ISMAʿĪL AL FĀRŪQĪ

Selected Essays

ISMAʿĪL R. AL FĀRŪQĪ
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FOREWORD

SINCE HIS DEATH in 1986, the legacy of Professor Ismaʿīl Rājī al Fārūqī's thought and action continue to inform and impress discourse throughout the world. An authority on Islam and comparative religion these select essays published in honor of that legacy and intellectual output portray him as an extremely gifted scholar, able to fortify with formidable logic and rational scientific argument his thinking on a number of important and complex, subjects, challenging and evaluating with a broad sweep of the brush prevailing ideas and concepts, whilst maintaining a clear *tawḥīdī* perspective throughout.

Al Fārūqī recognized that the crisis of the modern world was the crisis of knowledge, and this crisis, he thought, could only be cured via a new synthesis of knowledge in an Islamic epistemological framework, in order to galvanize Muslims to become active participants in intellectual life and contribute to it from an Islamic perspective. He worked tirelessly towards this end until his untimely demise.

The subjects discussed are not easy to grasp and the language Al Fārūqī employs is highly specialized, but it is hoped that for the most part both general and specialist readers alike will benefit from the perspectives offered and the overall issues examined. Each paper has been published as it first appeared with the caveat that diacritical marks have been added in accordance with our *Style Sheet*.

Since its establishment in 1981, the IIIT has served as a major center to facilitate serious scholarly efforts. Towards this end it has, over the decades, conducted numerous programs of research, seminars and conferences as well as publishing scholarly works specializing in the social sciences and areas of theology which to date number more than seven hundred titles in English and Arabic, many of which have been translated into other major languages.

JANUARY, 2018

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF
Ismaʿīl Rājī al Fārūqī
(1921–1986)

ISMAʿĪL RĀJĪ AL FĀRŪQĪ was born in Jaffa, Palestine. He was a great contemporary scholar of Islam and his scholarship encompassed the whole spectrum of Islamic Studies covering areas such as the study of religion, Islamic thought, approaches to knowledge, history, culture, education, interfaith dialogue, aesthetics, ethics, politics, economics, science and women's issues. It is no exaggeration to say that his was indeed a remarkably encyclopedic mind, and that he himself was a rare personality among contemporary Muslim scholars.

Al Fārūqī at first emigrated to Beirut, Lebanon, where he studied at the American University of Beirut, enrolling the following year at Indiana University's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, to obtain an M.A. in philosophy in 1949. He was then accepted for entry into Harvard University's department of philosophy where he was awarded a second M.A. in philosophy in March 1951. However, he decided to return to Indiana University where he submitted his Ph.D. thesis to the department of philosophy obtaining his doctorate in September 1952. The title of his thesis was, "Justifying the Good: Metaphysics and Epistemology of Value."

Al Fārūqī then studied Islam in Cairo and other centers of Muslim learning, and Christianity at the Faculty of Divinity, McGill University. He taught at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University; the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi; the Institute of Higher Arabic Studies of the League of Arab States, Cairo University;

Al-Azhar University, Cairo; and at Syracuse University, USA, where he held the position of Associate Professor of Religion between 1964 and 1968, developing a program of Islamic Studies.

In the Fall of 1968 Al Fārūqī became professor of Islamic studies and history of religions in the Department of Religion, Temple University, a position he held until his tragic death in 1986.

The Problem of the Metaphysical Status of Values in the Western and Islamic Traditions

IN THE LAST hundred years, the problem of the metaphysical status of value has made great strides in the Western tradition. While insisting on the a priori nature of the moral law, Immanuel Kant sought to establish it as a "fact of reason."[1] The moral law is, according to him, both "a priori" and "given." From this position – a watershed in the history of Western philosophy – two traditions arose, one seeking to carry the Kantian insight deeper and further, and the other, seeking to establish a different insight because it denied Kantian epistemology altogether. The former arose and developed in the land of Kant, in Germany, whereas the latter did so in England having never outgrown the skepticism of David Hume. These are the idealist and the empiricist traditions respectively.

In the idealist camp, the paradox of the moral law being "a priori" and "a fact" was receiving more and more sophisticated but constructionist deductions until the breakthrough of Edmund Husserl.[2] Armed with the tools of the new discipline, *i.e.*, of phenomenology, Max Scheler succeeded in breaking down the Kantian law that the a priori is always formal and only the formal can be a priori. He succeeded in establishing a *materiale* a priori which is the content of an emotional intuition a priori,[3] thus freeing value-theory from the fruitless fixation of seeking the moral in ever more abstractionist constructions of the mind, under which the post-Kantian idealists had laboured.[4] The road was hence laid open for a rehabilitation of the moral law to its

transcendental status, not as a demand of a confused Church Dogmatics which ambivalently held the finality of reason *and* its subservience to an ecclesiastical magisterium, but critically, as the content of an a priori *logique* of reason.[5] The foremost thinker who rose to the new challenge and promise of this great breakthrough in the Western idealist tradition and achieved this rehabilitation of value as an a priori, absolute, ideally self-existent essence endowed, like a genuine entelechy, with efficacious moving power and appeal, was Nikolai Hartmann.[6]

In his brilliant *Metaphysik der Erkenntniss*,[7] Nikolai Hartmann devoted a chapter in the last section of the last volume to the cognition of the valuational element in the external world. He rightly said that when a real-existent – be it a sensory object, an event or a situation, or an imagined picture, percept, or attitude – enters our consciousness, three levels of cognition are at once set into activity. First, there is the level on which we grasp the object presented to our consciousness. This is not a simple act, but a double-phased one. Besides apprehending by means of the senses the physical data of the object of cognition, there is the other phase in which we order by means of our noetical faculty the manifold data of sense under a frame constituting the form, essence or idea of the object apprehended. These two phases or modalities of cognition, the sensory and the noetic, constitute our theoretical cognition. Besides this level, cognition takes place on a second, totally different one; and it too is double-phased. Along with the theoretical apprehension of it, the object evokes in us attitudes of approval or disapproval, of acceptance or rejection, of desire, interest, quiescence, or of resistance and aversion. These are the data of valuational perception. As such they are "hard," as empirical as the sensory data; and the first phase consists in our apprehension of them, in our feeling these affections. In another phase or modality, the subject orders these data under the frame of an axiological idea or essence, of a *value*, which then becomes, in the subject's perception, the ground or "*pries*" of the object's valueness. As in the case of theoretical cognition there is no intuition of essences without the manifold data of sense, so in valuation cognition there is no intuition of value without the manifold data of interest, approval, desire, rejection, etc. For the act of approval, of desire, of being for or against

itself implies a principle under which the attitude is taken. It is an entirely different matter whether such principle becomes in turn object of the theoretical consciousness on a third higher level, as when we reflect introspectively upon that which has determined our feeling or desiring or satisfaction when the object entered into our consciousness. This third stage may or may not be clear; indeed it may not be reached at all. For it is the prerogative of the moral teacher and investigator whose very business is to reflect on our value-apprehensions and to sift the various elements that determine and constitute them. But that the principle or essence under which our valuational act had taken place is there, and that it has determined the act or attitude in question – and that is all that is meant by the second stage of axiological cognition – remains indubitable. Theoretical (*i.e.*, discursive) consciousness of that under which the attitude is taken, is a tertiary affair. The primary object of axiological cognition is that which dominates the consciousness of the subject, namely, the real-existent object apprehended. The secondary object of axiological cognition is the value, the "*prius*" under which that which we perceive as good, is good. Such secondary cognition accompanies every primary cognition of goodness, every desiring and every averting. For no object of desire or aversion is ever apprehended except as falling under this or that value. If it were apprehended merely as affecting us as perceiving subjects in this or that manner, that is to say, as merely evoking in us this or that feeling-state, we would certainly be justified in describing our own feeling-states, but never the object as "cause" or "occasion" of these feeling-states. We may then speak of the stream or flux of affective states, but never of objects as good or bad. In this case, there would be little sense in talking of any real-existent, of any object as evoking the valuational act or attitude. To have good and bad objects, right and wrong acts and attitudes, implies therefore the entry into consciousness, though not into discursive consciousness, of something extra-personal, extra-feeling states, of something new which has determined the personal emotional response to be what it is.[8] It is such secondary cognition that Hartmann calls "the primary consciousness of value."[9] It consists neither in the feeling-states, nor in the discursive consciousness which relates feeling-states to valuational judgments;

but, rather, in the consciousness that value-objects are realizations, or instantiations, of certain values. Admittedly, it is a bit confusing to call it "primary consciousness of value." But we can appreciate that by calling it so, Hartmann meant to emphasize its immediacy, the fact that it provides the data which can become, by means of a later process of abstraction, the object of the theoretical consciousness, not on the level of sense, but on that level where consciousness is of that which has determined the emotional response once the sensory object has been subsumed thereunder. Secondly, the "primary consciousness of value" is *consciousness* because it is genuine knowledge of being. For its object is just as independent a reality as spatial relations are for geometrical knowledge, or bodies are for knowledge concerning things.[10] Values are objects of possible value-apprehension; but they do not come into being in the apprehension of them. Neither are they the attitudes of feeling-states of the perceiving subject, nor his thoughts and representations. On the contrary, it is they that determine the subject in his perception of them, while in themselves they remain utterly unaffected by whether or not they are perceived, perceived correctly or falsely, given real existence or violated. It is the fact that value-perception – though it is the emotional aspect of it that is there in question, not the sensory or the discursive – is an objective perception of genuine being that gives value-consciousness its gnoseological as well as ontological weight.[11]

This was a truly great achievement. Because of it, it has become possible in the idealist tradition, to speak critically of an aprioristic realm of being, namely the realm of values, whose members act as the first principles of all finalistic *nexūs* and command the deflection of given causal threads of nature, or the inception of new causal threads, realizing their real-existential *matériaux*. This realm of being, a priori though *materiale* or contentual, absolute though relational to man and all the realm of real existents, alive with real energizing power that takes the form of the moral ought, is a transcendent realm. Yet, it is not the cold, unreachable "other" that merely coexists with empirical reality,[12] but one that is of fundamental relevance to that reality. The fact that its relevance assumes the form of an ought or command tempts man to speak of it in personalist terms. Only a consistently critical attitude of the mind

can keep present in consciousness the fact that the realm in question is really an infinite plenum of essences which, though tangentially moving and energizing, hover over reality at infinite distance. Their relevance is forever individual, pertaining to each value as an individual entelechy. As a realm, they are known only conceptually, by the discursive intuition of a fastidious reason.

In the empiricist camp, on the other hand, the a priori nature of the moral law was ruled out. Hence, its factual character was sought either in the psychic faculties of man or in the empirical qualities of things. In the former case, a wide variety of theories were elaborated; but they all based themselves in final analysis on goodness being a category under which real-existents are classified on account of man's being affected towards them in this or that fashion. The moral sentiment theories spoke of a sixth sense – the moral – which works spontaneously in man telling him what is good and what is evil.[13] The social approbative theories spoke of harmony or coherence with social convention as constitutive of goodness.[14] A third group which includes evolutionists, Marxists, pragmatists and humanists, spoke of reality as an interminable process and of the good as that which in any given stage of the process, agrees with the realities of that stage as well as with the onward moving logic which seeks to transcend the given stage and bring forth a new one.[15] However varied the detail, dependence upon a state of the subject remains in all these theories the essential characteristic of value throughout. That this state is an approbative state, or a state of agreement and harmony, demands in first place that the locus of goodness be within the subject alone. Indeed, it is a secondary question to determine the nature of that state of the subject, which is to be called 'good,' the first principle of these theories being that the good is a state of the subject at all. Taking this first principle for granted, another group of ethical theories – the psychological, properly speaking – defined the state of the subject that is constitutive of goodness as pleasure, affection or interest. Although all these theories derived some inspiration from Epicurus, only the first variety call themselves theories of hedonism; the second call themselves affective or emotive theories and the third, interest theories.[16] The psychological theories may be said to have gone deeper in

their analysis than either the approbative or the process theories. For they have sought to analyze the rock-bottom element of which goodness supposedly consists. The analyses which these have made of the feelings of pleasure and pain, of the affective or emotive faculty, of interest and desire, are genuine contributions to psychology.

All these are empiricist theories because they conceive of value as a real-existent. A psychic state of the subject is a real-existent though psychic, since it is part of nature, of space-time, and is identifiable and explicable as an effect of certain antecedent natural causes, and a cause of certain consequent natural effects, in space-time. The empiricist nature of these theories has been acknowledged by all; and all but the French social approbative theories and the Marxist process theories which nonetheless agree with the basic premises of empiricism, have been recognized as standing squarely within the tradition of British Empiricism incepted by Locke, Berkeley and Hume. But nowhere has this empiricist nature of value been as clearly established and emphasized as in the writings of Clarence Irving Lewis. Indeed, compared with Lewis, many of the so-called empiricist theories do not seem empirical at all but verge, as in the case of the Marxist and the humanist theories, on the aprioristic.

In his *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*,[17] C. I. Lewis elaborated a naturalistic theory of valuation where, to use his own terms, "valuation represents one type of empirical cognition."[18] Like all empirical truth, the knowledge of value is empirical because it "cannot be known except, finally, through presentations of sense… (and rests), at bottom, on direct findings of sense."[19] However, unlike the presentations of outer sense, the presentations in question are given to the inner sense of desire, aversion and the feelings of pleasure and pain. In either case, the nature of value-knowledge is the same. According to Lewis, a naturalistic conception of values implies, therefore, "that valuations represent one type of empirical cognition, [and] hence [that] their correctness answers to a kind of objective fact, but one which can be learned only from experience and is not determinable a priori."[20] Equally, an empiricist axiology implies that "the quality by reference to which, ultimately, all things are to be judged valuable or disvaluable is a quality

unmistakably identifiable in the direct apprehension of it when disclosed in experience."[21] Borrowing the expression of Berkeley, C. I. Lewis says that the *esse* of value is its *percipi*, for the only intrinsically valuable thing in existence is goodness discerned or discernable when disclosed in experience.[22] This apprehension, or rather consummation, of value-quality in experience is his hard datum. It is not adequately described as pleasure or pain, "hedonic tone," "quiescence pattern" or "satisfaction," because it is more general and includes them all. Although such expressions may help to characterize value, they never constitute it. For it is the state of the apprehending subject when value-quality is presented to his consciousness. This state is a kind of quiescence which the subject suffers when value enters his consciousness not as a meaning but as an experienced reality. That X is valuable, means, therefore, that upon its becoming an object of experience, its valuableness will be apprehended by the subject immediately. Such apprehension which is certainly "a mode of feeling" is "the head and front of the whole matter and no more precise test of objective value would be true to our intent."[23] Arguing against the apriorists, Lewis asserts that immediate value-apprehension in experience, such as might be the subject-matter of an expressive value-proposition (of the type, 'Now that I eat the ice cream, I apprehend directly a value-quality in the experience') is the basis of all valuation. "Without the experience of felt-value and disvalue, evaluations in general would have no-meaning."[24] Therefore, concludes Lewis, "the supposition that values are a priori could arise only through confusion between apprehension of a meaning itself and apprehension that this meaning has application in a particular instance… Only apprehensions of this latter sort are valuations."[25]

We must immediately notice that when Lewis's valuational 'hard datum' is expressed in propositions of the terminating type (*i.e.*, of the type, 'If S, then P' or 'If I eat icecream, I shall apprehend a value'), it has all the elements which constitute Hartmann's primary consciousness of value. Lewis's terminating proposition presupposes a feeling-state, an object that is necessarily related to the feeling-state, and a consciousness of that necessary relation – all of which are the elements of which

Hartmann's value-consciousness consists. Where Lewis differs from Hartmann is in the nature of the theoretical consciousness on second level, where the findings of the primary consciousness of value are translated into discursive propositions. Whereas Hartmann regards these propositions as a priori (*i.e.*, as expressing something that is originally given as content of an immediate intuition, when we disregard "every kind of positing of subjects which think them and of the actual conditions of such subjects, and also, when we disregard every kind of positing of objects to which they may apply," an experience of them being an experience of phenomenological whatness),[26] Lewis regards them as non-terminating propositions (*i.e.*, of the form SP = *Qn'* R*n*; or '*X* is good means that an indefinite number of propositions are true each of which says that if a certain act is performed, a certain value-quality will be apprehended in experience') that may find as much corroboration in experience, and therefore probability, as its Q's and R's find fulfilment when put to the test of experience.[27] But both Hartmann and Lewis are one in their anchoring of valuation in the given of experience, in a hard datum. Hartmann's epistemology enabled him to identify this given as *Wesen* or essence.[28] This was an answer to the question of the metaphysical status of value, which remains in Hartmann's mind the first question of value-theory. Had Lewis addressed himself to the same question, his empiricism would have caused him to seek an empirical value-quality in things. For it is inconsequential to claim that value is a state of the soul of the apprehending subject evoked by the presentation of an object in experience, without raising the question of the nature of that which, whether in the object or in the experience, causes the value-quality apprehension to be experienced. Here two answers are possible. Either our apprehension of value-quality in experience is an auto-suggested, auto-fabricated psychic illusion, or it is a quality or force in objects on a par with colour, size, gravity, magnetism, and other forces of nature. Only in these answers would a thorough-going empiricism be maintained. The first alternative will have to deny the whole of the real world and relegate it to a moment in "the stream of consciousness;" the other would have to explain how and why science has never been able to discover, isolate or study the

so-called real value-force of an object in nature. By not addressing himself to this question at all, as far as this reader can make of his writings on the subject,[29] C. I. Lewis must have allowed his empirical value-quality of things to pass as a *qualilas occulla*.

Despite these splendid achievements on both fronts, that of idealism or apriorism as well as that of empiricism, the problem of the metaphysical status of value still stands removed from a lasting and satisfactory solution. In the idealist camp, values have remained floating essences which, though related to one another, sometimes closely and oft remotely, had no frame or structure that may be said to belong constitutively to their realm. We do not know them as a realm, despite the fact that we can have something to say about their status. For by definition, values are here regarded as transcendent beings forever removed from human knowledge. All that can be known of them is two modalities: the "ought-to-be," or the relevance of that value as such to the realm of real-existence, and the "ought-to-do," or the relevance of that value to a moral subject standing in the historic situation where the "ought-to-be" is relevant.[30] Indeed, we may never hope for a knowledge of the realm of values as such as intimate and penetrating as our knowledge of any individual member of the realm. Such knowledge of the whole as is claimed by the metaphysical personalists and theologian ethicists is, as Hartmann himself pointed out in criticism of his master Scheler, always a construct, and can never aspire to a critical establishment of its tenets.[31] As a realm, human knowledge of them will remain as unrewarding as George Santayana's bold and philosophically critical description of the "Realm of Essence."[32] Furthermore, as Hartmann himself has pointed out, the realm of values is one where individual members operate under the law of the *bellum omnium contra omnes*; for every individual member is constantly trying to monopolize the field of human vision and rule tyrannically to the exclusion of its brother-members without any chance of reconciliation whatever.[33] The idealist tradition, therefore, which claims ideal self-existence *sui generis* for values,[34] does so for them as an indefinite internally chaotic mass, despite the fact that many significant internal relationships are discernible and of which a "Phenomenology of values" is even possible.[35]

While Hartmann remained true to the phenomenological method and denied himself any step beyond the description of some value-relationships, Scheler could not resist the temptation to look for an inner structural principle in the realm of values, and he identified that principle as saintliness.[36] This turned out to be the one final value which determines the valueness of all other values. This, Scheler has done at the cost of destroying the phenomenologicality of the description; for the raising of saintliness to the rank of axiological supremacy led to the suspicion – which Scheler never answered – that saintliness was really the only value and all other "values" were categorical means to it. It was this finding which put him squarely within the Christian camp where theology was only too anxious and happy to back him up and to appropriate his discoveries.[37] On the other hand, Hartmann's critical strictness safeguarded the philosophical gains he had achieved against such speculation. But it left his value-realm, despite the excellent "phenomenology of value," devoid of inner unity. Every value is practically a God unto man; and there is no overarching value to bring them under control and harmony.[38]

On the other hand, assuming the object of consciousness, or the value itself, out of bounds for investigation and research, the empiricist camp directed its attention to the apprehending subject. The psychologists analyzed his apprehensions of value-quality, *i.e.*, his attitudes, desires and aversions, and the philosophers reduced their task to that of semantically analyzing what the subject means to say when he reports his findings of value-quality. The former have availed themselves of the findings of empirical psychology and elaborated on the basis of its data their hedonistic, affective and interest theories. The latter were predominantly the logical positivists who assumed that no proposition is meaningful unless it is analytic (and hence, tautological, claiming no more than that such predicate is conventionally used in a given language to mean what it asserts) or synthetic (and hence, empirical, claiming a greater or lesser degree of probability such as any testable generalization of science might possess).[39] From this, the logical positivists moved on to the assertion that the propositions of ethics belong to neither category, and are hence meaningless.[40] According to them, moral predicates

are mere expressions of emotions, equivalent to the more familiar exclamations and interjections of 'Oh,' 'Hurrah' and 'Alas.'[41] Moral propositions are thus removed outside the realms of truth and falsehood, and there is no way in which a conscious, deliberate and consistently-held difference in what ought or ought not to be, can be solved or even composed.[42]

The foregoing may be said to be an account of the secular side of the Western Tradition of thought in the field of metaphysics of value. There is no doubt, however, that the said side is the greater, for it includes most of the thinking that has taken place in the West. That thinking which is specifically Christian has not produced much on this question. True to type, modern Christian thought in this as well as in other fields has come hobbling after secular thought in what may be described as an attempt by Christian scholars to react, adjust to, or appropriate the achievements of secular thought.

As far as is known to this author, only two Christian thinkers have made a deliberate attempt to "benefit" theology from the achievements of secular thought in the problem of the metaphysical status of values, namely, Edgar S. Brightman[43] and Henry N. Wieman.[44] The former borrowed heavily from Max Scheler and followed him into metaphysical personalism: the latter borrowed heavily from Ralph Barton Perry and constructed what came to be called an "empirical theology." At the same time that Wieman was trying to explore the possibilities of a wedding of empiricism to theology, Brightman was reacting against the introduction of this empiricism into the stream of American thought.

Against Perry, he argued for a rejection of the view that value is the object of an interest, on the grounds that it subjects the whole realm of value to dependence on consciousness. This is subjectivism, he maintained, as it makes a state of the subject constitutive of value.[45] Brightman saw that though all value may be relational to consciousness, it is not relative thereto.[46] But the establishment of the realm of value as an objective real realm beyond consciousness was indispensable for making sense of religious experience.[47] That realm, he held, is the very "principle by which the mind tests and seeks to organize its religious experience."[48] But this realm of objective value can be only "the

conscious experience and will of one Supreme Person, God."[49] Drawing on Sorley[50] as well as on Scheler, Brightman defined "the objectivity of values… (as meaning) their existence as purposes of the Divine Mind."[51]

The first premise of Brightman's philosophy, his concern to prevent the realm of values from being subjective – that is to say, from an essential dependence on human consciousness – is worthy and well taken. But the second premise of his philosophy, his identification of values with the ideas and purposes of a Supreme Person, lacks the wisdom of his negative first premise. Just as the relationality of values to human consciousness does not make them the product of that consciousness, their relationality to a Supreme Mind – if such can be established – does not make them that Mind's factitive "ideas and purposes." At best, they would be relational to it; and it would be as objectively determined by them as human consciousness. Once they are taken to be the factitive product of any consciousness, whether human or divine, their objective reality is in real danger. Secondly, the personalization of the Godhead stands on a par with that of the cosmos. The phenomenon of the human person willing, desiring, judging and acting in freedom and responsibility is a fact. It is the only fact of its kind. Reading this fact into the cosmos, the Godhead or any other non-man is unwarranted construction, a leap outside the realm of critical thought.

Viewed from another angle, Brightman's inconsequence consisted in saving the objectivity of value by loosening the grip of consciousness upon it, and tossing that realm, as it were, onto the upper stage of divine consciousness. Wieman, on the other hand, sought to save that same objectivity by subjecting the realm of value to the specific structures constituting the experience of nature by that human consciousness. The one tried to save objectivity by raising and expanding, the other by lowering and reducing.

Wieman was sufficiently interested in R. B. Perry to write his doctoral dissertation on Perry's theory of value as interest. His acceptance of Perry's metaphysic of value was complete.[52] He added to it, however, the Bergsonian notion of creativity, and attributed this notion not to any interest, however general and inclusive – as Perry did – but, to the

principle of organization of all interests, which is not itself an interest unless the term is stretched beyond its common sense meaning. A third and special affinity to Josiah Royce becomes evident when we consider that, for Wieman, what is involved in the organization of interests is not a principle but an event, a "creative event." The plea for objectivity begins with the identification of interest with "the total process of interaction between organism and environment,"[53] and hence, with the implication that it does not wholly depend upon the subject, and is therefore not entirely a state of the subject. An attempt to confirm this objectivity followed with an analysis of the possibility of achieving the "creative event" of interest-organization on the social level. Such a solution was precisely Perry's.[54] But this had to be abandoned as unworkable when Wieman examined the concrete example of Western society and found reason not only "to doubt the reality of a free society (in which mutual creativity can be fully operative, but) even its possibility."[55] This failure of society to measure up to the requirements led Wieman to "look beyond society for that organization of interests which will yield the largest measure of good" and this, he asserted, is religion.[56] For, religion encompasses all interests and pursues them as "cosmic purpose;"[57] God as "individuality and teleology of the universe;" etc.[58] However, in order to accommodate the Christian dogma of redemption in this secularization of religion and empirical "cosmic purpose" (*sic*) Wieman now turned against the individuality and personal character of interest to assert that cosmic interest may never be a proper object of any man's interest and pursuit, for it stands beyond human control and must transcend the human range of experience and interest. Consequently, man's ultimate role can be only one of total acquiescence in the divine scheme.[59]

It is nothing short of amazing to the rational observer how this superlatively empiricist mind can go on asserting the empiricist thesis while at the same time denying it in favour of articles of dogmatic faith. As late as the appearance of *The Empirical Theology of Henry Nelson Wieman*, Wieman wrote that outside what is given to sense, nothing divine, religious or moral could be sought or found.[60] This notwithstanding, he spoke of another knowledge, immediate and subjective,

whose object constitutes a realm a *part*, different from and in every respect other than the realm which empirical science studies. He even gave them the contrasting names of form and content asserting that, while the former was best developed by the modern West, and the latter by the ancient East, truth is really in a merging of the two.[61] But the only reason he gave for the existence and validity of the new source of knowledge is the old argument that there must be a mind and a person in order to have any scientific knowledge at all.[62] It is no wonder that he made this concession under the criticism of his colleague, Professor Bernard Eugene Meland. Aiming at Wieman's notion of the never-to-be-experienced cosmic purpose which is God asserted alongside the empiricist thesis, the latter wrote with a charity that is all the more devastating because it is charitable: "what he (Wieman) once spoke of as the 'rich fullness of experience' presents a constant 'more' to him, which is the unmanageable depth of the living situation, extending to the unmanageable dimensions (or inexperienceable aspect) of God's reality. To him, this is at once an *abundance of good* and a *threat to clarified understanding* of that which is ultimately good and transforming of our own good." Professor Meland rightly concluded that this is the work of a "divided mind," endowed with "dual loyalties."[63]

Thus the problem stands in the Western tradition.

Passing over to the Islamic tradition, we find that axiological phenomenology was pursued not as a philosophic discipline as such, but as one or another of the sciences of the Qur'an.[64] Axiological methodology, on the other hand, was pursued as the science of the *ṣifāt* (divine attributes). In the former, many of the so-called "*ʿUlūm al Qur'ān*" were really searches after the underlying meanings of revelation and hence after that which God had intended to enter man's consciousness and determine his will; *i.e.*, after values, their inter-relations and structure. The preoccupation of the theorists of *asbāb al-nuzūl* with history, for instance, was a means for evaluating the contexts in which the verses were revealed; and this in turn led to a grasping of the divine meaning, or value, which God intended to convey.[65] In the latter, the question of the sense in which God's attributes are predicable of Him amounts really to that of the metaphysical status of value. For the *ṣifāt* were all the

ethical ideals of the Muslim – to be sure, never completely realizable by man on earth or in heaven – but nonetheless constituting the ultimate ideals of truth, goodness and beauty.[66] In fact this predication of values or ideals to God as attributes saved the unity and objectivity of the Muslim's ideals in the sea of interpretations to which the word of God was subjected by authority-condemning Muslims. In the course of the spread of Islam east of the Two Rivers where Arabization did not keep abreast with Islamization, the Qur'anic meanings came to be less and less the object of an intuitive grasp and immediate understanding, and more and more that of a conceptualizing sense-empiricism in doubt about the new message which shattered its old pre-Islamic world-view. Compared with the Arab or fully-Arabicized mind, this mind was incapable of fully grasping the idea of transcendence and of appreciating the necessarily-human, necessarily-conceptual and necessarily-aesthetic (poetic) language in which the transcendent may be expressed or talked about. But where the transcendent or the Qur'anic meanings pertaining thereto are not object of an immediate intuition, they become irrational stumbling-blocks. It was natural therefore that among those whose consciousness has not been completely governed by the categories of Arab consciousness, a movement began to spread which understood God in anthropomorphic terms and which drew its intellectual nourishment either from Eastern Christianity, from the religions of Persia and India, or from the Jahwism of those Jews who thought of their God in excessively human terms.[67] Judging from the kind of arguments which the *Mushabbihah* (anthropomorphists) advanced in support of their position, we may even say that the converts from Judaism must have supplied the intellectual leadership of the other anthropomorphists who, according to Shahrastānī, consisted largely of *al-Shīʿah al-Ghāliyah*, or *Shīʿah* excessivists (*e.g.*, Ḥashwiyyah, Hishāmiyyah, Muḍar, Kuhmus, Aḥmad al-Hujaymī, etc.)[68] The *Mushabbihah* argued that "their God has a figure, organs and parts, some spiritual and some bodily; that He moves about, descends and ascends, sits down and stays put…" that "God's eyes once ailed Him and the angels cured their ailment, that He actually cried when the Deluge destroyed mankind until His eyes hurt Him: that the throne squeaks when He sits on it as a new

saddle does when the rider sits on it," that "Moses… actually heard the voice of God and that it was thundering like the sound of dragging chains," etc.[69] "Pure anthropomorphism," he wrote, "is a purely Jewish affair, though not all Jews are anthropomorphists. It was mostly the Karaites among them that capitalized on the Torah's many words about God which [ostensibly] support their thesis."[70]

Against these, the adherents of the idea of transcendence rose like one man, but with several voices. Several schools were formed, each of which advanced arguments to prove its own view of things. However, all of them opposed the new anti-transcendentalist anthropomorphism with equal absoluteness and determination.

The stakes were high: If God were to be understood anthropomorphically, His attributes would be on a par with the attributes of men. They would certainly be the ideal and most perfect – as the attributes of the Greek deities – but their unity, objectivity and transcendent status would become meaningless as they are taken to be the unparalleled but not unparallelable, admirable but not necessary, perfections of man. The new position pulls down the two houses at once: that of theology and that of ethics; of *tawḥīd*, or the unitarianism of God, and of the transcendent status of the ethically imperative or the ethical (*i.e.*, non-empirical) nature of the command.

Maʿbad al-Juhanī and Ghaylān ibn Marwān were the first to pose the problem as one of divine attributes.[71] Seized with spiritual panic when they saw the new converts entertain their anthropomorphic conception of the Godhead, Maʿbad and Ghaylān argued for transcendence by denying all the divine attributes. Although this opinion later developed into a school of philosophy, their argument was simple enough. God, they are reputed to have said, along with the Muʿtazilah school, "is knowing in His essence, capable in His essence, alive in His essence, not by means of [a faculty] of knowledge, [a faculty] of capacity, [a faculty] of life. These attributes are eternal in Him; they are meanings belonging to Him. For, if they co-existed with Him [as faculties] in eternity – which is the central core of the Godhead – they would have shared with Him the divine status."[72] The Divine attributes are thus *muʿaṭṭalah* or neutralized. "It is impossible that there be two

uncreated, eternal beings," and it is certain, according to them, that "whoever established a meaning or an attribute as eternal, has actually established the existence of two gods."[73] On these lines, the *Muʿaṭṭilah*, or those who neutralize the divine attributes, argued that the attributes are not predicative of God, but definitive; that to predicate them of God is only a means of talking about Him.

A more sophisticated version of the argument was advanced by Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf. "He" (*i.e.*, God), he said, "is knowing with a knowledge which is Himself, capable with a capacity which is Himself, alive with a life which is Himself; and so is the case with divine hearing, seeing, eternity, glory, might, greatness, magnanimity and all the other attributes of His self… When I say 'God is knowing,' I simply assert that He has knowledge which is God and have denied that He has ignorance [which is not God]; I have pointed to a known that has been or is existent (*wa-dalaltu ʿalā maʿlūm kāna aw yakūnu*). And when I say 'God is capable,' I have simply denied God's incapacity, asserted that He has a capacity which is God himself and pointed to a something that is the object of that capacity."[74] All this boils down to a repudiation of the literal meaning of the Qur'anic attribution for a figurative one. Indeed, al-Ashʿarī tells us that "Abū al-Hudhayl said so himself. 'God has a face,' he said, 'which is Himself; it is He, and so is His soul.' He interprets allegorically the Qur'anic assertion regarding the divine hand as meaning a blessing, and '…in order that you might be formed under Mine eye' (Qur'an, 20:39) as meaning 'with My knowledge.'"[75] Transcendence was thus preserved, but at the cost of *taʿṭīl* or neutralization.

This procedure was as much followed by the Qadariyyah, or those who hold man capable of action and hence ethically responsible, as the Jabriyyah or determinists. The former were also known as Muʿtazilah for holding a number of other views. They were compelled to "neutralize" because of the consideration that if God's acting was literally true of Him, He would have to be, in some respect, the efficient cause of becoming in nature. Such involvement of God in nature, *i.e.*, His being the author of change, would not only compromise His immutability or ontological poise, but the ethical responsibility of man. For man's actions too are events in nature; and as long as this realm is not exclusively

that of man alone, human responsibility would be impaired. Anxious to save this ethical responsibility, the Qadariyyah had at least to restrict the meaning of divine action. On the other hand, the Jabriyyah were compelled to neutralize the divine attributes because, they argued, to hold them true of God is to project unto Him schemata of character which are empirically given in man and which have thence been borrowed to build our concept of Him. This is tantamount to anthropormorphizing Him. "We should not," said Jahm ibn Ṣafwān, "describe God by that which is true of His creatures."[76] Thus, the Jabriyyah lay the grounds for neutralization. God is not "alive" or "knowing," because these are human attributes. And yet, God is certainly capable and acting because these are not at all prerogatives of man – man being a God-determined creature throughout.[77] Evidently, they were anxious to deny God all the attributes which smack of human character or colour; and for this reason, they first divided them into definitive and predicative attributes of divine Being. The former they called *ṣifāt al-dhāt*, or "attributes of the divine Self," the latter, *ṣifāt al-fiʿl*, or "attributes of divine action."[78] Their object was to save transcendence from the charge that if action and knowledge were predicative, change in the divine Being as subject of action, which is a necessary implication of the processes of knowing and acting, would be inevitable.[79] Hence, they readily agreed with their opponents to effect the same *taʿṭīl*, or neutralization, upon all predicative attributes by allegorically interpreting them. When they turned to the definitive attributes, allegorical interpretation was not so successful, since the content was already an abstract one. Hence, they had recourse to the alternative of identifying the definitive attributes with the divine Self. Whereas the Qadariyyah neutralized in order to save human freedom and responsibility, the Jabriyyah did so in order to deny that freedom and responsibility.

With all the divine attributes thus *muʿaṭṭalah*, or explained away by neutralization, they thought the attributes would pose no problem at all and divine transcendence would be maintained.

However, this process of *taʿṭīl*, to which all the arguments of the Jabriyyah and Qadariyyah really boil down, ran counter to the intuitive grasp of Qur'anic meaning by those whose consciousness has remained

true to the categories of the Arabic Qur'an. For these, it was no problem to accept the verbatim character of revelation, without anthropomorphism. No wonder then that, while the anthropomorphism of the *Mushabbihah* (anthropomorphists) revolted them, the rationalizations and strained allegorical interpretations of the *Muʿaṭṭilah* (neutralizationists) left them not only unmoved but troubled. What they looked for was an intellectually satisfying view that would establish at once the transcendent character of deity as well as the *verbatim* meaning of the attributes as stated in the Qur'an.[80] Mālik ibn Anas, Sufyān al-Thawrī, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī al-Iṣfahānī are said to have held this view.[81] But it was ʿAbdullāh ibn Saʿīd al-Kullābī that first put this point of view discursively.[82] God's attributes are necessary, he reasoned, because He ascribed them to Himself in the Qur'an which is His work. God, he thought, does indeed have a hand, for example; but it is far from being a human hand. Likewise, God is knowing and has knowledge, but the how of His knowing must forever escape us.[83]

It was this candid and yet unsophisticated intuition of the *ṣifātiyyah* (or attributists; *i.e.*, upholders of the real though not anthropomorphic truth of the attributes) that Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī seized upon, elaborated and gave to posterity as definitive of the Islamic position.[84] The attributes, he claimed, imply no change in the deity and are co-eternal with the divine Being. Hence they are Him. But they are certainly not Him inasmuch as He stands beyond all human knowledge and hence, beyond all assertions about the divine. As his famous dictum went, "the divine attributes are eternal, inhering in the divine Self. Neither can it be said that they [the attributes] are Him; nor that they are other than Him; neither that He is not them, nor that He is other than them."[85] Historically, this brought about crushing silence to both *Mushabbihah* and *Muʿaṭṭilah*. None could contradict either horn of the argument, despite the fact that the argument as a whole still left most intellectuals unsatisfied with its simple and clear assertion and denial at the same time. And yet, anyone who dared object to it faced the impossible task of denying either God's transcendence or the *verbatim* revealed status of the Qur'an. However, couched in these very terms, the problem was bogged down forever. For by juxtaposing in antinomical alternation,

the transcendence of the divine Essence, and the Qur'an's fact of predication of attributes to that essence, any solution was ruled out *ex hypothesi*. The direct and unequivocal attribution of the *ṣifāt* to God is true because it is Qur'anic. And yet, as long as the *ṣifāt* are taken as if to instruct us about God *in esse*, *i.e.*, from an ontological point of view, they run diametrically opposed to the transcendental character of the Godhead, which is an equally Qur'anic position, and which emphasizes that "…there is nothing like unto Him,…" (Qur'an, 42:11).

Obviously, the fault lay in couching the problem as one of whether or not the attributes instruct us about God's essence, about His ontological being. Al-Ashʿarī's antinomy of the attributes being and not-being God, does not solve the problem. It merely asserts the two truths that the attributes, being Qur'anic, must be true of God; and that being conceptual, *i.e.*, belonging to human knowledge, they cannot *ex hypothesi* instruct about God's transcendent being. The antinomic relation remains bogged down, and so does the problem of the attributes.

Although Ashʿarism had its great men, it had greater opponents. Indeed, it has been elbowed out as an aberration verging on heresy and has never seen a bright day since al-Ghazālī gave it a crushing refutation in favour of Sufism.[86] Despite this fact, the fundamental al-Ashʿarī position regarding the divine attributes remained constitutive of all orthodox Islamic positions throughout, including that of Sufism. Indeed, al-Ghazālī's argument regarding the *ṣifāt* did not go at all beyond the denial of anthropomorphism (hence the refutation of the *mushabbihah* in favour of the *ṣifātiyyah*) and the assertion of the literal truth of the attributes (and hence, the refutation of the Muʿtazīlī and other neutralizationists' identification of the attributes with divine Essence).[87] This is all Ashʿarist doctrine to the core; and the overthrow of Ashʿarism by Sufism has not added anything new to the argument. As long as the question remained one of ontology, that is of the being, as such, of God, no solution was ever possible. As the great Kant had found out, the being of the transcendent is a realm forever removed from human knowledge and conceptualization.[88] Hence, the Qur'anic predication of the attributes to the being of God is, though absolutely true, a philosophic stumbling block which is not removed by merely asserting it.

Theology can escape it only at the cost of criticality.

And yet, it is certainly within the tradition of *kalām* that the direction of a solution to the antinomy must be sought. For what went wrong with the Islamic answer to the problem of the *ṣifāt* is the form in which the Muslim theologians have presented the problem. Al-Ashᶜarī was, in a way, compelled to pose the problem as he did in order to save transcendence. And once the problem was posed in the form al-Ashᶜarī gave to it, nobody in the Islamic tradition could carry it forward towards a solution. What was needed is, above all, a change of perspective.

Of all the Islamic thinkers who addressed themselves to the problem of the *ṣifāt*, none had the breadth to shake the problem from its Ashᶜarite fixation except Taqiyy al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah. It was he who opened the road to a solution of al-Ashᶜarī's antinomy. Not that he had actually solved it but that he lifted it from the fixation under which it lay immobile for centuries. It is sufficient for Ibn Taymiyyah's immortal credit that he has done precisely no more than to remove the problem out of the ontological fixation in which al-Ghazālī had left it.

Firstly, Ibn Taymiyyah seconded the Orthodoxy's rejection of the *Muᶜaṭṭilah*, on the grounds of the predication of attributes to God by the Qur'an whose attributism is sufficiently evident. This is a good *ṣifātī* position. The nature of God could not be better known by anyone than by God Himself. Even the Prophet's personal knowledge of God could not compare with divine knowledge. This knowledge is given to us in the Qur'an; for it was He who has therein described His nature. His word about Himself is therefore the first and last word.[89]

Secondly, the Jabriyyah have emphasized a very true principle, namely, that we may not predicate of God anything that is predicable of man. That is the principle of transcendence which remains the head and fount of all Islam as well as the doctrinal mainstay of "the people of the *Sunnah*, of *Jamāᶜah* and of *Ḥadīth*, the companions of Mālik, Shāfiᶜī, Abū Ḥanīfah, Aḥmad [ibn Ḥanbal]… the predecessors of the *ummah*… that 'Nothing is like unto Him.'"[90] *Tanzīh*, or the transcendentalist conception of God, must be maintained.

Thirdly, Ibn Taymiyyah exposed the fact that both al-Ashᶜarī's as well as his opponents' objection to and denial of the process of *taᶜṭīl* was

the direct effect of their fear to introduce plurality into the conception of God. But a unity of God which is absolutely opposed to plurality must be a mathematical unity; and it was precisely such arithmetic conception of unity that stood at the root of their denial of multiplicity or becoming in the Godhead, implied, according to them, in any acceptance of the attributes as real and belonging to divine essence. Divine unity, Ibn Taymiyyah thought, was organic, not mathematical; hence, there is no need to distinguish between predicative attributes pertaining to divine action and definitive attributes pertaining to essence or to identify the predicative attributes with that essence. "Divine essence is one," Ibn Taymiyyah argues, "and the attributes are many."[91] Indeed, the attributes are infinite in number, neither nine as the Ashʿarīs have thought, nor any other number.[92] "Mankind is incapable of ever bringing the divine attributes within definitive survey."[93] Nonetheless, their plurality does not affect the unity of divine essence. For it is nonsense to speak of many attributes without a unique being of whom they are the attributes. "That of whom a predicate is predicated cannot be the predicate;"[94] that is to say, in the same respect. If, Ibn Taymiyyah reasoned, we can and do conceive of a substance that is one but endowed with many attributes, and are incapable of conceiving of one that is endowed with none, it should be equally possible for us to conceive of a One God endowed with a manifold will that is not ontologically alternative to Him, but is in a sense other than the ontological "Him."[95]

Fourthly, while thus the process of thought which leads to neutralization is repudiated, Ibn Taymiyyah is equally anxious to refute the Ashʿarī consequences drawn from that process. Against al-Ashʿarī's "neither He nor other than He" Ibn Taymiyyah argued that "To speak of His attributes is a kind of [or tantamount to] speaking of His essence,"[96] thus establishing for the first time in the history of Islamic theology a differentiation within the concept of God, of two orders, to wit: The order of being and the order of knowing. Rejecting, therefore, the *Ṣifātiyyah's* attempt to safeguard transcendence by emptying the attributes of their content (*i.e.*, the fallacy of the deconcretissation of the concrete,[97] the concrete being in this case God) as idle, Ibn Taymiyyah accepted their multiplicity declaring it a multiplicity in knowledge

which, as such, does not involve *shirk* (association of other eternal beings with God) because it does not pertain to God as He is in Himself, but as we know Him.

Fifthly, the divine attributes do not constitute an irrational order, but a rational and orderly one. We discern therein a hierarchical stratification, an order to rank; for the attributes are *tafāḍulī*.[98] This aspect of the attributes is, further, inseparable from their pluralism; for it is inconceivable that a pluralistic realm belonging to Divine essence should not be orderly and hence, hierarchical. Not that the attributes now belong to essence, not to act, as the Ashᶜarīs and Muᶜtazilah would have it, but that they all belong to the One Being in the same respect. The attributes stand in such relations to one another as to make them prior to others.

These insights of Ibn Taymiyyah constitute the greatest contribution to the problem of the *ṣifāt* to date. Together, their philosophical purport amounts to a change of the metaphysical status of the attributes. The attributes are all God's, to be sure; and they all are attributes of His essence, for to talk of them is to talk of God's essence inasmuch as that essence can become object of human knowledge. God *in esse*, we may therefore understand Ibn Taymiyyah as wanting to say, we may and shall never know. Being the transcendent Being, He can never become object of human knowledge. But He remains the only One Necessary Being prior to all other beings which are contingent and whose contingent reality is itself the proof of His being. God *in percipi*, on the other hand, may be the object of knowledge, and this is none other than the attributes which are partly given to us as the demands of reason, or implications of our empirical knowledge of the world and men. These are given to us in the Qur'anic revelation or in the *Ḥadīth*, as *akhbār*, which it is the duty of Muslims not only to accept in their common sense (*ẓāhir*) meaning while keeping in mind that they are modes of talking about Him intelligible to man, but to elaborate and analyze them seeking out their implications by concordance (*muṭābaqah*), material implication (*laḍāmun*) and formal implication (*iltizām*).[99] In either case, then, the attributes are "ideas of reason," informative about God inasmuch as He can be object of human knowledge

at all. The old questions of the *Mutakallimīn*, Ibn Taymiyyah is here saying, were misconceived: All attributes have the same status, namely, they are God, not *in esse* since this remains the *mawṣūf* (He of whom the predicate is predicated) and no *mawṣūf* can be its own *ṣifāt*, but *in percipi*. They are infinite and, inasmuch as we can discern them, hierarchical.

To these insights we must add those gained from Ibn Taymiyyah's critique of sufism.[100] The sum of these which concern us here is that contrary to the *ittiḥādī* (unionist) claims, man can never unite with God in any fashion. All man can achieve in this world is obedience to divine command and compliance with divine will. For God, especially God *in esse*, we may never know, not to speak of uniting with Him. But His will is not only knowable – through God's own *ikhbār* (revelation) and reason's elaboration and analysis of the given in creation – but stands as a command which man ought to heed and realize. These are the same methods by which we know the *ṣifāt*. Furthermore, the *ṣifāt* are the ideals – ad *perfectum* – which human conduct ought to, but will never realize. As "ideas of reason," they serve to regulate human conduct by orienting it towards themselves. Contentually as well as methodologically, therefore, the *ṣifāt* are the divine will, and divine will is not God-in *esse*, but *God-in-percipi*, for all that is given to us to know of Him is His will, or *ṣifāt*. The *ṣifāt* or divine will are God-for-us, on the level of human knowledge while remaining mere attributes of a *mawṣūf* on the level of being.

Together, these insights point to the direction in which a solution of the problem of the metaphysical status of values may be sought. If the *ṣifāt* are values – and this can hardly be contested since the *ṣifāt* have constituted the regulative ideals of practical reason in the Islamic tradition – the Islamic tradition may be said to have accomplished through Ibn Taymiyyah's revolution what the Western idealist tradition has achieved through the phenomenological. Values – and likewise the *ṣifāt* – are ideally self-existent essences, whence the ought-to-be, or the ethically-imperative, issues. They are a pluralistic yet orderly and hierarchical realm of which a "phenomenology of values" is possible by the processes of *muṭābaqah*, *taḍāmun* and *iltizām*. The ought-to-be of

values is all that can be known of them; they are, *in percipi*, this very ought. And so are the *ṣifāt*; for they become known to us in so far as God Himself becomes object of knowledge, but never *in esse*. The problem at which the wisdom of Nikolai Hartmann stopped, namely, the chaos inherent in the realm of values to which their individual tyranny and mutual antinomic relations give evidence, may at least be restated, and perhaps solved under the Islamic consideration that they are the will of a unique divine being – the transcendent whole of which they are, according to Hartmann, the members. The commands of a Being are one though many; and their inner conflicts may dissolve in the unity of the divine Being of Whom they are the will. But such unity of divine Being cannot be the unity of a Person – the mistake of metaphysical personalism. It is endowed with will; and that is the ought-to-be of value emitted by the ideal, a priori, transcendent realm. But this is not the will of a person. It is, rather, the 'moving appeal' of the realm and of its individual members, a modality of their ideal existence. The establishment of this insight for a philosophy that is committed to reason and criticality as well as to the *khabar* of the divine word, is the task par excellence of the theology of the future.

Notes

1. "The consciousness of this fundamental principle (the categorical imperative) may be called a fact of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason, such as the consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given), and since it forces itself upon us as a synthetic proposition a priori based on no pure or empirical intuition." Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Practical Reason*, V, 31, Lewis White Beck's translation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950, p. 142.
2. For a description of the currents of philosophical thinking leading to Husserl and Husserl's "breakthrough to phenomenology," see Farber, Marvin, *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943, pp. 3-222.
3. Scheler, Max, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Jahrbuch fur philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Niemeyer, Halle, 1913-1916, Chap. IV, pp. 48 ff.
4. *E.g.*, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer.
5. Scheler, Max, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-87. It should be noted here that Hemsterhuis had by this time developed the concept of an *organe moral*, for the same purpose.
6. Hartmann, Nicolai, *Ethik*, 1926, translated by S. Colt under the title *Ethics*, George Allen und Unwin Ltd., London, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 183-247.
7. *Les principes d'une métaphysique de la connaissance*, Tome II, Aubier, Paris, 1946, pp. 282 ff.
8. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 222-223.
9. Ibid., pp. 99-102.
10. Ibid., p. 219.
11. Ibid., p.226. Hartmann, *Les principes d'une metaphysique de la connaissance*, Tome I, pp. 281-284.
12. Such as "the Absolute Other" of Indian religions, or the impersonal god of some philosophers (e.g., Ibn Rushd).

13. Such are, for example, the theories of Edward Westermarck (*Ethical Relativity*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., New York, 1932; and *Christianity and Morals*, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1939), of Arthur Kenyon Rogers (*The Theory of Ethics*, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1934), of Frank Chapman Sharp (*Ethics*, The Century Co., New York, 1928), etc.
14. Such are, for example, the theories of Emile Durkheim (*On the Division of Labor in Society*, tr. by G. Simpson, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1933; and *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, tr. by J. W. Swain, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1915), and of Lucien Levy-Bruhl (*Ethics and Moral Science*, tr. by Elizabeth Lee, Archebald Constable and Co., Ltd. London, 1905), etc.
15. Examples of the first kind, *i.e.*, evolutionist, are Thomas H. Huxley (*Evolution and Ethics*, D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1929), Olaf Stapledon (*A Modern Theory of Ethics*, Methuen and Co., London, 1929), Peter Kropotkin (*Ethics, Origin and Development*, tr. by L. S. Friedland and J. R. Peroshnikoff, The Dial Press, New York, 1926), and Julian S. Huxley (*Evolutionary Ethics*, Oxford University Press, London, 1943). Of the second type, *viz.*, Marxist, are Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel's writings. Of the third type, *i.e.*, pragmatist, are John Dewey (*Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, Register Publishing Co., Ann Harbor, 1891) and J. H. Tufts (*Ethics*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1932; *The Study of Ethics*, George Wahr Publishers, Ann Harbor, Michigan, 1897; *The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1908; and *Theory of Valuation*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1909). Of the Fourth *viz.*, the humanist type, are Warner Fite (*An Introductory Study of Ethics*, Longmans Green and Co., New York, 1906; *Moral Philosophy*, The Dial Press, New York, 1925; *Individualism*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1924), C. 13. Garnett (*Wisdom in Conduct*, Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1940), Irving Babitt (*On Being Creative*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1932), etc.
16. Examples of the first group are W. T. Stace (*The Concept of Morals*, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1937) Moritz Schlick (*Problems of Ethics*, tr. by David Rynin, Prentice Hall, New York, 1939); of the second group are George Santayana (*The Life of Reason or the Phases of Human Progress*, One Volume edition, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953, first published 1933; *Winds of Doctrine*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926;

The Philosophy of George Santayana, Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston and Chicago, 1940, etc.), David Wright Prall (*A Study in the Theory of Value*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1921; *The Present Status of Theory of Value*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1923; *Naturalism and Norms*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1925); of the third group are Ralph Barton Perry (*General Theory of Value*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1926), Dewitt Henry Parker (*Human Values*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931), F. R. Tennant (*Philosophical Theology*, The University Press, Cambridge, 1928), etc.

17. Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle, Illinois, 1946.
18. Lewis, C. I., *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, p. 365.
19. Ibid., p. 171.
20. Ibid., preface, p. viii.
21. Ibid., p. 400.
22. Ibid., pp. 404, 407.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 375.
25. Ibid., p. 378.
26. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. by W. R. Boyce Gibson, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1931, Second Impression, 1952, pp. 54-58.
27. Lewis C. I., *op. cit.*, p. 375. The symbolic logical representation of the principle is found in the same work, p. 230 *et seq*.
28. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 183 ff., 234 ff., 241 ff., following Scheler and Husserl.
29. As far as is known to this author, C. I. Lewis published only one more work in ethics, besides his *Analysis*, *viz*., *The Ground and Nature of the Right*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1955. Here Professor Lewis limited himself to a discussion of problems of deontology.
30. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 247-297.
31. Ibid., pp. 341-343, "*Ethics or Theology*."
32. According to Santayana, the essences are infinite in number and kind, and hover over the universe of being like cluster clouds of space particles. Furthermore, "an essence," he writes, "is an inert theme, something which cannot bring itself forward… The multitude of essences is absolutely infinite." (Santayana, George, *Realms of Being*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New

York, 1942, pp. 20-21).

33. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. II, pp. 76 ff. "Now so far as the oppositions (*i.e.*, oppositions of moral determination) are genuine antinomies, the antagonism is between the values themselves. In themselves these antinomies are insoluble…" (Ibid., p. 77) "All conflicts among values are clashes of axiological determination as such. They would set a limit to the harmony even of a divinely perfect, of a world-ruling, providence and of reordination." (Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 301-302).
34. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 217 ff.
35. See Vol. II of his *Ethics*, *cit. supra*, entitled *Moral Values*, and containing a highly instructive analysis of the principles governing the internal structure of the realm of values.
36. Scheler, Max, *op. cit.*, p. 262 fr. *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, Neue Geist, Leipzig, 1923, pp. 274-276. For a critique of Scheler's position see Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 332-343; Vol. II, 27-29.
37. Niebuhr, Reinhold, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. I, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1943, pp. 162-165. Here Niebuhr misunderstood Scheler's notion of 'Geist,' as distinguished from discursive reason (the Greek *nous*) and by which Scheler meant the faculty through which we perceive values – "the primary consciousness of value" – as evidence for the Christian "idea of transcendence" (the self- and nature-transcending of man and his reach to a God-in whose image he is made). Tillich, Paul, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, The University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 43, 106-107. For Tillich, Scheler and the whole phenomenological school have rendered a good service in epistemology and ethics; but not in religion where the whole school stopped short of the truth because they failed to include an "existential-critical element" in their perspective. (Ibid., p. 107).
38. Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. III, p. 262.
39. Lewis C. I., *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, pp. 387, 395-396, 432-434.
40. "Only the propositions of mathematics and empirical science have sense." (Carnap, Rudolph, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, Kegan Paul, London, 1935, p. 36).
41. Pap, Arthur, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1949, pp. 31-34; Von Mises, Richard, *Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding*, pp. 319-325; Stevenson, Charles L., *Ethics and Language*,

Yale University Press, New Haven, 1944, pp. 36 *et seq*.; Carnap, Rudolph, *The Unity of Science*, Kegan Paul, London, 1934, pp. 22 ff.

42. "If, now a philosopher says 'Beauty is good,' I may interpret him as meaning either 'Would that everybody loved the beautiful' – or 'I wish that everybody loved the beautiful.' – The first of these makes no assertion, but expresses a wish; since it affirms nothing, it is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsehood. The second sentence, instead of being merely optative, does make a statement, but it is one about the philosopher's state of mind, it could only be refuted by evidence that he does not have the wish that he says he has. This second sentence does not belong to ethics, but to psychology or biography. The first sentence, which does belong to ethics expresses a desire for something, but asserts nothing." (Russell, Bertrand, *Religion and Science*, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., London, pp. 236 ff.). Views identical to Russell's may be found in Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1936; Stevenson, Charles Leslie, *op. cit*.; Pap, Arthur, *op. cit*.; Schlick, Moritz, *Problems of Ethics*, tr. by D. Rynin, Prentice Hall, Inc., New York, 1939; etc.

43. Predominantly in *Religious Values*, The Abingdon Press, New York, 1925; *Moral Laws*, The Abingdon Press, New York, 1933; *Nature and Values*, Abingdon Cokesbury Press, New York, 1945; *Person and Reality: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ronald Press Co., New York, 1958; *Persons and Values*, Boston University Press, 1952.

44. *The Source of Human Good*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946; *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1927; *Intellectual Foundation of the Faith*, Philosophical Library, 1961. "A Workable Idea of God," *Christian Century*, XLVI, Feb. 14, 1929, pp. 226-228; "God and Value," Chapter in *Religious Realism*, ed. D. C. Macintosh, The MacMillan Co., New York; "Values Primary Data for Religious Inquiry," *Journal of Religion*, *XVI*, 4, October, 1936, pp. 379-405; "Creative Freedom: Aim of Liberal Religion," *The Christian Register*, October, 1955. A discussion of Wieman's views by a number of Christian thinkers may be found in *The Empirical Theology of Henry Nelson Wieman*, Library of Living Theology, Vol. 4, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1963.

45. A full criticism of Perry's value theory by Brightman appeared as a chapter in E. C. Wilm's *Studies in Philosophy and Theology* (The Abingdon Press, New York, 1922, pp. 22-64) entitled "Neo-Realistic Theories of Value."

46. Brightman, E. S., *Religious Values*, pp. 123, 130.
47. Ibid., p. 126.
48. Ibid., p. 127.
49. Ibid., p. 136.
50. Sorley, William Ritchie, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, The Gifford Lectures, 1915, The University Press, Cambridge, England, 1919.
51. Brightman, E. S., *Religious Values*, p. 169.
52. The problem of the dissertation, he wrote, is "to discover that organization of human interests which is most conducive to their maximum fulfillment" ("The Organization of Interests," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dpt. of Philosophy, Harvard University, 1917, p.1, quoted in Rich, Charles M., "Henry Nelson Wieman's Functional Theism as Transcending Event," Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, School of Divinity, University of Chicago, 1962, p. 108).
53. Wieman, H. N., *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1927, p. 161.
54. "What we require is a *personal* integration (of interests) that shall be *socially qualified*, or that shall guarantee a harmonious fulfillment of all interests … The highest good (is achieved when)… all persons are comprised within one community each member of which wills only what is consistent with the wills of all the rest." (Perry, FL B., *General Theory of Value*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1954, p. 676-677).
55. Wieman, H. N.,"The Organization of Interests," Doctoral Dissertation *cit*., pp. 194-195, quoted in Rich, Charles Mark, *op. cif*., p. 152.
56. "Religion represents the utmost reach of human interest far surpassing its application to human society." (Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," p. 207; Rich, *op. cif*., p. 153).
57. "Religion .., not only brings our experience of other persons into the process of creating a will, but it also takes in our total experience of nature … When the cosmic purpose is my purpose … then I experience continuous and complete satisfaction. This is that organization of interests for which we have been seeking throughout this investigation." (Wieman, ibid., p. 237; Rich, *op. cif*., p. 159).
58. Wieman, ibid., p. 239; Rich, *op. cit*., p. 162.
59. Wieman, ibid., p. 254; Rich, *op. cif*., p. 169.
60. "I am convinced that religious inquiry is misdirected when some presence

pervading the total cosmos is sought to solve the religious problem. It is even more futile to search infinite being which transcends the totality of all existence. It is impossible to gain knowledge of the total cosmos. Consequently, beliefs about these matters are illusions … What is true of science in this respect (*i.e.*, methodology) is true of philosophy and theology or any other way in which the human mind might attain knowledge … Without sense experience there is no revelation of God …" etc. (Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography," in Bretall, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5).

61. Wieman, "Reply to Meland," in Bretall, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.
62. Meland, B. E., "The Root and Form of Wieman's Thought," in Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
63. Ibid.
64. In his monumental *Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur'ān* (Al-Azhar Press, Cairo, 1318 A.H.), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī listed a large number of disciplines which, despite their apparent variety, all seek to establish that which, in the Qur'an, God intended to be the religiously, morally and aesthetically imperative, that which human desiring, willing and doing ought to aim at realizing. The discipline known as *asbāb al-nuzūl*, for instance, is said by al-Suyūṭī to bring about that "aspect of wisdom for the sake of which the revelation of a Qur'anic law was made" (Ibid., Vol. I, p. 29); to constitute "a firm road to the understanding of Qur'anic meanings" (Ibid.) and, quoting from Ibn Taymiyyah, "to bring a knowledge of that for the sake of which the revelation of the given verse was made by means of uncovering the immediate cause and circumstance of its revelation" (Ibid.); to enable us to derive the universal meaning-content, or moral, from the particular judgment of a unique, given case (Ibid., p. 31). Allowing for the fact of the absence of "value" as a contemporary philosophic notion, any reading of the table of contents of al-Suyūṭī's book of "sciences of the Qur'an," will expose the fact that these "sciences" are diverse attempts at uncovering the values of which the Qur'an is a conceptual expression.
65. Al-Suyūṭī went far beyond al-Wāḥidī who, in his famous classic, *Asbāb al-Nuzūl* (Hindiyyah Press, Cairo, 1316 A.H., p. 342) explained *Sūrah al-Fīl* (the chapter of the Elephant) purely historically. Al-Suyūṭī rightly saw that no *asbāb al-nuzūl* discussion of this surah is complete without uncovering the moral lessons it contains. (*Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al Qur'ān*, Vol. I, p. 32).
66. For a discussion of the view that the unity of God is equivalent to, and hence

convertible with, the unity of truth and value, see this author's *On Arabism*, Vol. I, *Urubah and Religion*, Djambatan, Amsterdam, 1962, pp. 12, 250 ff.

67. Shahrastānī, Muḥammad ibn ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-, *Al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, ed. by Muhammad Fathallah Badran, Al-Azhar Press, Cairo, 1328/1910, pp. 146, 176.
68. Ibid., p. 173.
69. Ibid., p. 146.
70. Ibid., p.174. Indeed, al-Shahrastānī recognized that the advocates of such views are the Jews "among whom anthropomorphism is a constantly recurring habit." (Ibid., p. 176).
71. Ibid., p. 29. We should not be misled, however by al-Shahrastānī's classification of Maᶜbad and Ghaylān as founders of the Muᶜtazilah sect, or authors of the first "deviation" from Islam, for he wrote from the perspective of a later time at which the deviations had loomed large on the horizons of Islamic thinking.
72. Ibid., p. 62.
73. Ibid., p. 65. al-Shahrastānī reports these words as coming from Wāṣil ibn ᶜAṭā', student of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and one of the elders of the Muᶜtazilah movement.
74. Al-Ashᶜarī, Abū al-Ḥasan ᶜAlī ibn Ismāᶜīl, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn*, ed. by Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Hamid, Vol. I, Maktabat al Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo, 1369/1950, p. 225.
75. Ibid.
76. Al-Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., p. 9.
79. Ibid. Jahm is reported to have argued as follows: "If God knew and then created, did His knowledge remain the same or not? If it remained the same, then in one respect (*viz.*, that of the new created thing) He was ignorant. For, that He knew that the thing is to be created is other than the knowledge that it has been created. On the other hand, if his knowledge did not remain the same, then it has changed; and that which changes is not eternal (uncreated or divine)." (Ibid.)
80. Al-Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, p. 145 (Preface to the chapter on *Ṣifātiyyah*).
81. Ibid., p. 147.
82. Ibid. To ᶜAbdullāh ibn Saᶜīd, al-Shahrastānī adds the names of Abū al-ᶜAbbās

al-Qalānisī and al-Ḥārith ibn Asad al-Muḥāsibī as co-inceptors of the science of *Kalām* and advocates of straightforward attributism.

83. Ibid., p. 145.
84. Ibid., p. 148.
85. Ibid., p. 152. Al-Ashʿarī, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 202.
86. Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid, *Iḥyā' ʿUlūm al-Dīn*, al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyyah al-Kubrā, Cairo, n.d., pp. 104-110.
87. Against the *Mushabbihah*, Al-Ghazālī wrote: "As it is rationally valid that God is actor without an organ of action (like hand, tongue, foot, body, tool, etc.) and knower without heart or brain, it is rational that He is seer without eye, hearer without ear… talker without words… *i.e.*, without sound or letter…" (Ibid., p. 109). Against the Muʿtazilī neutralizationists, he wrote: "God is knower with a knowledge, alive with a life, potent with a potency, wilier with a will, speaker with speech; hearer with hearing, seer with seeing, all of which attributes are eternal. Those who say, knower without knowing as the common saying says 'Rich without wealth, knowing without knowledge and knower without a thing known,' (are wrong); for knowledge, the knower and the known are as inseparable from one another … and unimaginable in separation from one another as killing without the killer and the killed." (Ibid., p. 110).
88. Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. by F. Max Muller, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1949, pp. 495 ff. ("Discovery and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs, of the Existence of a Necessary Being"), and p. 508 ff. ("Criticism of all Theology based on Speculative Principles of Reason").
89. Ibn Taymiyyah, T. D. A., *Bayān Muwāfaqat Ṣarīh al-Maʿqūl li Ṣaḥīḥ al-Manqūl*, on the margin of *Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah fi Naqd Kalām al-Shīʿah wa al-Qadariyyah*, Al-Maṭbaʿah al-Kubrā al-Amīriyyah, Cairo, 1321, pp. 73-74.
90. Ibn Taymiyyah, T. D. A., *Minhāj al-Sunnah*, p. 241.
91. Ibid., *Majmūʿat al-Rasā'il al-Kubrā*, al-Maṭbaʿah al-Sharafiyyah, Cairo, 1323, Vol. I, p. 41; Vol. II, p. 34.
92. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Minhāj al-Sunnah*, Vol. I, p. 236.
93. Ibid., p. 237.
94. Ibid., p. 235.
95. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmūʿat al-Rasā'il al-Kubrā*, Vol. I, pp. 440, 465.

96. Arguing with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, in this respect an advocate of strong Ashʿarī views, Ibn Taymiyyah wrote: "He says to us, You are not unitarians (*muwaḥḥidīn*) at all until you say God was and nothing else was. We answer, We do say God was and nothing else was. But if we say that God has always been endowed with all His attributes, are we not describing one God endowed with attributes? We gave them an example thereof, saying, Tell us about this date tree; does it not have a trunk, pinnate leaves, clusters of dioecious flowers… (etc.); does it not have a single name which was given to it as endowed with all these qualia? So is God … endowed with all His attributes, still One and only One God?"(*Minhāj al Sunnah*, Vol. I, p. 234).
97. Whitehead, Alfred North, *Process and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1929, p. 433, where it is called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness."
98. *Kitāb Jawāb Ahl al-Imān*, Maktabat al-Taqaddum, Cairo, 1322 A.H., pp. 1 ff.
99. *Muqaddimah fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*, al-Matḥaf al-ʿArabī, Damascus, 1936, pp. 7-8.
100. Ibn Taymiyyah's critique of sufism runs throughout all his works. The following, however, were devoted to it: *Ḥaqīqat Madhhab al-Ittiḥādiyyīn wa Waḥdat al-Wujūd wa Bayān Buṭlānihi bi al-Barāhīn al Naqliyyah wa al-ʿAqliyyah*, ed. by Rashid Rida, Al-Manar, Cairo, 1349 A.H., constituting Vol. IV of *Majmūʿat al-Rasā'il wa al-Masā'il al-Qayyimah*, pp. 61-120; *Kitāb Ibn Taymiyyah ilā Shaykh al-Ṣufiyyah*, pp. 161-183; *Fī Ṣifāt Allah wa ʿUluwwihi ʿan Khalqihi*, pp. 186-216. A summary of these views may be read in Abu Zahrah, Muhammad, *Ibn Taymiyyah*, *Ḥayātuhu wa ʿAṣruhu*, *Ārā'uhu wa Fiqhuhu*, Dār al Fikr al-ʿArabī, Second Edition, Cairo, 1958, pp. 326-339.

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