Mohammad Hashim Kamali

TAJDĪD, *IṢLĀḤ* AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL IN ISLAM

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FOREWORD

THE International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia have great pleasure in jointly presenting Occasional Paper 27 *Tajdīd, Iṣlāḥ and Civilisational Renewal in Islam* by renowned scholar and specialist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, Mohammad Hashim Kamali. He has published widely on various Shariᶜah topics. Many of his books including *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*; *Shariᶜah Law: An Introduction*; and *A Textbook of Hadith Studies* are used as reference works in English speaking universities worldwide.

The basic theme of this paper is that civilisational renewal is an integral part of Islamic thought. The paper looks into the meaning, definition and origins of *tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ* and their relationship with ijtihad, and how these have been manifested in the writings and contributions of the thought leaders of Islam throughout its history. It also develops *tajdīd*-related formulas and guidelines that should lead the efforts of contemporary Muslims in forging the objectives of inter-civilisational harmony and their cooperation for the common good.

Where dates are cited according to the Islamic calendar (hijrah) they are labelled AH. Otherwise they follow the Gregorian calendar and are labelled CE where necessary. Arabic words are italicised except for those which have entered common usage. Diacritical marks have been added only to those Arabic names not considered modern.

Since its establishment in 1981, the IIIT has served as a major center to facilitate serious scholarly efforts. Towards this end it has, over the decades, conducted numerous programs of research, seminars and conferences as well as publishing scholarly works specialising in the social sciences and areas of theology, which to date

number more than seven hundred titles in English and Arabic, many of which have been translated into other major languages.

Founded in 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia is an independent research institute, dedicated to objective academic research with practical policy-relevant implications on Islam and contemporary issues. In a relatively short period, IAIS has grown into a dynamic public forum that engages in seminars and publications of concern to Malaysia, the Muslim world, and Islam's engagement with other civilisations. IAIS Malaysia publishes a quarterly international peer-reviewed journal, *Islam and Civilisational Renewal* (ICR), a bi-monthly *IAIS Bulletin and Islam and Contemporary Issues*, books, monographs, and Occasional Paper Series. In the past nine years it has convened about 280 events, seminars, roundtables, national and international conferences on a wide range of topics of concern to Islam and the Muslim world. Details on IAIS Malaysia activities and publications can be found at www.iais.org.my. Professor Kamali's own website is www.hashimkamali.com.

IIIT LONDON OFFICE *and* IAIS MALAYSIA, KUALA LUMPUR
February 2018

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The history of Islamic thought is marked by a continuous tradition of internal revitalisation and reform embedded in the principles of *iṣlāḥ*, and *tajdīd*. The ultimate purpose has been to bring existing realities and social change in line with the transcendant and universal standard of the Qur'an and Sunnah through a process of restoration and reform. The tradition of *iṣlāḥ-tajdīd* has thus consistently challenged the Muslim status quo and prompted fresh interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah, understood and implemented through the methodologies of interpretation and ijtihad, as well as rejection of unwarranted accretions to the original messages of Islam.[1]

This paper is presented in two parts, the first of which consists of an analysis of *tajdīd*, its definition and scope, its textual origins and the impact of scholastic developments thereon. The second part turns to *iṣlāḥ* in conjunction with Islamic revivalist movements, interaction and responses to western modernity and secularism. Western challenges to Islam have also prompted new and more inquisitive approaches to *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd*. A brief discussion that ensues also explores the relevance of *maqāṣid* to *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd*, to be followed by an overview of the Western critique and responses it has received from Muslim thinkers. The final section addresses the question as to how civilisational renewal (*al-tajdīd al-ḥaḍārī*) is to be understood in its Islamic context. The paper ends with a conclusion and some actionable recommendations.

MEANING AND SCOPE

Tajdīd literally means renewal, when something is made or becomes new, and when it is restored to its original condition. Renewal as such takes for granted the occurrence of some change in the subject matter to which it is applied: Something is known to have existed in an original state, then it became overwhelmed by factors that changed it. When it is restored to how it was prior to that change, that is *tajdīd*.² It thus appears that *tajdīd* also takes for granted the existence of a valid precedent, a principle or body of principles that fell prey to distortion and neglect, and need to be restored to their original purity. *Tajdīd* is not necessarily concerned with new beginnings and new principles, yet as will be seen below, the task of renewal and *tajdīd* does not yield itself to overly restrictive applications nor to a mere revival of past precedent. Recourse to *tajdīd* is therefore likely to acquire different dimensions as I elaborate below.

Muslim scholars have recorded a variety of definitions for *tajdīd*, some of which are closely tied to precedent whereas others tend to be more open. The earliest definition on record of *tajdīd* is that of Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124 AH/724 CE) who wrote that *tajdīd* in the hadith (as reviewed below) "means revival (*iḥyā'*) of that which has disappeared or died out due to neglect of the Qur'an and Sunnah and their requirements."³ Ibn al-Athīr's (d. 606 AH/1210 CE) definition of *tajdīd* reflects more on scholastic developments which were well-developed by his time. *Tajdīd* is accordingly equated with the revival (*iḥyā'*) of the legacy of the leading *madhāhib*. The *mujaddid*, or carrier of *tajdīd*, is thus described as "a prominent leader who emerges at the head of every century to revive the religion for the Ummah and preserve the *madhhabs* of their following under the leadership of their respective imams."⁴ On a broader note, al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 AH/1505 CE) wrote that "*tajdīd* in religion means renewal of its guidance, explanation of its truth, as well as eradication of pernicious innovation (*bidʿah*), of extremism (*al-ghuluw*) or laxity in religion." He went on to add that *tajdīd* also means observance of people's benefits, societal traditions and the norms of civilisation and Shariʿah.⁵

Writing in late 20th century, al-Qaradawi understood *tajdīd* as "combining the beneficial old with the appropriate new – *al-qadīm al-nāfiʿ wa al-jadīd al-ṣāliḥ*," and being "open to the outside world without melting into it." He juxtaposed *tajdīd* with ijtihad and added that "ijtihad captures the intellectual and knowledge dimensions of *tajdīd*, but that *tajdīd* is wider in the sense that *tajdīd* also encapsulates the psychological and practical dimensions [of revival]."[6] Hence ijtihad and *tajdīd* are about the same on the intellectual plane, but *tajdīd* has an emotive component that is manifested in collective activism and movement. Many of al-Qaradawi's contemporaries went on record to endorse him: Kamal Abul Majd, Munir Shafiq, Umar Ubaid Hasanah and Fathi al-Darini – to name a few.[7] Hasan al-Turabi is openly critical, on the other hand, of those who confined *tajdīd* to the revival of the spirit of religiosity and theological doctrines only. For *tajdīd* may well consist of individual or collective ijtihad in theoretical and practical matters, or may indeed visualise a new prototype that unites the timeless guidelines of Shariʿah with a new reality and circumstance.[8] Turabi added further that religious *tajdīd* has two aspects, one that looks at the Shariʿah from within and consists essentially of its revival (*iḥyāʾ*), whereas the other stretches the perimeters by bringing in new elements that may partake in *taṭwīr al-dīn*, that is, diversification of the resources of religion. *Tajdīd* is further extended to mean a "total revival in all aspects," including the area of political reform by devising a mechanism for a *shūrā* based system of governance.[9]

Understanding *tajdīd* and what it has meant to commentators has thus been influenced by various factors, one of which is historical in that challenges faced by people and societies in various periods of history are evidently not the same. This also implies that people tended to interpret *tajdīd* in the light of their own experience and conditions. Another factor is the interpreter's viewpoint and specialisation. A jurist may understand *tajdīd* differently to a historian or a sociologist. The prevalence of imitation or *taqlīd* over many centuries is yet another factor affecting the understanding of *tajdīd*.[10] The time factor is evidently important for *tajdīd*: Reading the views of a 20th century scholar or *faqīh* may well provide a

different vision of *tajdīd* compared to his earlier counterparts. This is partly because *tajdīd* is inherently dynamic and multi-dimensional, and can tie up with many other ideas and principles. A comprehensive reading of *tajdīd* is also likely to go beyond a strictly theological framework and touch on issues of concern to the renewal of Islamic society and civilisation.[11] In Muhammad Imarah's view, since the Ummah is faced with a crisis in its encounter with modernity; it is most likely that *tajdīd* reads the scripture in conjunction with new reality through the lenses of rationality and ijtihad.[12]

A reference may be made to two other Arabic expressions that occur in the Islamic reformist discourse, namely *al-taghyīr* and *al-taṭwīr*. *Al-taghyīr* (change) could either mean regeneration and renewal of what had existed before, which is tantamount to *tajdīd*, or it could mean seeking to change the status quo without reference to a precedent, which is *taṭwīr*. Both of these partake in gradual reconstruction and reform, but if the change is sudden and unprecedented, it would then qualify as *thawrah/inqilāb* (revolution). Some change may consist, in addition, of purification and the purging of unwanted accretions that originate in questionable practices in the name of religion – this would most likely be in the nature of *al-tanqīḥ* (lit. purification, purging) and not of renewal as such.[13] That said, no black and white categories can be visualised as in reality, many of these concepts partake of one another and overlap.

Another allied word already mentioned is *iḥyā'* (revival), which evidently means restoring status quo ante without necessarily of any attempt to improve or reform it. Some authors have, however, used *iḥyā'* in a generic sense that did not preclude renewal and reform. This may be said of Imam al-Ghazālī's (d. 1111 CE) renowned work, *Iḥyā' ʿUlūm al-Dīn* (revival of the religious sciences), whereas the Prominent Indian author, Wahiduddin Khan's choice of *Tajdīd ʿUlūm al-Dīn* (renewal of the religious sciences) for his well-known book is actually meant, on the other hand, to convey the notion only of revival (*iḥyā'*) rather than that of *tajdīd*. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī has used *tajdīd* in his writings in the sense mainly, however, of ijtihad. Two well-known works of twentieth century origin on *tajdīd* that merit attention are that of the Egyptian Abd al-Mutaal

al-Saidi *Al-Mujaddidūn fī al-Islām*, and that of Muhammad Iqbal's *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, both of which penetrated the various aspects of *tajdīd*.[14] Other authors who have contributed to the *tajdīd* discourse in recent times include, apart from Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Abul A'la Maududi, Hasan al-Turabi, Ismail Raji al Faruqi, Fazlur Rahman, Taha Jabir Alalwani and many others. One would, however, hesitate to identify them as *mujaddidūn* in the traditional sense, yet there is little doubt in their substantive contribution of ideas to that effect. Then it appears that the conventional notion of *tajdīd* itself has been changing, perhaps with the advent of globalisation, the sheer bulk and rapidity of ideas and contributions.[15]

A brief mention may also be made of the Arabic words *al-nahḍah* and *al-ṣaḥwah* (awakening, resurgence), which tend to signify movement and a demand for change. Some movements using these words in their mottos call for a total revival of the past heritage, whereas others are critical of modernity and westernisation, but still others who take a more balanced view of *tajdīd*.[16]

Due to its inherent dynamism, *tajdīd* has hardly been subjected to a pre-determined methodology and framework, which would explain, to some extent, why Muslim scholars have frequently underlined their concern over the Islamic authenticity of what can be rightly subsumed under it. "The true *mujaddid* (renewer) is one," according to al-Qaradawi, "who rejuvenates religion by the religion itself. *Tajdīd* through syncretism and implantation of what has no basis in the religion does not qualify as *tajdīd*."[17] Yet al-Qaradawi also refutes the assertion by some that the religion, its tenets and principles are not open to *tajdīd* – saying that while Islam is open to *tajdīd* by the authority of a clear text, it would be incorrect to change the essential pillars and beliefs of Islam in the name of *tajdīd*.[18] Outside this particular framework, in other words, Islam remains open to *tajdīd* in all areas.

The need for *tajdīd* is accentuated by both the norm and praxis. At a certain stage of its development, the community's touch with the original impulse and premises of Islam may be weakened, or

even lost, under the strains of challenging conditions – such as *taq-līd*, colonialism, rampant secularism, and globalisation – as already mentioned.

Islam's long history has undoubtedly witnessed instances of both rejuvenating *tajdīd*, and of deadening stagnation and *taqlīd*. The weight of unwarranted accretions even managed to declare, at some point, the door of creative thinking and ijtih ad closed. Hence the community's need for inspiring thinkers and *mujaddids* in the persons of such luminaries as Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī; Ibrāhīm al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388 CE) with his innovative contributions on the higher purposes, or *maqāṣid*, of Shariᶜah; Taqī al–Dīn ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE), the harbinger of political revival, the polymaths of civilisational renewal, ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406 CE) and Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dahlawī (d. 1762 CE), and many more. Some have even cited Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al–Ayyūbī (d. 1193 CE) as a *mujaddid* of a different kind.

A point may be made also regarding information overload. Generations upon generations of scholars have added their personal deductions and interpretations to the original teachings of the religion, which may well have had the unwanted effect of making the religion more complicated and remote from the common man. Instead of knowing the teachings of religion as the predecessors did, through direct personal insight, the common man is often placed in a position to rely on second-hand expositions offered by people who have specialised in the study of some aspects of Islam. The opinions of these mediators naturally differ and verification of the correct positions often requires a great amount of learned labour, resulting in further additions to the original messages. Direct contact and awareness of Muslims of the essence of Islam is consequently supplanted by elaborate rules and burdensome extrapolations.

TEXTUAL ORIGINS OF *TAJDĪD*

Tajdīd originates in the authority of a renowned hadith that has been carefully analysed and interpreted by its learned commentators. To quote the hadith: "God will raise for this Ummah, at the

head of each century, someone who will rejuvenate for them their religion – *inna Allāh yabᶜath li-hādhihi al-Ummah ᶜalā ra's kull mi'at sanah man yujaddid lahā dīnahā.*"[19]

The key word here is *yujaddid* from the verbal root, *jaddada*, which means to renew something. *Mujaddid*, being its active participle, refers to one who renews or revives the application of Islam in the Muslim community. *Tajdīd* accordingly implies renewal and regeneration of the application of Islam in society, returning it to the path of Islam anew, as it was originally.[20] The emphasis is on the revival of Islamic tenets and principles that have been neglected, marginalised or forgotten under the weight of new conditions and developments. Restoring and disseminating the purity of those principles among people and their acting upon them is the main task of the *mujaddid*.[21] According to a hadith commentator, "*Tajdīd* means revival of what has been marginalised of the Qur'an and Sunnah and issuance of judgment on their basis as well as eradicating pernicious innovation (*bidᶜah*) that contravenes the established Sunnah."[22] This definition seems to correspond with that of al-Zuhrī's, as earlier quoted, albeit with minor additions – as discussed later. Further commenting on the hadith under review, al-Manāwī (d. 1621 CE) added that "*yujaddid lahā dīnahā*" means that the *mujaddid* clarifies and differentiates the Sunnah from that which is pernicious innovation and *bidᶜah*, and he fights it.[23]

Commentators have further added that the message of this hadith tends to go beyond its literal meaning: it is basically to accentuate the need for renewal, interpretation and ijtihad on unprecedented issues and developments that the Ummah may encounter over time.[24] In juridical matters of concern to the Shariᶜah, *tajdīd* is akin to ijtihad and should therefore be regulated by the methodological guidelines of ijtihad as are expounded in the science of the sources of Islamic law, the *uṣūl al-fiqh*. It is widely acknowledged that ijtihad is Islam's principal tool of constructive regeneration and renewal, which may well consist of *tajdīd*, yet the two technically differ in that ijtihad proceeds mainly in conjunction with practical *fiqhī* matters, legal and juridical issues, whereas *tajdīd* is not so confined and extends to all aspects of the religion, indeed of the life of the

Ummah, its ethos, lifestyle and civilisation. Briefly, ijtihad may be divided into two types: creative (*inshā'ī*), and clarificatory (*intiqā'ī*), both of which must contain an element of originality, and a fresh understanding of the source guidelines in order to qualify as ijtihad.

The hadith under review is also understood to mean that Islam will not die nor become redundant and that God will help this Ummah to reconnect with the original messages of Islam. The hadith is similarly understood to be conveying a message of hope and assurance that God will help this Ummah to be on the right path and find its bearings with its past heritage to face new challenges.[25]

The *mujaddid* must possess certain qualifications that include: 1) a clear understanding of the changeable and unchangeable in Islam. The unchangeable in Islam refers to the essentials of belief, worship and morality, as well as its decisive scriptural injunctions. Islamic principles in the sphere of civil transactions (*muʿāmalāt*) are, on the other hand, open to interpretation and adjustment. 2) Knowledge of the rules of necessity and Shariʿah concessions (*ḍarūrah, rukhṣah*) pertaining to exceptional circumstances. 3) Knowledge of the place of rationality and ratiocination (*taʿlīl*) in the understanding of scripture. 4) Due regard for *maṣlaḥah* and people's legitimate interests. And 5) due observance of the general customs of society.[26]

The fact that the hadith under review refers to *mujaddid* in the singular, does not necessarily mean emergence only of one *mujaddid* at any given place or century. This is because the Arabic pronoun 'man' therein can refer to one person or to a multitude. *Tajdīd* may accordingly be attempted by one person or a group of persons, party or movement. Notwithstanding the emergence of individual *mujaddids* that featured prominently in the writings of early commentators, modern interpretations of *tajdīd* favour collective *tajdīd* undertaken by groups of ʿulamā', specialists and scholars in various disciplines. One *mujaddid* may be a jurist, another a political scientist, yet another an economist and so forth. Under the present circumstances, *tajdīd* and its allied concept of *iṣlāḥ* (which see below) are both movement-oriented and their combined impact on both the inner life of individuals and their collective action tend to acquire renewed prominence in modern times.[27] Moreover, *tajdīd*

and *iṣlāḥ* cannot be meaningfully separated, just as the inner self and outer conduct of the individual may be said to be necessarily intertwined. In the context of Malaysia, the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) that emerged in 1971 drew much of its motivation from a combination of both *tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ*, one that called for spiritual and moral transformation of individuals and visualised a more equitable and just society.[28]

Islam is not concerned with personal spirituality alone, and unless this is manifested in the outer conduct of individuals and in societal relations, spirituality by itself can be subjective, misinterpreted, and even seen to be anti-social – as is often said regarding some of the Sufi movements. For mainstream Sufism, this integration of the inner spiritual self with outer conduct is evidently in line with Islam's over-arching principle of *tawḥīd*. Hence it is not difficult to see that *tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ* should be integral and a logical extension of one another.

Furthermore, *tajdīd* is not confined to traditional disciplines, such as theology, fiqh, or hadith but also extends to science and technology, economics and other fields of learning that are meaningful for the revival of the Ummah and Islamic civilisation. Another point of interpretation arising is whether it is the religion of the time in which the *mujaddid* lives that he is supposed to revive in the light of the conditions of that time, or that of the Islam that prevailed during the lifetime of the Prophet (ṢAAS)*. The wording of the hadith confirms the former meaning: The phrase '*yujaddid lahā dīnahā*' thus means that the *mujaddid* revives for the Ummah the religion that they practice at the time when the *mujaddid* emerges. The hadith did not say for instance 'the religion of Allah, or of the Prophet Muhammad, or Islam as such,' but visualised instead the religion that the Ummah observes.[29] The *mujaddid*, to be sure, "is not out to create some past scenario in the history of the Ummah. Rather he is to reapply the principles of Islam in their contemporary context so that the community is enabled to live and symbolise those ideals and principles."[30]

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*(ṢAAS) – *Ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam*: May the peace and blessings of God be upon him. Said whenever the name of the Prophet Muhammed is mentioned.

How should the phrase "every one hundred years" be under-stood in the hadith under review? Many have understood it literally and engaged themselves with a series of minor issues as to whether the *mujaddid* is to appear at the end of the year that marks the end of a century or its beginning. What if someone died a week or month before the beginning of a century – thus precluding renowned imams like Mālik (d. 975), Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767 CE) and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855 CE) simply because they did not fulfil those meticu-lous calculations. Others have added that the reference to a century may be no more than an indication of a period of time after which the Muslim community, or any human society for that matter, may require revitalisation. Ibn Khaldūn's theory of the rise and fall of civilisations, which takes about four generations, may give cre-dence to such interpretation. The cyclical pattern of the ascendancy and decline of civilisations that Ibn Khaldūn identifies is intimately related to the state of the arts and sciences, the depth and diversity or otherwise of crafts and industries and, most of all, good governance, especially its commitment to justice.[31] The message of the hadith may simply be that *tajdīd* will occur frequently enough to ensure that the Muslim community remains in touch with its roots. That God the Most High will send *mujaddids* whenever the Ummah is in need of them, and it may indeed happen at any time or part of a given century.[32] Some writers have highlighted the need for *mujad-dids* in times of tumult and external aggression. To this effect, it is of interest to note that Abū Dāwūd al–Sijistānī, the author of the renowned *Sunan Abū Dāwūd*, has recorded the hadith of *tajdīd* as the first hadith in his chapter on 'tribulations and tumults' (*kitāb al-malāḥim*).[33]

As earlier noted, *tajdīd* presupposes a degree of stagnation char-acterised by the decline of society and generation. The *mujaddid* alerts and awakens them to their responsibilities and tries to rekindle in them a yearning to strive and change for the better.[34] Muslim individuals and groups must in this connection heed to the Qur'anic proclamation that "God will not change the condition of a people until they change that which is in themselves" (Qur'an, *al-Raʿd*, 13:11).

Many have mentioned ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 101 AH/719 CE), and Imam al-Shafiʿī (d. 205 AH/895 CE) as the *mujaddids* of the second and third hijrah centuries respectively. Many have also added Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324 AH/936 CE), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403 AH/1013 CE), and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH/1111 CE) who emerged at the head of the succeeding three centuries as the third, fourth and fifth *mujaddid* respectively. Only the first two names are, however, commonly quoted, but then due to the prevalence of the *madhhabs*, commentators have tended to refer to renowned names in the *madhahbs* only of their own following.[35]

The emergence and crystallisation of *madhāhib* was a factor behind the prevalence of indiscriminate imitation (*taqlīd*) that contributed, in turn, to the so-called 'closing of the door of ijtihad' and suppression of the spirit of free inquiry and scholarship. Could this also mean that speaking of *tajdīd* at times when ijtihad is suppressed and *taqlīd* dominated is not all that meaningful? This is not to say that *tajdīd* came to a standstill, as it actually did not, but scholars continued to speak of *tajdīd* of a limited type, often within the confines of their own schools of following.

Another question raised is: does the hadith under review visualise a *mujaddid* for the whole of the Ummah, or whether each country and community could have their own *mujaddids*? In response it is said that *tajdīd* for the renewal of Islam must in principle mean that it is meant to be for the whole of the Ummah. Yet it is added, on a practical note, that due to the vast territorial domain of Islam, different regional and geographical segments of the Ummah may have their own *mujaddids*.[36] The assertion, however, by some early commentators that the hadith of *tajdīd* actually contemplated members of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*) as carriers of *tajdīd*, *or mujaddids*, is at odds with the general tenor of many other hadiths that speak of knowledge and erudition rather than the family and descent of scholars as such. Had the point over *ahl al-bayt* been a reliable interpretation, then the naming of certain figures, such as ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, al-Shāfiʿī and others, who were not from the *ahl al-bayt* would have not have materialised in the first place. In

discussing this, one observer has even quoted a had ith wherein the Prophet referred to Salmān al–Fārisī as one of his *ahl al-bayt*, as a gesture merely of closeness and affection even though he was not one of his family members as such.[37]

Al-Qaradawi has observed that *tajdīd* with reference to religion in the said hadith implies a renewed understanding of the religion, reaffirmation of one's faith and a renewed commitment to the authentic principles of Islam. The basic message of the hadith, he added, is inevitability of social change over the course of time, which is to be expected in every generation and century. Although the hadith itself simply speaks of the beginning of every century without specifying any particular calendar or framework of calculation, most commentators understood as if it contemplated the Hijri century and calendar. Yet, there is no objection, in principle, if it is applied to an equivalent span of time using a different calendar. As for the question whether the beginning of a century should start with the birth date of the Prophet Muhammad, or his demise, al-Qaradawi singled out the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Madinah as the most significant since it marked a new beginning in so many ways, and therefore the most appropriate starting point for *tajdīd*.[38] This also goes for the Islamic Hijri calendar which commences from the event of the Prophet's migration.

Some commentators have further added combat of harmful innovation in religion (*kasr al-bidᶜah*) to the understanding of *tajdīd*. This addition seems to have emerged following sectarian developments, such as that of the Kharijites, the Muᶜtazilah and the *fiqhī* schools. The hadith scholars then tried to bring in the notion of *bidᶜah* within the purview of this hadith. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it appears that *tajdīd* may involve combat of *bidᶜah*, yet it is something which may or may not be integral to its meaning. The Andalusian jurist, Ibrāhīm al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388 CE), rightly observed that the hadith contains a positive message and contemplates the common good and *maṣlaḥah* of the Ummah generally.[39] The hadith should not, in other words, be given a sectarian and factional interpretation. Commenting on al-Shāṭibī's observation, Abid al-Jabiri also wrote that renewal and *tajdī d* in our time means finding

practical solutions to the issues of common concern, issues that were not encountered in the past.[40]

IṢLĀḤ AND TAJDĪD: 20ᵀᴴ CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

Iṣlāḥ (reform) in the modern context, primarily refers to the works of 20th century scholars Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and their mentor, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1987). The Qur'anic origins of *iṣlāḥ* signify the broader meanings of 'reconciliation,' 'striving toward peace,' and 'pious action' as explained below.

Ṣalāḥ and *iṣlāḥ* in the Qur'an often refer to the general good of the people. The believers are thus called upon to engage themselves in righteous conduct – '*ʿamal sāliḥ*', which may consist of that which is good and recommendable (*maʿrūf*) or which seeks to bring peace and reconciliation among people (*iṣlāḥ bayn al-nās*) (al-Nisā', 4:114). *Iṣlāḥ* may also consist of eradication of corruption, or *fasād*, which is the opposite of *iṣlāḥ* (al-Aʿrāf, 7:56). People's intention to achieve peace and *ṣalāḥ*, and not only their action, also earn them reward, for "…God certainly knows the *mufsid* (agent of corruption) from the *muṣliḥ* (agent of good)…" (al-Baqarah, 2:220) and shall reward the *muṣliḥīn* and all those engaged in God-ordained work of benefit to humankind (cf., al-Aʿrāf, 7:170).[41]

The intimate relationship between *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd* is underscored by the analysis that *tajdīd* for its own sake would mean little unless it is aimed ultimately at *iṣlāḥ*. It is further acknowledged that *iṣlāḥ* necessarily presents a challenge to predominant religious, cultural and intellectual *status quo*. The potency of *iṣlāḥ-tajdīd* in Islamic history sprang from its scriptural origins and the evolving consensus that set the boundaries of orthodoxy. While stimulating evolution of the religious and cultural life of the Ummah, the chief concern of the *tajdīd-iṣlāḥ* tradition was to preserve its unity and cohesion. In this spirit, an important aim of the reform project at the turn of the twentieth century had been to restore Muslim consensus. At the same time, it is conceded that twentieth century Islamic thought is no longer wholly internally generated, but is substantially

influenced by, or consist of a reaction to, external challenges from western and non-western ideas and doctrines.⁴²

No consensus exists on a definition of *iṣlāḥ* in an Islamic context. This is partly because almost every sectarian movement has claimed to be the agent of *iṣlāḥ*. By some accounts, even the ultraconservative Wahhabiyyah is considered reformist, because it too aspired to purify the religion from harmful influences of innovations and to call for the original simplicity of early Islam. Muhammad Abduh defined *iṣlāḥ* in a way that brings it closer to *tajdīd*. *Iṣlāḥ* is thus:

> Liberating one's thought from the shackles of *taqlīd* to understand religion in the way the predecessors of this Ummah (*salaf*) did prior to emergence of disagreements – through direct recourse to the sources of Islam and in due regard also to the norms of rationality which God has endowed in the human intellect. It is to eliminate confusion and accomplish God's messages for the preservation of humanity and world order.⁴³

This rather lengthy definition has invoked some criticism in its attempt to integrate traces of western modernity and rationalism in the fabric of *iṣlāḥ*. But even so, leading figures in the *iṣlāḥ* movement such as Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (d. 1899), Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d. 1903) have all been critical of blind imitation of the West. In line with the teachings of Ibn Rushd al-Qurṭubī (d. 1198 CE), al-Afghani and Abduh also refused to accept that reason is incompatible with *īmān* (belief), and held that the reformist movement would fail if Muslim clerics continued to preach the virtues of *taqlīd*. The proponents of *iṣlāḥ* also stressed the need for continuous ijtihad in their conviction that modern problems required modern answers.⁴⁴

The Salafiyyah–cum–*iṣlāḥ* movement may be distinguished from Wahhabism in that the latter aimed at cleansing religious practice and thought from all its alien elements to save the Muslim people from divine wrath; they were opposed to all Sufi manifestations of Islam, and were more concerned with fighting *bidᶜah* rather than advocating the positive aspects of reform. The movement also saw

no need for reinterpretation of text or ijtihad to adapt to conditions of modern life.[45]

The Abduh–Rida *iṣlāḥ* movement was subsequently divided into two branches, one of which leaned toward modernity (*al-ḥadāthah*), and the other toward revivalism of past precedent (*al-salafiyyah al-iḥyā'iyyah*). The former is associated with the thoughts mainly of twentieth century scholars Qassim Amin, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Husayn Haykal and the latter mainly with Abduh and Rashid Rida. There remained a centrist *iṣlāḥī* school of thought that was manifested in the works mainly of Mustafa al-Maraghi, Ali Abd al-Raziq, Mahmud Shaltut, Abdullah Darraz and others.[46]

That said, Salafiyyah, which is derived from *salaf* 'pious ancestors,' is sometimes distorted and used, for instance, by al-Qaeda terrorists. Any such attribution should not mean, as Nasar Meer has correctly observed, that the Salafis are in any way associated with terrorism or even likely to be terrorists or extremists. Only a distorted meaning of Salafi can be applied in that context. Terrorists are, of course, to be judged by their conduct, regardless of association, whether real or alleged, with any particular movement.[47]

Renewal and reform gained further traction after the fall of Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Some reformers, such as al-Afghani and al-Kawakibi, associated renewal in religion with major political reform. There is emerging consensus, for instance, on the integration of the Qur'anic principle of *shūrā* (consultation) in governance, and its accountability to the electorate. Some reformers also sought to improve the status of women in society. Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad al-Ghazali have, in principle, refused to attribute women's inequality to Islam but considered it to be the product of ignorance and misinterpretation of Islamic texts. The advocates of reform also stressed the revival of Islamic education, and the integration of scientific knowledge into the curricula of Islamic institutions of learning.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr has vindicated the primacy of *tajdīd* over *iṣlāḥ*: *Tajdīd* has Islamic roots which *iṣlāḥ* lacks. Nasr is of the view that it is *tajdīd* that is the fount of some of the most significant Islamic responses to the modern world.[48] The stronger scriptural roots of

tajdīd is undeniable, yet on a broader note, it is reasonable to say that *tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ* complement one another. Looking at the wider spectrum of Islamic tenets and principles, *iṣlāḥ* would appear to be integral, even if not based in a clear text, to the spirit and purport of the textual guidelines of Islam. Twentieth century discourse on *tajdīd* was actually precipitated by the *iṣlāḥ* movement that started with al-Afghani and Abduh.

The quest for knowledge has been made obligatory for Muslims, male and female, on the authority of hadith. Islam is also assertive of an inherent link between knowledge and upright conduct (*ʿamal ṣāliḥ*), the command to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, the command to do justice – all total up into a dynamic prospect for *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd* in the Muslim community. The intrinsic connection between *ʿilm* and *iṣlāḥ*, which is most emphasised in Islam, has also meant that the *mujaddid* must be an *ʿālim* of some renown. A learned renewer should undoubtedly seek to enjoin the right and reject what is wrong, setting aright people's affairs, establishing justice among them, support truth against falsehood and the oppressed against oppressor.

A more recent articulation of the broader notion of *tajd īd*-cum-*iṣlāḥ* in its contemporary context is found perhaps in the Mecca Declaration (December 2006) of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (now Cooperation) Summit of heads of states as follows:

> All the governments and peoples of the Ummah are unanimous in their conviction that reform and development are the priorities to which all efforts should be channelled within a framework that is intimately moulded in our Islamic social make-up. At the same time this framework needs to remain in harmony with the achievements of human civilisation and steeped in the principles of consultation, justice and equality in its drive to achieve good governance, widen political participation, establish the rule of law, protect human rights, apply social justice, transparency and accountability, fight corruption, and build civil society institutions.[49]

Murtada Mutahhari (d. 1981), a leading Shia philosopher and theologian, in his book, *al-Ishkāliyyah al-Iṣlāḥiyyah wa Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (difficulties in the reform and renewal of Islamic thought) has spoken extensively on *tajdīd*. For him, *tajdīd* or revival of Islam does not mean the revival or renewal of religion itself by changing its rules and guidelines or abrogating its teachings. Rather, what is meant is the renewal of the act of thinking about religion that leads to a revivification in the soul of the follower that influences, in turn, the direction of his action. It is the people and their way of thinking, in other words, that are being renewed, not Islam as such.[50]

Mutahhari's perception of renewal is basically underlined by timely interpretation that leads to action: a text can be understood in various ways, and a new approach in light of developments is a recommended approach to *tajdīd*. This may also entail divesting the religion of accretions that are a residue of false experience and have burdened and weakened it.[51]

This articulation of *tajdīd* comes close, one might say, to that of al-Qaradawi, and many other Sunni thinkers. For much like his Sunni counterparts, he stresses on drawing a clear distinction between the changeable and the unchangeable principles of Islam (i.e *mutaghayyirāt and thawābit*) saying that the latter are not open to renewal and *tajdīd*. He further proposes a merger between rationality, emotion, and ijtihad that draws on the resources of rationality (ʿaql) and moderation (*wasaṭiyyah*). Mutahhari was convinced that knowledge does not generate action if it lacks motivation. His views in this part tend to integrate some of the Shia jurisprudential postulates on ʿaql into his approaches to *tajdīd*.[52]

Elsewhere Mutahhari widens the scope of *tajdīd* when he writes that *tajdīd* is not confined to religion but also extends to philosophy and science, adding that including the philosophical position in *tajdīd* helps to inform it of our standing on things, how we regard our surroundings and influence our overall attitude. Science is capable of providing useful knowledge regarding how things work, and religion contributes to our ability to engender hope and motivation, and the ability also to attribute transcendence and holiness to human goals.[53]

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM, MODERNITY AND *TAJDĪD*

Expressions such as 'Islamic modernism,' Islamic revivalism' and 'Islamic reform' are embedded in the notions of *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd*, often attributed, as already mentioned, to al-Afghani, Abduh and Rida. Islamic modernism in the works of these and other thinkers sought to reconcile modern values such as constitutionalism, scientific investigation, modern methods of education, women's rights, cultural revival etc., with the tenets and principles of Islam. Islamic revivalism of the latter part of 20th century has had the effect of strengthening the affinity of *tajdīd* with the scriptural guidelines of Islam. Muhammad Iqbal's seminal work, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, was translated in Arabic by Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad in 1955, and Abd al-Mutaal al-Saidi's work, *Al-Mujaddidūn fī al-Islām min al-Qarn al-Awwal ilā al-Rābiᶜ ᶜAshar*, in the same year. Both expatiated on the scope and space that Islamic sources themselves provide for regeneration and renewal. Amin al-Khuli's title, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Dīn*, initially published as an article, and later as book, also reflected on similar themes.

It is of interest to mention that al-Saidi's previous book, published in the early 1950s, *Tārīkh al-Iṣlāḥ fī al-Azhar* (history of reform in Azhar) focused more on the concept of *iṣlāḥ* initiating in the meantime a call for a revolutionary reformer (*al-muṣliḥ al-thā'ir*) but was almost totally silent on *tajdīd*, which then became the central theme of his subsequent book in 1955.[54] The main reason for this change of focus was the realisation firstly that western modernity had begun to penetrate and confuse *iṣlāḥ* with currents of opinion that did not enjoy Islamic credibility. And secondly, the spread of nationalism and secular ideologies during the post-colonial period that consisted mainly of political mottos. Added to this was the Arab defeat by Israel, and the tussle that followed between Islamic movements and governments in power in many Muslim countries. A climate of crisis prevailed and *iṣlāḥ* began to give way to *tajdīd* due mainly to the latter's stronger grounding in the scripture.

Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) praised Abduh for recognising the need for reform, just as he commended Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) and Abul A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979) for countering the excesses of

Islamic modernism and defending Islam against secularism. But he criticised them in the meantime for not having a 'method' and for the ad hoc nature of the solutions they proposed to major issues. Fazlur Rahman tried, in turn, to articulate a new Islamic methodology as he believed that traditional methods had fallen short of bringing Muslim thought into the intellectual framework of the modern age. He focused his attention on the Qur'an and on correct methodology in particular of its interpretation. Rahman's mission may be summed up as an endeavour to retrieve the moral elan of the Qur'an in order to formulate a Qur'a n–centred ethic. For without an explicitly formulated ethical system, one can hardly do justice to Islam.[55]

Fazlur Rahman criticised the 'atomistic approach' of traditional scholarship. The methodology of the jurists was also lacking of a systematically broad socio-ethical theory that he believed should underlie the law. Indeed, the jurists, in their quest to develop a highly structured legal system, missed out on the fluidity that could have been the result of such a theory.[56] Fazlur Rahman expounded as to how the Qur'anic guidance was intimately connected with the religious, political, economic and cultural life of the people of Hijaz, and more broadly the people of Arabia. However, this close connection was later disrupted by the lengthy disputations of Islamic theology and law, creating an ever-widening gap. Revelation came to be seen as a historical and transcendant beyond the reach of humankind. The occasions of revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*) that played a vital role in explicating certain texts were marginalised and the link between *tafsīr*, fiqh, theology and real life of Muslims was further weakened.[57] It is remarkable to note also that Muslim writings on ethics were mainly developed outside the Shariᶜah framework and were explicitly based on Greek and Persian sources.[58]

In his writings on *tajdīd* in fiqh, Jamal al-Din Atiyah raised several issues that called for a review and renewal of fiqh in many areas. Beginning with devotional matters (ᶜ*ibādāt*), Atiyah noted that too much emphasis is placed on ritual performances at the expense of the spiritual component of ᶜ*ibādāt*. Whereas psychologists have spoken of the many beneficial psychological and character building

effects of prayer and fasting, this is totally absent in fiqh. With regard to marriage, the Qur'an characterised it as "friendship and compassion – *mawaddah wa raḥmah*," which the fiqh scholars have reduced to a contract of ownership (ᶜ*aqd al-tamlīk*), marking a total departure from that original Qur'anic spirit and its broader messages on human dignity (*karāmah*), justice and fair treatment (*al-ᶜadl wa al-iḥsān*).[59] The emphasis in both ᶜ*ibādāt* and contracts falls instead on formalities, pillars and conditions (*arkān wa shurūṭ*) in highly structured formulations that often compromise on the essence and spirit of the subject and tend to reverberate medieval society values.[60] Then again, Islam is a religion of unity (*tawḥīd*), whereas the divisive impact of the fiqh schools, or *madhhabs*, on Muslim unity is either exaggerated or misunderstood. The schools of law were a manifestation of latitude in scholarly inquiry and ijtihad, but which lost focus and became an instrument of fanaticism and disunity among Muslims. In a similar vein, fiqh scholarship in the era of *taqlīd* became focused on details and took an atomistic approach to law at the expense of developing general theories and comprehensive guidelines. There is, moreover, a certain disconnect between fiqh and the beliefs and ethical norms of Islam and how should all of these be related to governance.[61]

On a light note, Atiyah recounts what he had heard from al-Qaradawi that as a youth in his early years in Egypt, he (al-Qaradawi) attended the Ramadan lessons at the local mosque in late evenings between the *maghrib* and ᶜ*ishā'* prayers. The lessons were on ablution and cleanliness. Then al-Qaradawi humorously added that "all the 30 nights we did not exit that one subject." Compare this with the approach the Prophet took when a Bedouin came and asked him on how to perform the salah, and the Prophet simply said to him: "pray the way you see me praying."[62]

In his book *Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fī Ṭarīq al-Tajdīd*,[63] Muhammad Salim al-Awa speaks of the stagnation of fiqh due to the long-standing hold of *taqlīd*, and raises a number of issues over which innovative responses are wanting. He also noted that the political jurisprudence (*al-fiqh al-siyāsī*, also *al-siyāsah al-sharᶜiyyah*) has failed to integrate the Qur'anic principles of *shūrā* and accountability.

Al-Awa maintains that limiting the tenure of office of the head of state is no longer an option but a necessity, and that in many other areas, fiqh needs to be developed through comprehensive ijtihad: to provide relevant responses to issues of citizenship, freedom of association, political parties in the context of nation state, and peaceful relations with other states. Furthermore women's right of participation in the political life of the community, her entitlement to act as judge and witness, and absolute equality in her right of life, as expounded in some scholastic works, were patently discriminatory – with reference, for example to blood money or *diyyah*. Similar questions arise over equality in respect of the fundamental rights of non-Muslims and fiqh formulations over the imposition of poll tax (*jizyah*), Islam's position on art and music, as well as issues in criminal law concerning apostasy and the law of evidence, especially methods of proof that need to be brought into line with modern and more reliable scientific means of establishing facts.

Salim al-Awa started his afore-mentioned book with a review of Jamal al-Banna's book, entitled *Naḥwa Fiqh Jadīd* (Toward a new fiqh), and finds commonalities in their respective approaches to some of the challenging aspects of the renewal of fiqh. Al-Awa comments, however, on a point of difference between his own and al-Banna's approach: whereas al-Banna seems to depart from the established methodologies on renewal and reform, al-Awa thinks that most of the issues can be addressed through the accepted Islamic methodologies of ijtihad.[64]

The foregoing presents a fairly long list of issues that involve a healthy dose of self-criticism among Muslim scholars – the genesis one might say, of renewal and *tajdīd*. Some progress has been made on many of these through twentieth century family law reform legislation and scholarship, although progress is uneven in various countries and generally eclectic. Many of the authors I discussed have not only posed questions and raised issues but have also addressed them and deliberated over prospective solutions. Space does not permit details but I have elsewhere attempted a fuller picture of the twentieth century Islamic law reform measures through statutory legislation, juristic doctrine and research.[65]

Twentieth century, 'Islamic resurgence' witnessed aspects of re-
vivalism, that included both the salafiyyah type of revivalism, and
that of modern reform through statutory legislation. However, one
area that did not see tangible *tajdīd*-based improvement was consti-
tutional law and government. But even here the Arab Spring, 2011
and its aftermath, was undoubtedly, assertive of a public demand for
accountability and good governance where innovative Islamic
thought, democracy and human rights could blend and lead to,
beneficial changes. This could have marked a different direction to
the haphazard importation of western laws and constitutions that
had failed to deliver their much-awaited promises of constitutional-
ism, democracy and rule of law in the Muslim world. Yet as of this
writing, the Arab Spring has unfortunately not yielded its desired
results either thanks to unyielding dictators who confronted their
people only to frustrate their legitimate wishes.

THE RELEVANCE OF *MAQĀṢID*

The renewed interest in *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*, the higher objectives of
Islamic law, seen in Islamic thought and scholarship of recent
decades has been a partial response to the textualist overtones of
scholastic methodologies of interpretation and ijtihad. *Maqāṣid* has
now become an accepted term of reference and criterion of a
reformist idea and initiative. Whenever *tajdīd* introduces an initia-
tive, plan or purpose which can be subsumed under the five
essential *maqāṣid* (i.e. the *ḍarūriyyāt*),[66] its authenticity is most likely
verified in that context. In the event, however, where an instance of
tajdīd cannot be related to any of the recognised *maqāṣid* (objectives
of the Shariʿah), it is submitted that one may apply a negative test,
which is to say that *tajdīd* is valid if it does not contravene any of the
immutable norms and principles of Islam. In this case, one would
not need to produce affirmative evidence from the Islamic sources
to prove the acceptability of *tajdīd*. The application of *tajdīd* to the
dogma and basic pillars (*arkān*) of Islam is apparently limited. But
since *tajdīd* can engage in matters outside this sphere and issues of
concern to human relations and *muʿamalāt* with greater flexibility,

its relevance to the concerns of modernity and civilisational renewal is not difficult to see.

Linking the *maqāṣid* to *tajdīd* may be visualised with reference to economic development, which is not a juridical concept, nor is it a manifestly religious one, yet fighting poverty through economic development and realisation of equitable distribution of wealth are important aspects simultaneously of the *maqāṣid* and *tajdīd*. The imams al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭibī were of the view that Islamic thought must concern itself with the broader objectives of our religion and not solely with its prohibitive aspects, or to exclusively literalist interpretations.[67] This vision can best be achieved by drawing attention to the *maqāṣid* that are entirely goal-oriented, broader in scope, and capable of rising above particularities that can sometimes run in different directions and need to be made coherent in the light of *maqāṣid*.

Looked at from a different angle, the *maqāṣid* themselves can be developed through *tajdīd*. Some aspects of the *maqāṣid* that have remained underdeveloped could thus be developed through *tajdīd*-oriented research. This may be said of the role of rationality (*ʿaql*) in the identification of *maqāṣid*, and whether or not the scope of the conventional enumeration of the essential *maqāṣid*, or *ḍarūriyyāt*, can be widened to include other values and objectives that are clearly upheld in the scriptural sources. In a similar vein, two other categories of *maqāṣid*, namely the complementary (*ḥājiyyāt*) and embellishments (*taḥsīniyyāt*) may be wanting of better indicators and methodological refinements to minimise arbitrariness in their identification. The present writer has elsewhere discussed this subject in fuller details,[68] suffice it to say here that an important aspect of relating *tajdīd* to the *maqāṣid* would be to forge a closer nexus between the scriptural injunctions (*nuṣūṣ*) and their expressed purposes, or *maqāṣid*, and then to specify the *tajdīd*-related dimension thereof. It is no longer enough, therefore, to extract a ruling (*ḥukm*) of Shariʿah from a text in total isolation and neglect of its purpose and objective, or indeed as to how that particular *ḥukm* can offer a lead in a *tajdīd*-related direction for the Ummah of the fifteenth/twenty-first century.[69]

A CRITIQUE OF *TAJDĪD*

The climate of crisis that dominated the post-colonial Muslim world also began to erode the credibility of *tajdīd*. Public opinion grew increasingly critical of the *tajdīd* movements in Turkey, for example, which saw the collapse of Ottoman caliphate and the rise of questionable *tajdīd-cum-iṣlāḥ* groups, such as that of Ataturk with his westernised and secularist overtones – which Rashid Rida later called as imitative *tajdīd* infected by western models. *Tajdīd* was seen no longer to be grounded in the Prophetic hadith but in western modernity and thus of doubtful authenticity. Some even began to equate *tajdīd* with secularism, and others with pernicious innovation (*bidʿah*) in the guise of Islam.[70]

Twentieth century developments in the *tajdīd* discourse may be summarised into four clusters as follows:

1. Precedent-oriented *tajdīd* that mainly sought to address new issues through ijtihad. The advocates of this position linked *tajdīd* to past precedent, which was an important component also of the Salafiyah movement. Precedent is here understood not only to consist of text and scripture but also of schools, learned personalities and imams of the past, which evidently brought it closer to imitation and *taqlīd*, except that the advocates of this current remained open to ijtihad, albeit a restrictive and well-regulated ijtihad. Rashid Rida, Said Ramadan al-Buti, and Mahmud al-Tahhan manifested this current of opinion.[71]

2. Advocacy of open ijtihad (*al-ijtihād al-maftūḥ*) that read scripture and rationality side by side. Muhammad Iqbal, Abd al-Mutaal al-Saidi, Amin al-Khuli and Yusuf al-Qaradawi manifested this current in their call for the liberation of Islamic thought, advocacy of Shariʿah and ijtihad in tandem with modern realities and developments.

3. Islamisation of knowledge (*Islāmiyyat al-maʿrifah*) and epistemological reform movement that sought to address a perceived crisis of civilisation (*azmat al-ḥaḍārah*) through methodological innovation and reform. This current of opinion is manifested by

the Virginia-based International Institute of Islamic Thought ever since its inception in 1981. The Institute and its founders are critical of *taqlīdī* thought on the one hand and seeing the challenges of modernity through the lenses of western doctrines on the other. *Tajdīd* to the advocates of this current means re-forming the methodologies of thought (*iṣlāḥ manāhij al-fikr*), which consist of two readings, namely reading of the scripture (*qirā'at al-naṣṣ*), and reading the existential reality (*qirā'at al-kawn*) side by side in the light of Islamic values. The focus is evidently on tools and methodologies more than on subject matter and content. AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, Taha Jabir Alalwani, Imad al-Din Khalil, Muhammad Kamal Hassan and others manifested this current of opinion.[72]

4. *Tajdīd*-cum-globalisation, which proposes a much wider under-standing of *tajdīd* that is not tied to any particular methodology or framework but seeks to address the challenges of modernity in their own context. Globalisation has faced the Muslim world with challenges of civilisational proportions, hence efforts at renewal and *tajdīd* should accordingly be informed by the nature of the challenge and encapsulate its wider scope and dimensions. The advocates of this current include Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, Abul-Qasim Haaj Ahmad, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Muhammad al-Talbi and others who maintain that *tajdīd* move-ments of the past have failed to realise their objectives due mainly to their eclectic approaches to methodological issues, past her-itage and modern developments, which read modern reality through the lenses mainly of religion and past heritage.

Muslim reformist movements, according to Malek Bennabi (d. 1973), have suffered from poor planning and lack of direction. The result was a confusion of the two schools of thought, namely the modernists and the reformists. The first lost its way while journey-ing to the West searching for ready-made solutions to local prob-lems, while the second remained servile to past glories, faithful to *status quo* and unable to penetrate the very causes of the malaise.[73] Another observer noted that Islam fell victim to parochialism and

became reduced to a set of ritualistic performances that suppressed its broader civilisational objectives. "Unfortunately, purely non-civilisational issues" have occupied the agenda of many of the recent Islamic revivalist movements.[74] In a 2005 Cairo University conference on 'Dialogue of Civilisations' – *Ḥiwār al-Ḥaḍārāt*, Tariq al-Bishri observed that, "*muᶜāṣarah* (modernism) in the Muslim usage of the post-colonial period has on the whole been premised on western modernity and western civilisation. Muslims looked at themselves through western lenses." Another commentator in the same event, Ibrahim al-Bayyumi, noted that "the modernity discourse among Islamic movements has largely consisted of approximation and comparison with the western model. The liberal secularist movements have uncritically taken that model for their own agendas."[75] This is illustrated in the works of Qassim Amin, who advocated gender equality under the influence of ᶜAbduh's ideas, but it soon succumbed to the currents of western modernity such that its Islamic credentials became increasingly overshadowed by western thought.

Murtada Mutahhari's critique of *tajdīd* highlights two types of obstacles to what he called the renaissance project: internal and external. The former refers in turn to two factors, one of which is the religious institution that needs to rid itself of negative stereotypes and try to be more open to the renewal of certain aspects of Islam concerning, for instance, the freedom of thought, gender equality, and modern science. The second factor that holds back genuine renewal is political tyranny, which is evidently not new, for it has been a part of Muslim experience for a long time. In the past, tyranny relied on religion to legitimise itself by arrogating to itself a kind of divinely-ordained status. In modern times, political tyranny has operated in different guises, either in the methods for gaining power, or in the origin of its power and of using religion as a means of tendentious politics. This should be confronted and the truth exposed for the benefit of society. It is also necessary to free the educational institutions from the hold of political power.[76]

A weakness of the *tajdīd* discourse that Mutahhari has rightly underlined is the internal weakness of the *tajdīd* itself, such as the

absence of a comprehensive plan and vision. Sometimes it focuses on one aspect at the expense of others, and it also becomes occasionally too idealistic. This lack of poorly defined methodology of *tajdīd* has inhibited its progress.[77]

The external obstacles to renewal are three: 1) foreign colonialism by way of economic and political exploitation and control; 2) cultural and moral invasion of society that contradict Islamic values – especially since the advent of globalisation; and 3) ideological and intellectual incursions that distorted our view of ourselves and the world.

A PLEA FOR THEOLOGICAL RENEWAL

Murtada Mutahhari whom we earlier mentioned has also looked into the details of *kalām* theology at some length, and we begin with reviewing his work on this subject first. Mutahhari speaks of old *kalām* and new *kalām*. He is critical of the former for its dialectic character and remoteness from the actual conditions of Muslim life. The new *kalām* which he mentions is based on the cumulative contributions mainly of twentieth century Muslim thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and others. This new discourse on *kalām* is anchored in *tawḥīd* and relates meaningfully to the life of Muslims and to human relations generally. The following paragraphs summarise Mutahhari's views on *kalām*-related developments:

Mutahhari defines *kalām* in general as follows: "*Kalām* (scholastic theology) is the use of evidence based on logic that was initially used to defend Islamic beliefs against the heresies and false creeds that occurred within Islamic society."[78]

The dialectic *kalām* was initially developed and employed in many well-known confrontations, and sought to preserve the cohesion of Islam. However, during its later development, *kalām* began to become a collection of logical religious and philosophical concepts presented in the form of basic principles, without which one could not become a Muslim. This practice started taking shape at the time of the first political differences that emerged within Islam,

the introduction of Hellenistic philosophy, and the formation of different groups and creeds. It was used as a tool by which each sect affirmed its legitimacy. The different sects developed methods to defend their points of view, using theological and philosophical knowledge acquired from different sources. Despite all that, *kalām* managed to preserve its connection with the foundations of religious faith, even though it included some exclusively philosophical themes. Its standpoint always pertained to the existence and attributes of God Almighty, predestination, revelation, prophethood, Judgment Day, the *imāmah*, governance, and other relevant themes. Therefore, monotheism remained the basis for all the other themes that were constructed, and for this reason *kalām* became known as Islamic theology.

During its development, there remained the single question as to the purely theoretical nature of its interpretations, and how could they affect the individual and society? *Kalām* was deeply reliant on dialectic and developed into a paradoxical theoretical methodology and concepts that barely related to everyday life. It also concerned itself with non-essential issues, and ceased to have much of an impact on the personal life of the Muslim and his relationship with God Almighty.

The ambiguity of *kalām* regarding the scope of divine action and the limits of man's activity had an impact on Muslims. This argument did not depend entirely on dialectics, but rather the simple question of the relationship between God and His creatures. The claim that God Most High is the absolute agent went in the direction of belief in predestination, which raised in turn many questions regarding man's responsibility. As a result, those involved in the controversy sought to provide every justification possible to support their claim.

The alternative route stated that the centrality of humankind in God's creation endows man to govern his actions. To affirm man's responsibility for his actions basically justified the Shariʿah. The claim that God is the agent of all actions is alarming, for it would include everything man did, whether right or wrong, and made in turn the principle of ethical obligation redundant.

The social and psychological effects of the principle of monotheism are not in question, yet theoretical dialectic does not need to penetrate our general awareness in order to demonstrate the living consequences of faith. In general, such themes did not reach beyond scholarly discussion, and their effect as motivating principles in the social conscience remained minimal. *Kalām* began as a means of defending the faith and guiding mankind, yet it ended up by almost toppling everything, and the influence of religion withered.[79]

Muslims had to wait for the emergence of modernity before they could search for a fresh approach to work out the ambiguity they faced. The new twentieth century *kalām* that emerged restores the basic function of Islam as it is stated in the scripture. This should liberate man and his potential, and revive his efficiency in managing the rhythms of life, free from the problems of complicated dialectical arguments. Furthermore, living practice revitalises the soul, motivates man and provides him with hope.

Mutahhari confirms that Muhammad Iqbal was the first to attempt such an approach, after he saw the necessity of reforming *kalām*. Instead of only affirming the absolute knowledge of God, man should build a relationship that provides an inner motivation that revivifies his heart, thus gaining victory over indolence and inertia.[80]

This train of ideas also impacted the work of Malek Bennabi, who wrote in his book, *Destination of the Muslim World*:

> Our issue does not lie in proving the existence of God. Rather, it lies within our ability to sense and experience His presence, as He is the source of all life, power and action, and the origin of will, determination and resolve.[81]

Traditional *kalām* could not be expected to do this, since it glorified discussion and substituted cultural and psychological efficiency with theoretical ideas about the existence of God. Muslim thinkers were consequently led to the reform of traditional *kalām*, such that it could influence the personal lives of Muslims. However, there was

another factor. In the big haste everywhere to modernise, there was an unprecedented interaction between the cultures and religions of the world. The most important issues had to do with progress and civilisation, and new outlooks and discoveries aroused curiosity and overshadowed religious belief.

Mutahhari confirms that al-Afghani made the first attempt to recreate the perspective of monotheism in the hope that it would respond to the demands of progress. In his criticism of atheistic doctrines, he focused on the belief in the principle of *tawḥīd* and the one destiny of all creation – their gathering for judgment on the Day of Reckoning – and its positive effect on man's values and sense of responsibility for his actions. He stressed the importance of these two points to say that they generate powerful restraints that curb the desires of the soul and prevent it from being destructive; they curb treachery and fraudulence and they are indispensable to attaining justice. Al-Afghani believed that monotheism could help civilisation advance, and consequently engender happiness and spiritual perfection in man. In order to bring this about, the distortion that had accumulated over the years had to be cleared away.[82]

Mutahhari continues the narrative: Muhammad Abduh pursued Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's work and advanced the most important vision of Islamic thought of the time in his book *Theology of Unity*. He stressed the effect of conscience as much as that of reason: man is not merely rational, but has an awareness of his dependence on the power of God Most High and His directions on how to conduct his activities. The book provides many guidelines for the believer to revive his soul, awaken his conscience and subdue his inferior impulses.[83]

Abduh considers *tawḥīd* to be a liberated energy that empowers human dignity and freedom, and conveys the message that mankind was created equal, and that all should work together to advance these values. Just as monotheism attributes all beliefs to the essence of submission to God Almighty, it also traces societal differences back to unity, and as a consequence results in the independence of man's will, his ideas and opinions. However, Abduh admitted that many Islamic beliefs had been distorted during the regression that

Muslims had experienced over time. Hence, Islam declined in proportion to the decline of the believers.[84]

Aref Ali Nayed, a specialist in *kalām* (theology), director of Dubai-based Kalam Research & Media (KRM), and formerly professor at the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies (Rome) has issued a passionate plea for a renewed theology of compassion. Here I summarise a conference presentation he made in Cambridge, then published under the title *Growing Ecologies of Peace, Compassion and Blessing*. Nayed spoke of theological stagnation to say that *kalām* had become overly ritualistic, politicised, radicalised, and caught in a vicious cycle of violence in the name of religion. There is a need and a calling upon us all to be "on vigilant guard against abusive and distorting mutilations of our traditions. We must all unite in condemning all cruelty against even a single soul of God's creatures, for that is equivalent to attacking all humanity."[85]

A renewed *kalām* must be rooted in the guidance of the Qur'an and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad, and show that the best way to God's love is the practice of love, compassion, and service toward His creatures. The *kalām* of compassion should be grounded in the Islamic traditions of "renewal (*tajdīd*) and scholarly spiritual striving (ijtihad)."[86] Good theologies are authentically rooted in the tradition, and are abundantly fruitful of goodness for humanity. Bad theologies are superficially connected to, or even cut off from, the tradition, and produce nothing but thorns that injure humanity.[87]

Nayed reviews numerous passages from the Qur'an and hadith in support of his plea. Striking in this connection is God's own affirmation in the Qur'an that:

> Your Lord has prescribed mercy (*al-raḥmah*) upon Himself (*al-Anʿām*, 6:54).

And the hadith from the Prophet Muhammad:

> God shows mercy to the merciful servants. Be merciful to the inhabitants of the earth and He who is in heaven will be merciful to you.[88]

It then becomes our assignment to build compassion "into the very centre of our theological ecologies, and make it the very centre of our living together."⁸⁹ Furthermore, Sunni *kalām* traditions (Ashʿarī, Māturīdī, or Ḥanbalī) cannot be renewed, Nayed adds without mutually respectful engagement with renewed Shiʿi *kalām* (be it Twelver, Zaydī, or Ismāʿīlī) as well as with Ibāḍī *kalām*. Sunnī *kalām* can also not be revived and renewed without respectful inter-faith engagement with Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu theologies of today. For God's creativity is the very source of the reality of our pluralistic diversity. No renewed Islamic theology will therefore thrive in isolation from the God-decreed complexities of theological diversity.⁹⁰

Different communities and schools with different doctrines and theologies must, of course, witness to that which they believe and know to be true. They will therefore disagree and argue, but they "must do so humbly and meekly," and Muslims must keep true to the Qur'anic guidance on kindness, judicious exhortation, and cour-teous reasoning (*al-Naḥl, 16:125*). When we encounter disputes that are simply irresolvable, let that be acknowledged as such, and place our trust in God to show us the right path.⁹¹

CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL (*TAJDĪD ḤAḌĀRĪ*)

How do we understand the notion of civilisational renewal in Islam is the question I address next.

Islamic teachings convey on the whole a certain awareness and insight into one's inner self and outer environment, informed and enlightened in the meantime by a set of principles and sound human reason. The external dimension of this awareness is a civilisational mission pertaining to relations among human individuals and com-munities and how they relate, in turn, to their earthly habitat and living environment. This is the focus of Islam's teachings on the vicegerency of man in the earth (*istikhlāf fī al-arḍ*) and his responsi-bility to build it and create a just social order that is ethically grounded and enriched by the spirit of beneficence (*iḥsān*). Islamic teachings also expound the notions of reminding (*dhikr*), good advice

(*naṣīḥah*), and the perennial struggle, or jihad, for self–improvement and that of the society in which one lives, and then of course, *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd*. Reminding and good advice are deemed necessary as the values just mentioned can fall prey to human forgetfulness and neglect. Since the carrier of *tajdīd* is a reminder of that which is a religious obligation and "calls attention to the civilisational vision of Islam, then *tajdīd* is both a religious and a practical necessity of Islam."[92]

The idea of conscious awareness of the theocentric core of Islamic teachings is conveyed in the Qur'an as follows:

> Say [O Prophet]: "This is my way: I do invite unto God,- on evidence clear as the seeing with one's eyes, (*ᶜalā baṣīratin*), I and whoever follows me. Glory to God! And never will I join other deities with God!" (*Yūsuf*, 12:108).

The 'calling to God' enunciated by the Prophet, is described in this verse as the outcome of a conscious insight and conviction, accessible to, and verifiable by the light of, reason, which also mani-fests Qur'an's approach to the religion itself. Conscious awareness must mean integrating an inner awakening of the believer with his outer conduct and role he is to play in a continuous quest for societal improvement.

Civilisational renewal is broad and comprehensive, and so is the role of *tajdīd* therein, which must be rich in content and multi-dimensional. *Tajdīd* may also be broad or address only those aspects of civilisation that are wanting of renewal. As already noted, *tajdīd* is inclusive of the whole of the Muslim community and not confined to particular groups and regions thereof. It is also not confined to any particular sphere of the religion but is inclusive of the whole of Islam. *Tajdīd* may thus address devotional matters and aspects of Islamic beliefs (*ᶜibādah* and *ᶜaqīdah*), although not in an essentialist sense, but in the sense of removing unwarranted accretion and deviation from them, and also of attaining greater levels of refine-ment in the integration of rational thought with the essence of belief and worship. If religious practices have become too ritualistic

to the extent of isolating their meaning and spirit, then renewal may evidently be wanting. Similarly, if uncertainty in the impact of secularist modernity and science raises questions over their acceptability or otherwise from the Islamic viewpoint, then *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd* may well play that role.[93]

Tajdīd and *iṣlāḥ* are not confined, as earlier noted, to a particular time segment and may be attempted when manifest neglect or deviation from the norms of Islam are noted. Without suggesting a monopoly of any group over these ideas, it is important to note, nevertheless, that *tajdīd*, *iṣlāḥ* and ijtihad in specialised areas and issues are undertaken by the experts, be it individuals or bodies and institutions, in line with the Qur'anic address to the believers to: "…So ask the people of the message if you do not know" (*al-Naḥl*, 16:43). This is particularly relevant in our time when specialisation of disciplines has become ubiquitous. *Tajdīd* and ijtihad in matters of concern to Shariʿah should integrate the *nuṣūṣ* and *aḥkām* (text and ruling) with their valid purposes and *maqāṣid* – as well as their contemporary implications as earlier noted. Islamic civilisation is grounded in moderation in line with the Qur'anic vision of *wasaṭiyyah* (cf., *al-Baqarah*, 2:143),[94] just as it is universalist and inclusive that views the whole of humanity as a single brotherhood. Islamic civilisation is also evolutionary such that renewal and reform is contemplated in tandem with the actual needs and benefits (or *maṣlaḥah*) of the people. This should also be informed by the Qur'anic guidelines on compassion (*raḥmah*) and wisdom (*al-ḥik-mah*). Two other important dimensions of this vision are impartial justice, and as already noted, that of being good to others (*al-ʿadl wa al-iḥsān*).

I now summarise the various dimensions of civilisational renewal in Islam in its relationship especially with other major civilisations:

1. Reciprocating with what is better. This is based on the Qur'anic verse that "Good and bad can never be equal. Respond to evil in a way that is better, then the one who was a foe will become as if he were an intimate friend." (*Fuṣṣilat*, 41:34) This is an important guideline for the Islamic vision of dealing with the different

Other – indeed an excellent guideline to peaceful coexistence and cooperation in mutually beneficial works.⁹⁵ Muslims should, in other words, engage with contemporary issues of public concern constructively, and take initiative in line with the Qur'anic spirit of justice and beneficience – and even beyond that: reciprocate with what is better, all in the light of good judgment and *ḥikmah*.

2. Recognition and advocacy of pluralism in the cultural, political, and socio-legal components of civilisation. This too is based on the Qur'anic declaration and guideline "…To each among you have We prescribed a law and an open way. If God had so willed, He would have made you a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He has given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues…" (*al-Mā'idah*, 5:48; see also *al-Ḥujurāt*, 49:13).

3. Developing beneficial cooperation and exchange with other communities and civilisations. The possibilities of such cooperation (*taʿāwun*) are extensive in the spheres particularly of science and commerce, environmental care, campaign against terrorism and violence, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Relations with non-Muslim communities and nations should primarily be guided by rationality rather than juristic specifications that have no support in the scripture, such as the binary division of the world into Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr etc.

4. Enhancing and further developing the jurisprudence of minorities (*fiqh al-aqaliyyāt*) for minority Muslims in non-Muslim majority countries. This should be based on the Qur'anic principle that "…No soul shall have a burden laid on it greater than it can bear…" (*al-Baqarah*, 2:233) and its directives on removal of hardship (*rafʿ al-ḥaraj*). This also implies a certain commitment to common citizenship for minorities in Muslim majority countries in line with the principle of equality before the law, and that of reciprocal treatment (*muʿāmalah bilmithl*) with the larger community as well as relations between Muslim and non-Muslim countries worldwide.

5. Civilisation is normally concerned with beauty, art and culture, hence the advice of accentuating the beauty-enhancement

values (*al-qiyam al-jamāliyyah*) of Islam. References abound in the Qur'an to earth's unlimited potential for growth of beautiful flora and fauna, gardens and rivers, and the God-enjoined beauty in birds, animals and marine life. Instructive in this regard are also two renowned hadiths we may quote: "God is beautiful and He loves beauty;" and "Truly God has inscribed beauty upon everything." Thus it is for us to exert ourselves to discover and manifest it among ourselves and in our relations with our environment and other communities and civilisations.

6. Unwavering commitment to the advancement of equality, freedom, human rights, gender justice and protection of the human dignity of women. We also call attention to vindication of the ethical norms and dimensions of civilisation that are all too often neglected and marginalised.[96]

7. A resolute stand and commitment to the elimination of sectarian conflict among the Sunni and Shia followers of Islam. This is a call for taking all-round measures to make the Qur'anic vision that "Verily the believers are brethren; so make peace between your brothers…" (*al-Ḥujurāt*, 49:10) a reality of relations among all Muslim communities and nations. The essence of this theological unity is evidenced by the truism that all the six articles of faith (*īmān*), and the five pillars (*arkān*) of the religion are identical among the Sunni and Shia followers of Islam.

I may also add a note on the Kuala Lumpur based International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), which started operation as an Islamic think-tank in October 2008.[97] IAIS is a non-governmental Institute of research on Islam and contemporary issues. The Institute embraced the basic vision of civilisational renewal (*tajdīd ḥaḍārī*) that aims at widening the scope of the revivalist discourse of the closing decades of 20th century from its exceedingly narrowed focus on fiqh issues, mannerism, what Muslims wear and what they eat etc – issues that were hardly representative of the wider concern of the Ummah over the broader themes and objectives of Islamic civilisation. Scant attention was thus paid to issues of justice and good governance, poverty eradication,

science, technology and the environment as well as Islam's relation with other civilisations – issues that now constitute the main research agenda of IAIS Malaysia. The Institute publishes a quarterly refereed journal, "*Islam and Civilisational Renewal*" a journal dedicated to contemporary and policy relevant research and serves as a platform of advancing public debates, conferences and seminars.[98]

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the somewhat disconcerting currents of opinion that afflicted Islamic thought in the post-colonial period, it is clear that "the *tajdīd* potential is a permanent feature of the Ummah from its inception to the end of time .... The potential may be dampened or heightened by a number of factors but it remains in the community precisely because its ingredients are contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah."[99] Even in the seemingly westernised Muslim societies of today, the potential of *tajdīd* is not lacking. The complexity of our contemporary society may modify the role of the ʿālim-mujaddid, as the very agenda of *tajdīd* and the business of reordering and running a state today require a variety of inputs from technocrats and professionals as well as the ʿulamāʾ. But the quest for *tajdīd* and the Ummah's capacity to attempt it is clearly borne out by the emergence of Islamic revivalist movements in many Muslim countries. "There is clearly a latent energy for *tajdīd* in every Muslim community" even those that may appear to have strayed away from the centre.[100]

Modern scholarship has evidently widened the scope of *tajdīd* to matters outside the established text and precedent. This is a consequence partly of Islam's encounters with modernity and the nature of the challenges the Ummah has to face in the era of globalisation. Issues of authenticity and verification of ideas presented in the name of *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd* have always been the focus of scholarly attention and discourse. The concern over adherence to past precedent, became exaggerated and overemphasised at the expense often of narrowing down the scope of the reformist and revivalist discourse. The challenge that remains, and one that demands persistent

engagement of Muslim thought leaders, is one of establishing a correct balance of emphasis between valid yet also sometimes conflicting pulls of Islamic authenticity, and formation of adequate responses to contemporary issues. The challenges of good governance, economic development, science and technology, for example, cannot be wholly addressed through looking at past precedent nor through the lenses of law and religion. Broader issues of science and civilisation also impress the need for more diversified responses that do not, in the meantime, contravene Islamic values. I now propose the following:

- *Tajdīd* is an important instrument of achieving renewal and social progress in harmony with religious principles. Yet it is a broad and comprehensive concept that should not be reduced by narrow technicalities and restrictive interpretations.
- The Islamic discourse on renewal and *tajdīd* has moved in tandem with the prevailing conditions of history and time. It has exhibited internal diversity and scope to meet new challenges. The relatively open understanding of *tajdīd* to begin with was subsequently subjected to restrictions with the crystallisation of the leading school of theology and law. Twentieth century *tajdīd*-related discourse was inclined to look to new horizons but then entered the tense environment of confrontation with western modernity and internationally challenging conditions. Yet the *tajdīd* discourse has moved on and has become wider, more engaging and no longer a responsibility only of individual *mujaddids*, but also of movements and thought leaders of society and politics, educationists, mainstream media and the wider Muslim community. *Tajdīd* should now be considered in this wider context and no longer seen as prerogative exclusively of individuals and *mujaddids*.
- *Tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ* complement one another in the sense that renewal and regeneration is attempted when there is neglect, or indeed misunderstanding and distortion of the principles of Islam. *Tajdīd* would thus necessitate corrective action and reform by way of *iṣlāḥ* and pave the way for renewed readings of Islam in imaginative ways.

- *Tajdīd* should also be complemented by ijtihad. Whereas *tajdīd* is not regulated by a methodology of its own, ijtihad and its sub-varieties are enriched by the elaborate methodology of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Without proposing that *tajdīd* should be subsumed under ijtihad, it should nevertheless draw support from its resources. *Tajdīd* should draw inspiration, as far as possible, directly from the Qur'an and Sunnah, but also from the broader vision of the *maqāṣid* al-Sharīʿah. The principles and methodologies of ijtihad should, in a similar vein, complement the application of *tajdīd* to juridical issues.

- *Tajdīd* is not a *fiqhī* theme nor can it be subsumed by the particularities of any one discipline. It is multi-disciplinary and draws inspiration and support from all areas of Islamic learning, and those of the modern sciences that do not contravene Islamic values. This multidisciplinary approach to *tajdīd* should now be accorded greater recognition.

- One ought to be guarded against syncretism and mixing of discordant Islamic and secularist doctrines that originate in differential philosophies and outlooks. Superficial compatibility is not a substitute for genuine harmony. Only this latter can offer potential for growth whereas plausible compatibility is short-lived and can even sow the seeds of conflict, which should be avoided.

- *Tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ* need not be confined to the particularities of any discipline of learning, but look at the broader picture of Islamic civilisational objectives, the neglected aspects of accountability and good governance, poverty eradication and Islam's relations with other civilisations in ways that are harmonious to the core values of Islam.

- It will be difficult to realise equilibrium and balance of the Islamic discourse in a climate of tension, heightened Islamophobia, and mainstream media bias against Islam. When turbulent politics, extremism and violence overwhelms the social climate *tajdīd* is likely to decline. Genuine *tajdīd* benefits from a conducive environment of normality and peace, which should be the common objective and responsibility of both the Islamic and western thought leaders and governments.

- Muslims should join hands with other communities and nations to address the common problems of human trafficking, drug use and disease, moral depravity and oppression through innovative solutions that may well partake in *tajdīd*. *Tajdīd* in the era of globalisation may thus acquire international dimensions and common solutions for Muslims and non-Muslims together.
- Notwithstanding the work that has already been done on the renewal of *kalām* theology to give it a stronger anchoring into a *tawḥīd*-centred *kalām*, there is still a case for further adjustment to bring it closer to the compassionate self of Islam. Islamic thought leaders and religious personalities should take the lead to come up with ideas and an action agenda on how this could be achieved.
- The renewed emphasis on monotheism and how it should impact the lives of Muslims evidently invites attention to the state of intra–Muslim unity, especially the Sunni–Shia divide that has taken a turning for the worse since the closing decades of twentieth century and calls for a decisive correction.

NOTES

1. Cf., John O. Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah," in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 32f.

2. Ibn Manẓūr al-Ifrīqī, *Lisān al-ʿArab*, vol. 2, p. 202; and Muḥammad ibn Abū Bakar al-Rāzī, *Mukhtār al-Ṣiḥāḥ*, p. 95 – as quoted in Adnan Muhammad Imamah, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār ibn al-Jawzī, 2001), p. 19.

3. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Tawālī al-Taʾsīs li-Maʿālī Muḥammad ibn Idrīs* – as quoted in Abd al-Rahman al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: Min al-Naṣṣ ʿalā al-Khiṭāb: Bahth fī Tārīkhiyyāt Mafhūm al-Tajdīd," *Al-Tajdīd* (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM, 1420/1999), vol. 3, no. 6, p. 100.

4. Mubārak ibn Muḥammad al-Jazarī ibn al-Athīr, *Jāmiʿ al-Uṣūl li-Aḥādīth al-Rasūl*, ed., Abd al-Qadir al-Arnaut, 3rd edn., (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1983), vol. 11, p. 321.

5. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr* – as quoted in Adnan Muhammad Imamah, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār ibn al-Jawzī, 2001), p. 19.

6. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Liqāʾāt wa Ḥiwārāt Ḥawl Qaḍāyā al-Islām wa al-ʿAṣr*, (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1992), pp. 85-86.

7. Abd al-Rahman al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ ʿalā al-Khiṭāb: Bahth fī Tārīkhiyyāt Mafhūm al-Tajdīd," *Al-Tajdīd* (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM, 1420/1999), p. 115.

8. Hasan al-Turabi, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 2nd edn., (Jeddah: al-Dār al-Suʿūdiyyah li al-Nashr, 1978), p. 176, p. 32.

9. Al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: Min al-Naṣṣ," p. 125.

10. Ibid., p. 103.

11. Usman Muhammad Bugagie, Concept of Revitalisation in Islam, (unpublished PhD thesis), http://dar-sirr.com/Tajdid.html, p. 5.

12. Muhammad Imarah, *Azmat al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Muʿāṣir* (Cairo: Dār al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 1990), p. 85, p. 83.

13. Ahmad Sidqi al-Daj jani, "*Afkār fī al-Taghyīr*," published by the Ministry of *Awqāf* and Islamic Affairs of the State of Kuwait, (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Awqā f, 1955), p. 20.

14. See for details Abd al-Sattar al-Sayyid, "Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Mash-rūʿiyyatuh wa Ḍawābiṭuh" in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1430/2009), p. 364f.

15. Cf., Abu Bakr al-Rafiq, "al-Tajdīd wa Ahammiyyatuh fī al-ʿAṣr al-Ḥadīth," in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1430/2009), p. 603.

16. Cf., Ammar al-Talibi, "Al-Tajdīd fī Fikr Mālek Bin Nabī," in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1430/2009), p. 863.

17. Yu suf al-Qaradawi, *Ḥawl Qaḍāyā al-Islām wa al-ʿAṣr*, 3rd edn., (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1427/2006), p. 89.

18. Ibid., p. 85.

19. ʿAbd Allāh al-Khaṭīb al-Tabrīzī, *Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ*, ed., Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 2nd edn., (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1399/1979), vol. I, hadith no. 247. This is a collection of verified hadiths from all the six major books of hadith, known as *Al-Kutub al-Sittah*. See also for an analysis of this hadith and its significance for civilisational renewal Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Civilisational Renewal: Revisiting the Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2nd edn., (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, 2009), p. 51ff.

20. Usman Muhammad Bugagie, "Concept of Revitalisation in Islam," (unpublished PhD thesis), http://dar-sirr.com/Tajdid.html, pp. 2-3.

21. Cf., Adnan Muhammad Imamah, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār ibn al-Jawzī, 2001), p. 17.

22. Muḥammad Shams al-Dīn ʿAzīmabādī (d. 1858 CE), *ʿAwn al-Maʿbūd Sharḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, vol. 11, p. 391, as quoted in Adnan Imamah, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār ibn al-Jawzī, 2001), p. 17.

23. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Manāwī, *Fayẓ al-Qadīr*, vol. 2, p. 357 as quoted in Adnan Imamah, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2001), p. 17.

24. Sufi abu Talib, "Al-Tajdīd wa Ḍarūrat al-Tawāzun," conference paper

presented to the Third International Forum of al-Azhar Alumni (Kuala Lumpur, 16 February 2008), p. 5.

25. Muhammad Masad Yaqut, "Naẓarāt fī Ḥadīth al-Tajdīd: fī Hādhā al-Qarn Naḥtāj ilā Ḥarakah Tajdīdiyyah Shāmilah wa Mutakāmilah wa Mustanīrah," http://saaid.net/ aldawlah/359.htm, pp. 2-3 (accessed 26 August 2012).

26. Cf., Adnan Imamah, *Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p. 26f.

27. Osman Bakar's seminar paper "Religious Reform and the Controversy Surrounding Islamization in Malaysia," presented at a forum on "Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia" at the National University of Singapore (5-6 March 2008), p. 4.

28. Ibid., p. 7. Osman Bakar adds that in conformity with its combined understanding of *tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ*, ABIM proposed an educational programme that combined spiritual renewal and social reform for the realisation of social justice. ABIM of the 1970s was a unique Islamic revivalist movement that significantly impacted the Malaysian society of its time

29. Muhammad Masad Yaqut, "Naẓarāt fī Ḥadīth al-Tajdīd," p. 4.

30. Usman Bugaje, "Concept of Revitalisation," p. 5.

31. Cf., ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn*, ed., Hamid Ahmad Zahir, (Cairo: Dār al-Fajr li al-Turāth, 1425/2004), p. 483 and passim.

32. Cf., Bugaje, "Concept of Revitalisation," p. 4.

33. Cf., Khalil Ahmad al-Saharanfuri, *Badhl al-Majhūd fī Ḥall Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, ed., Taqi al-Din al-Nadwi, *Kitāb al-Malāḥim, bāb mā yudhkaru fī qarn al-mi'atah*, (Beirut: Sharikah Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmiyyah, 1427/2006), vol. 12, p. 335.

34. Ibid., p. 5; Al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: Min al-Naṣṣ," p. 104.

35. Some have said that it is the end of the century that is taken into account. For ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, who is the first *mujaddid*, only died at the head of second century thus emerging at the end of the first. This will also account for the fact that the first century AH was headed by the Prophet himself – hence the view that it is the end of that century we start with.

36. Taqi al-Din al-Nadwi has thus drawn the conclusion that correct understanding of the hadith does not confine *tajdī d* either to one individual or to one particular community and place, and that it is equally open to plurality in its implications.

37. The hadith thus simply mentioned that "Salmān is one of us, an *ahl*

al-bayt – Salmān minnā ahl al-bayt." Cf., Isam Ahmad al-Bashir, "Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī," in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p. 91.

38. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Ummatunā Bayna Qarnayn*, 3ʳᵈ edn., (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1427/2006), p. 10; Idem, *Min Ajli Ṣaḥwah Rāshidah: Tajaddud al-Dīn wa Tanahhud al-Dunyā* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1421/2001), p. 13.

39. Shirin Hamid Fahmi, "Manẓūrunā al-Islāmī al-Ḥaḍārī," http://www. islamonline.net/arabic/contemporary/2005/09/article04.html. See also al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ ʿalā al-Khiṭāb," *Al-Tajdīd*, p. 102.

40. Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, *Al-Dīn wa al-Dawlah wa Taṭbīq al-Sharīʿah* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsat al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabiyyah, 1996), p. 133.

41. See for a discussion John Voll as in note, no. 1.

42. Cf., Suha Taji-Farouki, ed., *Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur'an*, Introduction, (London: OUP and the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2004), p. 18.

43. Muhammad Imarah, "Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī ʿinda Muḥammad ʿAbduh wa Madrasatuh," *Kitāb al-Hilāl* (Cairo, 1980), no. 360, pp. 40-69.

44. Cf., Asad Abu Khalil, "Revival and Renewal" in ed., John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (OUP, 1995), p. 432f.

45. Ibid.

46. Cf., Al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: Min al-Naṣṣ," p. 106.

47. Nasar Meer, "Complicating 'Radicalism'- Counter-Terrorism and Muslim Identity in Britain," *Arches Quarterly* (London: Spring 2012), vol. 5, p. 15.

48. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 92.

49. "Makkah al-Mukarramah Declaration," *Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference* (5-7 Dhū al Qiʿdah 1426/7-8 December 2005), p. 3.

50. Murtada Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal of Islamic Thought*, Eng. tr. by Muhammad Zamin & Zaynab Alayyan, ed., Khanjar Hamiyyah, (London: MIU Press, 2013), p. 90.

51. Ibid., p. 91.

52. Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, p. 114.

53. Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, pp. 112-113.

54. Al-Haaj Ibrahim, "Al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ ʿalā al-Khiṭāb," *Al-Tajdīd*, p. 109.

55. Abdullah Saeed, "Fazlur Rahman: a framework for interpreting the ethicolegal content of the Qur'an," in ed., Taji-Farouki, *Modern Muslim intellectuals and the Qur'an* (London: OUP and the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2004), pp. 42-43.

56. Ibid., p. 44.

57. Ibid., p. 48.

58. Ibid., p. 52.

59. Jamal al-Din Atiyah and Wahbah al-Zuhaili, *Tajdīd al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1422/2002), pp. 31-32.

60. Ibid., p. 35.

61. Ibid., p. 35.

62. Ibid., p. 46.

63. Muhammad Salim al-Awa, *Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fī Ṭarīq al-Tajdīd*, 2nd edn., (Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1998), p. 119, p. 272.

64. Ibid., pp. 20-222.

65. Mohammad Hashim Kamali: *Shariᶜah Law: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008), ch. 12, Adaptation and Reform, pp. 246-262.

66. The five essential *maqāṣid* are protection of life, religion, human intellect, property and family. A sixth item added to this list is personal dignity or honour. See for further detail on *maqāṣid*, M. H. Kamali, *Shariᶜah Law: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008), ch. 6, pp. 123-140.

67. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

68. Cf., Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Shariᶜah Law: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008), ch. 6 on "History and Methodology of Maqasid." See also idem, *Maqasid, Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal* (London & Kuala Lumpur: IIIT and IAIS Malaysia, 2012). Another useful work to consult would be Ali Jumah, "Tajdīd Uṣūl al-Fiqh," in Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p. 357f.

69. Cf., Isam al-Bashir, "Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī," in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p. 94.

70. Ibid., pp. 111-112.

71. Ibid., pp. 113-114.

72. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, *Azmat al-ᶜAql al-Muslim*, 3rd edn., (Virginia: Al-Maᶜhad al-ᶜĀlamī lī al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1994), p. 40; Taha Jabir Alalwani, *Iṣlāḥ al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Madkhal ilā Niẓām al-Khiṭāb al-Islāmī al-Muᶜāṣir*, 3rd edn., (Virginia: Al-Maᶜhad al-ᶜĀlamī lī al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1995), pp. 72-73.

73. Fawzia Barium, *Malek Bennabi, His Life and Theory of Civilisation* (Kuala Lumpur: Budaya Ilmu, 1993), pp. 163-164.

74. Cf., Maimul Ahsan Khan, *Human Rights in the Muslim World* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), p. 58.

75. Ibid.

76. Cf., Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, pp. 163-164.

77. Cf., Ibid, p. 161.

78. Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, p. 126.

79. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

80. Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, p. 129 quoting Muhammad Iqbal's *Man and His Faith*, pp. 26-38.

81. As quoted in Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, p. 128.

82. As recounted in Mutahhari, *Reformation and Renewal*, pp. 26-27.

83. Ibid., p. 130.

84. Cf., Ibid.

85. Aref Ali Nayed, *Growing Ecologies of Peace, Compassion and Blessing: A Muslim Response to 'A Muscat Manifesto'* (Dubai: Kalam Research & Media, 2010), p. 25.

86. Ibid., p. 18.

87. Ibid., p. 21.

88. Muhammad b. ʿĪsa al-Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmiʿ al-Saḥīḥ Sunan al-Tirmidhī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah).

89. Nayed, *Growing Ecologies of Peace*, p. 24.

90. Ibid., p. 16. In a footnote Nayed mentions of his involvement in a project of 'co-theologising' with a Jewish scholar, Stephen Kepnes, a Christian scholar, David Ford, and the preparation of three parallel books on the future of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theology planned to be published by Blackwell of Oxford.

91. Ibid., p. 19.

92. Sheikh Abd al-Ghani Ashur, then Acting Sheikh of al-Azhar, "Manhaj al-Taʿāmul maʿa al-Qurʾān wa al-Sunnah," in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p. 636.

93. Cf., Isam al-Bashir, "Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fikr," in ed., Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, p. 94f.

94. Moderation (*wasaṭiyyah*) will thus discourage exaggeration even in religiosity, too much legalism, sufi practices, and the like. See for details Mohammad

Hashim Kamali, *Moderation and Balance in Islam: The Qur'anic Principle of Wasatiyyah* (Kuala Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia, 2010).

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

97. The present writer is currently the Founding Chairman and Senior Fellow of IAIS Malaysia.

98. See for details IAIS Malaysia website at www.iais.org.my. IAIS has published about one hundred and twenty publications since its inception in 2008.

99. Usman Bugaje, "Concept of Revitalization," p. 5.

100. Ibid.

The history of Islamic thought is marked by a continuous tradition of internal revitalisation and reform embedded in the principles of islah, and tajdid. The ultimate purpose has been to bring existing realities and social change in line with the transcendant and universal standard of the Qur'an and Sunnah through a process of restoration and reform. The tradition of islah-tajdid has thus consistently challenged the Muslim status quo and prompted fresh interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah, understood and implemented through the methodologies of interpretation and ijtihad, as well as the rejection of unwarranted accretions to the original messages of Islam. The basic theme of the paper is that civilisational renewal is an integral part of Islamic thought. The paper looks into the meaning, definition and origins of tajdid and islah and their relationship with ijtihad, and how these have been manifested in the writings and contributions of the thought leaders of Islam throughout its history. It also develops tajdid-related formulas and guidelines that should lead the efforts of contemporary Muslims in forging the objectives of inter-civilisational harmony and their cooperation for the common good.