

Mohammad Hashim Kamali

ACTUALIZATION (*Taf̣īl*)
OF THE HIGHER PURPOSES
(*Maqāṣid*) **OF SHARIAH**



OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES 28

OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES 28

Actualization (*Taf̣īl*)
of the Higher Purposes
(*Maqāṣid*) of Shariḥ

Mohammad Hashim Kamali



IIIT
LONDON · WASHINGTON



International Institute of
Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia

© IIIT 1441AH/2020CE

IIIT, P.O. BOX 669, HERNDON, VA 20172, USA www.iiit.org
P.O. BOX 126, RICHMOND, SURREY TW9 2UD, UK www.iiit.org.uk

© INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED ISLAMIC STUDIES (IAIS) MALAYSIA
P.O. BOX 12303, PEJABAT POS BESAR, 50774, KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
www.iais.org.my

*This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exceptions
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of the publishers.*

ISBN 978-1-56564-999-6
E-BOOK ISBN: 978-1-64205-345-6

*The views and opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and is
not necessarily those of the publisher. The publisher is not responsible
for the accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites
referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee
that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.*

Typesetting and Cover Design by Shiraz Khan
Printed in the USA

Series Editors
DR. ANAS S. AL-SHAikh-ALI
SHIRAZ KHAN

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	V
• Introductory Remarks	I
• Definition and Meaning of <i>Maqāṣid</i>	5
• Approaches to <i>Maqāṣid</i> : Reductionism, Expansionism and Moderation (<i>Tafrīt, Ifrāt, I‘tidāl</i>)	6
• <i>Maqāṣid</i> – Scriptural Sources and <i>Uṣūl al-Fiqh</i>	10
• Human Intellect (‘ <i>Aql</i>) and Innate Human Nature (<i>Fiṭrah</i>) as Identifiers of <i>Maqāṣid</i>	12
• Actualization of <i>Maqāṣid</i> and the Role of <i>Wasā’il</i>	15
• <i>Ijtihād Maqāṣidī</i>	19
• <i>Maqāṣid</i> -based Ijtihad: Case Studies	20
• Conclusion and Recommendations	25
NOTES	30

FOREWORD

The *maqāṣid al-sharīah* are much talked about but poorly understood, partly due to historical factors in that the subject has remained somewhat under-developed and theoretical even in the Arabic sources and manuals of Islamic law. However, of late, scholars have shown their interest in the revival of *maqāṣid* as witnessed by the numerous conferences, academic dissertations and introduction of specialised university courses on the study of this subject. Following that, there has been much development concerning the *maqāṣid* in relationship, for instance, to Islamic banking and finance, Islamic education, government policy, and fatwa making.

Malaysia has also seen important *maqāṣid*-related initiatives in recent years in the areas particularly of Islamic banking and finance and government policy formulation. The Malaysian Shariah Index (February 2015), and Bank Negara Malaysia's Value-Based Intermediation (July 2017), as the author has discussed, are both anchored in the idea of bringing the *maqāṣid* into the working modalities of public institutions in this country.

Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali has written widely on Islamic law and jurisprudence and also on various other themes of *maqāṣid*, especially on the methodology of *maqāṣid*. The present work brings to light a new aspect of the subject and offers interesting insights into the science of the sources of Islamic law, the *uṣūl al-fiqh*, and how they relate to one another.

In this work Professor Kamali makes a special effort to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of this evidently important aspect of the Shari'ah, and what he writes is not explored in the existing literature in the English language on *maqāṣid*. It is written in an easy style with many practical examples that makes the subject accessible to the average educated reader.

TUN ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD
Former Chief Justice of Malaysia

Actualization (*Taf'īl*) of the Higher Purposes (*Maqāṣid*) of Shari'ah

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The higher purposes, or *maqāṣid*, of Shari'ah are applied and actualized through their means (*wasā'il*). Since the *maqāṣid* are not applied directly, they are usually a step further removed from actual practice. For the *maqāṣid* to be actualized, the first step would naturally be to identify the *maqṣad* one is having in mind. This would give rise, in turn, to a question as to how is the *maqṣad* or purpose of Shari'ah actually identified, and which method, if any, is used toward that end. The *maqāṣid* are divided into several types. According to one of its classifications, they are divided into two types: *maqāṣid* of the Lawgiver (*maqāṣid al-Shāri'*) which are mostly identified by the Shari'ah, and human purposes (*maqāṣid al-mukallaf*), which anyone can determine and identify for themselves. The Lawgiver's purposes are identified in the Qur'an or hadith either directly or by allusion. Sometimes the text makes numerous references to something without actually saying that it is a Lawgiver's purpose. When all such references are put together, their combined reading concurs on a certain purpose or *maqṣad*. This process is known as induction (*istiqrā'*) which is a generally accepted method for the identification of *maqāṣid*. A learned scholar of Shari'ah would know, for instance, that trustworthiness (*amānah*), truthfulness (*ṣidq*), justice, compassion, good character (*adab*, *ḥusn al-khuluq*), unity among the faithful (*wahḍah*) and God-consciousness (*taqwā*) are among the *maqāṣid* of Shari'ah even if the text does not specifically say so. *Istiqrā'* partakes in *ijtihād*, so it would be reasonable to say that *maqāṣid al-shari'ah* are identified by the scripture or by *ijtihād*.

The human purposes do not necessarily involve a juridical methodology and approach. Human beings make numerous decisions based on purely practical purposes which may or may not relate to Shari‘ah purposes. With reference to pursuit of knowledge, for instance, the Lawgiver’s purpose of knowledge and education is knowledge of God and proper manner of worshipping Him and also to explore and understand His creation. The human purpose of education may be to earn a university degree in order to secure employment. In a similar vein, the Shari‘ah purpose of marriage is procreation of the human species, but the human purpose of the same for an elderly couple may only be to find companionship. The two classes of purposes are often interrelated: in such cases the Shari‘ah only specifies that the human purposes do not violate *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah*. It may be helpful to illustrate in a few examples how the Shari‘ah and human purposes interact and are actualized in combination with one another:

1. Bringing of ease and removal of hardship (*taysīr, raf‘ al-ḥaraj*) is one of the recognised *maqāṣid* of Shari‘ah that characterises Islam’s approach generally but more so perhaps with reference to temporal affairs, say in education and teaching. The question of how is this to be actualized and through what means may be responded to as follows: Scholars and teachers should speak with simplicity in line with the receptivity of their audience’s level of understanding, cultural characteristics and needs. Is it mere information or also improvement of character and combating of a particular mischief? A lecture given in a village is not the same as one delivered in a metropolis, and one that is given to a group of scholars is also not the same as one that addresses the general public. A speech that seeks to rectify existing deviations should also be focused on its purpose and avoid complex theoretical preliminaries.¹ All of these may be said to be the means toward actualizing the Shari‘ah purposes of *taysīr* in the dissemination of knowledge.
2. Another recognised purpose of Shari‘ah is cooperation (*ta‘āwun*) in good works, which is grounded in both scripture and precedent and commands high merit in the Islamic order of values. This is actualized, in turn, by means, not only of helping those in need of it in time of calamity and distress, but also by means of long term measures

that sustain the effort, and widen its network through inviting others to join hands. The means (*wasīlah*) toward that *ta‘āwun* may also be the establishment of philanthropic foundations, adoption of correct and better targeted policies that respond to people’s needs, and also informing them of the value that Islam attaches to charitable work. As can be seen in this illustration, several means are utilised to secure and actualize the same purpose, that is, of cooperation in good works.²

3. Should our purpose be to raise public awareness of the *maqāṣid* themselves, as we think that individuals and organisations ought to be better informed of *maqāṣid* and pay greater attention to them, then we need to identify the means by which this can be effectively done. One would evidently be to engage with the media to give greater exposure about the *maqāṣid*. Another would be to identify capable persons to write not only learned essays for academic publications on *maqāṣid* but also brief, succinct and targeted pieces for print media outlets. Yet another possible means would be to hold seminars and conferences. And finally, if one were to think that the Arab countries should do better in this regard, one would need to find ways and means to engage with them in Arabic and identify areas to focus one’s efforts. One may even do that in the selection of *maqāṣid* themselves, simply because *maqāṣid* occur in so many varieties. If one aims at the *darūriyyāt* category of *maqāṣid*, then which one does one take as a matter of priority and so forth.
4. With reference to Islamic banking and finance (IBF), there is a groundswell of opinion among both the Shari‘ah advisors and industry professionals on the need to inject the *maqāṣid* of Shari‘ah into the fabric of IBF and that doing this is necessary if one were to protect the credibility of IBF from further erosion. IBF practices are said to have moved further away from the spirit of Shari‘ah by following their conventional counterparts and western banking products for a long time. IBF has furthermore followed the rules of fiqh in a formalistic way often at the expense of their purposes. IBF practitioners apply, in other words, the fiqh rules but are in disconnect with the *maqāṣid* of those rules. There is clearly a demand for a *maqāṣidī* approach to overcome the shortcomings of this *fiqhī* literalism in the IBF

practices. But when turning to the *maqāṣid* blue print, it also tends to fall short of providing the needed input in the form of pragmatic tools to rectify the aberrations, partly because the *maqāṣid* have remained somewhat too theoretical to be of much help to practitioners. Most of the *maqāṣid* are theoretical in that they do not have substantive rules of their own. Rather the *maqāṣid* can tell us how the fiqh rules should be applied, not to replace those rules. That said, one may still need to explore the resources of *maqāṣid* further to make a better appraisal of their relationships with the fiqh and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, which is what we propose to do. One obvious question would be how to identify the valid Shari‘ah purpose of a fiqh rule, transaction or contract.

To identify one’s purpose and specify the means to actualize it may or may not always involve recourse to Shari‘ah sources, but only to rational common sense methods, which is why some scholars maintain that *maqāṣid* can be identified by the human intellect (*al-‘aql*) and also innate human nature (*al-fiṭrah*) as we shall presently explain. When a *maqṣad* is identified, the next step would be to ascertain the suitable means for its actualization. The means that one chooses must not be disproportionate or too indirect for the purpose and that it is also permissible under Shari‘ah. Both the means and ends must be lawful. For a serious discrepancy between them can lead to distortion, or manipulation through the use, for instance, of a legal trick (*hīlah*) to obtain an unlawful end through a seemingly lawful means.³ This would introduce complication and invoke, in turn, application of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* notion of ‘blocking the means’ (*sadd al-dharā’i*). In short, actualization (*taf‘īl*) of *maqāṣid* is about identification of purposes and the means by which they are actualized.

This paper begins with the definition and meaning of *maqāṣid* and proceeds to ascertain three discernible tendencies regarding their scope: reductionist, expansionist, and the moderate approach of *wasāṭiyyah/i’tidāl*. Then we address the question as to whether the *maqāṣid* may be recognised as a proof or source of Shari‘ah in its own right. Can one, in other words, extract a ruling (*ḥukm*) of Shari‘ah directly from the *maqāṣid*, or should one always follow the *uṣūl al-fiqh* approach? Responding to these questions would help the reader to

know more clearly what to expect of the *maqāṣid*. We often speak of the *maqāṣid* but when it comes to actual practice, we apply the fiqh rules. Can one just ignore the latter and refer directly to *maqāṣid*? Then we explore the relationship of *maqāṣid* to the Qur’an and hadith, and to *uṣūl al-fiqh* respectively. We also ascertain the roles respectively of the human intellect (*‘aql*) and innate human nature (*fiṭrah*) in the identification of *maqāṣid*. Our following review of the means and actualization of *maqāṣid* elucidates this subject through several illustrations. *Maqāṣid*-based *ijtihād*, or *ijtihād maqāṣidī*, is also discussed in a succeeding section, which is followed, in turn, by a conclusion and a set of actionable recommendations.

Definition and Meaning of *Maqāṣid*

Maqāṣid is the plural of *maqṣad*, from the root word *qaṣada* (to intend), or that which one intends to reach which is usually one’s objective or purpose. Muslim scholars have given different definitions to *maqāṣid*. The renowned Andalusian Ibrāhīm al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) who wrote much on the *maqāṣid* did not actually define it. Commonly cited definitions of *maqāṣid* are those of Muhammad Tahir ibn Ashur (d. 1974), Muhammad al-Zuhayli, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Ibn Bayyah, all of whom describe *maqāṣid* as the “wisdom and meaning” that underlie the rulings (*aḥkām*) of the Lawgiver. Ibn Ashur defined the general objectives (*maqāṣid ‘ammah*) of the Shari‘ah as “the deeper meanings (*ma‘ānī*) and inner wisdom (*ḥikam*) that the Lawgiver has contemplated in respect of all or most of the Shari‘ah ordinances.”⁴ For Qaradawi, “*maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah* refer to the final ends and purposes (*al-ghāyāt*) aimed at by the textual commands, prohibitions and permissibilities, and the detailed rulings (*al-aḥkām al-juz’iyyah*) seek to realise them in the life of competent individuals, families and communities of the Muslim Ummah.”⁵ Simply put, *maqāṣid* is another term for the meaning and wisdom sought by the textual rulings of Shari‘ah. Qaradawi’s definition clearly seeks to relate the *maqāṣid* closely to the detailed textual rulings of Shari‘ah in their totality. The *maqāṣid* are thus to be found in the *aḥkām* and have no separate existence outside them. For Abd Allah Bin

Bayyah, *maqāṣid* refer to “the spirit of Shari‘ah, its meanings, wisdom, purposes and objectives.” These meanings arise from the original address of the Lawgiver (*min khiṭāb al-Shāri‘ ibtida’an*), as well as those arrived at through inferences and interpretations.⁶ Bin Bayyah’s definition not only relates the *maqāṣid* closely to the text but is inclusive of rational inferences from the textual sources that can also determine and identify the *maqāṣid*. Muhammad al-Zuhayli defined *maqāṣid* as “the ultimate goals, aims, consequences and meanings which the Shari‘ah has upheld and established through its laws, and consistently seeks to realise, materialise and achieve at all times and places”.⁷

Approaches to *Maqāṣid* : Reductionism, Expansionism and Moderation (*Tafrīt, Ifrāt, I’tidāl*)

Three tendencies are noticeable in the contemporary discourse on *maqāṣid*, one of which is the neo-Zahiri approach which tends to be reductionist (*tafrītī*) of *maqāṣid* and confine them to the clear text and immediate meaning and purpose thereof. For a *maqṣad* to exist, in other words, there must be a clear text to say so. The second tendency is expansionist (*ifrātī*) that exaggerates in the identification of *maqāṣid* at the expense even of scripture – creating and identifying new *maqāṣid* without clear supportive evidence. The third and the correct approach is the moderate (*wasatī*) approach opting for *maqāṣid* that find support in the scripture and valid precedent. For instance, elimination of harm (*raf‘ al-ḍarar*) is a valid Shari‘ah purpose which has wide-ranging applications and there are guidelines on how a harm can be correctly measured and evaluated – and that is how moderation is also ascertained. A careful approach to moderation is to be guided by valid precedent, knowledge and good judgment.⁸

There is general agreement that the Qur’an and Hadith are the most authoritative sources of *maqāṣid*, but there is disagreement as to whether rational inference from these sources can also introduce and identify *maqāṣid*, and if so, to what extent.

The five essential *maqāṣid*, namely of protection of religion, life, intellect, lineage and property are the salient purposes of Shari‘ah by

general consensus. Prominent scholars, including Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1996), Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Ahmad al-Raysuni, Ismail Hasani, and Ahmad al-Khamlishi have added justice, equality, freedom, social and economic rights to the higher purposes of Shari‘ah saying that the five essential *maqāṣid* were based on the ijtiḥad of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 508/1111) based on his reading of the prescribed penalties (*ḥudūd* and *qiṣāṣ*) and the value points the Shari‘ah sought to protect through them.⁹ Other scholars have included human dignity, mercy and compassion, unity, and fraternity (*ukhuwwah*) to the range. Support for most of these can be found in the Qur’an and Hadith, yet many text book writers have excluded them on the analysis that they are too general and need to be specified and related to particular cases. Khadimi and Raysuni have also spoken of adding fundamental human rights and protection of the environment to the list of essential *maqāṣid* but registered differences of opinion as to whether most of these can be subsumed under the five *ḍarūriyyāt* through a wider reading thereof. Protection of life would thus include human dignity and basic rights as well as the right to environmental safety. Human dignity and environmental protection can also be subsumed to a large extent, under the protection of religion and that of property. One can add, they say, separate headings for these new *ḍarūriyyāt*, or else subsume them under the existing five.¹⁰ In our view, adding these new headings under the *ḍarūriyyāt* is likely to dilute an existing consensus over the five *ḍarūriyyāt*, hence it may be preferable to seek fresh consensus for these new additions. Jamal al-Din Atiyah (d. 2016) has made an attempt to include most of them either under the higher objectives of Shari‘ah or place them under his expanded classifications of the *maqāṣid*.¹¹

It is reasonable and moderate to note what some commentators have observed that the *maqāṣid* should not be confined to ijtiḥad and *mujtahidīn*; it should be possible instead for everyone who can utilise the resources of *maqāṣid* in due proportion to their knowledge and experience to do so. For the *maqāṣid* are guidelines to purposeful thinking, analysis and evaluation generally, not confined to any particular discipline as such. Every researcher, interpreter, mufti, and judge could gain from the knowledge of *maqāṣid al-shari‘ah*.¹² Clear

goal identification then becomes a strategy of thinking that enhances one's resources and guides one's progress in meaningful ways. This is what is often lacking on the part of many competent researchers in the economic and development fields – they may construct the economic aspect at the expense, however, of human development, and may even be inflicting harm. One may also find people who defend individual rights often at the expense of community rights; food experts introduce and promote food and beverage varieties at the expense, at times, of harming people's physical and even moral health. Individuals and states may be constructing one thing but destroying another – which is what is happening in the space and weapon technologies and some of the questionable scientific advances.¹³

Atiyah has aptly noted that traditional Islamic scholarship in the area of theology (*ilm al-kalām*) has almost totally ignored the potential contributions of *maqāṣid*, whereas contemporary opinion actually demands this. He adds that the prospects of extending the *maqāṣid* to theology have increased in the light of enhanced scholarly contributions in recent decades that pave the way toward that end.¹⁴

A similar neglect of the *maqāṣidī* approach is noted in the field of politics. Since leadership is a religious imperative, establishing a system of rule is one of the *maqāṣid* of Shari'ah. Thus it is suggested that *siyāsah shar'īyyah* (Shari'ah-oriented polity) that subsumes political leadership must be guided by the ethical norms of Islam. This has not, however, been the case in the longer history of Islamic government.¹⁵

A debate has also arisen as to whether the *maqāṣid* constitute a proof of Shari'ah side by side with the other recognised proofs, and if so, can a ruling of Shari'ah be founded on *maqāṣid* and acted upon without looking at any other evidence. Subhi Mahmassani's affirmative response to this question came under scrutiny, however, by Allal al-Fasi (d. 1964). In his *Falsafat al-Tashrī' al-Islāmī*, Mahmassani had recognised the *maqāṣid* as an additional proof (*dalīl*). Al-Fasi's response is that the *maqāṣid* is not another proof the like, for example, of natural law and natural justice in western jurisprudence – on which a judicial decision may be based. *Maqāṣid* is not a proof in itself, but one which stands with every other proof and a part thereof. Al-Fasi added that the Shari'ah consists of laws and rules (*aḥkām*) which have their own

purposes; *ahkām* are also sometimes taken from *maqāṣid*. Anyone learned in Shari‘ah should read the text and laws of Shari‘ah in the light of their purposes so that his or her understanding becomes deeper, coherent and mature. The Qur’an is the first proof, together with its *maqāṣid*, which is also true of the Sunnah. Analogy (*qiyās*) is also a proof that must stand on its purpose. Some instances of analogy are found to have departed from its rationale and *maqṣad*, in which case a correction is attempted by recourse, for instance, to juristic preference (*istiḥsān*) or consideration of public interest (*istiṣlāḥ*) so as to integrate the proper *maqṣad* therein. In the event where an issue is encountered for which no relevant text or analogy is found, reliance on *maqāṣid* will be greater. Recourse is to be had in that case to broad and general guidelines of the scripture to extract a ruling in the light of their *maqāṣid*.¹⁶

Ibn Ashur thought that the *maqāṣid* should be given an independent status. This was not entirely without precedent as earlier scholars, including the Mālikī scholar Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d.684/1283), Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah of the Ḥanbalī school had made comments that pointed in the same direction.¹⁷ A critic suggested, however, that al-Shāṭibī had not given the *maqāṣid* an independent status when he discussed the *maqāṣid* in the fourth of his four-volumed *al-Muwāfaqāt* and treated it as an extension of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, for the other three volumes are on *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Al-Shāṭibī had, in other words, accentuated the importance of *maqāṣid* without claiming that it is either separate from, or independent of, *uṣūl al-fiqh*.¹⁸

Bin Bayyah’s opinion on the relationship of *uṣūl al-fiqh* to *maqāṣid* is that they are inseparable from one another, albeit that *maqāṣid* is a distinctive chapter in the larger matrix of *uṣūl*, alongside other chapters such as *istiṣlāḥ*, conflict and preference (*al-ta‘arud wa al-tarjih*) and *qiyās* etc. Having discussed both Ibn Ashur and Bin Bayyah, Raysuni is inclined to side with the former, adding that *maqāṣid* is being taught, in recent decades, as a separate course in many countries and universities, including Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, al-Azhar of Egypt and many more and is treated as a distinctive subject in its own right.¹⁹ In our view teaching a separate course on *maqāṣid* is not a proof of its independence from *uṣūl al-fiqh*. We take the view that it is a distinctive discipline of Shari‘ah without

claiming, however, that it is independent.

Maqāṣid – Scriptural Sources and Uṣūl al-Fiqh

Traditionally textual interpretation (*tafsīr*) and analogy (*qiyās*) served the principal vehicles of delivering the meaning of the scripture and its analogical extension to similar cases. Yet the scope of this exercise was restricted by a plethora of conditions that *uṣūl al-fiqh* attached to almost every aspect of interpretation and analogy.²⁰ The *uṣūl* methodology subsumed the *maqāṣid* mostly under the effective cause (‘*illah*), saying that the cause and rationale of a ruling also indicates its purpose. Thus we read in a legal maxim: “The effective causes of Shari‘ah rules indicate the purpose of the Lawgiver and should be followed whenever they are known.”²¹ Yet in our view subsuming the *maqāṣid* under ‘*illah* would effectively place the *maqāṣid* back under the umbrella of conventional *uṣūl al-fiqh*.²² What we propose instead is to read the ‘*illah* and *maqṣad* together and draw appropriate conclusions from them in the construction of *ijtihād*, but not to subsume the one under the other. To subject the *maqāṣid* to the *uṣūlī* process of *ta‘līl* (search for the ‘*illah*) is also not straightforward. For it is not easy to identify the ‘*illah* to begin with, and then also that ‘*illah* and *maqṣad* are different in certain respects: ‘*illah* is usually tied to *status quo ante* and it looks to an existing *ḥukm*, whereas a purpose (*maqṣad*) also looks to the future and seeks to extend the Shari‘ah beyond existing precedent. The *maqāṣid* are also evolving and changeable in tandem with the progress of science and civilisation. ‘*Illah* is a more restrictive concept by comparison.

We propose therefore that ‘*illah* and *maqṣad* should inform rather than substitute one another. To illustrate, the Qur’an enjoins just retaliation (*qiṣāṣ*) in terms of ‘life for life (*al-nafsu bi al-nafs*),’ in one place (*al-Mā‘idah*, 5:45), but also provides that the law of *qiṣāṣ* is meant to protect life (*al-Baqarah*, 2:179). The former expounds the ‘*illah* and the latter expounds the purpose and wisdom (*ḥikmah*) of the law of *qiṣāṣ*. In the event where several persons collude in murdering one, an ‘*illah*-based approach will make only one person liable to *qiṣāṣ*, which is not satisfactory, as it was shown, in fact, during the time of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in a murder case in Yemen. He concluded after much

deliberation that people’s lives cannot be protected unless all who colluded in the murder of one are made liable to *qiṣāṣ*. This position is sound as it reads the *‘illah* together with the *maqṣad* or *ḥikmah*, and it represents a standard Islamic law in both its Sunni and Shia branches.

Reflecting on al-Shāṭibī, he did not resort to *ta‘līl* (search of the correct *‘illah*) in his construction of the theory of *maqāṣid*. When he proposed induction (*istiqrā’*) as an identifier of *maqāṣid*, for instance, he was of the view that induction cannot be subsumed under *ta‘līl*. In rational terms, induction could also be extended to ideas and values that society may embrace in the course of history and time. Thus when one says that the essential *maqāṣid* should also include human rights or protection of the environment, one can find support for them in the sources of Shari‘ah in a way that can hardly be tied to the *‘illah*. Then more recently when Ibn Ashur and some other scholars added rationality, and innate human nature (*‘aql* and *fiṭrah*) as additional identifiers of the *maqāṣid*, the whole of their effort was geared toward equipping the theory of *maqāṣid* with its own methodology and approach rather than subjecting it to any *uṣūl al-fiqh* method, including the *‘illah*.²³

Twentieth century scholarship has actually sought to expand the scope of *maqāṣid* from a purely juristic context to the wider arenas of modernity and civilisation.²⁴ The *maqāṣid* should naturally have a higher profile as a goal-setter and determinant of values. The *uṣūl al-fiqh* can be seen in a fresh light as a facilitator of *maqāṣid* by providing it with ideas and resources to help with the actualization of *maqāṣid*. Yet the *uṣūlī* doctrines are almost all in the nature of probabilities and have not been recognised as the final arbiters of goals and values. Hasan Jabir elaborates on this to say that the Qur’an is the most authoritative source of the *ahkām*. While the *uṣūl al-fiqh* shows the ways of extracting rules from that source, *uṣūl al-fiqh* is by itself not enough without the aid of *maqāṣid* – if the Qur’an and Sunnah were to guide the way of the Muslim ummah to new times and climes. For this would necessitate studying the primary sources in light of the broader universals of *maqāṣid*.²⁵ Moreover, since the *maqāṣid*, as a discipline, consist of an articulation of the spirit and purpose of Shari‘ah, it helps to guide the *uṣūl al-fiqh* doctrines by removing or minimising instances of apparent conflict and burdensome elaborations therein. The

maqāṣid also aspires to greater consensus among the wider spectrum of schools and scholars of Shari‘ah – even of other traditions and ideologies.²⁶

The idea of *maqāṣid* has in reality been the prime mover in bringing the letter and spirit of the law closer together. With regard to the consolidation of hadith, for instance, unlike the Qur’an which is equipped with detailed information on the occasions of its revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*), most of the hadith do not elaborate their own occasion and context. This is often left to the speculation of the narrator and jurist. By paying attention to the *maqāṣid* and the overall knowledge of the subject, Hadith scholars were able to sift through and isolate much of the superfluous material in hadith.²⁷ *Maqāṣid* can also play the same role as criteria of evaluation of legal rulings obtained through interpretation and *ijtihād*. The *ijtihādī* rules of Shari‘ah and fatwa are changeable with the change of time. Almost all jurists understand, as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah explains, that justice is not done by the formal application of law regardless of circumstances that may present pressing situations of necessity and need. A competent scholar therefore assesses a situation and decides whether or not there is a need for an exception to the law. With knowledge of the purposes and objectives of the law, the scholar would know whether there is a need for fresh *ijtihād*, or for grant of relaxation (*rukḥṣah*) to formal application of the law.

Human Intellect (*‘Aql*) and Innate Human Nature (*Fiṭrah*) as Identifiers of *Maqāṣid*

Can human intellect and judgment validate the *maqāṣid* side-by-side with the text – or even in the absence of a clear text? Different responses have been given by both the early and contemporary jurists. Few would agree that *‘aql* alone can validate the *maqāṣid* without any textual evidence. Most jurists have agreed, on the other hand, that reason can evaluate human conduct on temporal affairs, but that reason cannot provide a reliable basis of evaluation on devotional matters (*‘ibādāt*).²⁸ The discourse on this point tends to run parallel, for the most part, with the one that has arisen concerning the proof of

maṣlahah. Al-Ghazali has observed: “It is by means of ‘aql that people know the benefits of this world.”²⁹ Credibility is given, however, he added, to the intellect of those with sound judgment and knowledge of the custom and culture of society. ‘Izz al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262) observed that “temporal benefits and harms are mostly known and identified by ‘aql, not only in the Shari‘ah of Islam, but in most other traditions. A person of sound judgment would know, even before the existence of a revealed text, that realisation of pure benefit or prevention of pure harm is praiseworthy. Learned scholars in most traditions would also agree on the prohibition of murder, theft, adultery and the like. As for the benefit or harm of concern to the hereafter, these can only be known by means of transmitted proof (*naql*).”³⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah’s view on the authority of ‘aql is similar but it adds a reference to innate human nature (*al-fiṭrah*)³¹ that also plays a role in the identification of *maqāsid*. The Shāfi‘ī school holds unrestricted reasoning (*istidlāl*) as a valid basis of judgment even if it cannot be traced to a proof text, provided that it operates close to the meaning and spirit of those proofs.³² Imam al-Shāfi‘ī referred to the precedent of Companions saying that whenever they could not find a textual ruling on a matter they would resort to *istidlāl*.³³

Human intellect is informed by the senses, but has the capacity to go beyond the data of the senses, although it falls short of the wider reaches of revelation (*wahy*). The intellect performs a number of functions. It perceives that which is unseen based on that which is seen, derives universals from particulars, recognises self-evident truth, and associates causes and effects. It is a criterion of responsibility, and the criterion by which God Most High has honoured humankind above the rest of His creation. It is also the only means by which humans can know the essence of responsibility and *taklīf*. Human reason is therefore a credible basis of judgment in the absence of revelation, provided that the judgment arrived at is in harmony with the general spirit and guidance of the revealed scripture.

Innate Human Nature (*fiṭrah*)³⁴ is a Qur’anic term denoting a human disposition that inheres in every person and thus is universal by the fact of its commonality. The Qur’anic assignment of the vicegerency of man in the earth (*istikhlāf-al-Baqarah*, 2:30) makes everyone carrier

of a Divine trust and mission to build the earth. *Fiṭrah* thus refers to the innate nature of God's trusted vicegerents, all of whom partake in a sparkle of the Divine (*Ṣād*, 38:72), and excel in ranks over the rest of His creatures (*al-Isrā'*, 17:70). This is also manifested in Islam's designation of itself as *dīn al-fiṭrah*, a religion that strikes harmony with enlightened human nature. *Fiṭrah* is intuitive but matures with insight and experience. Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) equated *fiṭrah* with *ʿaql* when he spoke of intuitive intellect (*fiṭrah*) endowed in someone who is brought into this world without prior exposure to society. Then he perceives and comprehends concrete realities and customs. He admits, however, that not everything affirmed by *fiṭrah* is true; what is true is the capacity of innate human reason to discern value, good and bad, in what is perceived by the senses.³⁵

Natural *fiṭrah* is thus an inherent endowment, and Islam bears essential harmony with it. The natural *fiṭrah* in our human make-up is not all known to us, but our intellect can learn much from our inner organism and bodily architecture, genetic, cellular and intercellular communication, and physiological interactions in and between organs. *Fiṭrah* is not sufficiently studied for us to know how it communicates with our intellect. We do not know well enough the physiological workings of our mental faculties within our *fiṭrah*. One can assume, however, that when they go against one another, knowingly or otherwise, a corrective is likely fall due.³⁶ It goes against the *fiṭrah* of a young child of two, for instance, to be pushed into premature tutoring, for children ought to learn by playing; it also goes against our *fiṭrah* to be deprived of our natural needs for sleep, family ties and friendship.

Whereas rationality is testable through closer scrutiny, *fiṭrah* is not so clearly testable due to our insufficient knowledge of it. Social custom and consensus of people of sound nature may be said, however, to be a reasonably reliable external indicator of *fiṭrah*.

Ibn Ashur linked the *maqāṣid* to *fiṭrah*, quoting a Qur'anic text, and concluded that both the Shari'ah and its *maqāṣid* bear harmony with *fiṭrah*:³⁷

And so, set thy face steadfast towards the one true faith, turning away from all that is false, in accordance with the natural disposition (*fiṭrah*) which God has endowed in humankind. Allow no change to alter (or corrupt) what God has endowed. (*al-Rūm*, 30:30)

Fiṭrah also refers, according to Ibn Ashur, to the natural disposition (*khilqah*) and the natural order (*niẓām*) that God has endowed in every creature. The human *fiṭrah* consists both of inward and outward manifestations. Walking on two feet is just as much an aspect of man’s physical *fiṭrah* as is his intellect and reason. Similarly, relating effects to their causes and drawing conclusions from them is an intellectual *fiṭrah*. In sum, the Shari‘ah objectives, or *maqāṣid*, according to Ibn Ashur, are mostly embedded in man’s innate *fiṭrah*.³⁸

Actualization of *Maqāṣid* and the Role of *Wasā’il*

The whole of Shari‘ah consists of purposes (*maqāṣid*) and the means (*wasā’il*, also known as *mukammilāt*) that seek to attain them. A *wasīlah/mukammil* is the means that helps to achieve the particular *maqṣad* it is attached to, be it essential (*darūrī*), complementary (*ḥājī*) or a desirable (*taḥsīnī*). When a suitable means is used to secure a correctly identified purpose, the latter is actualized as a result. Means and accomplishers are sometimes, but not always, identified by the Shari‘ah directly or through the fulfillment of certain causes and conditions. The means are liable to change with the change of circumstances, whereas purposes tend to command greater stability and permanence.³⁹ Yet it is the means that help to establish the relevance of the *maqāṣid* to a particular context or circumstance. The *maqāṣid* are also desired in themselves, whereas the *wasā’il* are not. Moreover, the means are subsumed by their purposes, depending on the strength or weakness of the relationship between them. If the means in question is indispensable to securing its relevant purpose, then according to a legal maxim, “That without which a *wājib* (obligatory command) cannot be accomplished also becomes a *wājib*.” This maxim refers to means that is instrumental to its end but not to one that may be related only to a subsidiary or incidental aspect thereof.⁴⁰ The reverse of this is also true in that the means to *ḥarām* also partakes in *ḥarām*. Unlawful means cannot therefore bring about lawful results – both the purpose and its means must be lawful.⁴¹

The means to a certain purpose may have been identified in the text

of the Qur'an or Hadith, failing which it is identified through rationality and *ijtihad*. To illustrate the means/accomplisher of an essential purpose, the Qur'an (*al-Baqarah*, 2:283) enjoins that a future obligation (*dayn*) should be reduced into writing. This is to ensure protection of property (*hifz al-māl*), which is one of the essential *maqāṣid*. Documentation in this case is the means toward the protection of that purpose, and both are textually identified.

Accomplisher of a purpose signifies a complementary means or factor in securing a purpose. To illustrate this point, we refer to contractual options (*khiyārāt*, sing. *khiyār*) that can be appended to a sale's contract. Upon concluding a sale, for instance, the purchaser may stipulate an option that he will ratify the deal in three days. Inserting an option into a sale contract serves as an accomplisher (*mukammil*) of the sale, which ensures that it is free of uncertainty and misrepresentation (*gharar*) – sale itself being a complementary (*ḥājī*) purpose of Shari'ah. To illustrate the accomplisher of a *taḥsinī*, or a desirable *maqṣad*, in relationship to the permissibility of sale, one may refer to market regulations requiring, for instance, that only clean and lawful food may be offered for sale.⁴²

The means must not exceed nor overrule its purpose. To take our previous example of sale and option again, the purpose of an option is to prevent uncertainty and *gharar* in a sale, but if one were to exaggerate and demand total exclusion of *gharar*, it would be difficult to achieve and may even obstruct the sale. For a slight *gharar* is unavoidable and is usually tolerated in a sale. To give another example, the existence of counter-values in an exchange contract is desirable – as it accomplishes the purpose of sale very well. Yet if this were to be demanded in a contract of lease (*ijārah*) on the assumption that this is just another type of sale, it would nullify the deal – as only one of the two sides of the contract is usually present in *ijārah*, not both.⁴³

An instance of excessive and exaggerated use of the means can be seen in the IBF practices, for instance, of *murābahah* (cost plus profit sale) and *bay' bi-thaman ājil* (deferred payment sale), which are primarily trading tools, or *wasā'il*, yet both are so frequently being used as means, not of trading, but of financialisation reduced into paper transactions and exchange of documents, and procurement of *ribā*-oriented

revenues. This is tantamount to excessive, even distorted, uses of means for procurement of questionable purposes. The main part of the narrative of dissatisfaction we have depicted regarding the IBF practices is due, in our view, to careless and distorted uses of the *wasā’il* and *maqāṣid*. We have also seen excessive reliance in the IBF practices on *bay‘ al-ṭmah*, which is widely seen as a disguise to *ribā*. In Malaysia, a corrective measure was taken by Bank Negara Malaysia, which issued orders in 2014 that *bay‘ al-ṭmah* should be substituted by *tawarruq*. Unlike *bay‘ al-ṭmah* which is concluded between two parties, *tawarruq* involves a third party intervention. Since then, *tawarruq* has become even more pervasive than *murābahah* for the same purpose: financialisation and disguised *ribā*. The end-result is about the same, and so is the public criticism of the IBF practices.⁴⁴

When there are numerous means for the realisation of one and the same purpose, the one that is most efficient and direct must be selected. Should there be several equally good means available to realise a particular *maqṣad*, then more than one means may be selected. The *Shari‘ah* thus provides certain guidelines with regard to the selection of means, this being an area where flexibility and choice exists for a competent person, such as a scholar or judge, to make appropriate choices in light of the attendant circumstances.⁴⁵ No text has given a definitive list of the means and purposes, which is why we proceed to provide a few additional illustrations that help to develop a certain insight into the subject matter.

An instance of *ijtihad* in the selection both of the means and purpose was the *ijtihad* of caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in his treatment of the spoils of war. The issue was whether the fertile lands of Iraq that the Muslim fighters had conquered should be distributed among them. For the Qur’an had entitled the warriors to it (Cf., *al-Anfāl*, 8:41). Yet the caliph did not distribute the said land in due regard to another Qur’anic ruling that wealth “many not be concentrated among the wealthy” (*al-Ḥashr*, 59:7). ‘Umar interpreted the two verses so as to say that the former (on war booty) referred to movable assets, not to land. He reasoned that distributing that land would turn the Muslim warriors into settled land-owners, which was not an appropriate option at that time. He consequently let the land remain with their

owners, but they had to pay the *kharāj* tax.⁴⁶

The caliph thus used *ijtihād* in the selection of both the purpose and its means. It would be possible to distribute the war booty according to the first verse in surah *al-Anfāl* on the assumption that this was how wealth was distributed to prevent its concentration, but his *ijtihād* followed a different path, and no one has opposed him on this. The initial means would have been distribution of the war spoils but the caliph used taxation as an alternative means of preventing undue concentration of wealth among the wealthy.

Another example was the moratorium on the prescribed punishment of theft that caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb imposed during the year of drought in Madinah. This also entailed a temporary suspension of a Qur’an verse for a broader Qur’anic purpose, namely justice. For imposing the said punishment seemed unjust during the famine. The means (*wasīlah*) used here was suspension of punishment – which involved, once again, a measure of reflection and *ijtihād*. The initial purpose was justice and the means toward it was implementation of the prescribed punishment, but the caliph used suspension of that same punishment instead as the means to attain justice.

In yet another example, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb made a decision to impose *zakah* on horses, despite the Prophet’s (ṢAAS)* clear instruction that exempted horses from *zakah*, as horses were used in fighting. However due to change of time and the fact that horses had become valuable assets for their wealthy owners, they were required to support the poor through the payment of *zakah*.⁴⁷

Next we look at instances of contemporary *ijtihād* that either proceed on the basis of *maqāṣid* or were strongly influenced by it. These illustrations may also help to provide insight into our discussion over the independence or otherwise of *maqāṣid* and how they relate to, or interact with, their means. But first, a word about *ijtihād maqāṣidī*.

Ijtihād Maqāṣidī

* (ṢAAS) – *Ṣallā Allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam*: May the peace and blessings of God be upon him. Said whenever the name of the Prophet Muhammed is mentioned.

Ijtihād maqāšidī is a relatively new phrase that has found expression in the works of twentieth century scholars, including Raysuni, Atiyah and the Shia scholar Mahdi Shamsuddin, who recommend a certain expansion of the *uṣūlī ijtihād* so as to embrace the wider idea of *ijtihād maqāšidī*, also known as *ijtihād maṣlahī*. In this effort, the scholar/*mujtahid* develops new rulings based on his understanding of *maṣlahah* and *maqāšid*, provided that he/she is endowed with a comprehensive knowledge of Shari‘ah, its priorities, methods of conflict resolution and so forth. When *ijtihād maqāšidī* is recognised as a valid form of *ijtihad*, it will, to a large extent, subsume and overshadow the argument for the independence or otherwise of the *maqāšid* as a proof of Shari‘ah separately from *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

With reference, for instance, to the protection of intellect (*hifz al-‘aql*), which is an essential Shari‘ah purpose, one may include, the introduction of modern sciences into the educational programmes of the Islamic institutions of learning, as well as the use of new methods of enquiry that promote the faculty of intellect. This would mean actualization of *hifz al-‘aql* in a novel way rather than sticking to the hallowed example of prohibition of wine-drinking given as a means of protection of intellect. It may also mean that the religious madrasahs would be more open, as many have already been so, to the reform and modernisation of their teaching programmes.⁴⁸

The leading Lebanese scholar, Mahdi Shamsuddin, has also stressed in this connection the importance of inference (*istinbāt*). Thus, he wrote that the Qur’an and Sunnah provide us with important sources of *istinbāt*, but the modalities of inference have been exceedingly restricted by the *uṣūlī* stipulations, which need to be revised and made more receptive to the influence of new developments in education and science. A wider understanding of *istinbāt* is therefore recommended. Two areas of interest highlighted in this connection are the legal maxims of *fiqh*, which can be a rich resource for *maqāšid*-based *ijtihad*.⁴⁹ The other and even more important is the general principles of the Qur’an, such as justice, being good to others, human dignity, and equality etc., which have been sidelined, on the whole, in the *maqāšid* discourse through the *uṣūlī* restrictions on rules of interpretation, or through stipulations attached to the application of *istihsān*,

istiṣlāḥ, and *qiyās*.⁵⁰

With reference to *qiyās*, Raysuni, Hasan al-Turabi (d. 2016) and Shamsuddin have looked into the prospects of how a more flexible reading of *qiyās* can be attempted to connect *qiyās* with the *maqāṣid*. The prohibition of liquor drinking in the Qur'an (*al-Mā'idah*, 5:90), for instance, has been rather narrowly constructed in traditional *uṣūl al-fiqh* manuals. The respective writers took a fresh look at *qiyās* through a combined reading of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *maqāṣid* so as to extend the rationale of the text to new subjects and areas. One of the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, namely the protection of intellect is thus used to prohibit all substances that compromise the intellectual faculty of a person even if the substance in question is not an intoxicant. Irrational ceremonies and superstitious practices in the name of ancestral legacy, and use of amulets for curing illnesses etc., are also to be proscribed. Moving further, one may even refer to broader textual dispensations on the elimination of harm and prejudice (*ḍarar*) to arrive at the same conclusion, without necessarily stretching the meaning of the particular text on drinking.

Maqāṣid-based Ijtihad: Case Studies

Instances of *maqāṣid*-based ijthad that revise certain *fiqhī* positions in the light of new realities are found in some of al-Qaradawi's responses to particular questions, which may be summarised as follows.⁵¹

1. *Christmas Greeting*

A PhD student from Germany wrote to al-Qaradawi informing him that he is a practising Muslim alongside many others. Was it permissible for them to send Christmas greeting cards to their non-Muslim friends and neighbours and also exchange gifts with them: "We receive gifts from them and it is discourteous if we do not respond in a similar fashion."

In his response al-Qaradawi began with quoting the Qur'an where Muslims are permitted to act justly and be good to those of other faiths who have not been aggressive toward them, but which also prohibited them from taking them as friends if the non-Muslims had been aggres-

sive toward Muslims (cf., *al-Mumtaḥanah*, 60:8-9). Al-Qaradawi added that the prohibition in this verse contemplated the polytheists of Makkah who committed acts of aggression toward the Prophet and his Companions. The verse so referred to advises the believers to be good (*tabarrū*) to all non-aggressors, which means something better than a measure-for-measure response. Al-Qaradawi also cited the hadith in which Asmā’ the daughter of Abū Bakr came to the Prophet and asked him about the fact that her mother, who was an associator (*mushrikah*) at the time, keeps on showing her affection – should she also reciprocate in the like manner – to which the Prophet responded that she should. The Qur’an also refers to non-Muslims “and if they greet you then you greet them with a greeting more courteous or equal” (*al-Nisā’*, 4:86). Al-Qaradawi discussed Ibn Taymiyyah’s restrictive views on this in some detail but then commented that had Ibn Taymiyyah lived in our time and saw how the world has shrunk and Muslims are in constant interaction with non-Muslims, he might have revised some of his views. Al-Qaradawi also relied on the point that many Christians themselves celebrate Christmas as a social occasion rather than a particularly religious one.

What we have seen here is a recourse directly to the Qur’an, especially to the *maqṣad* of fairness and good relations with peaceful non-Muslims. The means (*wasīlah*) at issue was exchange of Christmas cards and gifts. Qaradawi offered a fresh interpretation that delivered the desired response and purpose.

2. *Inheritance*

In another question, a Muslim convert asked al-Qaradawi whether a Muslim may inherit from a non-Muslim, adding that he was a British Christian and embraced Islam ten years earlier. His mother died and left a little inheritance which he refused to take based on the ruling that Muslims and non-Muslims may not inherit one another. Now his father also died and left a big estate behind of which he was the sole heir. British law entitled him to all of it. Should he refuse it and leave it to non-Muslims while he was in need of it himself and could spend it on his Muslim family and other Islamic welfare objectives?

Al-Qaradawi responded that the majority position on this was

based on the hadith according to which Muslims and non-Muslims do not inherit from one another. This has also been the practice of Companions and upheld by the leading schools of Islamic law. Some of the leading Companions, including ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal and Mu‘āwiyah ibn Abū Sufyān entitled the Muslims, however, to inherit from non-Muslims but not vice versa. Al-Qaradawi wrote that he also preferred this latter position even if the majority have not supported it, just as he also preferred the Ḥanafī interpretation of the hadith whereby ‘*kāfir*’ in the hadith at issue is understood to mean a *ḥarbī* at war with Muslims, but not all non-Muslims. He further added that the criterion and purpose of inheritance was material assistance (*al-nasrah*) and not unity in faith. This is why a *dhimmī* does not inherit a *ḥarbī* even if they are of the same religion. To entitle a Muslim to inherit from his non-Muslim relative will also help prospective converts not to turn away from Islam for reasons only of losing their inheritance rights.⁵²

In this ruling, assistance is the purpose; the means (*wasīlah*) is inheritance of a Muslim from a non-Muslim relative, and the *ḥukm* (ruling) so issued actualizes that purpose.

3. *Organ Donation*

Is it permissible to graft a part of the human body of a person into that of another person who is in dire need of it with the donor’s consent?

Al-Qaradawi’s response: There are two views on this, one prohibitive and the other permissive. The former maintains that the norm of Shari‘ah is that a Muslim does not have the right to destroy or mutilate a part of his own body (cf., *al-Baqarah*, 2:195), and also the renowned hadith: “all that belongs to a Muslim is prohibited to another Muslim, his blood, his property and his honour” (Muslim). This is u n l i k e personal property whose owner is entitled to give, sell, or donate as he wishes. The permissive view maintains that the criterion or purpose here is the greater benefit that may accrue the proposed donation especially when the harm is minor or negligible to the donor but which may well save the recipient’s life. Modern medicine has also changed the conditions of earlier times whereby grafting or mutilation of a body

part could be fatal to the donor, which is no longer the case. Hence the prohibition collapses when the fear of fatality is no longer present.⁵³

Al-Qaradawi concludes: “we concur with the permissive position provided that the surgical operation is carried by qualified and skilled physicians as there is greater benefit and saving of human life therein.”⁵⁴

In this *maqāṣid*-based ijtiḥad, the purpose is saving life, and transfer of a body part through surgical mutilation is the means. The affirmative ruling or fatwa so issued actualizes the purpose in question.

4. *Cloning*

Questions have arisen with regard to the permissibility of cloning and other modes of genetic engineering applications. In response, we may say that if our study of the nature of cloning leads us to the conclusion, as it has in fact, that human cloning tends to fundamentally alter human nature and the God-ordained design of the human constitution, then it will broadly be considered a violation and prohibited. This may briefly be explained as follows: Whereas the normal child has twenty-three chromosomes from the mother and twenty-three from the father, a cloned child has twenty-three chromosomes from just one person. The Qur’an on numerous occasions refers to the natural way of human creation from a male and a female, and entitles the child to both mother and father. Human cloning violates these Qur’anic postulates. Another aspect of concern over cloning and other human genetic engineering applications, or eugenics, would be that science could become an instrument of discrimination whereby those who have access to means can eventually select their genealogies.

The two leading *maqāṣid* that are relevant here are protection of life, (*hifẓ al-nafs*) and protection of lineage (*hifẓ al-nasab*), and the means (*wasīlah*) in the picture is human cloning. Both must be lawful and bring benefit. The means here interferes with the integrity of both these purposes and fails to actualize them in a Shari‘ah compliant way.⁵⁵

5. *DNA Analysis*

The Shari‘ah response may be totally different to other aspects of

scientific developments. For instance, if new methods of fact finding, such as DNA analysis, can resolve confusion over paternity, or identification of war dead and those who die in a plane crash, or in the depth of open seas, this will serve in a better way the Shari‘ah objective of the preservation of lineage (*hifẓ al-nasab*), and observance of the ties of kinship (*ṣillāt al-raḥim*) in the family, who may need to know the facts of death of their deceased relatives.

In this illustration, the purpose is clearly stated to be the protection or preservation of lineage, and the means (*wasīlah*) here is the use of DNA analysis, which is also applied in a lawful way, and the purpose is duly actualized through the affirmative ruling we have arrived at.

6. *Direction of Qiblah*

Finally, one may pass a permissive fatwa or ruling in regard to another technological application that concerns the *maqāṣid*. For instance, if computerised timing and location indicators can show, as they do indeed, the direction of *qiblah* and determine precise time and location in unknown places and in outer space for prayer and fasting, this will evidently help to promote and protect religion (*hifẓ al-dīn*), which is one of the *ḍarūriyyāt*, and would demonstrate an instance of harmony between Shari‘ah and science. A Shari‘ah purpose has been served here through the use of a computer, which is the means (*wasīlah*) in this example, and its application is also clear of impermissible elements. The person who prays in outer space, or one who observes the fasting of Ramadan in this way would have actualized the *maqṣad* in question. The affirmative ruling here serves to actualize the said *maqṣad*.⁵⁶

In almost all these examples, we have shown that a ruling of ijtiḥad, or of fatwa, is based on the realisation of a certain purpose or *maqṣad*. Provided that the purpose in question is a valid one from the viewpoint of Shari‘ah and brings benefit to the people, then ijtiḥad may be based on it. *Maqāṣid* can, in other words, be the basis of ijtiḥad without

recourse to the established doctrines of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The foregoing illustrations serve to show that the argument for the recognition of *maqāṣid* as a separate or independent proof of Shari‘ah is not entirely devoid of substance. The focus of independence in this case is from the *uṣūl al-fiqh*, which has traditionally dominated the *maqāṣid* and subsumed it under its various other proofs (*adillah*), such as juristic preference (*istiḥsān*), general custom (*‘urf*), consideration of public interest (*istiṣlāḥ*) and even analogy (*qiyās*). Each of these are separate formulas for *ijtihād*. Then there should be no issue if one adds the *maqāṣid* also as separate proof or heading to the list without, however, suggesting that the *maqāṣid* should replace the *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Islamic banking and finance is clearly a show-case of the contemporary discourse on the actualization of *maqāṣid*, due partly to its extensive market presence and the public’s engagement with its operations. It is also due to global financial crises that IBF became the centre of attention as a possible alternative. That said, the *maqāṣid* discourse is by no means confined, as the examples we have given clearly show, to the IBF or to *mu‘āmalāt*.

Public opinion has clearly been provoked to expect the IBF regulatory authorities to bring in important reforms to integrate *maqāṣid* into the IBF operations. However, there has also been scepticism that Islamic banks are unlikely to be the prime movers of the expected reforms, dominated as they are by the capitalist model. It has even been said that banks are not an ideal institutional model for operationalisation of profit and loss sharing, equity based and *ribā*-averse principles of the Islamic economy and finance.

This weaker presence of *maqāṣid* in contemporary IBF practices can be shown perhaps by the Shari‘ah Governance Framework (SGF) that Bank Negara Malaysia introduced in June 2011 and has energetically pursued ever since. BNM has been active to make Shari‘ah the governing principle of IBF in Malaysia more comprehensively than before. This was a significant reformist step under the circumstances. Yet it is also clear that the *maqāṣid* discourse has been conspicuously absent in

the spate of SGF related publications on perimeters and operational modalities of the various fiqh contracts – and then also in the Islamic Financial Services Act in 2013 that followed suit. Instead, the focus in all of this has basically been on the regulatory and procedural aspects of IBF without assigning any visible role to the *maqāṣid*. Six years down the line, public demand for the implementation of *maqāṣid* in the IBF sector has not subsided; one might even say it has become more pronounced because only a *maqāṣid*-anchored IBF is likely to curb the ubiquitous dominance of the capitalist model. Only in July 2017, BNM introduced the strategic concept of Value-Based Intermediation and held a one-day workshop on it to explain its due implementation. This is a welcome initiative that pays attention to value-based IBF and the values so articulated resonate closely with the *maqāṣid* and higher purposes of shari‘ah. VBI pays attention to generating sustainable impact and give greater benefit to the society, economy and environment.

Transition to a *maqāṣid*-anchored IBF, if and when it becomes a reality, would require careful preparation. It would also require, proactive and innovative leadership, and a supportive institutional attitude. It is also likely to be a journey without a clear end as it can take progressive stages of refinement. In such an eventuality, the system would still be operating the existing fiqh contracts, simply because the *maqāṣid*, as a discipline, does not offer a substantive fiqh of its own. The changes will most likely be in the *maqāṣid*-anchored regulatory regimes and how the existing fiqh contracts are practiced in the IBF institutions.

If there is a transition to a *maqāṣid*-anchored IBF in Malaysia, as is expected to be the case under the Value-Based Intermediation concept, one would expect that it would focus, in its initial stages at least, on the primary and general (*aṣliyyah*, *‘āmah*) purposes of the fiqh contracts, or at least those that are most commonly criticised for their neglect of the *maqāṣid*. One would presumably need to know and be able to identify what exactly are the primary and general purposes, say of *murābahah* (cost plus profit sale), *bay‘ bi-thaman ājil* (deferred payment sale) etc. For only then can one meaningfully attempt to address and rectify their respective shortfalls on the *maqāṣid*. This

would also entail fresh research to identify the primary objectives of the commonly-practiced fiqh contracts.

Malaysia has also seen a similar yet more important initiative when Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak introduced the Malaysian Shari‘ah Index in February 2015. The substance of this initiative is as he put it “to gauge objectively and scientifically, Malaysia’s commitment in achieving the Five aspects of the *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah*.” The benchmarking for measurement covers eight areas: judicial, economy, education, infrastructure and environment, health, culture, politics and social development.

Moving away from the IBF, and particular government initiatives *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah* also holds the promise of offering a counter-narrative in the application of Shari‘ah law generally so as to minimise the erosive effects of the prevailing materialist culture, its capitalist underpinnings, and globalisation (largely of western values) that have also aroused public criticism and demand among the Muslim masses for authenticity.

This demand was spearheaded by the Islamic revivalist discourse in the latter part of the twentieth century that called for changes to bring law and government in post-colonial Muslim countries closer to their Islamic heritage. Ironically, flagrant violations of the higher purposes of Shari‘ah on the protection of life have been committed by the very protagonists of Islamic revivalism, such as the so-called IS or Daesh, who became increasingly radicalised and violent.

Based on the foregoing, we now propose the following by way of actionable policy recommendations:

- A purpose-oriented approach and utilisation of the resources of *maqāṣid* are important simply because issues keep arising with the rapid advancement of science and civilisation. With regard to contemporary human rights, for instance, many questions have arisen that require fresh responses, and they relate closely to the *maqāṣid*.
- Twentieth century Islamic scholarship has enhanced the hitherto underdeveloped methodology of *maqāṣid*. It is justified to say therefore, that a ruling of ijtiḥad can be founded on *maqāṣid* by a duly qualified scholar who is knowledgeable of the jurisprudence of *maqāṣid*, fiqh and *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

- *Maqāṣid al-sharīʿah* arises from the Shariʿah and does not have a separate existence. Shariʿah is a unified whole but has many separate yet interrelated branches and disciplines. The *maqāṣid* may be recognised as a separate proof of Shariʿah, which recognition should not in any way derogate or negatively affect the integrity of Shariʿah generally.
- *Ijtihād maqāṣidī* should be recognised as a valid form of ijtiḥād. For it is in many ways the end result of the scholarly efforts for a revised methodology of the *maqāṣid*. Many of the instances of ijtiḥād we have reviewed above are in fact of *ijtiḥād maqāṣidī*.
- A more open approach to the identification of *maqāṣid* as well as an easier access to the primary sources of Shariʿah away from the technicalities of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is advisable. Easier access to these sources through revised methods of interpretation and inference merit recognition and support.
- *Uṣūl al-fiqh* and *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah* should be seen as complementary to one another. Such complementarity should also acknowledge and allow an expanded role and scope for the *maqāṣid* in the formulation of ijtiḥād.
- A distinction should be made, we propose, between practical purposes (*maqāṣid ʿamaliyyah*) and juridical purposes (*maqāṣid sharʿiyyah*). This will be a parallel distinction, to an existing classification of purposes into the human purposes (*maqāṣid al-mukallaf*) and those of the Lawgiver (*maqāṣid al-Shāriʿ*).
- Rationality (*ʿaql*) can be accepted as the sole determinant and identifier of *maqāṣid ʿamaliyyah*.
- In temporal affairs of concern to the individual and society, such as government policy on economic affairs and international relations too, rationality and *fiṭrah* can be accepted as identifiers and determinants of means and purposes, provided they do not in any way violate the scriptural sources of shariʿah.
- New additions of key significance to *maqāṣid* such as protection of the natural environment (*hifẓ al-bīʿah*) and basic human rights (*ḥuqūq al-insān al-asāsiyyah*), should be recognised based on their merit, and not necessarily subsumed under an expanded reading of one or the other heading of the five *ḍarūriyyāt*.

- Purposes and means are in changeable relations to one another such that a means can turn into a purpose and vice versa depending on their role and the context in which they operate. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that the one is not mistaken for the other, and that the way purposes and means relate to one another is clear of exaggeration, distortion and neglect.
- Notwithstanding the proposed complementarity of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *maqāṣid*, it is proposed that the scope of interpretation and inference (*istinbāṭ*) should not be subjected to the restrictive requirement of traditional *uṣūl al-fiqh*, nor should the *uṣūlī* concept of effective cause (*‘illah*) limit the more dynamic outlook of the *maqāṣid*.
- The use of questionable means for the procurement of *maqāṣid* have become frequent and often misleading. Due care should therefore be taken to avoid distortion in the pursuit and enforcement of alleged but unproven *maqāṣid* through questionable means.
- Initial reformist steps in IBF may well consist of minimising instances of replication and mimicking of the conventional products and practices. It is proposed that the IBF regulatory authorities draw up a carefully prepared plan for a gradual overhaul of the existing products and practices over a period of time.
- Any transition to a *maqāṣid*-anchored IBF should have clearly defined targets as the *maqāṣid* are internally diverse and may need to be separately implemented for each of its various divisions.
- Every country and jurisdiction should find its own bearings with the *maqāṣid al-shari'ah* and how they can be internalised and implemented into the system. The macro and micro aspects of *maqāṣid*-based decision making should be adequately informed by, and coordinated with, one another.

NOTES

- 1 Cf., Nur al-Din Mukhtar al-Khadimi, *Fuṣūl fī al-Ijtihād wa al-Maqāṣid* (Cairo: Dār al-Salām li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 2010/1431), p. 176.
- 2 Ibid., p. 177.
- 3 Typical examples of such tricks include the double sale of *ʿinah* (to buy e.g. at \$80 now and sell back at \$100 with the price payable in one year’s time) which effectively amounts to charging the prohibited interest (*ribā*). Exaggeration also occurs when the normal order of priorities is ignored. For instance, a Muslim woman who observes the *ḥijāb* is permitted in the meantime to expose herself during a medical examination to a stranger, or non-*muḥrim*, physician. If she insists, on the other hand, not to do so and runs the risk of death, that would be an exaggeration that consists of confusing a *taḥsīniyyāt* rule of fiqh by raising it to the level of *ḍarūriyyāt*.
- 4 Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyah*, ed. Muhammad al-Tahir al-Messawi (Amman: al-Baṣaʿir li al-Intāj al-ʿIlmī, 1998), p. 171.
- 5 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Dirāsah fī Fiqh Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah: Bayn al-Maqāṣid al-Kullīyyah wa al-Nuṣūṣ al-Juzʿiyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2012), pp. 20-1.
- 6 Abd Allah bin Mahfuz bin Bayyah, *Mashāhid min al-Maqāṣid* (Riyadh: Dār al-Wujūh, 2010/1431), p. 165.
- 7 Muhammad al-Zuhayli, *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah: Asās li Huqūq al-Insān* (Doha: Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of Qatar, 2003), p. 70.
- 8 Al-Khadimi, *Fuṣūl*, pp. 191-2. See also Muhammad al-Shatiwi, “Manhajīyyatu Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah bayn Asʿilat al-Māḍī wa Asʿilat al-Wāqiʿ,” in ed. Mohamed Salim El-Awa, *Tafīl Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah fī al-Majāl al-Siyāsī, Majmūʿah Buḥūth* (London: Muʿssasah al-Furqan li al-Turath al-Islami, 2014), pp. 79-81.
- 9 Cf., al-Khadimi, *Fuṣūl*, p. 190. See also Abd Allah al-Qasimi, *Madkhal*

- ‘*Am li-Dirāsāt al-Maqāšid* (Cairo: Dār al-Kalimah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 2015/1436), pp. 16-7.
- ¹⁰ Al-Khadimi, *Fuṣūl*, 56-7; Ahmad al-Raysuni, *Muḥāḍarāt fi Maqāšid al-Sharī‘ah* (Cairo: Dār al-Kalimah li all-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 2014/1435), p. 178.
- ¹¹ Cf., Jamal al-Din Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl Maqāšid al-Sharī‘ah* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2001/1422), p. 187.
- ¹² Ahmad al-Raysuni, *al-Fikr al-Maqāšidī* (Morocco: Manshūrāt al-Zamān, Kitāb al-Jayb, 1999), p. 99 & p. 115.
- ¹³ Cf., Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl Maqāšid*, p. 230.
- ¹⁴ Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl Maqāšid*, p. 229.
- ¹⁵ Cf., Ismail al-Hasani, *Naẓariyyat al-Maqāšid ‘ind al-Imām ibn ‘Ashūr* (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995/1416), p. 407.
- ¹⁶ Al-Raysuni, *Maḥāḍārt*, pp. 123-4.
- ¹⁷ Al-Qarāfi observed that “the foundations of Shari‘ah are of two types, one is the *uṣūl al-fiqh* and the other the legal maxims of fiqh, which are numerous and enormously helpful in ascertaining the wisdom and underlying meanings (*asrār al-shar‘ wa ḥikamuh*) of Shari‘ah”, (*al-Furūq*, vol. 1-2, p. 3). As an explanatory note, it may be said that at that time, legal maxims were an integral part of the *maqāšid* but have since been recognised to belong mainly to fiqh. Ibn Taymiyyah observed that in addition to the rulings (*aḥkām*) of Shari‘ah that are evidently important, the wisdom and meanings (*al-ḥikam wa al-ma‘ānī*) on which they are founded is the most noble of all Shari‘ah sciences (*min ashraf al-‘ulūm*). Ibn Qayyim pointed at the textual injunctions of Shari‘ah, which are inclusive of comprehensive purposes and one who masters them would not need to rely on speculative evidences, opinion and analogy (Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim as quoted in Jamal al-Din Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl Maqāšid al-Sharī‘ah*, p. 235).
- ¹⁸ Al-Shatiwi, “Manhajīyyatu Maqāšid”, p. 87.
- ¹⁹ Ahmad al-Raysuni, *Muḥāḍarāt fi Maqāšid*, p. 272.
- ²⁰ See for details on analogy and the rules of interpretation, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003).
- ²¹ The Arabic version is: *‘ilal al-aḥkām tadullu ‘alā qaṣd al-shāri‘ fihā fa-ḥaythumā wajadat ittaba‘at*.
- ²² See for detail Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Maqāšid, Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal*, Occasional Paper Series 20 (London and Kuala

- Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia and IIIT London), pp. 32-3.
- 23 By methodology is meant the definition of *maqāṣid*, its conditions of validity, methods of identification, classifications, and how it relates to means and accomplishes (*wasā'il*) and so forth.
- 24 Cf., Mazin Muwaffaq Hashim, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah: Madkhal 'Umrānī* (Herndon VA, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2014/1435), p. 91.
- 25 Cf., Hasan Jabir, *Al-Maqāṣid al-Kulliyah fī daw' Qirā'ah al-Manzūmiyyah li al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Beirut: Dār al-Ḥiwār, 2011), p. 107; Hashim, *Maqāṣid: Madkhal 'Umrānī*, pp. 108-9.
- 26 Cf., al-Raysuni, *Muhāḍarāt*, p. 291. See also Islamic Education Trust Nigeria, *Sharī'ah Intelligence* (Kuala Lumpur: Interactive Dawah Training, 2015/1436), p. 207.
- 27 Cf., *Sharī'ah Intelligence*, p. 189.
- 28 This is the view of al-Juwaynī, al-Sarakhsī, al-Sulamī and Ibn Taymiyyah. It is also noted that since Imam Mālik accepted *maṣlaḥah mursalah* as a basis of law and judgment, he can be assumed to have accepted *'aql* as a proof also of *maqāṣid*. See for details Zahir al-Din bin Abd al-Rahman, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah fī-Aḥkām al-Buyū'* (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia Press, 2009), p. 10.
- 29 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyyah al-Kubrā, n.d.), 4:115.
- 30 'Izz al-Dīn 'Abd al-Salām, *Qawā'id al-Aḥkām fī Masāliḥ al-Anām*, ed. Abd al-Latif Abd al-Rahman (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1999), 1:8.
- 31 Cf., Abd al-Rahman, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah*, p. 104.
- 32 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, *Al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Doha: Dār al-Qalam, 1978), 2:114.
- 33 Ibid., 2:117.
- 34 We understand *fiṭrah* as innate human nature, although *fiṭrah* can refer to innate nature generally, not necessarily confined to human nature as such. Compare Qur'an *al-Rūm*, 30:30.
- 35 Abū 'Alī Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Najāt fī al-Ḥikmah al-Mantiqiyyah wa al-Ṭabī'iyyah wa al-Ilāhiyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, 1985), p. 99.
- 36 Cf., Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Reading the Signs: A Qur'anic Perspective on Thinking," *Islam and Science* 4, 2 (2006), pp. 141-65. See also Elma Berisha, "The Qur'anic Semio-Ethics of Nature," *Islam and Civilisational Renewal* 8, No.1 (2017), p. 58.

- 37 Ibn Ashur, *Maqāshid*, p. 58.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 266.
- 39 Abd Allah Bin Bayyah, *Maqāshid al-Sharī'ah fī al-Mu'āmalāt*, Lecture series no. 6, al-Maqāshid Research Centre in the Philosophy of Islamic Law, London, 2008, 52 and 54. See also al-Shaikh-Ali & Khan, *Ibn Ashur Treatise*, p. 18.
- 40 Cf., Atiyah, *Towards Realisation*, 109. See also for a discussion of *Maqāshid* and *Wasā'il*, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Goals and Purposes of Islamic Law," in ed., Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, *Defining Islamic Statehood* (New York and Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 200-34 & pp. 228-30.
- 41 Sayf al-Din Abd al-Fattah, "Naḥwa Tafīl al-Namudhaj al-Maqāshidi fī al-Majāl al-Siyāsī wa al-Ijtīmā'ī," in al-Maqāshid Research Centre, *Maqāshid al-Sharī'ah wa Qaḍāyā al-ʿAṣr*, pp. 187-8.
- 42 Cf., Riyad Mansur al-Khalifi, "Maqāshid al-Sharī'ah wa Atharuhā fī al-Fiqh; al-Mu'āmalāt al-Māliyyah," *Majallah Jāmi'ah al-Malik ʿAbdulazīz fī al-Iqtisād al-Islāmī*, 17, 1 (2004/1425), p. 14.
- 43 Al-Shātibī, *Al-Muwāfaqāt*, pp. 13-14; see also al-Khalifi in the previous note at p. 16.
- 44 See for a critical assessment of the ubiquitous *tawarruq* practice, Mohammad Mahbubi Ali, "Toward Islamic Banking without Tawarruq," *Islam and Civilisational Renewal* 8, no.2 (2017), p. 260.
- 45 See for details, Ibn Ashur, *Maqāshid al-Sharī'ah*, pp. 419-20.
- 46 See for detail Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Dirāsah fī Fiqh Maqāshid al-Sharī'ah: Bayn al-Maqāshid al-Kulliyyah wa al-Nuṣūṣ al-Juz'iyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2012), p. 173.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 177.
- 48 Al-Raysuni, *Al-Fikr al-Maqāshidi*, 96, also cited in Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl*, p. 191.
- 49 Legal maxims such as "Harm must be eliminated," "Necessity makes the unlawful lawful," "Necessity is to be measured according to its [true] proportions," and "Credibility is attached to purposes and meanings, not to words and forms," can enrich the contemporary expositions of human rights from an Islamic perspective. Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl*, pp. 190-1 has discussed Mahdi Shamuddin's views in some detail on this. See also al-Khadimi, *Fuṣūl fī al-Ijtihād*, p. 55.
- 50 Cf., Atiyah, *Naḥwa Tafīl Maqāshid*, pp. 189-91. See also al-Khadimi,

Fuṣūl fī al-Ijtihād, p. 152.

5¹ Al-Qaradawi, *Dirāsah fī Fiqh Maqāṣid*, pp. 275-6.

5² Al-Qaradawi, *Dirāsah fī Fiqh al Maqāṣid*, pp. 280-1.

5³ This also illustrates the maxim that “the *ahkām* of Shari‘ah are founded on their effective causes and collapse when the effective cause is no longer obtained.”

5⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 229-32.

5⁵ See for details Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Shari‘ah Law: Questions and Answers* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2017), pp. 185-9.

5⁶ *Ibid.*

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali is Founding CEO of the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, Malaysia and a world renowned scholar in his field of specialisation. He was Professor of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence at the International Islamic University Malaysia (1985-2004), and Dean of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC) from 2004 to 2006.

He holds Bachelor of Arts degree in Law and Political Science from Kabul University, Afghanistan where he also served as Assistant Professor, and subsequently as Public Prosecutor with the Ministry of Justice; Master of Laws from the London School of Economics, and a PhD in Islamic Law from the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London.

Dr. Kamali served as Assistant Professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University in Montreal, and later as a Research Associate with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He was a Visiting Professor at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio where he served as a member of the International Legal Education team in 1991. He was a Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Study Berlin, Germany 2000-2001, and later served as a member of the Constitutional Review Commission of Afghanistan (2003), a UN Shari'ah expert on the constitutions of Iraq, the Maldives and Somalia (2004-2005) respectively. He is Senior Fellow of the Royal Academy of Jordan; Institute of Advanced Study Berlin, and Afghanistan Academy of Sciences.

His works have been translated into Bahasa Malaysia, Bahasa Indonesia, Farsi, Pashto, Dari, Arabic, Bengali, Bosnian, German, Italian, Turkish, Azari, and Japanese. He received the Isma'il al-Faruqi Award for Academic Excellence twice, in 1995 and 1997. He is listed in a number of leading *Who's Who in the World*. He features in the book *The 500 Most Influential Muslims in the World* (2009, 2010, 2016). He is a recipient of the King Abdullah II International Award 2010 in recognition of his intellectual contributions towards serving Islam and Muslims, and a recipient also of the 25th Iran World Award for Book of the Year 2016.

The higher purposes, or maqasid, of Shariah are applied and actualized (taf' il) through their means (wasa'il). This paper begins with the definition and meaning of maqasid and proceeds to ascertain three discernible tendencies regarding their scope: reductionist, expansionist, and the moderate approach of wasatiyyah/i'tidal. It addresses the question as to whether the maqasid may be recognised as a proof or source of Shariah in its own right. Can one, in other words, extract a ruling (hukm) of Shariah directly from the maqasid, or should one always follow the usul al-fiqh approach? Responding to these questions would help the reader to know more clearly what to expect of the maqasid. We often speak of the maqasid but when it comes to actual practice, we apply the fiqh rules. Can one just ignore the latter and refer directly to maqasid? The work explores the relationship of maqasid to the Qur'an and hadith, and to usul al-fiqh respectively. It also ascertains the roles respectively of the human intellect ('aql) and innate human nature (fitrah) in the identification of maqasid. The author reviews the means and actualization of maqasid and elucidates this subject through several illustrations and a set of actionable recommendations.



IIIT



International Institute of
Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia

978-1-56564-999-6

