.79.

53 Safvet-beg Bašagić, also known for writing under the pseudonym Mirza Safvet, was a leading figure in modern Bosnian literature as well as in national reformation. In addition to his profound knowledge in literature, he was a historian and politician and translated numerous works into the Bosnian language, including those of Heinrich Heine. He is buried in the courtyard of the Gazi Husrev-beg mosque in Sarajevo. Gelez, Philippe, *Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934). Aux racines intellectuelles de la pensée nationale chez les musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine* (Athens: École française d'Athènes, 2010).

54 *Privatschreiben S.E. des Ministers an S.E. Bar. Kutschera Sarajevo*. Vienna 17 March 1893 ABH PräS. ZMF 1893 59/1893, *ibid.* 24.4.1893 85/1893; *Kutschera: Eure Exzellenz*. Sarajevo 18.4.1893; ABiH 141 1893; *Jusuf-beg Filipović in Sarajevo betreffend Erhöhung der Subvention für den Bosnjak*, 21.-24.7.1904; *Bericht der Landesregierung für Bosnien und die Hercegovina vom 5. März 1906 betreffend die weitere Subventionierung der hierortigen Zeitung "Bošnjak"*, 244, 1906; Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*, p.200.

55 Sarajevo kao glavni grad, [Sarajevo as capital city], *Bošnjak*, 14 December 1893. *Evo nam ovdje najbolja škola za proučavanje našega narodnoga života, škola za proučavanje sjajne prošlosti našeg domovine- to je naš dobro i bogato uređeni muzej. U njemu je nagomilano toliko blaga i bogatstva da je svak učeni stranac, kad dogje ovamo odista čudi, da se je takova šta uopće uraditi dalo.*

56 Balić, *Kultura Bošnjaka*, pp.187-191.

57 *Eine Abschrift der Franz. Übersetzung pro Actis dem Privatbrief an Baron Kutschera anzuschliessen*. ABiH PräS ZMF Wien, 24 February 1900.

58 Appel, *Der Chef der Landesregierung: Hohes Ministerium!* Sarajevo 7 March 1900 ABiH ZMF PräS 268; ZVS 630.

59 *Behar*, 1 (1), 1 May 1900, p.3-4.

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60 Reg. *Comissar Sarajevo weg. Übernahme der Behar –Redaction durch Edhem Mulabdić an Stelle Safet-beg Bašagić* 25/4 1901 ZVS ABiH; Osman Nuri Hadžić: *Muslimani a ne Muhamedanci- Poslanik a ne porok ili profeta* [Muslims and not Muhammedans – Messenger and not Prophet], in *Behar*, 11 (1), 1 October 1900, p.168-171.

61 In the introductory part, Braun admits that Fehim Spaho, Hamdija Kreševljaković and Alija Nametak supported him in this endeavour. He analyzed the works of Safet-beg Bašagić, Osman – Aziz (pseudonym of two writers Osman Nuri Hadžić and Ivan Miličević), Edhem Mulabdić and the contents of the literary magazine *Behar*. Braun, *Začeci Evropeizacije*, p.9.

62 Ibid., p.46.

63 Ibid., pp.49-50.

64 Ibid., p.97.

65 Rizvić, *Bosansko-muslimanska*, p.187.

66 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.178.

67 *Schreiben S.E. des Minsters an Lad.Chef Benko Sarajevo*. Wien 11.3.1901 ABiH ZMF Präs. 45 1901.

68 “Čitateljima na početku sedme godine,” [To the readers at the beginning of the seventh year], *Behar*, 1 (7), 1 May 1906.

69 Ibid.

70 *Der Chef der Landesregierung Albori: Hohes Ministerium!* ABiH Präs. ZMF 386 27.4. 1906.

71 Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*. [History of the Bosniaks], (Sarajevo: 2006), p.232.

72 Ibid.

73 Even during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in 1921, the leaders of the political party JMO (*Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija*) [Yugoslav Muslim Organization] set two conditions for giving their consent to the new Constitution (*Vidovdanski ustav*). Firstly, Bosnia should be kept as a single territorial unit, and secondly Shari‘ah courts should be preserved for Muslims of Bosnia and Yugoslavia. However, in 1929 the Constitution was changed with the coup d’état by Alexandar Karađorđević and Bosnia was divided. Thus, the map of Bosnia was redrawn.

74 Ferdo Hauptmann, *Borba Muslimana za vjersku i vakufsko-mearifsku autonomiju* [The struggle of the Muslims for religious and endowment-educational autonomy], (Sarajevo: Arhiv Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, 1967), pp.431-433.

75 Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle*, p.xii.

76 Ibid.

77 *Musavat* 1, 16 October 1906.

78 *Musavat* 12, 18 April 1907.

79 *Musavat* 29, 30 August 1907.

80 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, pp.138-139.

81 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.142.

82 In 1907, for example, this paper had a circulation of 1,600 copies and had 1,480 subscribers. Imamović considers this quite significant because at that time there were 10 political magazines in Bosnia with around 10,000 subscribers. Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.147.

83 Ibid., pp.147-148.

84 Ibid., p.180.

85 Ibid., p.174.

86 Ibid., p.175.

87 Bašagić in *Ogledalo*, 1, 31 May 1907.

88 *Ogledalo*, 9, 26 July 1907.

89 Hajdarpašić, *Whose Bosnia*, p.178.

90 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, pp.180-181.

91 In Bosnian *Sabor*, German *Landesvertretung*.

92 In Bosnian *Zemaljski ustav* or *Štatut*, German *Landesstatut*.

93 The Annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary.

http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Annexation_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_by_Austria-Hungary. Accessed on 18 April 2022.

94 The proclamation read as follows: We, Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, and Apostolic King of Hungary, to the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina: When a generation ago our troops crossed the borders of your lands, you were assured that they came not as foes, but as friends, with the firm determination to remedy the evils from which your fatherland had suffered so grievously for many years. This promise given at a serious moment has been honestly kept. It has been the constant endeavour of our government to guide the country by patient and systematic activity to a happier future. To our great joy we can say that the seed then scattered in the furrows of a troubled soil has richly thrived. You yourselves must feel it a boon that order and security have replaced violence and oppression, that trade and traffic are constantly extending, that the elevating influence of education has been brought to bear in your country, and that under the shield of an orderly administration every man may enjoy the fruits of his labours. It is the duty of us all to advance steadily along this path. With this goal before our eyes, we deem the moment [has] come to give the inhabitants of the two lands a new proof of our trust in their political maturity. In order to raise Bosnia-Hercegovina to a higher level of political life, we have resolved to grant both of those lands constitutional governments that are suited to the prevailing conditions and general interests, so as to create a legal basis for the representation of their wishes and needs. You shall henceforth have a voice when decisions are made concerning your domestic affairs, which, as hitherto, will have a

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separate administration. But the necessary premise for the introduction of this provincial constitution is the creation of a clear and unambiguous legal status for the two lands. For this reason, and also remembering the ties that existed of yore between our glorious ancestors on the Hungarian throne and these lands, we extend our suzerainty over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is our will that the order of succession of our House be extended to these lands also. The inhabitants of the two lands thus share all the benefits which a lasting confirmation of the present relation can offer. The new order of things will be a guarantee that civilization and prosperity will find a sure footing in your home.

http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Annexation_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_by_Austria-Hungary). Accessed on 1 October 2022.

95 Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, pp.424-432.

96 Philippe Gelez, 'Factions et partis politiques musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine face à l'annexion' [Muslim political factions and parties of Bosnia-Herzegovina confronting the Annexation] in 1908, *L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, cent ans après*. Catherine Horel (ed.), (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2011), pp.165-176. [*L'annexion tranchait définitivement en faveur de Vienne: ils étaient désormais mis en demeure de s'adapter définitivement, ou bien de quitter cette terre dont le souverain était Européen et catholique*].

97 Ibid., p.173.

98 "Sva naša inteligencija je na strani vladinoj i vlada njima diktira po svojoj volji i to oni izvršavaju kao sa nekom čašću." ABH ZMF Präs 1950/1908 in Hauptmann, *Borba Muslimana*, pp.635-636.

99 ABH ZMF Präs 2246/1908 in Hauptmann, *Borba Muslimana*, pp.638-639; Imamović, 2006, pp.427-428.

100 Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, p.430.

101 *Musavat*, 15 September 1909.

102 See the whole document *Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Bosnien und die Herzegovina*. <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgicontent/alex?aid=lbh&datum=1909&page=443&size=45>. Accessed on 18 April 2022.

103 Gelez, 'Factions et partis politiques', p.174.

104 *Bošnjak*, 9 October 1908 and 6 November 1908.

105 ABH ZMF Präs 1707/1908.

106 Dževad Juzbašić, 'Die Annexion von Bosnien-Herzegowina und die Probleme bei der Erlassung des Landesstatutes' [The Annexion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the problems with remitting the Constitution], *Südost-Forschungen* 68 (2009), pp.247-297. Hungary particularly tried to use the opportunity to affirm its historical right to Bosnia from medieval times when the Hungarian crown had aspired to rule the country, claiming "historical continuity". About the internal consequences and discussions within the *Gemeinsame Ministerrat*, i.e. the highest common decision-

making body of Austria-Hungary, see the protocols in Anatol Schmied-Kowarzik, 'Die Protokolle des gemeinsamen Ministerrates der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie.' VI: 1908–1914 [Protocols of the Common Ministry Council of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy], (Budapest 2011).

107 *Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Bosnien und die Hercegovina*. 22 February 1910. *Landesstatut für Bosnien und die Hercegovina*, pp.21-29. http://fcjp.ba/de/templates/ja_avian_ii_d/images/green/Landesstatut.pdf. Accessed on 18 April 2022.

108 A "virilist" was, according to the Constitution of 19th century Austria-Hungary, a person who is, based on his position in society (bishop, judge, university rector etc.), an *ex-officio* a member of a legislative body (Parliament).

109 Interestingly, the guaranteed equal representation of all three constituent peoples is the same in today's Constitution and political system of Bosnia-Hercegovina which were established within the Dayton Peace Agreement.

110 Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, p.438.

111 *Ibid.*, p.443

112 Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, p.226.

113 ...da skoro svako pitanje u BiH, zbog srpskih i hrvatskih nacionalističkih aspiracija, dobija nacionalno-politički, odnosno državno-pravni karakter. Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, p.445.

114 Pinson, *The Muslims*, p.118.

115 Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, p.452-453.

116 *Dieser Partei [MSS].... gehört fast die ganze moslemische Intelligenz an. Sie ist zwar, soweit die Zahl ihrer Anhänger in Betracht kommt, gegenwärtig in der Minorität, nichtsdestoweniger ist deren Einfluss auf das Gros der mohamedanischen Bevölkerung nicht zu unterschätzen. So waren gerade die Vertreter der Fortschrittspartei bei der Verfassungenquete die Wortführer des gesamten Moslimentums, Ihre Anträge wurden von den Konservativ-orthodoxen [MNO] stets unterstützt und angenommen. So zeigt sich denn das sonderbare Bild, dass die Minorität tatsächlich führend ist, und dass anderseits zwei Parteifractionen bestehen, die das Gleiche anstreben.*

117 *Betr. Parteiblatt der "Samostalna Muslimanska Stranka", Einstellung*. 2.-5.4. 1912 ABiH 588 1912.

118 Hamdija Kapidžić, *Hercegovacki ustanak 1882. godine*, [The uprising in Hercegovina in 1882], (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1973), p.75.

119 On 24 October 1881, the provisional conscription law for Bosnia was approved and issued, together with a Decree that was issued to the provincial government (*Verordnung an die Landesregierung*) on 4 November 1881. *Verordnung der Landesregierung für Bosnien und die Hercegovina vom 4. November 1881*, Zahl 2679/P., *betreffend die Kundmachung des provisorischen Wehrgesetzes für Bosnien und die Hercegovina*. <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=lbh&datum=18819004&seite=00000695>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

120 *Auszug aus dem Circularerlasse der Landesregierung für Bosnien und die Hercegovina vom 5. November 1881*, Z. 2698/Pr. betreffend der Behandlung der Mohammedaner während der activen Militärdienstzeit. <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=lbh&datum=1881&page=756&size=28>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

121 The provisional law was adopted in 1881, which was in force as of 1 January 1882. This is why often the Conscription law is usually referred to as a law of 1882. *Provisorisches Wehrgesetz für Bosnien und die Hercegovina*. <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=lbh&datum=18819004&seite=00000697>. Accessed 18 April 2022.

122 See more about responses of the Bosniaks, debates of religious scholars around the issue of migration (*hijra*) in the chapter Migration to Remaining Ottoman Lands.

123 *Sarajevski list*, 4 (192), 3 November 1881.

124 *Verordnung*, 4 November 1881, 696.

125 *Sarajevski list*, 4 (105), 11 November 1881.

126 This meant that the meat for Muslims had to come from animals that had been butchered according to the principles of Islam. Such meat is called *halal* meat.

127 Neumayer and Schmidl, *Des Kaisers Bosniaken*, p.110. The military imams in the Austro-Hungarian army from 1882 until 1918 are listed, including the cities in which they performed their military duty as imams: Mehmed ef. Kokić (1892-1888, Sarajevo), Mehmed ef. Bećiragić (1888-1895, Vienna/Sarajevo), Ahmed Šukri ef. Bajraktarević (1891-1904, Vienna/Sarajevo), Asim ef. Doglodović (1895-1902, Vienna), Hašim ef. Dženanović (1902-1914, Vienna / Budapest / Graz / Sarajevo / Trieste), Hafiz Abdullah ef. Kurbegović (1904-1918, Vienna; from 1914 as military mufti; received medal of Kaiser Francis Joseph), Salih ef. Atiković (1909-1918, Graz), Hafiz Ibrahim ef. Jahić (1909-1918, Budapest) and Osman ef. Redžović (1914-1917, Trieste). There were also some 100 military imams in reserve (cf. enumeration in Zijad Šehić, “Vojni imami u bosanskohercegovačkim jedinicama u okviru austrougarske armije 1878-1918,” *Godišnjak* (2006), pp.309-21. “Ef.” after the first name is the abbreviation for “efendija” which literally means “sir” in Turkish language, and has been used in Bosnia for graduates from Islamic high schools (*medresas*). To this day everyone who finishes the *medresa* automatically obtains this title which implies as well a sort of licence to lead prayers and give lectures on Islam.

128 Dževada Šuško, “Bosniaks & Loyalty: Responses to the Conscription Law in Bosnia and Hercegovina 1881/82,” *Hungarian Historical Review*, 3 (2014), pp. 529-559.

129 Kapidžić, *Hercegovački ustanak*, p.81.

130 Within a few months on 26 February 1882, the rebellion was crushed.

131 Kapidžić, *Hercegovački ustanak*, pp.81-82.

132 *Ibid.*, p.83.

133 Karl Gabriel, *Bosnien-Herzegowina 1878. Der Aufbau der Verwaltung unter FZM Herzog Wilhelm v. Württemberg und dessen Biographie* [Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878. The Establishment of the Administration under Field Marshall Duke Wilhelm v. Württemberg and his Biography], (Frankfurt am Main et al: Peter Lang, 2003), p.87.

134 An interesting comparison might be the issue of the Buffalo Soldiers. The expression “Buffalo soldiers” was used for the African-American regiments who fought on the side of the USA in the American civil war in 1866. Within these regiments there proved to be loyal soldiers who fought as well against the prejudices towards black people.

135 *Telegramm aus Sarajevo an das Auswärtige Amt*, 10.8.1914, RM3/4333; *Telegramm aus Sarajevo an Seine Majestät den Kaiser in Berlin*, 15.8.1914, RM5/2283.

136 *Chiffretelegramm des Landeschefs Potiorek an den gemeinsamen Finanzminister ABiH ZMF Präs.* 1842 15-18.11.1914.

137 Jihad can be defined in this sense as material and physical exertion to preserve one's religion or homeland from attack.

138 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ‘Euro-Islam by “Jihad Made in Germany”’ in *Islam in Inter-War Europe*. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (eds.), (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), p.271.

139 Dževada Šuško, ‘The Importance of the Berlin-Baghdad and Hejaz Railway for Germany’ in *Kaiser and Sultan: The Berlin-Baghdad and Hejaz Railway* (Sarajevo: Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks, 2014), pp.155-173.

140 Many brochures were published at that time in German and many were translations from Arabic to German. See Schwanitz, ‘Euro-Islam by “Jihad Made in Germany”’, pp.271-301.

141 Wilhelm II, ‘Tischrede in Damaskus (8 November 1898)’ [Toasts in Damascus] in *Reden des Kaisers* [Speeches of the Kaiser]. Ernst Johann (ed.), (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1966), p. 81.

142 *Fetve o džihadu* ABiH ZMF Präs.16210 26.11.-10.12.1914.

143 Ibid.

144 Hans Fritz, *Bosniak*. (Original work published 1931) [Reprint and Bosnian translation of the book *Bosniak*. Waidhofen a.d. Ybbs, 1931], (Sarajevo: Dobra Knjiga, 2007), p.9.

145 *Deutscher nach Geburt und Besinnung, bleibe ich dennoch zeitlebens ‘Bosniak’*. Ibid., p.4.

146 Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, pp.466-467.

147 Fritz, *Bosniak*, p.12.

148 [To remember the brave Bosniaks who heroically defended their common Austrian fatherland until the last day].

http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2009/lebring_kgs_wk1_stmk_oe.htm. Accessed 18 April 2022.

149 For more, see “*Bosnien’s treue Söhne*” [Bosnia’s loyal sons] on the official website of the current Austrian military (*Österreichs Bundesheer im Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung*)

<http://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendienst/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=1307>. Accessed 1 October 2022.

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(‘seinen Helden’) are held at the Historical Military Museum (Heeresgeschichtliches Museum) in Vienna. See as well Neumayer and Schmidl, *Des Kaisers Bosniaken*, p.148.

151 Karl Aspen, *Kriegsanekdoten. Heitere und ernste Tatsachen aus dem Jahre 1914/1915*, [Anecdotes from the war. Cheerful and serious facts from the years 1914/1915], (Regensburg: J.Habbel, 1918), pp.200-202.

152 Durić was a well known and appreciated personality in Budapest during the interwar period. See further Neumayer and Schmidl, *Des Kaisers Bosniaken*, p.68.

153 Karl Aspen, *Kriegsanekdoten*, p.202.

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In the late 19th century, Bosnia and Herzegovina, small but strategically significant (with a predominantly Muslim population), became the subject of great power interests as the Ottoman period shifted to that of Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878. The impact of this on the Bosniak people suddenly finding themselves under the authority of European rather than centuries old Islamic rule, and how they chose to navigate the transition in terms of faith and loyalty, is the subject of this work.

Included in European affairs the Bosniaks managed to straddle two contrasting worlds, maintaining their own Islamic interests without alienating those of Central Europe. These turbulent times in the post-Ottoman era are remarkable to examine, revealing the nature of that transition, its complex dynamics, and more specifically how new political, economic, societal and cultural realities, as well as radical modernization processes, impacted Bosniak Muslims, and to what extent loyalties shifted from one civilization (Ottoman) to another (Austro-Hungarian).

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COVER IMAGE: SARAJEVO, 26 MARCH 1914. Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević and Oskar Potiorek on the nomination of Džemaluddin Čaušević as Reis ul-Ulema, head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia. Gazi Husrev-bey Library, Sarajevo.